thedrifter
08-10-04, 12:24 PM
The Workhorse of the Pacific
by MAJ Henry B. Cook, ANG
The landing craft vehicle personnel was the amphibious workhorse of World War II (WWII).
Without its versatile aspects and the foresight of key individuals in the United States, its accomplishments would not have occurred.
Introduction
Waterborne vessels have been used to transport troops and equipment across bodies of water for many centuries. The Persians, Greeks, and Romans used galleys to conquer or subjugate most of the Mediterranean area before the time of Christ. The Norsemen used longboats to extend their sphere of influence to the Baltic region, eastern and western Europe, and the New World. Many warring factions gained advantages and won great battles by employing watercraft. The concept of amphibious operations and the use of landing craft have evolved throughout time to fit the particular needs of many different amphibious forces. The battlefields of the 20th century were no exception. In WWII the Allies studied previous conflicts and developed doctrine and tactics to capitalize on lessons learned from waterborne warfare. The most important result of the modern development of amphibious warfare was the use of the landing craft vehicle personnel (LCVP) and other forms of landing vessels and craft to accomplish the mission to free the world from Fascist tyranny. The landing craft allowed the flexibility for amphibious forces to lessen their immediate dependence on fixed port facilities.1
Genesis of Amphibious Operations
Amphibious operations exploit the element of surprise and capitalize on enemy weaknesses by projecting and applying combat power at the most advantageous location and time.2 The United States Army (USA) used amphibious operations in 1847 by landing an army at Veracruz, Mexico in the enemy rear, and then marched on Mexico City to defeat Santa Ana’s army and win the Mexican-American War.3 The USA used amphibious operations again during the Spanish-American War. It landed troops in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, and defeated the Spanish in both the Caribbean and the Pacific.4 The British used amphibious operations in WWI to attack the Ottoman Turk Empire at the Dardanelles.5 It did not conclude with a British victory, but many valuable lessons were learned and applied to amphibious assaults and landings that occurred later during WWII.
Previous to WWII, amphibious operations were conducted with whatever lifeboats or small craft might be readily available aboard the various war ships in the fleet. These craft were used because there were no other vessels available for the task. In essence, there were no viable landing craft designed and used primarily for landing troops and equipment across unimproved beaches. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) was one of the few institutions in the U.S. military that anticipated a need for a modern landing craft. The USMC knew what its mission would be if a war broke out with Japan. The Marines knew that they would need a better form of transportation to get from the ships to the shore. It was unfortunate that during the opening phases of WWII most naval leaders and planners considered the building of landing craft to be foolhardy.6 The United States Navy (USN) felt that the limited resources they had available would be better utilized by building large combatant and cargo ships. The USN did not see the big picture and they were stuck within a myopic prewar concept of a large combatant fleet controlling the sea and strangling an opponent into submission through sea control. Putting troops ashore to control the territory or set up staging areas would just be an incidental bump in the road.
Birth of the Modern Landing Craft
In the late 1930s the USN set up a committee in the Naval Bureau of Construction and Repair (BCR) to design a modern landing craft that would meet the needs of the USMC and USA. Its charter was to establish the mission need and to determine the operational requirements of a new boat or craft to be used primarily for landing personnel during amphibious operations. Due to lack of foresight or resistance to change, the BCR was stuck in a paradigm of having a landing craft very similar to the vessel being used ad hoc in the fleet. They were trying a transitional approach to a problem that needed a transformational solution.
There were several boat manufacturers as well as the BCR developing landing craft designs for the USN. The BCR had its own vested interest in designing a craft that would keep it in business as long as possible.7 The bureau did not take very much interest in a small-time boat builder in the south by the name of Andrew Jackson Higgins from New Orleans, LA.8 Higgins’ background did not impress the BCR. They felt that he was not educated and sufficiently trained in naval architecture. He could not possibly solve the complex problems associated with a modern landing craft.
