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thedrifter
10-10-04, 08:25 AM
SECURING THE SURRENDER: Marines in the Occupation of Japan
by Charles R. Smith
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At noon on 15 August 1945, people gathered near radios and hastily setup loud speakers in homes, offices, factories, and on city streets throughout Japan. Even though many felt that defeat was not far off, the vast majority expected to hear new exhortations to fight to the death or the official announcement of a declaration of war on the Soviet Union.

The muted strains of the national anthem immediately followed the noon time-signal. Listeners then heard State Minister Hiroshi Shimomura announce that the next voice they would hear would be that of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor. In a solemn voice, Emperor Hirohito read the first fateful words of the Imperial Rescript:

After pondering deeply the general trend of the world situation and the actual state of Our Empire, We have decided to effect a settlement of the present crisis by resort to an extraordinary measure. To Our good and loyal subjects, we hereby convey Our will. We have commanded Our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that Our Empire accepts the terms of their Joint Declaration.

Although the word "surrender" was not mentioned and few knew of the Joint Declaration of the Allied Powers calling for unconditional surrender of Japan, they quickly understood that the Emperor was announcing the termination of hostilities on terms laid down by the enemy. After more than three and a half years of fighting and sacrifice, Japan was accepting defeat.

On Guam, 1,363 nautical miles to the south, the men of the 6th Marine Division had turned in early the night before after a long day of combat training. At 2200, lights on the island suddenly came on. Radio reports had confirmed rumors circulating for days throughout the division's camp on the high ground overlooking Pago Bay: the Japanese had surrendered and there would be an immediate ceasefire. As some Marines clad only in towels or skivvies danced in the streets and members of the 22d Marines band conducted an impromptu parade, most of the 4th Marine Regimental Combat Team was on board ship, ready to leave for "occupational and possible light combat duty in Japanese - held territory." No less happy than their fellow Marines ashore, they remained cynical. The Japanese had used subterfuge before. Who could say they were not being deceptive now?

In May 1945, months before the fighting ended, preliminary plans for the occupation of Japan were prepared at the headquarters of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur in Manila and Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz on Guam. Staff studies, based on the possibility of the sudden collapse or surrender of the Japanese Government and High Command, were prepared and distributed at army and fleet level for planning purposes. In early summer, as fighting still raged on Okinawa and in the Philippines, dual-planning went forward for both the subjugation of Japan by force in Operations Olympic and Coronet, and its peaceful occupation in Operations Blacklist and Campus.

Many essential elements of MacArthur's Olympic and Black list plans were similar. The Sixth Army, which was slated to make the attack on the southern island of Kyushu under Olympic, was given the contingent task of occupying southern Japan under Operation Blacklist. Likewise, the Eighth Army, using the wealth of information it had accumulated regarding the island of Honshu in planning for Coronet, was designated the occupying force for northern Japan. The Tenth Army, a component of the Honshu invasion force, was given the mission of occupying Korea. Admiral Nimitz's plan envisioned the initial occupation of Tokyo Bay and other strategic areas by the Third Fleet and Marine forces, pending the arrival of formal occupation forces under General MacArthur's command.

When the Japanese government made its momentous decision to surrender in the wake of atomic bombings and the Soviet Union's entry into the war, MacArthur's and Nimitz's staffs quickly shifted their focus from Operation Olympic to Blacklist and Campus, their respective plans for the occupation. In the process of coordinating the two plans, MacArthur's staff notified Nimitz's representatives that "any landing whatsoever by naval or marine elements prior to CINCAFPAC's [Mac Arthur's] personal landing is emphatically unacceptable to him." MacArthur's objections to an initial landing by naval and accompanying Marine forces was based upon his belief that they would be unable to cope with any Japanese military opposition and, more importantly, because "it would be psychologically offensive to ground and air forces of the Pacific Theater to be relegated from their proper missions at the hour of victory."

Despite apparent disagreements, MacArthur's plan for the occupation, Blacklist, was accepted. But with at least a two-week lag predicted between the surrender and a landing in force, both MacArthur and Nimitz agreed that the immediate occupation of Japan was paramount and should be given the highest priority. The only military unit available with sufficient power "to take Japan into custody at short notice and enforce the Allies' will until occupation troops arrived" was Admiral William F. Halsey's Third Fleet, then at sea 250 miles south east of Tokyo, conducting carrier air strikes against Hokkaido and northern Honshu. On 8 August, advance copies of Halsey's Operation Plan 10-45 for the occupation of Japan setting up Task Force 31 (TF 31), the Yokosuka Occupation Force, were distributed. The task force's mission, based on Nimitz's basic concept, was to clear the entrance to Tokyo Bay and anchorages, occupy and secure the Yokosuka Naval Base, seize and operate Yokosuka Airfield, support the release of Allied prisoners, demilitarize all enemy ships and defenses, and assist U.S. Army troops in preparing for the landing of additional forces.

Three days later, Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger, Commander, Battleship Division 7, was designated by Halsey to be commander, TF 31. The carriers, battleships, and cruisers of Vice Admiral John S. McCain's Task Force 38 also were alerted to organize and equip naval and Marine landing forces. At the same time, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, directed the 6th Marine Division to furnish a regimental combat team to the Third Fleet for possible occupation duty. Major General Keller E. Rockey, Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps, on the recommendation of Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., nominated Brigadier General William T. Clement, the division's assistant commander, to head the combined Fleet landing force.

A Good Site..Lots of Good Reads and Info....

http://www.nps.gov/wapa/indepth/extContent/usmc/pcn-190-003143-00/index.htm


Ellie