thedrifter
10-04-04, 07:26 PM
AO in SE Asia History & Links
OPERATION RANCH HAND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 1961-1971
http://cpcug.org/user/billb/ranchhand/ranchhand.html
article below go to above web site for a variety of links to more info
also see:
www.ranchhandvietnam.org/Events/index5.html
www.ranchhandvietnam.org
OPERATION RANCH HAND
HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
1961-1971
By
William A. Buckingham, Jr., Ph.D.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of these terms related to the Vietnam War, which one do you think would be recognized by the most people today?
a.. Tet Offensive
b.. Khe Sanh
c.. William Westmoreland
d.. Agent Orange
I wouldn't bet against Agent Orange as the winner of this poll. It has been 30 years since the last U.S. Air Force herbicide flight in Southeast Asia, yet the controversy over these missions and their aftereffects continues. The widespread use of herbicides in Southeast Asia was a unique military operation, and examining the decisions which led to the initiation, expansion, and eventual termination of these spray flights may provide insights about the larger war of which they were a part. The history of this operation may also reveal a useful pattern for anticipating the course of events that may follow the introduction of some other unconventional tool of war in a future conflict.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The term "Operation Ranch Hand" was the military code name for spraying herbicides from U.S. Air Force aircraft in Southeast Asia from 1962 through 1971.1 The name itself had no particular significance and was one of a number of similar code names such as "Farm Gate" and "Barn Door" that denoted specific military activities early in the Vietnam War. Ranch Hand aircraft were Fairchild C-123s, medium transports with twin piston engines, which later had two jet engines added for extra thrust. The Ranch Hand detachment began with six planes, dropped to two, and peaked at about 25 in 1969. It had several organizational designations over the years, but during the peak spraying years between 1966 and 1970, it was known as the 12th Air Commando Squadron and the 12th Special Operations Squadron. In terms of personnel and aircraft, Ranch Hand was a relatively minor part of overall Air Force operations in Southeast Asia.
Between 1962 and 1971, Ranch Hand sprayed about 19 million gallons of herbicide. Eleven million gallons of this total was Agent Orange.2 The spray fell mostly on the forests of South Vietnam, but some was used in Laos, and some killed crops to deprive Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops of food. The military purpose for using herbicides on non-cropland was to remove the vegetation cover used by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces for concealment. Along roads, canals, railroads, and other transportation arteries, Ranch Hand cleared a swath several hundred yards wide to make ambushes more difficult. In Laos, the herbicide removed the jungle canopy from the network of roads and trails used for infiltrating men and supplies, making them more vulnerable to attack from the air. Ranch Hand also cleared large areas of forest that hid sanctuaries and bases, thereby forcing the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong to move or risk discovery and attack. In all, Ranch Hand planes sprayed herbicide over about six million acres, not correcting for multiple coverage.3
The herbicides Ranch Hand sprayed were common agricultural chemicals in wide use in the United States and other countries at that time. The most common ingredients in the herbicide mixtures were 2,4-D 4 and 2,4,5-T, phenoxy herbicides that act as growth regulators and cause destructive proliferation of tissues in plants when they are in a stage of active growth. Another plant growth regulator used was picloram. Cacodylic acid, an organic arsenic compound, killed crops by causing them to dry out.5 Various mixtures of these herbicides arrived in Vietnam in distinctive color-coded drums, the origin of the names "Agent Orange," "Agent Blue," "Agent White," etc. The primary focus in the continuing controversy over the human health effects of herbicides involves a dioxin impurity created as a byproduct in the manufacturing process of 2,4,5-T, one of the two herbicides in Agent Orange.
The Ranch Hand operation was not without historical precedent. U.S. aircraft conducted herbicide tests in World War II to see whether sprayed chemicals could be used to mark navigation points and defoliate jungle cover. An application considered but not employed in that war was destroying crops grown by isolated Japanese units on Pacific islands.6 Later, during the Malayan Emergency of the 1950s, British aircraft did spray herbicides on the isolated jungle plots of communist insurgents as part of a successful food denial program.7
In the 1950's, American military pilots in the United States worked to develop and improve herbicide delivery techniques and equipment.8 One successful experiment conducted at Camp Drum, New York, in 1959 foreshadowed what was to come later in Vietnam. Sugar maple foliage was obstructing the view of an artillery impact area, and ground access to cut down the trees was impossible because of unexploded shells. The Army Biological Warfare Laboratories sent Dr. James W. Brown, later involved in the earliest stages of the herbicide program in Vietnam, to Camp Drum. Helicopters sprayed the troublesome maple trees with a mixture of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T, causing their leaves to dry and drop about one month later, and this greatly improved visibility.9 This experiment at Camp Drum in 1959 used the same chemicals for the same purpose for which Ranch Hand later sprayed them widely in Southeast Asia.
