Exchange serves Marines holding line outside Fallujah [Archive] - Marine Corps

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thedrifter

07-22-04, 08:05 AM

Exchange serves Marines holding line outside Fallujah 
Submitted by: I Marine Expeditionary Force 
Story Identification #: 200472054535 
Story by Sgt. Colin Wyers 
 
 
 
CAMP FALLUJAH, Iraq (July...

thedrifter

07-22-04, 08:06 AM

CMC visits 3rd MAW personnel in Iraqi desert 
Submitted by: 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing 
Story Identification #: 20047228238 
Story by - compiled by 3rd MAW PAO 
 
 
 
AL ASAD, Iraq (July 22, 2004) --...

thedrifter

07-22-04, 08:07 AM

U.S. Marines Kill 25 Fighters in Battle in Iraqi City of Ramadi
July 22 (Bloomberg) -- U.S. Marines killed 25 insurgents in fighting in the Iraqi city of Ramadi yesterday, the U.S.-led military coalition said in an e-mailed statement.

The battle broke out when a roadside bomb was detonated near a Marine convoy. Insurgents then attacked the Marines with rocket- propelled grenades and small arms, the military said. Fourteen U.S. service members were wounded.

``This initial skirmish led to ensuing engagements that pitted elements of the 1st Brigade Combat team'' against between 75 and 100 fighters, the military said in the statement. Ramadi, in the ``Sunni Triangle'' known for opposition to the coalition, is 110 kilometers (70 miles) west of the capital, Baghdad.

The Marines called in reinforcements and support from U.S. aircraft. During the fighting, in which 17 insurgents were wounded, the Marines found and detonated two more bombs, one placed in a car, the military said.

The U.S. forces captured a further 25 fighters and confiscated four grenade launchers, a home-made rocket launcher and two anti-tank mines, according to the statement.

Six foreign truck drivers seized this week in Iraq by a group calling itself the ``Holders of the Black Banners'' work for the Kuwait & Gulf Link Transport Co., Al Arabiya television reported, citing one of the hostages. The road transport company is the emirate's largest.

The kidnappers threatened to kill one driver every 72 hours, beginning at 8 p.m. local time yesterday, unless the company pulls out of Iraq, Al Arabiya said. Three drivers are from India, two from Kenya and the sixth from Egypt. None of those countries has contributed soldiers to the military coalition in Iraq.

Angelo de la Cruz, a Philippine driver kidnapped in Iraq by another group, returned to Manila today. He was released after President Gloria Arroyo withdrew the Philippines' 51 soldiers and police from Iraq a month early in response to his captors' threat to behead him. De la Cruz, 46, was kidnapped as he drove a fuel truck from the Saudi capital, Riyadh, to Baghdad two weeks ago.

To contact the reporters on this story:
Julian Nundy in Paris at jnundy@bloomberg.net
James Cordahi in Dubai on cherifcord@bloomberg.net
Francisco Alcuaz Jr. in Manila falcuaz@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story:
Peter Torday in London at ptorday@bloomberg.net
Last Updated: July 22, 2004 06:47 EDT

http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000087&sid=aZEZhkAjPS58&refer=top_world_news

Ellie

thedrifter

07-22-04, 08:09 AM

New additions to two Iraqi police services graduate training at Camp Al Asad 
Submitted by: 1st Marine Division 
Story Identification #: 200472245129 
Story by Sgt. Jose L. Garcia 
 
 
 
CAMP AL...

thedrifter

07-22-04, 08:10 AM

Issue Date: July 26, 2004

New armor may mean greater maintenance
Tougher vehicles saving lives, but the wear and tear is worse

By Gordon Lubold
Times staff writer

CAMP FALLUJAH, Iraq — Marines love the added protection offered by the thick steel plates now being bolted to the sides of Humvees here.
But the vehicle armoring in turn raises larger issues, maintenance workers say.

The extra weight puts added stress on a vehicle’s engine, transmission and other components, which may cost the Corps down the road. And it also brings about larger questions about the type of equipment needed for missions leathernecks will conduct in the future.

