thedrifter
12-16-04, 06:29 AM
12-15-2004
Guest Column: The Humvee’s Fatal Design
By Jim Elders
Here’s the story thus far: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld got bushwhacked in Iraq by a couple of soldiers who challenged him about Humvees not being sufficiently armor plated. Several flabbergasted but not-so-alert generals and other senior officers stood by as the Secretary stumbled for answers.
The news media ate it up and the generals began to back-pedal, with DoD announcing by week’s end that up-armoring production would be significantly increased. But that “solution” will not solve the Humvee’s fatal flaw.
Some background: The first Humvees hit the dusty trail in the mid-1980’s, with the formal designation of the M998 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). They replaced the M151 (1/4 ton Jeep), M-274 (1/4 ton Mule), M561 (1-1/2 ton Gamma Goat, and M880 (1-1/4 ton truck). All of those vehicles were light cargo or administrative vehicles that were not designed to withstand the rigors of a combat environment. Neither was the Humvee.
That is the problem.
Taking a piece of equipment that was designed for light duty and trying to turn it into a combat machine is an exercise in programmed failure. It’s like giving a 100-pound female a rifle, basic load of ammunition, seventy-pound backpack, combat boots, flak jacket, helmet, a vest full of rations and other gear, and calling her a combat soldier. It only increases her already high probability of becoming a casualty. The same goes for armor plating Humvees.
The later model Humvee, the M1097A2, is powered by a 6.5-liter V-8 diesel engine, weighs 5,900 lbs., and has a payload of 4,400 lbs. Hanging up to 4,000 pounds of armor plating on it doesn’t leave many pounds for weapons systems, ammunition, troops, personal gear, radios, fuel and other battle-essential equipment.
Troops are being killed, but armor plating Humvees is not the Holy Grail. Reduced maneuverability, mobility, speed, and failures of transmissions, brakes, and suspensions will continue to be the Humvee’s Achilles’ heel: Move slowly, break down, and BANG, you’re dead.
The Department of Defense’s answer is to beef-up suspensions and add air-conditioning to the Humvee fleet. It’s comforting to know that our soldiers will die in comfort while riding around in their air-conditioned coffins.
A gussied-up cargo vehicle is no substitute for a combat vehicle. Furthermore, the Defense Department reports that armor plating cargo vehicles has already cost over $1.2 billion over the past year. Humvees should be put back in support and administrative units where they belong. Vehicles that have been designed and tested for combat should be in combat units.
Those Perfumed Princes (to use Hack’s term) who call themselves senior officers can help by acting like real combat leaders. They should get out of their china-decorated dining facilities and air-conditioned living quarters and go talk with their troops before the Secretary of Defense beats them to it.
And they need to do it where their soldiers work, not at specially arranged functions where they are safe from the realities of war. That was just one of the Army’s many problems when Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski commanded the troops that presided over the Abu Garhib prison abuse incident.
There are only two ways to clear buildings in a combat environment; reduce them to rubble or put troops on foot going street-to-street and room-to-room. It can’t be done from the imagined safety of improvised cargo vehicles.
Gen. George Patton said it best: “Any officer who comes back from a failed combat mission and isn’t dead or severely wounded hasn’t done his job.”
Patton must be rolling over in his grave.
Jim Elders is a criminologist and a retired Army officer. While serving in Vietnam, he survived having two jeeps blown from under him, a 122mm-rocket hit on his bunker, a Viet Cong ambush, sapper assaults and an attempted assassination. He never got a Purple Heart and is proud of it. He can be reached at ocse@earthlink.net. Send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
Ellie
Guest Column: The Humvee’s Fatal Design
By Jim Elders
Here’s the story thus far: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld got bushwhacked in Iraq by a couple of soldiers who challenged him about Humvees not being sufficiently armor plated. Several flabbergasted but not-so-alert generals and other senior officers stood by as the Secretary stumbled for answers.
The news media ate it up and the generals began to back-pedal, with DoD announcing by week’s end that up-armoring production would be significantly increased. But that “solution” will not solve the Humvee’s fatal flaw.
Some background: The first Humvees hit the dusty trail in the mid-1980’s, with the formal designation of the M998 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). They replaced the M151 (1/4 ton Jeep), M-274 (1/4 ton Mule), M561 (1-1/2 ton Gamma Goat, and M880 (1-1/4 ton truck). All of those vehicles were light cargo or administrative vehicles that were not designed to withstand the rigors of a combat environment. Neither was the Humvee.
That is the problem.
Taking a piece of equipment that was designed for light duty and trying to turn it into a combat machine is an exercise in programmed failure. It’s like giving a 100-pound female a rifle, basic load of ammunition, seventy-pound backpack, combat boots, flak jacket, helmet, a vest full of rations and other gear, and calling her a combat soldier. It only increases her already high probability of becoming a casualty. The same goes for armor plating Humvees.
The later model Humvee, the M1097A2, is powered by a 6.5-liter V-8 diesel engine, weighs 5,900 lbs., and has a payload of 4,400 lbs. Hanging up to 4,000 pounds of armor plating on it doesn’t leave many pounds for weapons systems, ammunition, troops, personal gear, radios, fuel and other battle-essential equipment.
Troops are being killed, but armor plating Humvees is not the Holy Grail. Reduced maneuverability, mobility, speed, and failures of transmissions, brakes, and suspensions will continue to be the Humvee’s Achilles’ heel: Move slowly, break down, and BANG, you’re dead.
The Department of Defense’s answer is to beef-up suspensions and add air-conditioning to the Humvee fleet. It’s comforting to know that our soldiers will die in comfort while riding around in their air-conditioned coffins.
A gussied-up cargo vehicle is no substitute for a combat vehicle. Furthermore, the Defense Department reports that armor plating cargo vehicles has already cost over $1.2 billion over the past year. Humvees should be put back in support and administrative units where they belong. Vehicles that have been designed and tested for combat should be in combat units.
Those Perfumed Princes (to use Hack’s term) who call themselves senior officers can help by acting like real combat leaders. They should get out of their china-decorated dining facilities and air-conditioned living quarters and go talk with their troops before the Secretary of Defense beats them to it.
And they need to do it where their soldiers work, not at specially arranged functions where they are safe from the realities of war. That was just one of the Army’s many problems when Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski commanded the troops that presided over the Abu Garhib prison abuse incident.
There are only two ways to clear buildings in a combat environment; reduce them to rubble or put troops on foot going street-to-street and room-to-room. It can’t be done from the imagined safety of improvised cargo vehicles.
Gen. George Patton said it best: “Any officer who comes back from a failed combat mission and isn’t dead or severely wounded hasn’t done his job.”
Patton must be rolling over in his grave.
Jim Elders is a criminologist and a retired Army officer. While serving in Vietnam, he survived having two jeeps blown from under him, a 122mm-rocket hit on his bunker, a Viet Cong ambush, sapper assaults and an attempted assassination. He never got a Purple Heart and is proud of it. He can be reached at ocse@earthlink.net. Send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
Ellie