thedrifter
08-25-04, 08:23 AM
08-24-2004
Critics Flip-Flop on ‘Powell Doctrine’
By William F. Sauerwein
Many critics of Operation Iraqi Freedom state that we ignored the principles of the “Powell Doctrine” in launching the invasion. In doing so, they would have us ignore the fact that it was they who helped destroy the doctrine in the early 1990s.
However, we only used this doctrine twice in battle – Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989 and Ooperation Desert Storm in 1991 – and it proved so successful that we scrapped it. The succeeding strategy remains an “orphan” since no one gave it a name. Ironically, many of today’s critics of the Iraqi campaign had earlier heartily endorsed this “orphan” strategy, which helped create our current mess.
The “Powell Doctrine” refers to Operation Desert Storm when then-Gen. Colin Powell was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Its underlying principle employed overwhelming force for delivering the enemy a quick “knockout punch.” A massive six-week air campaign severely weakened the Iraqis, and the ground campaign achieved a devastating victory in about four days.
One reason for this unprecedented victory was that at the time we possessed a robust military force. American forces were in a high state of readiness in anticipation of fighting our Cold War enemies. This readiness entailed a significant amount of flexibility for adapting to a variety of missions.
Another reason for our success was that Saddam Hussein proved to be his own worst enemy.
Desert Storm was not a Cold War deployment; however we adapted our Cold War plans and forces for the situation. The deployment schedule for my Army unit remained intact, only the destination and mission changed. Platforms designed for delivering nuclear weapons on Soviet targets were modified for delivering conventional munitions in Iraq. Fighting vehicles designed for engaging Warsaw Pact forces engaged the Soviet-armed and -trained Iraqi Army. We overwhelmed the Iraqis with the AirLand Battle Doctrine that had been designed for the plains of Europe.
Most importantly, the Army possessed enough forces for waging this war while simultaneously deterring war in other theaters. The Army deployed the equivalent of seven of its eighteen combat divisions to the Middle East. With that size of force structure the Army proved flexible enough for overcoming many problems, yet fielding sufficient forces.
Some divisions were undergoing modernization programs, rendering the affected unit non-deployable for about 90 days. At least two divisions “cross-loaded” brigades with non-deployed divisions for deploying at full strength. Other divisions received separate brigades, including cannibalizing one division to replace unready “round out” National Guard brigades.
Sufficient forces remained for contingency plans, such as reinforcing the Middle East or deterring North Korea. Someone stationed on the Korean DMZ at the time confirmed that North Korea indeed “rattled its sabers.” Furthermore, in case of a long-term deployment officials in late 1990 revealed that a workable troop rotation plan was under review.
The initial air campaign (our overriding advantage) achieved air superiority in a matter of days, cutting off Iraqi forces from their command and control and logistical support, which demoralized them. Air superiority also guaranteed us detailed intelligence of Iraqi defenses while keeping the Iraqis almost totally in the dark.
When the ground war began, it had been adequately planned, supplied and rehearsed to the minutest detail. Saddam focused on a seaborne invasion into Kuwait by the First Marine Expeditionary Force. Undetected, the Army’s VII and XVIII Corps moved far to the west, and execute the now-famous “Left Hook” into Iraq. Both U.S. Army corps had three full-strength divisions, with another division held in strategic reserve.
The victory confirmed the quality of both American troops and equipment as we defeated a well-equipped, numerically-superior enemy. It further proved the superiority of our AirLand Battle doctrine as it totally dominated the Soviet-trained Iraqis.
North Korea quieted down and any warlike thoughts of the Warsaw Pact quickly disappeared. Indeed, within the year the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union both ceased to exist.
Unfortunately, American leaders – feeling invulnerable after victory in the Cold War – succumbed to an attitude of arrogance and complacency. They ignored any shortcomings in the force identified during Desert Storm because the new strategy was to focus on reducing defense spending.
The incoming Clinton administration replaced the “Powell Doctrine” with what I term the “We can do more with less” doctrine. Subsequently, the administration reduced the Army from eighteen to ten combat divisions, yet the number of missions did not reduce, but actually expanded. “Experts” at the time stated that our technological superiority would compensate for the personnel losses. If the situation warranted, the military could gain additional forces through mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves.