Though there are a handful of new Humvees here that have factory-installed armor, the bulk of the Marines’ new fleet of A2 models requires “up-armoring.” Most vehicles sent on patrols have been hardened with 3/8-inch-thick steel plates on the doors and roof. Some have undercarriage plates and 5-inch-thick ballistic glass windows. But as effective as the extra metal can be at protecting the Marines, that weight — as much as 3,000 pounds added to an 11,000-pound vehicle — means more wear and tear on the relatively new Humvees the Corps plans to use for several years.

“When you add weight to a vehicle, it will put a greater load on the transmission, the engine and the brakes,” said Warrant Officer John Walter, 33, an engineer from North Point, N.Y., who oversees a maintenance shop at Combat Service Support Company 121.

But he sees the plates fitting in with the mission ahead.

“The future of warfare is guerilla warfare,” Walter said. “We live in a booby-trap world.”

More than 3,000 vehicles have been hardened, and Corps officials expect that number to hit 4,000 by the end of the summer.

It’s too soon to tell how much of a problem the added weight will be, maintenance officials said. The first armor kits have been mounted on Humvees for only about three months; Marines are putting the plates on vehicles as soon as the armor arrives.

At the outset of the current Marine rotation this spring, many leathernecks traveled in “soft-skinned” Humvees. But in the face of improvised explosives on the roadside and random attacks by insurgents, sandbags were used to fortify many of the vehicles — weighing them down and causing them to look like “low riders” — until the armor kits began arriving here in late March.

The kits varied, and many had to be modified. Some kits limited Marines’ field of fire, while other kits offered too little protection. The steel plates for the troop-carrying, high-back Humvees were not tall enough, leaving exposed the heads and shoulders of Marines riding in the back. Marines from motor transport units around Iraq began welding any scraps of metal they could find to those Humvees for added protection. The result is a mishmash of armoring that is mostly effective.

“Marines love this. They can’t thank whoever put it together enough,” said Master Gunnery Sgt. Robert Gipson, operations officer for 1st Marine Division’s Truck Company, based at Camp Blue Diamond in Ramadi.

Gipson’s garage hasn’t yet seen the negative effects of that added armor, but Gipson said he won’t be surprised when he needs to replace steering components, tires, struts, springs, ball joints and tie-rod ends on the drive train in the coming months — especially among older Humvees made in the early 1990s.

First Lt. Chris Kent, a logistics officer at Camp Hurricane Point near Ramadi, said he has 50 sets of suspension parts on order as a “pre-emptive” measure because he knows the extra weight will begin to degrade his Humvees later in the year, even after he leaves Iraq in September.

“The thicker and more boxed-in vehicle is probably the way to go in this environment,” said the 25-year old from Fort Worth, Texas.

Division officials said the future of Humvee armor poses a difficult question. Heavy means safe, but the Corps likes the mobility and open fields of fire offered by lighter vehicles.

Generally, though, Marines believe any additional armor is a good thing, said Capt. Amy Ebitz, 33, from Lawton, Okla.

“I would not trade that up-armor kit for keeping a Humvee for another 10 years,” she said.

Ebitz, commander of Bravo Company, 2nd Military Police Battalion, heads a unit that escorts daily convoys leaving from Camp Taqaddum in western Iraq.

“I wouldn’t trade it for anything,” she said.

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story.php?f=0-MARINEPAPER-3086839.php

Ellie

thedrifter

07-22-04, 09:14 AM

Troops Could Stay Beyond Limit
Pentagon is considering extending the tours of National Guard troops in Iraq who are nearing the 24-month active-duty maximum.

WASHINGTON — In yet another sign of the strains on the U.S. military in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks and the Iraq war, the Pentagon for the first time is considering extending the mobilization of National Guard soldiers who will soon hit the federal limit of 24 months of active service, defense officials said Tuesday.

Initially, the decision would affect about 450 soldiers of the Arkansas National Guard who are in Iraq with the 39th Brigade Combat Team. The soldiers, mobilized after Sept. 11 and first sent to the Sinai Peninsula on a peacekeeping rotation, are the first group of National Guard troops to approach the 24-month limit that the Pentagon established days after the terrorist attacks in the United States.

Ultimately, however, waiving the limit in this case might lead to extended deployments for thousands of other reservists and National Guard members in Iraq and Afghanistan, and provide ammunition to critics in Congress who are pushing the Bush administration to increase the size of the military.