The Kennedy Administration inherited a deteriorating situation in Southeast Asia in 1961, and in its first months in office began to address what the United States might do to strengthen the Diem government in South Vietnam in its fight against the communist insurgency. One early approach was to investigate what "techniques and gadgets" from the reservoir of American technology might be useful in the counterinsurgency effort.10 Chemical herbicides for clearing "fire breaks" along South Vietnam's borders received specific mention as early as July 1961,11 and later that year American personnel using South Vietnamese aircraft conducted some very limited but successful tests in that country that helped to persuade President Diem to become a staunch supporter of both defoliation and crop destruction.12
A proposal to use U.S. aircraft in a more extensive defoliation and crop destruction operation received attention in Washington during the latter part of 1961. The Department of Defense favored such an operation, while at the same time recognizing the possibility of adverse international reactions. Perhaps because of this public relations risk, the Defense Department advocated initially only a selective defoliation program along key transportation routes, with the addition of crop destruction later, if at all.13 The Department of State did not object to a closely controlled and selective defoliation program and argued that such operations would not violate any rule of international law and could even be considered an accepted tactic of war, citing the Malayan precedent.14 On November 30, 1961, President John F. Kennedy personally approved in principle the start of Operation Ranch Hand,15 and for a year afterwards, all herbicide targets to be sprayed by U.S. aircraft had to receive specific Oval Office approval. It was not until late 1962 that President Kennedy delegated limited authority to order Ranch Hand defoliation missions to his ambassador and military commander in South Vietnam.16
A Vietnamese officer observes Ssgt Milo B. Coghill operate a pump aboard a C-123 during one of the early defoliation missions in Vietnam. Ssgt Coghill, along with Captain Fergus Groves, II, and Captain Robert D. Larson died in a crash during a Ranch Hand training mission on February 2, 1962, becoming the first Air Force fatalities in Vietnam. Ranch Hand planes typically sprayed at an airspeed of 130 knots only 150 feet above the ground.
The decision to begin destroying crops with herbicides was longer in coming, even though President Diem was an early and enthusiastic advocate of crop destruction. He maintained that he knew where the Viet Cong crops were,17 and South Vietnamese officials had difficulty in understanding why the Americans wouldn't give them a readily-available chemical that would accomplish with much less effort what they were already doing by cutting, pulling, and burning. Although the Defense Department favored chemical crop destruction,18 several influential people in the State Department, notably Roger Hilsman and W. Averell Harriman, were opposed. They argued that there was no way to insure that only Viet Cong crops would be killed, and the inevitable mistakes would alienate the rural South Vietnamese people. Hilsman maintained that the use of this technology would enable the Viet Cong to argue that the U.S. represented "foreign imperialist barbarism,"19 and Harriman urged that crop destruction should be postponed to a later stage in the counterinsurgency struggle when the Viet Cong would not be so closely intermingled with the people.20
The pressure from Saigon continued, however, and on October 2, 1962, President Kennedy decided to allow restricted crop spraying to proceed.21 Until 1964, crop destruction operations were rare, and only South Vietnamese personnel and equipment conducted them. However, in the aftermath of the Tonkin Gulf incidents, the U.S. Ranch Hand detachment began to destroy crops. Because of the continuing sensitivity of crop destruction, Ranch Hand aircraft displayed temporary South Vietnamese markings when they flew these missions.22
Operation Ranch Hand expanded as the U.S. commitment to Vietnam deepened. Controls and limitations on spraying gradually relaxed, and new geographic areas were added. In late 1965, Ranch Hand began spraying the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex of roads and foot paths in southern and eastern Laos.23 The following year, occasional crop destruction in Laos became part of the Ranch Hand mission.24 In 1966 and 1967, Washington approved the spraying of herbicides in the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam.25 Ranch Hand's level of operations steadily increased and peaked in 1967 when the unit sprayed 1.7 million acres, 85% for defoliation and 15% for crop destruction.26
continued...........