At the time, officials dismissed or ignored the problems encountered with the mobilization of “round out” brigades during Desert Storm. Senior officials publicly acknowledged that mobilized units required from 60 to 90 days of post-mobilization training before deployment. This was deemed adequate because we lacked the transportation assets for deploying units into theater any quicker.
No one addressed the potential of an enemy using the “Powell Doctrine” on us before these 90 days. North Korea’s strategy was, and is, seizing as much of South Korea as possible before American forces arrive in sufficient numbers. The new primary threat, Iraq, had easy access into its Gulf neighbors, across open desert borders. However, we deceived ourselves into believing that neither would strike until we had assembled our forces in theater.
Planning for post-Gulf War Iraq used virtually all CONUS-based Army divisions, some already slated for deactivation. The Army had already reduced many of those by one-third and assigned a “round out” Guard brigade. But none of these Guard brigades’ icons appeared on the maps used during contingency training exercises.
After the dust settled for an Iraq contingency, three divisions remained for other emergencies. One was stationed in Korea, a vital commitment; with another stationed in Hawaii for reinforcing Korea. The 10th Mountain Division was the only CONUS-based division available for any “what if” scenario.
The Clinton administration set American global strategy as having the capability to wage “two almost simultaneous regional conflicts,” ironically the same strategy that we had used during the Cold War. It became obvious that if this occurred, we would quickly need a massive mobilization of Guard and Reserve forces. Again, these forces required a 60- to 90-day post-mobilization train-up period before deployment.
The “Powell Doctrine” went into the “dustbin of history,” deemed irrelevant in the post-Cold War era. Our accepted strategy became that American forces would provide mostly air power and logistical support while using “allied” ground troops. The U.N. Security Council would exercise command and control, usually with no clear chain of command.
This new strategy received its baptism of fire during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. The problems encountered during this humanitarian operation could be the subject of a separate article. Media images of starving people and the inability of the international community in solving it dictated American military strategy.
continued.............
Critics Flip-Flop on ‘Powell Doctrine’
By William F. Sauerwein
Many critics of Operation Iraqi Freedom state that we ignored the principles of the “Powell Doctrine” in launching the invasion. In doing so, they would have us ignore the fact that it was they who helped destroy the doctrine in the early 1990s.
However, we only used this doctrine twice in battle – Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989 and Ooperation Desert Storm in 1991 – and it proved so successful that we scrapped it. The succeeding strategy remains an “orphan” since no one gave it a name. Ironically, many of today’s critics of the Iraqi campaign had earlier heartily endorsed this “orphan” strategy, which helped create our current mess.
The “Powell Doctrine” refers to Operation Desert Storm when then-Gen. Colin Powell was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Its underlying principle employed overwhelming force for delivering the enemy a quick “knockout punch.” A massive six-week air campaign severely weakened the Iraqis, and the ground campaign achieved a devastating victory in about four days.
One reason for this unprecedented victory was that at the time we possessed a robust military force. American forces were in a high state of readiness in anticipation of fighting our Cold War enemies. This readiness entailed a significant amount of flexibility for adapting to a variety of missions.
Another reason for our success was that Saddam Hussein proved to be his own worst enemy.
Desert Storm was not a Cold War deployment; however we adapted our Cold War plans and forces for the situation. The deployment schedule for my Army unit remained intact, only the destination and mission changed. Platforms designed for delivering nuclear weapons on Soviet targets were modified for delivering conventional munitions in Iraq. Fighting vehicles designed for engaging Warsaw Pact forces engaged the Soviet-armed and -trained Iraqi Army. We overwhelmed the Iraqis with the AirLand Battle Doctrine that had been designed for the plains of Europe.
Most importantly, the Army possessed enough forces for waging this war while simultaneously deterring war in other theaters. The Army deployed the equivalent of seven of its eighteen combat divisions to the Middle East. With that size of force structure the Army proved flexible enough for overcoming many problems, yet fielding sufficient forces.