"Every day it seems to be another improvisational attempt to stretch forces that are already stretched very thin," said Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.), a former paratrooper with the Army's 82nd Airborne Division and an advocate of bolstering the Army's ranks.

But the status of the soldiers, being considered by David S.C. Chu, undersecretary of Defense for personnel and readiness, has not yet been decided, Pentagon officials said.

"This is the first time this has happened; we're breaking new ground here," said Lt. Col. Ellen Krenke, a Defense Department spokeswoman.

Doing away with the 24-month limit would be certain to upset many long-serving soldiers and their families, who say they are increasingly bearing the weight of a military stretched beyond its capacity. Over the last year, the conflict in Iraq has forced the Pentagon to keep more than 100,000 soldiers and Marines in the country for months after the Bush administration had expected to draw down the troop presence.

The Pentagon has issued orders preventing military personnel from leaving active duty, extended the tours of thousands of troops when insurgent activity in Iraq crested in the spring, and pulled troops out of South Korea to fill out Iraq rotations.

Last month, the Army was forced to dip into its pool of Individual Ready Reserve soldiers — troops who are not members of a specific reserve unit but have unexpired obligations to complete their military service — looking for roughly 5,600 to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan.

In a memo to top military officials dated Sept. 20, 2001, Chu established the 24-month policy to ensure that deployments abroad would not place an excessive strain on reservists and National Guard troops unaccustomed to a life of active duty.

The 39th Brigade Combat Team — made up of National Guard troops from several states — is a mechanized infantry unit currently based in Taji, about 10 miles north of Baghdad. When the unit went to Iraq in April, commanders were aware that hundreds of its soldiers would hit their 24-month limit while they were deployed there, most beginning in September.

As a result, Brig. Gen. Ronald Chastain, the brigade's commander, filed a request with the Pentagon to extend the soldiers' tours. Chu is considering that waiver request.

Since the 39th Brigade Combat Team entered Iraq, 13 soldiers from the unit have been killed by enemy attacks, said Capt. Kristine Munn, a unit spokeswoman.

Five were killed in a single weekend, four of those when mortar rounds hit the brigade's compound in Taji.

If the Defense Department retains the 24-month limit, those Arkansas National Guard troops whose active duty commitments are set to expire would be free to return home. They also would have the option of volunteering to remain in Iraq on active duty, defense officials said.

In the corridors of the Pentagon, a major concern is that the tempo of deployments since the Sept. 11 attacks will ultimately take its toll on retention and recruitment both in the active service and the reserves. Thus far, the Army has been able to meet recruiting goals for the active force, but is falling short of its 2004 target numbers for the National Guard.

There are now more than 131,000 Army National Guard troops and reservists on active duty, in most cases for 15- to 18-month stints.

Yet even as the Pentagon struggles to meet its global commitments, top defense officials repeatedly have said that there is no cause to expand the size of the military, as some lawmakers from both parties have been urging.

"There's folks in the Pentagon who refuse to admit that we're in for a long time in Iraq and Afghanistan," Reed said.

The Senate last month voted overwhelmingly to increase the Army by 20,000 soldiers, and the House voted for a 30,000-troop increase. The White House maintains its opposition to a permanent increase.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-guard21jul21,1,3332329.story

Ellie

thedrifter

07-22-04, 11:22 AM

A Reporter At Large 
 
The Price Of Valor 
 
We train our soldiers to kill for us. Afterward, they're on their own. 
 
 
By Dan Baum 
 
Carl Cranston joined the Army in 1997, when he was still a...

thedrifter

07-22-04, 11:23 AM

The country's ambivalence toward Vietnam, the prevalence of drugs, and the inability to distinguish civilians from the enemy all may help explain why Vietnam veterans appear to have suffered greater...

thedrifter

07-22-04, 11:25 AM

Since Korea, every Army division (of about three thousand soldiers) has been assigned nine combat-stress experts, six of whom are enlisted personnel and three of whom are officers. A soldier troubled...

thedrifter

07-22-04, 11:25 AM

"Their basic response was 'Soldier, you did your duty,' " Knox said. He finally found a support group through a V.A.-affiliated local facility in suburban San Francisco, where he lives, and he has...

thedrifter

07-22-04, 01:35 PM

thedrifter

07-22-04, 02:33 PM

Issue Date: July 26, 2004

Of God and men
Chaplains console fighters on the front lines in Iraq

By Gidget Fuentes
Times staff writer

At dozens of camps and on the front lines, scores of Navy chaplains such as Lt. Wayne Hall are a key source of comfort to thousands of sailors and Marines.
Hall pushes a message of continual “hope” and implores his flock to “fight the negative, dwell on the positive,” and share their burdens with one another.

