thedrifter
01-12-05, 06:15 AM
01-11-2005
Return of the M113
By William F. Sauerwein
The serious problem confronting our troops in Iraq caused by the lack of armored Humvees – and the inadequacy of the provisional “up-armor” kits used on many of the thin-skinned models – has prompted the Army to reactivate the M113-series of armored personnel carriers for use in the occupation. While the specifics of the M113’s new role remains unclear, it seems clear that the Army has finally opted to replace an administrative/logistical vehicle – the thin-skinned Humvee – with a true combat vehicle.
News reports last week, including a Knight-Ridder news service article by Joseph L. Galloway (“U.S. Army Adding Armor To ‘War Horse’ Troop Carrier,” The Miami Herald, Jan. 4, 2005), suggests that the Army is making a shift away from using wheeled vehicles as combat vehicles, something championed by former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki. Galloway reported that for service in Iraq, the fleet of M113s needs to have its armor upgraded for a projected cost of “$84 million. Just when the upgraded vehicles will deploy to Iraq was not mentioned.
The M113s were requested by the current ground commander in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Metz. Supposedly the Army has pushed hard for deploying these vehicles into theater for about two years. Galloway noted that the M113s are “more useful, cheaper and easier to transport than the … [new] Stryker.”
For those not remembering, the M113 was the predecessor of the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle. Commonly called the “track,” the M113 was the primary combat vehicle for the mechanized infantry during the 1960s and 1970s. It provided the mobility so that “mech” infantry could keep pace with the tanks.
The main difference is that the M113 is an armored personnel carrier (APC), while the Bradley is a fighting vehicle, armed with a M242 25mm “Bushmaster” Chain Gun. Using the M113, normally, the “track” provided support from a covered position but the squad fought dismounted. The vehicle provided protection from small arms fire and shrapnel, and carried the squad’s organizational and individual equipment.
My fondest memories of the “track” take me back to the 194th Armored Brigade (now deactivated) in the late 1970s. The “Dollar Ninety-Four” was stationed at Fort Knox, Ky., and was part of the rapid deployment force (RDF), the predecessor to Central Command. This meant that if the “balloon went up” the brigade came under operational control of the XVIII Airborne Corps.
I was a squad leader in a mechanized infantry company, commanded for a time by a much younger Capt. Thomas F. Metz. Many of the NCOs were Vietnam veterans, some with “mech” experience, and they emphasized their lessons learned. One of our platoon sergeants competed with the Fort Knox rifle marksmanship team, which greatly enhanced our M-16 rifle proficiency.
At the time, the “bible” for a “mech” squad was FM 7-7 (“The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad”) and since my previous three years had been with the “straight-leg” infantry, I read it cover to cover. The field manual reflected the prominent European scenario of the time where U.S. forces trained and practiced fighting a Warsaw Pact invasion of western Europe. Every “book” is merely a guide, and tactics are modified for most situations, depending on the ingenuity of unit leadership.
The most important thing was learning from other NCOs by picking each other’s brains. By sharing “lessons learned,” we improved the training for everyone, and improved the sense of camaraderie of the company’s NCOs. Competition between squads and platoons was rigorous, but friendly as we all worked for the improvement of the company.
Making efficient use of the limited training time forced on us by circumstances proved imperative. Fort Knox is the Army’s armor training center, and the Armor School held priority for all training ranges. The 194th was unofficially known as the “slave brigade” because of the numerous school support taskings it received.
As the only infantry battalion on the post, school support ate heavily into our time and resources. However, since most of these taskings related to infantry missions, we learned to use them as training opportunities. One that I remember was several weekends used for training National Guard units in “Real Train.”
“Real Train” was the forerunner of the Multi-Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) for assessing unit effectiveness and casualties. These Guard units were training their officers and NCOs as evaluators for upcoming training exercises, and we were the “tools.” The final phase was a force-on-force exercise with the Guardsmen as our evaluators. Competing against our sister platoons, and not wanting the “disgrace” of failure we were strongly motivated to win.
