thedrifter
02-05-05, 07:34 AM
02-01-2005
The ‘Navigator’s Paradox’
By Raymond Perry
The collision of the USS San Francisco with an apparently uncharted seamount south of Guam on Jan. 8 presents the first serious example of a “navigator’s paradox” that has been present for about a decade: That of knowing precisely where one is and running aground in spite of this superior capability.
From time immemorial, when a ship ran aground it was because the ship was not where it thought it was. The result was that it would strike a part of terra firma. Frequently, this meant the loss of the ship and many lives. Hence the grave career consequences that still attach to even the most minor of groundings in today’s Navy.
The advent of satellite and inertial navigation in the 1960s began a progression toward the collision of the San Francisco with the bottom. The introduction of GPS (Global Positioning System) and ESGN (Electrostatic Gyro Navigators) in the early 1990s provided navigators with real-time ship’s position with an accuracy previously unheard of.
For the first time, navigators could simply read the instrument nearly anytime and know ship’s position, immediately and precisely. There was no longer any need to work through fix accuracy, set and drift, leeway, and fix expansion to know current position.
Since navigators no longer needed to run the classical numbers or plan their day around fixing ship’s position, they developed a sense of security regarding ship’s position. This sense became all pervading and, like it or not, classic navigation skills atrophied.
In the “old days” of far less precision, navigators understood that charts denoting things out of sight of land were only as precise as the navigator of those ships recording the information. Simply put, they had a healthy regard for the potential imprecision of charts and would give charted dangers a reasonably wide berth.
The paradox: today when a ship runs aground it will know precisely where it is. But the ship will have attributed more to the chart than the chart maker intended.
I believe that this is exactly what allowed the San Francisco to pass three miles from the now-famous “discolored” water (shown on a satellite photograph of the ocean’s surface) and 12 miles from charted pinnacles. The Navy investigation’s conclusion as to culpability will turn on what level of additional precautions were taken by the ship in light of a questionable chart. It is rarely simple enough to state that the chart, electronic or paper, was in error and end the investigation with that.
Near-catastrophic collisions and groundings almost never turn on only one element, so an additional query should be, what else contributed to the collision with this uncharted mountain? There are frequently contributing causes that motivated people to make decisions that were links in the chain of events that brought them to the catastrophe.
In an earlier article on the collision (“Six Minutes to Danger,” DefenseWatch, Jan. 17, 2005), I noted that a senior officer in the chain of command may have been present on the submarine when it struck the seamount. If such a senior officer was indeed on board, then his possible role in the mishap must not be glossed over as it appears to have been done in the USS Greeneville’s collision with and sinking of the Japanese Fisheries Training Ship Ehime Maru in the spring of 2001. The question, was the San Francisco’s skipper trading off elements of prudent navigation to deliver his boss on schedule, remains valid.
An article by Christopher Drew in The New York Times last week contained one intriguing piece of information: An attached chart depicted the probable location of the submarine farther west than the optimum track of a fast transit from its home port in Guam to its planned destination in Brisbane, Australia.
If confirmed, another question arises: Was this position determined by the presence of a senior officer onboard for some reason? Was he to be disembarked on one of the islands of the Federated States of Micronesia for a return flight to his home base, while the San Francisco then continued on toward its planned liberty port of Brisbane?
Who was this officer? A close review of the numerous Navy press releases and other communications concerning the San Francisco revealed the names of many officers who would be reasonably associated with the San Francisco, but the presence of one officer has gone completely unmentioned: Commander, Submarine Group Seven.
More questions emerge: Why the silence? Was he on board? Did he drive the thinking of the San Francisco’s skipper and navigator? Did they cut a few corners in order to deliver him to a planned flight home? Did these dedicated officers unwittingly attribute to their charts an inappropriate accuracy that allowed them to deliver on a tight schedule?
If this senior officer was indeed on board when the collision took place, then the San Francisco’s immediate chain of command would have a serious conflict of interest in participating in the official investigation of the incident.
Not only is there a basic issue of whether navigators across the Navy may be lulling themselves into false confidence in their charts, but the service must address the possible role of senior officers causing trained professionals to ignore the strict rules of their profession.