“Do not allow yourself [to become] or make yourself an emotional casualty,” he tells the men.

That was easier said than done for the men of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, who endured a pitched, 10-day battle in early April in Iraq’s Sunni stronghold of Fallujah.

The heavy fighting took 10 of their brothers. Day after day, the Marines and sailors slugged it out, pushing their way through Fallujah’s seedy warehouse district.

The troops constantly battled sniper fire, mortar blasts and rocket attacks. They relished lulls that gave them short but peaceful moments to rest and regroup.

And when military officials finally ordered an end to their offensive operations, the frontal assaults were gone, but the nagging threat from insurgents remained.

Hall knew the slowed pace would give the men time to think about combat, their lost buddies and the hell they had just seen.

Hall, a prior enlisted sailor and 1/5’s battalion chaplain, worried that in taking stock of their recent experiences, “they were all going to start thinking about the bad things.”

So he spent his days visiting them on the front lines around Fallujah. On Sundays, many in the battalion, which returned to Camp Pendleton, Calif., on July 15— came to him to find solace.

It was a somber mood on April 18, the end of a week that saw 1/5’s mood swing up and down, hitting bottom one day with two fatal rescues-turned-ambushes and riding high from several discoveries of large enemy weapons caches.

About 35 men gathered inside a soda factory, sitting on stacks of folded boxes in front of a makeshift altar. Morning light filtered through high windows and cast a calming glow.

As they softly sang a hymn, their deep voices echoing inside the building, the loss of friends weighed heavily on their minds.

When Hall asked for prayer requests, the men asked for Pfc. Noah Boye, a mortarman from Grand Island, Neb., killed in an April 13 ambush, and “the wounded and the injured.”

Hall, who deployed to the gulf last year on the amphibious transport dock Dubuque, has leaned on his assistant, Religious Program Specialist 2nd Class Geoff Gotsch, to help reach out to the men. They’ve seen firsthand the price sailors and Marines pay, as they’ve ministered to the dying and wounded and cared for their platoons.

“We’re just doing what we can, when we can,” said Gotsch, 33, of Pottstown, Pa.

Relating to the troops

Nowhere else is the role of chaplains and RPs more critical than in combat. The shared experiences weave tight bonds among the sailors and Marines.

In lulls during the heaviest fighting, Hall broke out his playing cards and visited the wounded recovering at Camp Mercury. “I had my best time hanging out with the wounded guys, playing spades,” he said.

Indeed, chaplains with enlisted experience often speak of close bonds with the troops.

Shortly after arriving at al-Asad air base, Navy Lt. Mike Foskett and Religious Program Specialist 3rd Class Paul Brackenberg fashioned an olive-drab tent into a chapel and library for 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, from Twentynine Palms, Calif.

They filled the schedule with Bible studies, choir and discussions on marriage, relationships, the Lord’s Prayer and military service’s compatibility with Christianity.

The tent doubled as a small theater on Saturday nights, when the “chaplain’s choice movie” shows, with free popcorn and cold Gatorade.

“It’s primitive, but it’s coming along nicely,” said Foskett, a trim 34-year-old sporting a high-and-tight. It’s no surprise: He served eight years as a Light Armored Vehicle gunner and saw combat during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

In the quiet of the olive tent one night, Cpl. Ben Schmidt listened intently to a small group gathered that night for a discussion about religious belief and military service.

His deployment to Iraq with 2/7 is the first combat tour for Schmidt, a 23-year-old from Minnesota who admitted he had doubts last year about claims of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

But he has no qualms now about his role.

“You picture this war as a change. We’re here to help the Iraqi people now,” he said.

The son of ministers, Foskett went to seminary after his enlistment and returned to the sea services as a chaplain.

“I figured God could need me more as a chaplain than as an LAV gunner,” he said.

His role as chaplain hasn’t been greater than in consoling grieving and angry men mourning the loss of their dead.