Circumstances forced the unit leadership to “think outside the box,” scheduling training around the school. We used the training areas on weekends, when the school did not use them, and took our weekends during the week. This thinking proved fortunate because soon after Capt. Metz left, we took our squad and platoon level operations tests (ARTEPs).
Our training emphasized the weaknesses of the “track,” especially from rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and the wire-guided Sagger anti-tank missile. The most effective tactic against these threats was terrain driving, avoiding open areas when possible. Using evasive driving if engaged by a Sagger would hinder the Sagger gunner’s accuracy. Most importantly, we used cover and concealment as much as possible, especially when stopping the vehicle.
The “track’s” biggest vulnerability was its inferiority to its Soviet counterpart, the BMP. The BMP mounted a 73-mm. gun and a Sagger missile launcher, while the M113 only carried a mounted M-2 .50-cal. machine gun. I saw a picture of a “track” destroyed by a BMP from an Arab-Israeli battle. It did not inspire my confidence, to say the least, but that was the vehicle we had.
Tactics played a big part in survivability, and we emphasized combined arms teamwork in all training. When one vehicle moved the remainder of the platoon “overwatched” it, and provided covering fires. While the “track” protected us, we protected it from a deadly anti-armor ambush. In restrictive terrain such as dense forests or urban areas, the squad dismounted and cleared ahead of the “track.”
The brigade was “armor heavy,” therefore combined arms training and “task organizing” into tank-infantry teams was the norm. The tanks led in open areas, while we led in restrictive terrain where tanks were more vulnerable. One’s strength compensated for the other’s weakness, and one’s movement was covered by the other’s fire.
My point is, is that every type of military vehicle has weaknesses, and NCOs must train their soldiers on minimizing them. Ensure your soldiers are always alert for trouble, and react decisively when it occurs. When stopping your vehicle, quickly dismount your soldiers and assign them fighting positions with fields of fire. If stopped for an extended period, put RPG screen around your vehicle. It is easy to make, chain-link fencing held up by engineer stakes, and easy to put up and take down. Training for this is inconvenient, but inconvenience is preferable to becoming a casualty.
Until these “upgraded” M113s arrive in Iraq, the Army must take additional steps to increase self-protection. In infantry advanced individual training (AIT) almost a lifetime ago, we learned how to “harden” these “soft” vehicles. We loaded 2½ ton trucks with sandbags and rode in them with our weapons at the ready. The Army learned this lesson early in the Vietnam War, only to forget it once the war ended.
The debacle of Somalia provided a more recent example of the folly of using Humvees as combat vehicles. The Clinton administration’s Pentagon leadership assumed our enemy unworthy of the deployment of an armor/mech task force, and our soldiers paid a huge price. Why must we always relearn these lessons the hard way, when the knowledge is at our fingertips?
On another point: Since resupply convoys in Iraq seem to be the insurgents’ current favorite target, whatever happened to the Vietnam War “gun trucks?” One friend of mine recently recalled mounting a 40-mm. grenade launcher on his truck. Following Vietnam, many trucks had mounts for the M2 machine gun, even though the gunner was a sitting duck.
Throughout history, the American soldier has succeeded in overcoming insurmountable obstacles and equipment shortages, and it is imperative to overcome them now. While the M113 may provide more protection than current “soft” vehicles, it is not invincible. As I learned at Fort Knox nearly three decades ago, this vehicle is no better than the soldiers using it and the officers and NCOs leading them.
While the specifics of our armor shortage problem in Iraq have unique aspects, the bottom-line warning is timeless: Use the lessons learned by your predecessors, whose blood stained these vehicles in combat, and you can survive and win the fight.
