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thedrifter
12-05-04, 07:30 AM
12-03-2004

Guest Column: Hearts, Minds & Collateral Damage



By Maj. John J. Miles USMC



I am writing in response to William Lind’s guest column (“Tactics Of the Crescent Moon,” DefenseWatch, Nov. 19, 2004).



In his column, Lind makes some statements about the U.S. tactics in Fallujah that are grossly over-simplified and in dire need of being placed in a realistic context. An example: “The U.S. military has again destroyed the village in order to save it, giving its enemies a victory at the moral level. Will we ever learn?” In another sentence, he quotes a paragraph from a book: “More powerful than firepower in this new kind of war will be the preservation of infrastructure. For it is the lack of social services that gives the foe his recruiting base.”



First, the ROE (rules of engagement) for coalition forces in Iraq is very clear on the need to protect and preserve the property of Iraqi citizens whenever possible, even when engaged in combat operations. This applies especially to culturally significant structures, such as mosques, etc. U.S. commanders in Iraq do not decide lightly to target buildings, especially ones that the locals place cultural importance to. Contrary to Lind’s opinions about U.S. military leaders in Iraq, the majority of them realize very well the importance of winning the “hearts and minds” campaign in this fight. If infrastructure is targeted, it is because it has to be.



Why would buildings (including mosques) have to be targeted? For the simple reason that enemy knows of our reluctance to target them, so like any good Fourth Generation warrior, he tries to exploit what he considers our weakness. Lind can make all the academic arguments he likes about how we need to improve our small unit tactics, and how “good small units – true light infantry, which America sadly lacks – can win without the vast collateral damage and civilian casualties that work against us.”



I’ll agree with Lind that our tactics aren’t perfect, and how we can always get better at implementing small unit tactics. However, here is a reality check for Lind: When a small unit is advancing down a street, clearing it house by nerve-wracking house, and they come under fire from insurgents who are using a building for cover, that unit is going to do whatever it takes to silence the enemy fire at the least possible risk to themselves.



That remedy is most likely going to be the reduction of the enemy in that building by using superior firepower. If possible, the on-scene commander will use the lightest weapon that will cause the least collateral damage and still silence the enemy.



Regardless, the simple math is this: if that small unit leader has to honestly choose between risking the lives of his men by not causing collateral damage, or causing some collateral damage in order to protect his men, that decision is a no-brainer. I don’t care what kind of tactical revolution you come up with, it won’t change the fact that those servicemen’s lives are more important than damage to a structure. End of story.



As far as massive civilian casualties in Fallujah, there simply weren’t any. The U.S. military once again bent over backward to warn local civilians to leave town, since trouble was coming. Did this partially give away the element of tactical surprise? Maybe, but it did without a doubt limit civilian casualties.



And yes, coalition forces did have a plan to repair damage done to the city, and re-establish social services, etc., once the area was secure. This was not a scorched-earth operation, where the goals were to rubble the city and salt the earth when we left. Commanders knew that there would be damage done to the infrastructure, and that repairing that damage as quickly as possible is a key component of this fight. Civil Affairs groups were on standby, waiting to move in and start fixing stuff as soon as it was safe to do so.



Urban warfare is a nasty, brutal, heartbreaking business. The Marines and soldiers that went in to Fallujah completed their mission of securing the city with fewer casualties, and less collateral damage, than probably any large-scale urban operation in history.



Does this single operation win the war for us? Of course it doesn’t. Will it take a lot of prudence to prevent Fallujah from slipping back into the same lawless mess it was before we cleared it, you bet. Did Fallujah need to be cleaned out? Based on the hostage torture/beheading chambers, bomb making factories, weapons caches, etc., that the Marines and soldiers found in the city, I’d say so.



If Lind is so sure that he has a better way of winning this fight, I recommend that he go see his local recruiter, request an age waiver, and go join the fun over in Iraq. I’m sure the war-fighters over there would love to have the benefit of his wisdom first hand.



Guest Contributor Maj. John J. Miles USMC until this year commanded C Co., 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, one of the regiments that took part in the seizure of Fallujah last month. He can be reached at* sjmiles@optonline.net. Send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com*.



Ellie