Lt. Raymond Perry USN (Ret.) is a DefenseWatch Contributing Editor. He can be reached at cos1stlt@yahoo.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
Ellie
The ‘Navigator’s Paradox’
By Raymond Perry
The collision of the USS San Francisco with an apparently uncharted seamount south of Guam on Jan. 8 presents the first serious example of a “navigator’s paradox” that has been present for about a decade: That of knowing precisely where one is and running aground in spite of this superior capability.
From time immemorial, when a ship ran aground it was because the ship was not where it thought it was. The result was that it would strike a part of terra firma. Frequently, this meant the loss of the ship and many lives. Hence the grave career consequences that still attach to even the most minor of groundings in today’s Navy.
The advent of satellite and inertial navigation in the 1960s began a progression toward the collision of the San Francisco with the bottom. The introduction of GPS (Global Positioning System) and ESGN (Electrostatic Gyro Navigators) in the early 1990s provided navigators with real-time ship’s position with an accuracy previously unheard of.
For the first time, navigators could simply read the instrument nearly anytime and know ship’s position, immediately and precisely. There was no longer any need to work through fix accuracy, set and drift, leeway, and fix expansion to know current position.
Since navigators no longer needed to run the classical numbers or plan their day around fixing ship’s position, they developed a sense of security regarding ship’s position. This sense became all pervading and, like it or not, classic navigation skills atrophied.
In the “old days” of far less precision, navigators understood that charts denoting things out of sight of land were only as precise as the navigator of those ships recording the information. Simply put, they had a healthy regard for the potential imprecision of charts and would give charted dangers a reasonably wide berth.
The paradox: today when a ship runs aground it will know precisely where it is. But the ship will have attributed more to the chart than the chart maker intended.
I believe that this is exactly what allowed the San Francisco to pass three miles from the now-famous “discolored” water (shown on a satellite photograph of the ocean’s surface) and 12 miles from charted pinnacles. The Navy investigation’s conclusion as to culpability will turn on what level of additional precautions were taken by the ship in light of a questionable chart. It is rarely simple enough to state that the chart, electronic or paper, was in error and end the investigation with that.
Near-catastrophic collisions and groundings almost never turn on only one element, so an additional query should be, what else contributed to the collision with this uncharted mountain? There are frequently contributing causes that motivated people to make decisions that were links in the chain of events that brought them to the catastrophe.
In an earlier article on the collision (“Six Minutes to Danger,” DefenseWatch, Jan. 17, 2005), I noted that a senior officer in the chain of command may have been present on the submarine when it struck the seamount. If such a senior officer was indeed on board, then his possible role in the mishap must not be glossed over as it appears to have been done in the USS Greeneville’s collision with and sinking of the Japanese Fisheries Training Ship Ehime Maru in the spring of 2001. The question, was the San Francisco’s skipper trading off elements of prudent navigation to deliver his boss on schedule, remains valid.
An article by Christopher Drew in The New York Times last week contained one intriguing piece of information: An attached chart depicted the probable location of the submarine farther west than the optimum track of a fast transit from its home port in Guam to its planned destination in Brisbane, Australia.
If confirmed, another question arises: Was this position determined by the presence of a senior officer onboard for some reason? Was he to be disembarked on one of the islands of the Federated States of Micronesia for a return flight to his home base, while the San Francisco then continued on toward its planned liberty port of Brisbane?
Who was this officer? A close review of the numerous Navy press releases and other communications concerning the San Francisco revealed the names of many officers who would be reasonably associated with the San Francisco, but the presence of one officer has gone completely unmentioned: Commander, Submarine Group Seven.
More questions emerge: Why the silence? Was he on board? Did he drive the thinking of the San Francisco’s skipper and navigator? Did they cut a few corners in order to deliver him to a planned flight home? Did these dedicated officers unwittingly attribute to their charts an inappropriate accuracy that allowed them to deliver on a tight schedule?
If this senior officer was indeed on board when the collision took place, then the San Francisco’s immediate chain of command would have a serious conflict of interest in participating in the official investigation of the incident.
Not only is there a basic issue of whether navigators across the Navy may be lulling themselves into false confidence in their charts, but the service must address the possible role of senior officers causing trained professionals to ignore the strict rules of their profession.
Lt. Raymond Perry USN (Ret.) is a DefenseWatch Contributing Editor. He can be reached at cos1stlt@yahoo.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
Ellie