PDA

View Full Version : Torture as an Interrogation Technique


thedrifter
07-22-04, 09:21 AM
Torture as an Interrogation Technique

By: Maj. Anthony F. Milavic, USMC (Ret.)

Over the past eight-ten months, the manner in which the American Armed Forces handle detainees has been called into question: the LTC West incident in August of last year, photographs from a place called Abu Ghraib, and reports of Afghans/Iraqis dying while in U.S. custody. Overarching these events, there has been an almost worldwide accusation that "Americans are torturing detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan!" In the arena of public opinion, all these have been called "torture" regardless of judicial definition. Recently, I had the pleasure of addressing the faculty and students of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the staff of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, OSD on torture as an interrogation technique. This presentation is intended to share with a still larger audience some of the observations made with those two groups.

The Third Geneva Convention, which covers prisoners of war, says in part, "no physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion may be inflicted" to secure information and prisoners who refuse to answer, "may not be threatened, insulted or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind." The Fourth Geneva Convention, which covers persons held under foreign occupation, has less precise rules on interrogation but
still bans all "physical or moral coercion" to obtain information. The U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which covers ALL people under a states jurisdiction, attempts to define torture by stating in part: "the term 'torture' means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . .." This Convention also "distinguishes between torture and other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture . . .." The United States Congress has ratified the two Geneva Conventions cited above, but has yet to ratify our commitment to the U.N. Convention. There was also some confusion as to who was a Prisoner of War in our war on terror; all that was put to rest with the following 7 Feb. 2002 directive from President Bush:


"Our values as a nation, values that we share with many nations in the world, call for us to treat detainees humanely, including those who are not legally entitled to such treatment. As a matter of policy, the U.S. armed forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely, and to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva."


In addition to being illegal, these acts are usually ineffective and frequently counter-productive. The Romans threatened the early Christians with crucifixion, being burned at the stake, or being thrown to the lions if they did not reject their new religion and embrace the many gods of Roman: Thousands chose death. Joan of Arc was tried before an ecclesiastical tribunal accused of witchcraft and heresy because she claimed to be guided by divine voices. She was told to admit that she heard no such voices or be burned at the stake: She was not dissuaded by death. William Wallace, of "Braveheart" popularity, was hanged, drawn and quartered because he refused to swear allegiance to "Longshank." The threat of certain and excruciating death was ineffective in dissuading these and their deaths had opposite effects: the slaughter of Christians contributed to the conversion of Rome; Joan of Arc is widely remembered today while few remember the name of the French king who caused her to be tried; and, the death of William Wallace invigorated the Scots to successively ejected the English from Scotland.

This is not to say that coercive techniques fail to influence or prompt action. Four days after the war started and two days after he was captured, an American lieutenant has heard broadcasting over Radio Seoul on behalf of his North Korean "liberators." He was followed by others making similar statements and even confessions of using "germ warfare" weapons against the North Koreans and their Chinese allies. It wasn't long before an American journalist stepped forward and explained what was happening to America's sons, husbands and fathers: "Americans are being Brainwashed in Korea." Although these men were not "tortured," they were coerced into saying what the Koreans/Chinese wanted them to say. Some, faced with disciplinary action upon returning to the United States, argued that they said those things because they knew that no one would believe them. During the Vietnam War, Americans were tortured into making confessions of using bacteriological weapons against the North Vietnamese and other acts considered to be criminal by the world community.

Since its advent, criminals have been exonerated by DNA science. Some of these convictions were even based on confessions to capital crimes such as rape and murder. How could an innocent man confess to such a crime? One plausible explanation is that they were coerced into making the confessions.

On 27 May 2004, The New York Times reported that on 30 August 2003, LTC Alvin B. West, an artillery battalion commander, detained an Iraqi police officer named Yehiya Kadoori Hamoodi because he believed the officer knew about threats on his life. The Interrogation of Hamoodi, that included hitting him and threatening his life, failed to produce the desired answers. West the forced the man's head into a container and fired his pistol next to his head. Hamoodi gave West the names of several men who were purportedly involved in an effort to kill him. One man was picked up and shortly thereafter released; none of the named men were determined to be involved in a plot to kill West and Hamoodi later stated that he gave those names because he feared for his life.