On a chilly Palm Sunday morning, Foskett, a Protestant minister, stood under the shade of a metal awning with members of 2/7 to remember Pfc. Dustin Sekula, an 18-year-old from Texas killed April 1 by insurgent fire near Kubaysah.

“Times of pain and loss are usually times of great clarity for us,” he told them.

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story.php?f=0-MARINEPAPER-3088094.php

Ellie

thedrifter

07-22-04, 04:05 PM

Marine Corps Reserve Forces in
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

by Col Mark F. Cancian, USMCR(Ret), Cpl Paul V. Kane, USMCR
& the Reserve Combat Assessment Team

‘Our Marine reservists are Marines first, and there was absolutely no difference in performance—on the ground, in the air, in logistics.’

—Gen Michael W. Hagee,
Commandant of the Marine Corps

‘The problem is we won the war. Now Marines will say, ‘See, it works.’ They will go back to their old ways and fail to acknowledge those areas we have learned from this fight that are clearly in need of change.’

—Reserve unit commanding officer

Marines pride themselves on their willingness to face success and failure candidly. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) provided a rare opportunity to understand what works and what does not in modern-day conflict. In peacetime all plans, policies, and doctrine are at least partly theoretical because nothing can be subjected to the ultimate test of its validity. Even the most conscientious organization cannot fully anticipate the future. For this reason, when large-scale combat operations occur, the Marine Corps aggressively investigates lessons to be learned. To take advantage of the opportunity to learn and improve from OIF, the Commandant created a combat assessment team in January 2003.

Because Reserve forces would play such a large role in the operation, a Reserve forces team was formed to operate as an element of the overall combat assessment effort and to analyze Reserve issues indepth. The Reserve team collected extensive data in the continental United States (CONUS) and outside CONUS (OCONUS), including 250 interviews, 6,000 surveys, and a library of source documentation. Based on this extensive body of data, the team developed a 170-page report that lays out the major Reserve issues, with conclusions and recommendations. The report’s findings were presented to the senior Reserve and active duty leadership and key staffs last summer. It is time to bring those results to the broader Marine community. What follows are the report’s highlights (unfortunately, without most of the supporting statistics because of space limitations). These results represent the candid opinions of the team, not necessarily the official views of the Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, or Department of Defense (DoD).

The Success Story
Marine Corps Reserve forces are one of the great success stories of the war. They showed that they are skilled fighters who could perform as advertised—muster, train, deploy, and fight—and do it, not as second-stringers who might suffice in an emergency but as highly motivated, highly competent Marines.

Reserve combat units fought on the frontlines from the first minute of the war to the last. Logistics units provided critical support, for example, by building the longest bridge and establishing the largest fuel farm in Marine Corps history. After major combat operations ended, Reserve infantry and light armored reconnaissance battalions governed entire provinces on their own. Active duty commanders greatly appreciated reservists’ capabilities and enthusiasm, an appreciation that began at the highest levels. “We could not have done what we did without the Reserves,” noted LtGen James T. Conway, Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF).

Many nonbattle achievements of the Reserves are also worth noting. Unit mobilization was rapid and smooth, taking on average only 5 days. Marine Reserve units deployed rapidly and arrived when needed—99 percent of Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) Marines reported for duty, 98 percent of Marines were medically fit, and less than .05 percent of SMCR Marines requested a waiver.

For planners the experience of OIF reinforced the lessons of Operation DESERT STORM (ODS) and subsequent mobilizations: that use of Reserve forces is politically viable, that Reserve units will show up when called, and that Reserve units have the training to participate effectively. This recognition is an important step forward for reservists and for overall Marine Corps fighting capabilities.

Experiences in this conflict also validated the fundamentals:

• The Marine Corps relies heavily on its Reserve Component (RC). Because the active duty Marine Corps, with its many global commitments, is stretched thin even in peacetime, it needs its RC to participate fully in major combat operations. During ODS, for example, the Marine Corps mobilized more of its RC (63 percent) than any other Service. The same was true for the major combat operations of OIF during which the Marine Corps called up proportionally more of its RC (48 percent in May 2003) than any other Service.

• The Marine Corps Reserve is an expeditionary, warfighting organization. The Marine Corps can rely on its Reserves in major combat operations because all Marine Corps Reserve units are designed for warfighting and expeditionary operations.