Higgins had developed, by accident, a small craft that did not draw much water but could still maintain a respectful speed and carry cargo. The Higgins vessel was called the “Eureka.” It had a superior handling capability and could beach and retract with ease. It could also run over large floating objects and not destruct its underwater gear, propellers, and rudders.9
The BCR begrudgingly allowed a competitive test and trial, due to Higgins’ persistence and political logrolling. It was revealed that the Higgins Eureka boat outperformed all challengers.10 The Eureka design became the pattern for the landing craft personnel (LCP). The LCP had a solid bow, as all other vessels had prior to that time. The bow ramp, as remembered by anyone who has seen a war movie including landing craft, was not incorporated until 1941.11 Embarked troops had to exit the vessel by jumping over the side until the bow ramp was added. The bow ramp, as we know it, was designed in one night by some of Higgins Industries boat designers. Once the ramp was designed and installed on the LCP, it became known as the LCVP. This innovative bow ramp allowed troops to exit the boat quickly and also carry rolling stock, such as a 4 x 4 jeep. The LCVP could land a platoon of 36 with their equipment, or a jeep and 12 men.12
Although the USMC, USA, and British clamored for landing craft, the USN reverted to a WWI strategy and “declared that they could foresee no need for landing craft in a war with Germany.”13 The USN believed that landing craft would be required to execute the overall strategy for only the Pacific theater of the war. This frustrated the British. They realized that such archaic thinking would place the priority for landing craft below that of other types of ships being built in the United States at the time.14 The lack of adequate foresight ended up delaying the execution of Operation OVERLORD—the invasion of Europe—by 1 month.15 In the end, it was discovered that the USN had programmed 31,123 landing craft for conducting the Pacific campaigns, but only 2,493 for Operation OVERLORD.16 The naval leadership did not appear to understand the strategic implications of their shortsightedness. It took the direct intervention of GEN George C. Marshall to rectify the problem.
Over 20,000 Higgins boats were manufactured by the end of WWII. The LCVP held the honor of transporting more allied troops during the war than all other types of landing craft put together.17 The LCVP carried troops ashore in all European, African, Middle Eastern, Asian, and Pacific theaters of operations during the war.18 The boat’s utility and versatility ensured the LCVP’s place in history. Col Joseph H. Alexander, USMC(Ret) stated:
The Higgins boats broke the gridlock on the ship-to-shore movement. It is impossible to overstate the tactical advantages his craft gave U.S. amphibious commanders in World War II.19
The design and ultimate use of the LCVP prompted President Dwight D. Eisenhower to proclaim that A.J Higgins was “the man who won the war for us.”20 He went on to state, “If Higgins had not designed and built those LCVP’s, we never could have landed over an open beach. The whole strategy of the war would have been different.”21
continued.........
by MAJ Henry B. Cook, ANG
The landing craft vehicle personnel was the amphibious workhorse of World War II (WWII).
Without its versatile aspects and the foresight of key individuals in the United States, its accomplishments would not have occurred.
Introduction
Waterborne vessels have been used to transport troops and equipment across bodies of water for many centuries. The Persians, Greeks, and Romans used galleys to conquer or subjugate most of the Mediterranean area before the time of Christ. The Norsemen used longboats to extend their sphere of influence to the Baltic region, eastern and western Europe, and the New World. Many warring factions gained advantages and won great battles by employing watercraft. The concept of amphibious operations and the use of landing craft have evolved throughout time to fit the particular needs of many different amphibious forces. The battlefields of the 20th century were no exception. In WWII the Allies studied previous conflicts and developed doctrine and tactics to capitalize on lessons learned from waterborne warfare. The most important result of the modern development of amphibious warfare was the use of the landing craft vehicle personnel (LCVP) and other forms of landing vessels and craft to accomplish the mission to free the world from Fascist tyranny. The landing craft allowed the flexibility for amphibious forces to lessen their immediate dependence on fixed port facilities.1
Genesis of Amphibious Operations
Amphibious operations exploit the element of surprise and capitalize on enemy weaknesses by projecting and applying combat power at the most advantageous location and time.2 The United States Army (USA) used amphibious operations in 1847 by landing an army at Veracruz, Mexico in the enemy rear, and then marched on Mexico City to defeat Santa Ana’s army and win the Mexican-American War.3 The USA used amphibious operations again during the Spanish-American War. It landed troops in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, and defeated the Spanish in both the Caribbean and the Pacific.4 The British used amphibious operations in WWI to attack the Ottoman Turk Empire at the Dardanelles.5 It did not conclude with a British victory, but many valuable lessons were learned and applied to amphibious assaults and landings that occurred later during WWII.