According to a 12 June 2004 Navy Times story, two Marines, during "motion hearings" held on 28 & 29 June 2004, faced charges in connection with the death of Nagem Sadoon Hatab, a 52-year-old Baath party member who was being held in a makeshift detention center outside Nasiriya. Reportedly, Hatab had been struck and kicked on 4 June 2003 and the following day was lethargic and had defecated on himself. On 6 June, he was found dead.

As these examples show, the use of torture/abusive techniques frequently fails to elicit the desired response, at times, produces a false response, and, can result in the death of a potential source of information: A dead source is no source of information!

Practitioners of torture have frequently been described as being antisocial, bullies or products of a culture of violence; this is not always the case.

In the summer of 1991, Stanford University conducted a psychology experiment in prison life. College students that had been screened for normalcy were broken down into two groups, one of prisoners and the other guards, and placed in a prison environment for a scheduled two weeks. The experiment "had to be ended prematurely after only six days because of what the situation was doing to the college students who participated. In only a few days, our guards became sadistic and our prisoners became depressed and showed signs of extreme stress." In other words, people given extraordinary power quickly turn sadistic.

On 1 June 2004, the Washington Post reported that: "On May 1, a U.S. Army investigator took the stand in a criminal proceeding in Baghdad against one of the seven military police soldiers charged in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. There was, he said, 'absolutely no evidence' that military intelligence officers or the military police chain of command had authorized the abuse to aid interrogations. 'These individuals were acting on their own,' said Army special agent Tyler Pieron, who investigated the case for the Criminal Investigation Division. 'The photos I saw, and the totality of our interviews, show that certain individuals were just having fun at the expense of the prisoners. Taking pictures of sexual positions, the assaults and things along that nature were done simply because they could. It all happened after hours.'"

A 14 July 2004 Denver Post editorial reported that in January 2004, members of the Army's 3rd Brigade Combat team detained two Iraqi civilians. After first telling the men they could go, the soldiers forced the pair to jump from a bridge into the Tigris River. One survived, the other didn't. The survivor told The Associated Press the soldiers laughed while the pair struggled for their lives in the river's strong current.

Lastly, MG Antonio Taguba, USA, was tasked with investigating reports of improprieties at detention facilities in Iraq. Conclusion #1 of his report entitled, "ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE," reads:

"Several US Army Soldiers have committed egregious acts and grave breaches of international law at Abu Ghraib/BCCF and Camp Bucca, Iraq. Furthermore, key senior leaders in both the 800th MP Brigade and the 205th MI Brigade failed to comply with established regulations, policies, and command directives in preventing detainee abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and at Camp Bucca during the period August 2003 to February 2004."

During his public testimony, MG Taguba said that these guards were untrained and unsupervised.


continued.......

thedrifter
07-22-04, 09:22 AM
Certainly, torture is not the sole property of loose canons; this technique is also employed by those who believe it is the right thing to do.

On 21 Oct. 2001, Walter Pincus reported in the Washington Post that FBI agents were becoming frustrated in their efforts to glean information from terrorist suspects and "it could get to the spot where we could go to pressure."

On 23 Jan. 2002, Mike Wallace interviewed two people on the issue of torturing terrorists during interrogation: French Maj. Gen. Paul Aussaresses and Harvard law professor Alan M. Dershowitz. Aussaresses was asked whether he would use torture to force Al Qaeda suspects to talk. He answered in English and without hesitation: "it seems to me that it is obvious." He is the author of the book, The Battle of the Casbah; Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria 1955-1957 where he describes his use of torture against Algerian insurgents associated with the National Liberation Front (FLN). Aussaresses had no intelligence training when he took the job he writes about in the book and his instruction in interrogation came froma members of the Gendarmerie : "They quickly informed me that the best way to force a terrorist who refused to disclose what he knew was to torture him."The book is also replete with stories of summary executions of those who admitted to being involved with the FLN or those who were fingered by tortured Algerians; he doesn't mention any effort to confirm an accusation before he executed the accused. Nevertheless, he justifies the use of torture by saying that its use was instrumental in defeating the insurgents in the Casbah by 1957 even though he admits many mearly withdrew to the Atlas Mountains only to return later and expedite the withdrawal of France from Algeria in 1962.