• Reserve forces provide a prudent economy-of-force measure. Mobilization time and peacetime training allowed Reserve units to meet required wartime standards. Thus, by employing lower cost Reserve forces, the Marine Corps could stretch its constrained resources without increasing risk.

The foundation of this success is the individual Marine. Active duty commanders described Reserve Marines in glowing terms. As many noted, “You could not tell the difference between Active and Reserve Marines.”

The reasons for this success are so second nature to Marines that they are often overlooked—reservists attend the same schools, participate in the same exercises, and are held to the same standards as active duty Marines. All Reserve officers and many enlisted personnel have extensive active duty experience. The inspector-instructor (I&I) staffs come from the active duty force, set high standards, and are integrated with the Reserve unit. Finally, the demanding mobilization operational readiness deployment test ensures a high state of peacetime readiness.

A Challenge—Adapting to the New National Security Strategy
In 2001 the DoD announced a new strategy that abandoned the two major theater war construct of the 1990s and adopted a new set of principles for force planning that emphasizes greater speed, more forward deployments, transformation, and preparation for an uncertain future. Recommendations for improvement in Reserve performance must be made in the context of this strategy. Many mobilization difficulties would be mitigated or eliminated with more time and more certainty. However, the new strategy calls for less time and foresees less certainty. Therefore, recommendations that ignore these new strategic principles are not viable. Further, many observers believe that these changes imply a force that relies less heavily on Reserves. The challenge for the Marine Reserve community is to adapt to this new strategy.

A Dozen Lessons to be Learned
No effort is perfect, and the combat assessment team identified 12 issues for indepth analysis. Compared with the experience of ODS, these issues showed that many shortfalls in that operation had been corrected. A few new issues have arisen. Unfortunately, several shortfalls identified 12 years ago after ODS continue to trouble the Marine Corps.

(1) Force structure: is the Marine Corps Reserve properly structured for this kind of war? Force structure demands fell unevenly. In greatest demand for both ODS and OIF were motor transport, communications, medical support, C–130s, civil affairs, light armored vehicles, assault amphibious vehicles, and engineers. Others kinds of units were relatively less used. A few were not used at all. Senior officers, Active and Reserve, suggested that additional capabilities in these heavily used areas might be valuable. In its comprehensive review study, Marine Forces Reserve (MarForRes) has begun to grapple with future force structure needs. Although future conflicts may not levy the same demands as OIF and ODS and, on the whole, the Marine Reserve force structure was well-suited to these conflicts, some rebalancing of the structure may nevertheless be warranted.

Further, even the most well-designed force structure requires some adaptation in an imperfectly foreseen conflict. Therefore, organizational and intellectual flexibility is important. Mobilization planning should be clear that some unit missions might be nonstandard to fit the needs of the theater commander.

(2) Family support: how well did the Marine Corps take care of Reserve families? Support provided to Reserve families was on average rated from fair to good with relatively few ratings of poor. This was a great improvement from ODS, reflecting a decade of effort.

Support for the families of Marines in units was stronger than for individual augmentees. Support for augmentees was weak because their families generally lived far from the gaining command and their parent commands had not always been mobilized. A better system is needed for supporting them.

continued........

thedrifter

07-22-04, 04:06 PM

Assessments of the Key Volunteer Program, new to the Reserves since ODS, were divided. Peacetime/wartime support teams (PWSTs—the staff at the drill center after a unit deploys) and unit commanders described the program very positively, as a useful way to maintain communications with families. However, survey results were mixed about how effective the networks had been. Comments indicated it was important for Reserve units to exercise their key volunteer network routinely before any mobilization.

The chief complaint about PWSTs was that they were sometimes difficult to contact. PWSTs must ensure that they are available by phone at all times when their unit is deployed, and that they have a continuous presence in the Reserve center during normal work hours with some additional after-hours availability to help families that cannot come in during the week.

Health care was a major concern for all Marines and families before mobilization, but only a relatively small percentage indicated having problems. It was universally agreed that developing better briefings on Tricare would be valuable. Getting families accustomed to a new health care system takes several briefings and a great deal of personal attention.