Previous to WWII, amphibious operations were conducted with whatever lifeboats or small craft might be readily available aboard the various war ships in the fleet. These craft were used because there were no other vessels available for the task. In essence, there were no viable landing craft designed and used primarily for landing troops and equipment across unimproved beaches. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) was one of the few institutions in the U.S. military that anticipated a need for a modern landing craft. The USMC knew what its mission would be if a war broke out with Japan. The Marines knew that they would need a better form of transportation to get from the ships to the shore. It was unfortunate that during the opening phases of WWII most naval leaders and planners considered the building of landing craft to be foolhardy.6 The United States Navy (USN) felt that the limited resources they had available would be better utilized by building large combatant and cargo ships. The USN did not see the big picture and they were stuck within a myopic prewar concept of a large combatant fleet controlling the sea and strangling an opponent into submission through sea control. Putting troops ashore to control the territory or set up staging areas would just be an incidental bump in the road.
Birth of the Modern Landing Craft
In the late 1930s the USN set up a committee in the Naval Bureau of Construction and Repair (BCR) to design a modern landing craft that would meet the needs of the USMC and USA. Its charter was to establish the mission need and to determine the operational requirements of a new boat or craft to be used primarily for landing personnel during amphibious operations. Due to lack of foresight or resistance to change, the BCR was stuck in a paradigm of having a landing craft very similar to the vessel being used ad hoc in the fleet. They were trying a transitional approach to a problem that needed a transformational solution.
There were several boat manufacturers as well as the BCR developing landing craft designs for the USN. The BCR had its own vested interest in designing a craft that would keep it in business as long as possible.7 The bureau did not take very much interest in a small-time boat builder in the south by the name of Andrew Jackson Higgins from New Orleans, LA.8 Higgins’ background did not impress the BCR. They felt that he was not educated and sufficiently trained in naval architecture. He could not possibly solve the complex problems associated with a modern landing craft.
Higgins had developed, by accident, a small craft that did not draw much water but could still maintain a respectful speed and carry cargo. The Higgins vessel was called the “Eureka.” It had a superior handling capability and could beach and retract with ease. It could also run over large floating objects and not destruct its underwater gear, propellers, and rudders.9
The BCR begrudgingly allowed a competitive test and trial, due to Higgins’ persistence and political logrolling. It was revealed that the Higgins Eureka boat outperformed all challengers.10 The Eureka design became the pattern for the landing craft personnel (LCP). The LCP had a solid bow, as all other vessels had prior to that time. The bow ramp, as remembered by anyone who has seen a war movie including landing craft, was not incorporated until 1941.11 Embarked troops had to exit the vessel by jumping over the side until the bow ramp was added. The bow ramp, as we know it, was designed in one night by some of Higgins Industries boat designers. Once the ramp was designed and installed on the LCP, it became known as the LCVP. This innovative bow ramp allowed troops to exit the boat quickly and also carry rolling stock, such as a 4 x 4 jeep. The LCVP could land a platoon of 36 with their equipment, or a jeep and 12 men.12
Although the USMC, USA, and British clamored for landing craft, the USN reverted to a WWI strategy and “declared that they could foresee no need for landing craft in a war with Germany.”13 The USN believed that landing craft would be required to execute the overall strategy for only the Pacific theater of the war. This frustrated the British. They realized that such archaic thinking would place the priority for landing craft below that of other types of ships being built in the United States at the time.14 The lack of adequate foresight ended up delaying the execution of Operation OVERLORD—the invasion of Europe—by 1 month.15 In the end, it was discovered that the USN had programmed 31,123 landing craft for conducting the Pacific campaigns, but only 2,493 for Operation OVERLORD.16 The naval leadership did not appear to understand the strategic implications of their shortsightedness. It took the direct intervention of GEN George C. Marshall to rectify the problem.
Over 20,000 Higgins boats were manufactured by the end of WWII. The LCVP held the honor of transporting more allied troops during the war than all other types of landing craft put together.17 The LCVP carried troops ashore in all European, African, Middle Eastern, Asian, and Pacific theaters of operations during the war.18 The boat’s utility and versatility ensured the LCVP’s place in history. Col Joseph H. Alexander, USMC(Ret) stated:
The Higgins boats broke the gridlock on the ship-to-shore movement. It is impossible to overstate the tactical advantages his craft gave U.S. amphibious commanders in World War II.19
The design and ultimate use of the LCVP prompted President Dwight D. Eisenhower to proclaim that A.J Higgins was “the man who won the war for us.”20 He went on to state, “If Higgins had not designed and built those LCVP’s, we never could have landed over an open beach. The whole strategy of the war would have been different.”21
continued.........