thedrifter
08-18-04, 07:00 AM
08-14-2004
Encroachment Crisis Looms Worldwide
By Matthew Dodd
All but obscured by the political debate over our overall effectiveness in the global war on terrorism are a number of issues vital to ensuring U.S. military readiness. One of the more important ones is the issue of civilian encroachment against military bases and training areas.
Sadly, it looks like military readiness is losing against the forces of encroachment.
My dictionary defines encroachment as “to enter by gradual steps or by stealth into the possessions or rights of another; to advance beyond the usual or proper limits.” The Department of Defense defines encroachment as “the cumulative result of any and all outside influences that inhibit normal military training and testing.”
Both definitions are important to understand what is going on in this very critical conflict, one that is, as I wrote in a previous article two years ago, “potentially more destructive and tougher to fight than the war against terrorism” (see “Environmentalists, Military Need to Cooperate,” DefenseWatch, Aug. 28, 2002).
When combined, the two encroachment definitions paint a pretty accurate picture of some of the challenges facing leaders who are trying to maintain a high level of military readiness. Gradually, various civilian and environmental forces are besieging a large number of military training and testing ranges. In most cases, these sieges take place over time, sometimes years, and they appear to be innocent and harmless until they “suddenly” threaten or shut down ranges. I used to believe that encroachment was limited to U.S. ranges, but now know that encroachment has become a global issue.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) released a report in June 2002 on the impacts of encroachment in the continental United States (CONUS) that contained the following assessment of the problem:
“Whenever possible, the services work around these [encroachment] issues by modifying the timing, tempo, and location of training, as well as the equipment used. However, defense officials have expressed concern that these workarounds are becoming increasingly difficult and costly and that they compromise the realism essential to effective training.”
(For the full GAO report, see “DoD Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage Encroachment on Training Ranges,” June 2002.)
Two months prior to releasing that report, GAO had issued another study specifically addressing the impacts of restrictions on overseas training, which highlighted the serious encroachment threats to our deployed forces’ military readiness:
“Non-CONUS combat units are able to meet many of their training
requirements but face a variety of training constraints that have grown
over the past decade and are likely to increase further. Units have the most
difficulty meeting their training requirements for (1) maneuver operations,
(2) live ordnance practice, and (3) night and low altitude flying. These
difficulties arise because both the European and Pacific units’ home station
training locations are not large enough to conduct specific ground
maneuvers on a regular basis; are limited in the types of munitions or use
of live fire or both; and are restricted in terms of flight hours, altitudes,
and electronic frequencies allowed. While some restrictions are long
standing, the increase in restrictions facing U.S. forces in many cases is
the result of the growing commercial and residential development on or
near previously established training areas and ranges. The construction
itself, including residential and agricultural development within training
ranges, has forced some ranges to close, reduced the training capability at
others, and often delayed training on those that remain. Continued growth
in land use and competing demands for air space near training ranges is
likely to result in further training constraints in the future.
Training constraints have a variety of adverse effects, including
(1) requiring workarounds – or adjustments to the training event – that
sometimes breed bad habits that could affect performance in combat;
(2) requiring military personnel to be away from home more often; and
(3) in some instances preventing training from being accomplished. One
potential problem with workarounds is that that they lack realism, and the
procedures used during the workaround could lead to individuals
practicing tactics that may be contrary to what would be used in combat.
For example, in actual combat, weapons are armed well before pilots
make a final approach to a target; however, in Korea, pilots are not able to
arm their weapons until the final approach on its training ranges because
of terrain limitations. This causes these pilots to learn inappropriate
combat tactics. While all units have to deploy to major training centers,
like the Army’s Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany,
to obtain some of their higher-level combined-arms training skills, we
found that all non-CONUS units had to deploy to complete training that
normally is performed at home station by CONUS units. These units
deploy to other locations within the country in which they are stationed
(or in the case of Alaska and Hawaii to other locations in the state); to
other locations within their theaters; or back to the United States to
complete training. While deployments allow the units to complete a great
deal more of their training, they result in increased costs and more time
away from home. Even with these actions, there are times when the units
are not able to accomplish required training or accomplish the training to
such a limited extent that it just minimally satisfies the requirement.
However, the adverse effects of training constraints are often not being
captured in readiness reporting. Our review of unit readiness assessments
for almost all combat units in Europe and the Pacific for the last two fiscal
years showed that the impact of limitations and restrictions on training
were rarely reflected in unit readiness reports.