A new problem is rumor control. Information—accurate and inaccurate—flows rapidly from the theater to families. Units and PWSTs should use multiple means of communications with Reserve families—newsletters, phone trees, e-mail lists, phone watches, web sites—to meet families’ craving for information and to curtail “bum scoop.”

3) Employment: how has mobilization affected Reserve Marines’ jobs and income? Marines reported that their employers had been very supportive. But true tests of this support will come during the 18 to 24 months after mobilization when Marines return to civilian employment.

About one-third of Marines saw an increase in income because of mobilization. One-third saw no income change. One-third suffered an income loss in excess of 10 percent. Mobilized Marines who worked for Federal, state, or local governments typically received the best treatment by their employers.

Though employers have been supportive, some Marines (18 percent) expect to have employment problems upon return to civilian life. To ease the transition of reservists back to their civilian jobs, returning reservists should be thoroughly briefed about their reemployment rights and the services available from Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (a DoD agency established to promote cooperation and understanding between Reserve members and their civilian employers and to assist in the resolution of conflicts arising from an employee’s military commitment).

(4) Eligibility for security clearances: did Marines have the clearances they needed to do their jobs? Wartime operations require many more security clearances, and at higher levels, than peacetime policies permit. The Marine Corps, therefore, needs to greatly expand the number and level of clearances held by Reserve Marines.

The Marine Corps should base its security clearance needs not only on peacetime tables of organization, but also on the estimated number of billets to be filled during major combat operations in joint, combined, and Marine Corps organizations. The Marine Corps should budget adequate funds to support this higher level of security investigations.

(5) Training readiness: were units and individuals adequately trained? Who should be responsible for training mobilized Reserve units and individuals? Who should provide the resources?

• Units. Up to the company level, units were well-trained to accomplish their missions. Battalions also seem to have done better than in ODS. The emphasis on battalion-level training since ODS has had a positive effect. However, each of the combat battalions expressed the opinion that having at least some postmobilization training was necessary for the battalions to perform as well as they did. The Marine Corps, therefore, needs to continue battalion-level training exercises/emphasis for Reserve combat arms battalions to maintain the improved performance levels reached during OIF.

None of the force service support group (FSSG) battalions that were employed as battalions received postmobilization unit training, yet they accomplished their missions in theater. FSSG battalions may not need the same amount of battalion-level training that combat battalions do.

If possible, battalion staffs should be activated before the mobilization of the battalion’s main body to assist in the transition. This would provide the staffs time to conduct a mission analysis, verify mobilization preparations, and coordinate with the gaining force commander (GFC). At a minimum, battalion staffs should conduct extra drills when mobilization seems imminent.

Individuals. Marines in units were generally well-trained in their military occupational specialties (MOSs) and were judged by active duty commanders to be as capable as active duty Marines.

• Unclear chain of command. The postmobilization chain of command for Reserve units is complex as units moved from MarForRes, to Marine Forces Atlantic (MarForLant), to Marine Forces Central Command (MarCent). As a result, training responsibilities became unclear or unworkable. This greatly constrained the ability of units to obtain training support items such as ammunition, transportation, and supplies. The solution may be to give MarForRes a role in supporting the training of mobilized Reserve units, though the GFC should dictate the kind of training conducted. MarForRes has training and equipment oversight before mobilization and has a CONUS-wide structure established to execute these functions for Reserve units. MarForLant and MarCent do not.

• Back to basics. Reserve units want more emphasis on basic individual and unit skills. This implies a reduction in “adventure” training—training that is exciting but not part of a unit’s core mission.

(6) Equipment: did Reserve units have the equipment they needed? Marine Reserve units did not have all of the equipment their commanders believed they needed. The two most important causes were table of equipment (T/E) shortfalls and a lack of up-to-date communications equipment.

Many units in peacetime hold only a part of their T/E, called a training allowance. In theory, these units will receive additional equipment from war reserve stocks upon mobilization. Frequently, this did not happen. Some stocks could not be shifted in time. The remain behind equipment pool did not provide the amount of equipment that had been expected. Sealifted equipment sometimes arrived late. The problem had been just as severe in ODS—no progress has been made. Part of the solution may be to start earlier, as soon as planning begins, and not to wait for the deployment order. Another part of the solution may be to regularly exercise force deployment, planning, and execution procedures so that all organizations and personnel are accustomed to their roles.