Some divisions were undergoing modernization programs, rendering the affected unit non-deployable for about 90 days. At least two divisions “cross-loaded” brigades with non-deployed divisions for deploying at full strength. Other divisions received separate brigades, including cannibalizing one division to replace unready “round out” National Guard brigades.
Sufficient forces remained for contingency plans, such as reinforcing the Middle East or deterring North Korea. Someone stationed on the Korean DMZ at the time confirmed that North Korea indeed “rattled its sabers.” Furthermore, in case of a long-term deployment officials in late 1990 revealed that a workable troop rotation plan was under review.
The initial air campaign (our overriding advantage) achieved air superiority in a matter of days, cutting off Iraqi forces from their command and control and logistical support, which demoralized them. Air superiority also guaranteed us detailed intelligence of Iraqi defenses while keeping the Iraqis almost totally in the dark.
When the ground war began, it had been adequately planned, supplied and rehearsed to the minutest detail. Saddam focused on a seaborne invasion into Kuwait by the First Marine Expeditionary Force. Undetected, the Army’s VII and XVIII Corps moved far to the west, and execute the now-famous “Left Hook” into Iraq. Both U.S. Army corps had three full-strength divisions, with another division held in strategic reserve.
The victory confirmed the quality of both American troops and equipment as we defeated a well-equipped, numerically-superior enemy. It further proved the superiority of our AirLand Battle doctrine as it totally dominated the Soviet-trained Iraqis.
North Korea quieted down and any warlike thoughts of the Warsaw Pact quickly disappeared. Indeed, within the year the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union both ceased to exist.
Unfortunately, American leaders – feeling invulnerable after victory in the Cold War – succumbed to an attitude of arrogance and complacency. They ignored any shortcomings in the force identified during Desert Storm because the new strategy was to focus on reducing defense spending.
The incoming Clinton administration replaced the “Powell Doctrine” with what I term the “We can do more with less” doctrine. Subsequently, the administration reduced the Army from eighteen to ten combat divisions, yet the number of missions did not reduce, but actually expanded. “Experts” at the time stated that our technological superiority would compensate for the personnel losses. If the situation warranted, the military could gain additional forces through mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves.
At the time, officials dismissed or ignored the problems encountered with the mobilization of “round out” brigades during Desert Storm. Senior officials publicly acknowledged that mobilized units required from 60 to 90 days of post-mobilization training before deployment. This was deemed adequate because we lacked the transportation assets for deploying units into theater any quicker.
No one addressed the potential of an enemy using the “Powell Doctrine” on us before these 90 days. North Korea’s strategy was, and is, seizing as much of South Korea as possible before American forces arrive in sufficient numbers. The new primary threat, Iraq, had easy access into its Gulf neighbors, across open desert borders. However, we deceived ourselves into believing that neither would strike until we had assembled our forces in theater.
Planning for post-Gulf War Iraq used virtually all CONUS-based Army divisions, some already slated for deactivation. The Army had already reduced many of those by one-third and assigned a “round out” Guard brigade. But none of these Guard brigades’ icons appeared on the maps used during contingency training exercises.
After the dust settled for an Iraq contingency, three divisions remained for other emergencies. One was stationed in Korea, a vital commitment; with another stationed in Hawaii for reinforcing Korea. The 10th Mountain Division was the only CONUS-based division available for any “what if” scenario.
The Clinton administration set American global strategy as having the capability to wage “two almost simultaneous regional conflicts,” ironically the same strategy that we had used during the Cold War. It became obvious that if this occurred, we would quickly need a massive mobilization of Guard and Reserve forces. Again, these forces required a 60- to 90-day post-mobilization train-up period before deployment.
The “Powell Doctrine” went into the “dustbin of history,” deemed irrelevant in the post-Cold War era. Our accepted strategy became that American forces would provide mostly air power and logistical support while using “allied” ground troops. The U.N. Security Council would exercise command and control, usually with no clear chain of command.
This new strategy received its baptism of fire during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. The problems encountered during this humanitarian operation could be the subject of a separate article. Media images of starving people and the inability of the international community in solving it dictated American military strategy.
continued.............