U.S. military commands and services are taking a variety of actions to
address constraints, such as negotiating with host governments to lessen
restrictions on existing training areas, but such actions are often done at
an individual-service level and sometimes create unforeseen problems for
other services and for existing training capabilities. For example, Air
Force pilots at Misawa Air Base in northern Japan are allowed to use a
nearby Japanese air base to land their F-16s during inclement weather but
are not able to practice for this maneuver because of an agreement
reached by local Japanese military officials and a local U.S. Navy official
when Misawa was a U.S. Navy installation. Under the agreement, Navy P-3
aircraft were allowed to practice such landings, but U.S. fighter aircraft
could not. At the time, the Navy had no fighter aircraft at Misawa, and the
limitation did not seem significant. The regional military commands do not
have a strategy for coordinating efforts to improve training that could
prevent the individual services from pursuing solutions to their training
shortfalls that are unintentionally detrimental to other services or that
unintentionally sacrifice some training capabilities to improve others.”
One of the first publicized global encroachment battlefields was the live-fire range complex at Vieques Island, Puerto Rico. After a civilian range guard was killed there in a live-fire training accident in the early 1990s, encroachment advocates unleashed a relentless barrage of allegations highlighting the harmful effects of live-fire on the environment and on the health of the island’s population. The Defense Department fought long and hard to justify its required live-fire pre-deployment training requirements for Navy and Marine Corps units, but eventually the Vieques ranges were closed.
(To read the full GAO report, see “Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas But Are Not Reflected in Readiness Reporting,” April 2002.)
As DefenseWatch Editor Ed Offley pointed out in a column on Dec. 18, 2003 (“Back to Iraq – with a Florida Detour”):
“Since the closure of Vieques Island in Puerto Rico to such [live-fire pre-deployment] training, the Pentagon has been forced to disperse units nearing their deployment readiness certification to smaller ranges all up and down the east coast [like Florida’s Eglin Air Force Base].”
The latest global encroachment battlefield is a historic battlefield that is sacred to all Marines – Iwo Jima (see “Six Men, One Flag and an Immortal Symbol of Freedom,” DefenseWatch, Feb, 27, 2002). An Associated Press article on July 15, 2004 described how Iwo Jima became the latest publicized encroachment battlefield:
“Chosen 15 years ago by the Japanese government as a temporary solution to complaints over noise at a U.S. Navy airfield in Atsugi, a crowded Tokyo suburb, this famous World War II battleground has become a major training center for pilots assigned to the USS Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier. But, once again, it has also become the focus of an intense battle.”
The AP article went on to explain the inherent problems with training at or near Atsugi and the Navy’s work-around training at Iwo Jima – the same problems highlighted in both GAO reports:
continued..
Encroachment Crisis Looms Worldwide
By Matthew Dodd
All but obscured by the political debate over our overall effectiveness in the global war on terrorism are a number of issues vital to ensuring U.S. military readiness. One of the more important ones is the issue of civilian encroachment against military bases and training areas.
Sadly, it looks like military readiness is losing against the forces of encroachment.
My dictionary defines encroachment as “to enter by gradual steps or by stealth into the possessions or rights of another; to advance beyond the usual or proper limits.” The Department of Defense defines encroachment as “the cumulative result of any and all outside influences that inhibit normal military training and testing.”
Both definitions are important to understand what is going on in this very critical conflict, one that is, as I wrote in a previous article two years ago, “potentially more destructive and tougher to fight than the war against terrorism” (see “Environmentalists, Military Need to Cooperate,” DefenseWatch, Aug. 28, 2002).
When combined, the two encroachment definitions paint a pretty accurate picture of some of the challenges facing leaders who are trying to maintain a high level of military readiness. Gradually, various civilian and environmental forces are besieging a large number of military training and testing ranges. In most cases, these sieges take place over time, sometimes years, and they appear to be innocent and harmless until they “suddenly” threaten or shut down ranges. I used to believe that encroachment was limited to U.S. ranges, but now know that encroachment has become a global issue.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) released a report in June 2002 on the impacts of encroachment in the continental United States (CONUS) that contained the following assessment of the problem:
“Whenever possible, the services work around these [encroachment] issues by modifying the timing, tempo, and location of training, as well as the equipment used. However, defense officials have expressed concern that these workarounds are becoming increasingly difficult and costly and that they compromise the realism essential to effective training.”
(For the full GAO report, see “DoD Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage Encroachment on Training Ranges,” June 2002.)
Two months prior to releasing that report, GAO had issued another study specifically addressing the impacts of restrictions on overseas training, which highlighted the serious encroachment threats to our deployed forces’ military readiness:
“Non-CONUS combat units are able to meet many of their training
requirements but face a variety of training constraints that have grown
over the past decade and are likely to increase further. Units have the most
difficulty meeting their training requirements for (1) maneuver operations,
(2) live ordnance practice, and (3) night and low altitude flying. These
difficulties arise because both the European and Pacific units’ home station
training locations are not large enough to conduct specific ground
maneuvers on a regular basis; are limited in the types of munitions or use
of live fire or both; and are restricted in terms of flight hours, altitudes,
and electronic frequencies allowed. While some restrictions are long
standing, the increase in restrictions facing U.S. forces in many cases is
the result of the growing commercial and residential development on or
near previously established training areas and ranges. The construction
itself, including residential and agricultural development within training
ranges, has forced some ranges to close, reduced the training capability at
others, and often delayed training on those that remain. Continued growth
in land use and competing demands for air space near training ranges is
likely to result in further training constraints in the future.