OPERATION RANCH HAND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 1961-1971
http://cpcug.org/user/billb/ranchhand/ranchhand.html
article below go to above web site for a variety of links to more info
also see:
www.ranchhandvietnam.org/Events/index5.html
www.ranchhandvietnam.org
OPERATION RANCH HAND
HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
1961-1971
By
William A. Buckingham, Jr., Ph.D.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of these terms related to the Vietnam War, which one do you think would be recognized by the most people today?
a.. Tet Offensive
b.. Khe Sanh
c.. William Westmoreland
d.. Agent Orange
I wouldn't bet against Agent Orange as the winner of this poll. It has been 30 years since the last U.S. Air Force herbicide flight in Southeast Asia, yet the controversy over these missions and their aftereffects continues. The widespread use of herbicides in Southeast Asia was a unique military operation, and examining the decisions which led to the initiation, expansion, and eventual termination of these spray flights may provide insights about the larger war of which they were a part. The history of this operation may also reveal a useful pattern for anticipating the course of events that may follow the introduction of some other unconventional tool of war in a future conflict.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The term "Operation Ranch Hand" was the military code name for spraying herbicides from U.S. Air Force aircraft in Southeast Asia from 1962 through 1971.1 The name itself had no particular significance and was one of a number of similar code names such as "Farm Gate" and "Barn Door" that denoted specific military activities early in the Vietnam War. Ranch Hand aircraft were Fairchild C-123s, medium transports with twin piston engines, which later had two jet engines added for extra thrust. The Ranch Hand detachment began with six planes, dropped to two, and peaked at about 25 in 1969. It had several organizational designations over the years, but during the peak spraying years between 1966 and 1970, it was known as the 12th Air Commando Squadron and the 12th Special Operations Squadron. In terms of personnel and aircraft, Ranch Hand was a relatively minor part of overall Air Force operations in Southeast Asia.
Between 1962 and 1971, Ranch Hand sprayed about 19 million gallons of herbicide. Eleven million gallons of this total was Agent Orange.2 The spray fell mostly on the forests of South Vietnam, but some was used in Laos, and some killed crops to deprive Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops of food. The military purpose for using herbicides on non-cropland was to remove the vegetation cover used by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces for concealment. Along roads, canals, railroads, and other transportation arteries, Ranch Hand cleared a swath several hundred yards wide to make ambushes more difficult. In Laos, the herbicide removed the jungle canopy from the network of roads and trails used for infiltrating men and supplies, making them more vulnerable to attack from the air. Ranch Hand also cleared large areas of forest that hid sanctuaries and bases, thereby forcing the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong to move or risk discovery and attack. In all, Ranch Hand planes sprayed herbicide over about six million acres, not correcting for multiple coverage.3
The herbicides Ranch Hand sprayed were common agricultural chemicals in wide use in the United States and other countries at that time. The most common ingredients in the herbicide mixtures were 2,4-D 4 and 2,4,5-T, phenoxy herbicides that act as growth regulators and cause destructive proliferation of tissues in plants when they are in a stage of active growth. Another plant growth regulator used was picloram. Cacodylic acid, an organic arsenic compound, killed crops by causing them to dry out.5 Various mixtures of these herbicides arrived in Vietnam in distinctive color-coded drums, the origin of the names "Agent Orange," "Agent Blue," "Agent White," etc. The primary focus in the continuing controversy over the human health effects of herbicides involves a dioxin impurity created as a byproduct in the manufacturing process of 2,4,5-T, one of the two herbicides in Agent Orange.
The Ranch Hand operation was not without historical precedent. U.S. aircraft conducted herbicide tests in World War II to see whether sprayed chemicals could be used to mark navigation points and defoliate jungle cover. An application considered but not employed in that war was destroying crops grown by isolated Japanese units on Pacific islands.6 Later, during the Malayan Emergency of the 1950s, British aircraft did spray herbicides on the isolated jungle plots of communist insurgents as part of a successful food denial program.7
In the 1950's, American military pilots in the United States worked to develop and improve herbicide delivery techniques and equipment.8 One successful experiment conducted at Camp Drum, New York, in 1959 foreshadowed what was to come later in Vietnam. Sugar maple foliage was obstructing the view of an artillery impact area, and ground access to cut down the trees was impossible because of unexploded shells. The Army Biological Warfare Laboratories sent Dr. James W. Brown, later involved in the earliest stages of the herbicide program in Vietnam, to Camp Drum. Helicopters sprayed the troublesome maple trees with a mixture of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T, causing their leaves to dry and drop about one month later, and this greatly improved visibility.9 This experiment at Camp Drum in 1959 used the same chemicals for the same purpose for which Ranch Hand later sprayed them widely in Southeast Asia.