William F. Sauerwein is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at mono@gtec.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
http://www.sftt.org/JPG/article01112005a.jpg
M113s
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m113.htm
M2 and M3 Bradley
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m2.htm
Ellie
Return of the M113
By William F. Sauerwein
The serious problem confronting our troops in Iraq caused by the lack of armored Humvees – and the inadequacy of the provisional “up-armor” kits used on many of the thin-skinned models – has prompted the Army to reactivate the M113-series of armored personnel carriers for use in the occupation. While the specifics of the M113’s new role remains unclear, it seems clear that the Army has finally opted to replace an administrative/logistical vehicle – the thin-skinned Humvee – with a true combat vehicle.
News reports last week, including a Knight-Ridder news service article by Joseph L. Galloway (“U.S. Army Adding Armor To ‘War Horse’ Troop Carrier,” The Miami Herald, Jan. 4, 2005), suggests that the Army is making a shift away from using wheeled vehicles as combat vehicles, something championed by former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki. Galloway reported that for service in Iraq, the fleet of M113s needs to have its armor upgraded for a projected cost of “$84 million. Just when the upgraded vehicles will deploy to Iraq was not mentioned.
The M113s were requested by the current ground commander in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Metz. Supposedly the Army has pushed hard for deploying these vehicles into theater for about two years. Galloway noted that the M113s are “more useful, cheaper and easier to transport than the … [new] Stryker.”
For those not remembering, the M113 was the predecessor of the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle. Commonly called the “track,” the M113 was the primary combat vehicle for the mechanized infantry during the 1960s and 1970s. It provided the mobility so that “mech” infantry could keep pace with the tanks.
The main difference is that the M113 is an armored personnel carrier (APC), while the Bradley is a fighting vehicle, armed with a M242 25mm “Bushmaster” Chain Gun. Using the M113, normally, the “track” provided support from a covered position but the squad fought dismounted. The vehicle provided protection from small arms fire and shrapnel, and carried the squad’s organizational and individual equipment.
My fondest memories of the “track” take me back to the 194th Armored Brigade (now deactivated) in the late 1970s. The “Dollar Ninety-Four” was stationed at Fort Knox, Ky., and was part of the rapid deployment force (RDF), the predecessor to Central Command. This meant that if the “balloon went up” the brigade came under operational control of the XVIII Airborne Corps.
I was a squad leader in a mechanized infantry company, commanded for a time by a much younger Capt. Thomas F. Metz. Many of the NCOs were Vietnam veterans, some with “mech” experience, and they emphasized their lessons learned. One of our platoon sergeants competed with the Fort Knox rifle marksmanship team, which greatly enhanced our M-16 rifle proficiency.
At the time, the “bible” for a “mech” squad was FM 7-7 (“The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad”) and since my previous three years had been with the “straight-leg” infantry, I read it cover to cover. The field manual reflected the prominent European scenario of the time where U.S. forces trained and practiced fighting a Warsaw Pact invasion of western Europe. Every “book” is merely a guide, and tactics are modified for most situations, depending on the ingenuity of unit leadership.
The most important thing was learning from other NCOs by picking each other’s brains. By sharing “lessons learned,” we improved the training for everyone, and improved the sense of camaraderie of the company’s NCOs. Competition between squads and platoons was rigorous, but friendly as we all worked for the improvement of the company.
Making efficient use of the limited training time forced on us by circumstances proved imperative. Fort Knox is the Army’s armor training center, and the Armor School held priority for all training ranges. The 194th was unofficially known as the “slave brigade” because of the numerous school support taskings it received.
As the only infantry battalion on the post, school support ate heavily into our time and resources. However, since most of these taskings related to infantry missions, we learned to use them as training opportunities. One that I remember was several weekends used for training National Guard units in “Real Train.”
“Real Train” was the forerunner of the Multi-Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) for assessing unit effectiveness and casualties. These Guard units were training their officers and NCOs as evaluators for upcoming training exercises, and we were the “tools.” The final phase was a force-on-force exercise with the Guardsmen as our evaluators. Competing against our sister platoons, and not wanting the “disgrace” of failure we were strongly motivated to win.