Training constraints have a variety of adverse effects, including
(1) requiring workarounds – or adjustments to the training event – that
sometimes breed bad habits that could affect performance in combat;
(2) requiring military personnel to be away from home more often; and
(3) in some instances preventing training from being accomplished. One
potential problem with workarounds is that that they lack realism, and the
procedures used during the workaround could lead to individuals
practicing tactics that may be contrary to what would be used in combat.
For example, in actual combat, weapons are armed well before pilots
make a final approach to a target; however, in Korea, pilots are not able to
arm their weapons until the final approach on its training ranges because
of terrain limitations. This causes these pilots to learn inappropriate
combat tactics. While all units have to deploy to major training centers,
like the Army’s Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany,
to obtain some of their higher-level combined-arms training skills, we
found that all non-CONUS units had to deploy to complete training that
normally is performed at home station by CONUS units. These units
deploy to other locations within the country in which they are stationed
(or in the case of Alaska and Hawaii to other locations in the state); to
other locations within their theaters; or back to the United States to
complete training. While deployments allow the units to complete a great
deal more of their training, they result in increased costs and more time
away from home. Even with these actions, there are times when the units
are not able to accomplish required training or accomplish the training to
such a limited extent that it just minimally satisfies the requirement.
However, the adverse effects of training constraints are often not being
captured in readiness reporting. Our review of unit readiness assessments
for almost all combat units in Europe and the Pacific for the last two fiscal
years showed that the impact of limitations and restrictions on training
were rarely reflected in unit readiness reports.
U.S. military commands and services are taking a variety of actions to
address constraints, such as negotiating with host governments to lessen
restrictions on existing training areas, but such actions are often done at
an individual-service level and sometimes create unforeseen problems for
other services and for existing training capabilities. For example, Air
Force pilots at Misawa Air Base in northern Japan are allowed to use a
nearby Japanese air base to land their F-16s during inclement weather but
are not able to practice for this maneuver because of an agreement
reached by local Japanese military officials and a local U.S. Navy official
when Misawa was a U.S. Navy installation. Under the agreement, Navy P-3
aircraft were allowed to practice such landings, but U.S. fighter aircraft
could not. At the time, the Navy had no fighter aircraft at Misawa, and the
limitation did not seem significant. The regional military commands do not
have a strategy for coordinating efforts to improve training that could
prevent the individual services from pursuing solutions to their training
shortfalls that are unintentionally detrimental to other services or that
unintentionally sacrifice some training capabilities to improve others.”
One of the first publicized global encroachment battlefields was the live-fire range complex at Vieques Island, Puerto Rico. After a civilian range guard was killed there in a live-fire training accident in the early 1990s, encroachment advocates unleashed a relentless barrage of allegations highlighting the harmful effects of live-fire on the environment and on the health of the island’s population. The Defense Department fought long and hard to justify its required live-fire pre-deployment training requirements for Navy and Marine Corps units, but eventually the Vieques ranges were closed.
(To read the full GAO report, see “Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas But Are Not Reflected in Readiness Reporting,” April 2002.)
As DefenseWatch Editor Ed Offley pointed out in a column on Dec. 18, 2003 (“Back to Iraq – with a Florida Detour”):
“Since the closure of Vieques Island in Puerto Rico to such [live-fire pre-deployment] training, the Pentagon has been forced to disperse units nearing their deployment readiness certification to smaller ranges all up and down the east coast [like Florida’s Eglin Air Force Base].”
The latest global encroachment battlefield is a historic battlefield that is sacred to all Marines – Iwo Jima (see “Six Men, One Flag and an Immortal Symbol of Freedom,” DefenseWatch, Feb, 27, 2002). An Associated Press article on July 15, 2004 described how Iwo Jima became the latest publicized encroachment battlefield:
“Chosen 15 years ago by the Japanese government as a temporary solution to complaints over noise at a U.S. Navy airfield in Atsugi, a crowded Tokyo suburb, this famous World War II battleground has become a major training center for pilots assigned to the USS Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier. But, once again, it has also become the focus of an intense battle.”
The AP article went on to explain the inherent problems with training at or near Atsugi and the Navy’s work-around training at Iwo Jima – the same problems highlighted in both GAO reports:
continued..