The self-described civil libertarian, Alan Dershowitz, wrote and published a book in 2002 entitled, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge. In Chapter Four, he calls for the use of "nonlethal" torture in "ticking bomb" situations. Unfortunately, he neither tells use how we can be sure that an event is imminent nor how one can be sure that the torture applied will not have a fatal result. On the surface, his
recommendation of pushing needles under someone's fingernails appears to be a nonfatal technique. But, can we be sure in the case of an older source with a heart problem. However, true to his legal credentials, he believes that the torture must be first approved by a judge. As evidence that torture works, Dershowitz describes an event that took place in the Philippines in 1995. It seems the police captured one Abdul Hakim Murad after finding a bomb-making factory in his apartment in Manila. They beat him and broke his ribs, burned him with cigarettes, forced water down his throat, then threatened to turn him over to the Israelis. Sixty-seven days later he broke and told of a terror plots to blow up 11 airliners, crash another into the headquarters of the CIA and to assassinate the Pope. The Philippine police turned him over to U.S. authorities. Unsaid here is which of these purported plots were confirmed. Also, I find it curious that Dershowitz would argue for the use of torture in a "ticking bomb" situation based on a torture-interrogation example that took sixty-seven days to bring to fruition. It is a long-standing doctrinal precept that detainee information is highly perishable and, for time sensitive information, has a shelf-life of only 48 hours.

It is not the purpose of this presentation to demonstrate the U.S. Armed Forces doctrinal techniques of interrogation that have been honed over the years and are known and used by both military and law enforcement agencies worldwide. For the curious, I invite you to read FM 34-52 INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION (1992). You might also enjoy: The Interrogator: The Story of Hanns Joachim Scharff Master Interrogator of the Luftwaffe. This German interrogator purportedly gleaned information from every one of the American and British fighter pilots he interrogated without ever resorting to violence. This is not surprising when you consider: according to WO Brian Copeland of the Navy/Marine Intelligence Training Course, Dam Neck, Va. the current Marine Corps interrogation doctrine includes the precept that 98% of detainees respond to direct questioning. Even Gen Aussaresses admits in his book, "most of the time I didn't need to resort to torture, but only talk to people." This, of course, is known to trained professional interrogators as are those approach techniques that work with the other 2%--the operant words here are "trained professional interrogators." A second precept that is constantly on the mind of a trained interrogator is that: The interrogator does not know what the source knows or is able to communicate. Think about it, isn't that the reason the interrogation is being conducted? This point has profound implications for those who are untrained and/or inclined to use coercion. For example:

The following is a partial extract from the 11 July 2004, New York Times Magazine:

Memoir
Interrogation Unbound
By Hyder Akbar, as told to Susan Burton

It was a Wednesday afternoon in June 2003, and Abdul Wali was being interrogated by three Americans at their base near Asadabad, Afghanistan. I was interpreting. At the time, Wali's family guessed his age to be 28; he was 10 years older than I was. I'm 19 now. I grew up mostly in the Bay Area suburbs, but since the fall of the Taliban, I've been spending summers in Afghanistan, working alongside my father, Said Fazel Akbar, the governor of Kunar, a rural province in the eastern part of the country. It's a strange double life. I sometimes stumble into situations in which I'm called upon to act as a kind of cultural translator. It's a role that can leave me tense and frustrated, or far worse: I came away from Wali's interrogation feeling something close to despair.

On June 18, 2003, Abdul Wali visited my father's office. He knew that the Americans wanted to question him about some recent rocket attacks. He told us he was innocent, and he said he was terrified of going to the U.S. base, because there were pervasive rumors that prisoners were tortured there. My father told him that he needed to go, and he sent me along to reassure him.

A half-hour later, Wali and I were sitting across from three men I then knew only by their first names: Steve, Brian and Dave, who proved to be David A. Passaro. It was more than 100 degrees in the small room, and above us, a fan whirred wildly.