The Kennedy Administration inherited a deteriorating situation in Southeast Asia in 1961, and in its first months in office began to address what the United States might do to strengthen the Diem government in South Vietnam in its fight against the communist insurgency. One early approach was to investigate what "techniques and gadgets" from the reservoir of American technology might be useful in the counterinsurgency effort.10 Chemical herbicides for clearing "fire breaks" along South Vietnam's borders received specific mention as early as July 1961,11 and later that year American personnel using South Vietnamese aircraft conducted some very limited but successful tests in that country that helped to persuade President Diem to become a staunch supporter of both defoliation and crop destruction.12
A proposal to use U.S. aircraft in a more extensive defoliation and crop destruction operation received attention in Washington during the latter part of 1961. The Department of Defense favored such an operation, while at the same time recognizing the possibility of adverse international reactions. Perhaps because of this public relations risk, the Defense Department advocated initially only a selective defoliation program along key transportation routes, with the addition of crop destruction later, if at all.13 The Department of State did not object to a closely controlled and selective defoliation program and argued that such operations would not violate any rule of international law and could even be considered an accepted tactic of war, citing the Malayan precedent.14 On November 30, 1961, President John F. Kennedy personally approved in principle the start of Operation Ranch Hand,15 and for a year afterwards, all herbicide targets to be sprayed by U.S. aircraft had to receive specific Oval Office approval. It was not until late 1962 that President Kennedy delegated limited authority to order Ranch Hand defoliation missions to his ambassador and military commander in South Vietnam.16
A Vietnamese officer observes Ssgt Milo B. Coghill operate a pump aboard a C-123 during one of the early defoliation missions in Vietnam. Ssgt Coghill, along with Captain Fergus Groves, II, and Captain Robert D. Larson died in a crash during a Ranch Hand training mission on February 2, 1962, becoming the first Air Force fatalities in Vietnam. Ranch Hand planes typically sprayed at an airspeed of 130 knots only 150 feet above the ground.
The decision to begin destroying crops with herbicides was longer in coming, even though President Diem was an early and enthusiastic advocate of crop destruction. He maintained that he knew where the Viet Cong crops were,17 and South Vietnamese officials had difficulty in understanding why the Americans wouldn't give them a readily-available chemical that would accomplish with much less effort what they were already doing by cutting, pulling, and burning. Although the Defense Department favored chemical crop destruction,18 several influential people in the State Department, notably Roger Hilsman and W. Averell Harriman, were opposed. They argued that there was no way to insure that only Viet Cong crops would be killed, and the inevitable mistakes would alienate the rural South Vietnamese people. Hilsman maintained that the use of this technology would enable the Viet Cong to argue that the U.S. represented "foreign imperialist barbarism,"19 and Harriman urged that crop destruction should be postponed to a later stage in the counterinsurgency struggle when the Viet Cong would not be so closely intermingled with the people.20
The pressure from Saigon continued, however, and on October 2, 1962, President Kennedy decided to allow restricted crop spraying to proceed.21 Until 1964, crop destruction operations were rare, and only South Vietnamese personnel and equipment conducted them. However, in the aftermath of the Tonkin Gulf incidents, the U.S. Ranch Hand detachment began to destroy crops. Because of the continuing sensitivity of crop destruction, Ranch Hand aircraft displayed temporary South Vietnamese markings when they flew these missions.22
Operation Ranch Hand expanded as the U.S. commitment to Vietnam deepened. Controls and limitations on spraying gradually relaxed, and new geographic areas were added. In late 1965, Ranch Hand began spraying the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex of roads and foot paths in southern and eastern Laos.23 The following year, occasional crop destruction in Laos became part of the Ranch Hand mission.24 In 1966 and 1967, Washington approved the spraying of herbicides in the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam.25 Ranch Hand's level of operations steadily increased and peaked in 1967 when the unit sprayed 1.7 million acres, 85% for defoliation and 15% for crop destruction.26
continued...........