Circumstances forced the unit leadership to “think outside the box,” scheduling training around the school. We used the training areas on weekends, when the school did not use them, and took our weekends during the week. This thinking proved fortunate because soon after Capt. Metz left, we took our squad and platoon level operations tests (ARTEPs).
Our training emphasized the weaknesses of the “track,” especially from rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and the wire-guided Sagger anti-tank missile. The most effective tactic against these threats was terrain driving, avoiding open areas when possible. Using evasive driving if engaged by a Sagger would hinder the Sagger gunner’s accuracy. Most importantly, we used cover and concealment as much as possible, especially when stopping the vehicle.
The “track’s” biggest vulnerability was its inferiority to its Soviet counterpart, the BMP. The BMP mounted a 73-mm. gun and a Sagger missile launcher, while the M113 only carried a mounted M-2 .50-cal. machine gun. I saw a picture of a “track” destroyed by a BMP from an Arab-Israeli battle. It did not inspire my confidence, to say the least, but that was the vehicle we had.
Tactics played a big part in survivability, and we emphasized combined arms teamwork in all training. When one vehicle moved the remainder of the platoon “overwatched” it, and provided covering fires. While the “track” protected us, we protected it from a deadly anti-armor ambush. In restrictive terrain such as dense forests or urban areas, the squad dismounted and cleared ahead of the “track.”
The brigade was “armor heavy,” therefore combined arms training and “task organizing” into tank-infantry teams was the norm. The tanks led in open areas, while we led in restrictive terrain where tanks were more vulnerable. One’s strength compensated for the other’s weakness, and one’s movement was covered by the other’s fire.
My point is, is that every type of military vehicle has weaknesses, and NCOs must train their soldiers on minimizing them. Ensure your soldiers are always alert for trouble, and react decisively when it occurs. When stopping your vehicle, quickly dismount your soldiers and assign them fighting positions with fields of fire. If stopped for an extended period, put RPG screen around your vehicle. It is easy to make, chain-link fencing held up by engineer stakes, and easy to put up and take down. Training for this is inconvenient, but inconvenience is preferable to becoming a casualty.
Until these “upgraded” M113s arrive in Iraq, the Army must take additional steps to increase self-protection. In infantry advanced individual training (AIT) almost a lifetime ago, we learned how to “harden” these “soft” vehicles. We loaded 2½ ton trucks with sandbags and rode in them with our weapons at the ready. The Army learned this lesson early in the Vietnam War, only to forget it once the war ended.
The debacle of Somalia provided a more recent example of the folly of using Humvees as combat vehicles. The Clinton administration’s Pentagon leadership assumed our enemy unworthy of the deployment of an armor/mech task force, and our soldiers paid a huge price. Why must we always relearn these lessons the hard way, when the knowledge is at our fingertips?
On another point: Since resupply convoys in Iraq seem to be the insurgents’ current favorite target, whatever happened to the Vietnam War “gun trucks?” One friend of mine recently recalled mounting a 40-mm. grenade launcher on his truck. Following Vietnam, many trucks had mounts for the M2 machine gun, even though the gunner was a sitting duck.
Throughout history, the American soldier has succeeded in overcoming insurmountable obstacles and equipment shortages, and it is imperative to overcome them now. While the M113 may provide more protection than current “soft” vehicles, it is not invincible. As I learned at Fort Knox nearly three decades ago, this vehicle is no better than the soldiers using it and the officers and NCOs leading them.
While the specifics of our armor shortage problem in Iraq have unique aspects, the bottom-line warning is timeless: Use the lessons learned by your predecessors, whose blood stained these vehicles in combat, and you can survive and win the fight.
William F. Sauerwein is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at mono@gtec.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
http://www.sftt.org/JPG/article01112005a.jpg
M113s
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m113.htm
M2 and M3 Bradley
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m2.htm
Ellie