The interrogation started casually enough. In his friendly Southern accent, Brian dispensed with the nuts and bolts: have you been in contact with Taliban? Were you Taliban? Then the subject turned to Wali's recent visit to Pakistan.

"How long ago were you in Pakistan?" Brian asked.

Wali looked confused, and I doubted he'd be able to answer. People in Kunar don't have calendars; most of them don't even know how old they are.

"You don't have to give a specific date," Brian said. "Was it two, three days ago? Two, three weeks ago? Two, three months ago?"

"I don't know," Wali responded. "It's really hard for me to say."

The Americans exchanged glances. I prodded him: "Can you at least say a week or two weeks or a month or two months, or something?" But he couldn't. For him, as for many of his countrymen, time unfolded forward—there was no way to go back later and try to fix it in a structure.

"I just, I go to sleep, I wake up and there's a next day," he explained.

"I feed myself, I go to sleep and there's a next day."

The Americans weren't buying it. Dave took over the questioning.

He asked Wali where he had been 14 days earlier, on a night when three rockets were fired at the American base. "How could you not know where you were on the night three rockets were fired?" he said. Wali explained that his nights were often punctuated by explosions.

Even seated, Dave seemed enlarged by anger. His demeanor felt put on, as if he were acting the role of a fearsome interrogator (especially in comparison to Brian, whose Southern hospitality softened even his grilling of this suspected terrorist). Dave fixed Wali with an unrelenting stare. Wali returned a nervous smile.

"Translate this to him!" Dave exploded: "This is not a joking matter! Don't smile!"

"I'm sorry, I didn't mean to offend him," Wali replied anxiously. "It's very hard for me. I can't understand anything he's saying. He was staring at me, and I didn't know what to do. What should I do?" he asked me.

I wasn't sure how to react. Dave's behavior was unpredictable. Only days earlier, he and I had a friendly conversation about his little son, who could say his ABC's and count from 1 to 20 and back down again. But now he was acting as if he was full of rage. "If you're lying, your whole family, your kids, they'll all get hurt from this," he threatened.

As I translated, I started to feel as if Dave's words to Wali were my own, and all I wanted to do was stop saying these things to him.

"Your situation's getting worse," Dave warned. How was I supposed to tell that to Wali, when my father had assured him that coming to the base would make everything better?

continued..........

thedrifter
07-22-04, 09:23 AM
Nobody was behaving the way they would with a regular translator; both sides added comments meant only for me. In one ear, I had Wali pleading: "I'm innocent, I'm innocent." In the other, I had Brian dismissing his account: "That is impossible." What was I supposed to do, argue or agree?

At some point, I announced that Wali was making personal, emotional appeals to me, and that the other translator in the room—a local Afghan employed at the base—should take over. Then I quietly tried to share my largest concern with Brian. "I'm not going to translate for this guy," I whispered. "Look how he's acting."
"What do you mean?" Brian replied, perhaps misunderstanding. "I'm totally calm."

"You're calm, but look at Dave," I said.

Brian shrugged his shoulders.

As the interrogation continued, I was relieved to be on the sidelines, but still, it wasn't easy to watch Dave browbeat Wali. Finally the questions stopped, and Wali stood facing the wall as the Americans patted him down in preparation for detention. "Is there anything you want to give to your family?" Dave asked him.

The question terrified Wali. "No, no," he stuttered.

I approached Wali and, to calm him, put my hand on his shoulder.
"Just say the truth," I told him, trying to sound normal. "Nothing is going to happen if you just say the truth." Then I walked out of the room, promising myself that I'd come back and check up on him.

He died before I got the chance.

On June 17 of this year, a federal grand jury indicted C.I.A. contractor, David A. Passaro, in connection with his assault. Passaro, the first civilian to be charged in the investigation of prisoner abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan, is accused of beating Wali using his hands, his feet and a large flashlight.

End.


"In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military."

Gen. Douglas MacArthur


Semper Training,

Anthony F. Milavic
Major USMC (Ret.)