It may also be that the process asks too much of the GFC. Currently, the responsibility falls on this headquarters to fill these equipment deficiencies once a Reserve unit is mobilized. However, the GFC has generally already deployed, may be half a world away, and is already conducting operations. It may be more effective for MarForRes to have a role postmobilization, rather than putting the entire burden on the distant GFC. Although the GFC will always have to specify the requirement, MarForRes may be able to help with the CONUS coordination involved in identifying shortfalls, finding equipment, and shipping that equipment to the unit.

Compared with ODS, the compatibility of equipment between Active and Reserve forces was much improved and virtually seamless. The one exception was radios; Reserve units often had older, incompatible equipment and lacked sufficient sets. The Marine Corps, therefore, needs to review unit after-action reports to identify and remedy these shortfalls.

(7) Mobilization process: Was it effective and efficient? The Marine Corps Reserve is becoming adept at mobilization. For institutions that pay attention, practice makes them, if not perfect, at least better.

Units rapidly passed through the mobilization process. Pay administration and I&I integration were success stories and great improvements over the experience in ODS. The processes for medical screening and handling waiver requests were also generally smooth. However, the processes for issuing orders and active duty identification cards need improvement. Both were too slow for the rapid pace of events.

• Administrative support in theater. Mobilization is administratively intense and complex. Reserve units believed that having administrative personnel attempt to support them from centralized facilities at Camp Pendleton or Camp Lejeune did not provide the level of support they needed. One suggestion was to set up a Reserve administration shop in theater so that all Reserve Marines would have a local and responsive place for their specialized administration issues. Another alternative would be to assign the unit’s administration personnel to the Reserve center instead of to a centralized facility.

Because mobilization is so administratively intense, units should consider augmenting their administration sections on mobilization. Even small detachments should consider bringing an administrative specialist.

continued....

thedrifter

07-22-04, 04:07 PM

Line 10s. Units wrestled with whether to take “line 10s,” that is, Marines being processed for discharge because of unsatisfactory participation but who nevertheless report for mobilization. Units...

thedrifter

07-22-04, 04:08 PM

(10) The total force: how well did the AC and RC of the Marine Corps integrate into a total force? Reserve units generally integrated well. They have the same individual training, the same equipment, the same doctrine, the same standing operating procedures. I&I staffs are invaluable in ensuring that there is a unified, expeditionary culture.

However, at the individual level, most Reserve Marines felt that active duty Marines did not accept them initially. This gradually changed as the two groups worked together. Like all outsiders joining an existing entity, reservists had to prove themselves. However, a third of Reserve Marines felt that active duty Marines never did accept them. Reserve Marines recounted many stories of put-downs and condescension from their active duty counterparts. “You’re just dumb reservists,” was a typical comment, this one from a field grade officer. Active duty commanders were unaware that these problems existed in their units.

Although some degree of Active-Reserve tension may be inevitable, all Marines should be treated with respect. Commanders should establish a zero tolerance policy against abusive language or actions so that all Marines are treated fairly. Additionally, after mobilization, commanders should consider eliminating the use of the term “Reserve,” “reservists,” and “USMCR” and instead use the unit designations, such as “4th Marine Division/Wing/FSSG,” or “augmentee.” Afterall, what meaning does “Reserve” have when a unit is on duty full-time? This was done in World War II and did much to erase the distinction between regular and Reserve after mobilization.

(11) Deployment timeline: did the callup of Reserve forces delay launching operations? Reserve forces have been criticized for taking too long to mobilize and deploy. Indeed, some observers have suggested that because Reserve units were slow in arriving, the Active-Reserve mix should be changed. However, Marine Reserve units mobilized quickly and arrived in theater when needed. Marine Reserve units were ready to move to their gaining command within 4 days of their activation date. The average time from deployment order to the unit’s arrival in theater was 34 days. In other words, units went from civilian life to being on the ground halfway around the world in about a month.

The primary cause of delay for all forces, Active and Reserve, after basic strategic mobility constraints, was the ponderous request for forces (RFF)/deployment order process. Under this process U.S. Central Command did not execute the existing deployment plans but instead requested packages of forces (the RFF), each of which had to be approved by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) (resulting in a deployment order). The SecDef used the process to shape the plan and test assumptions. The difficulty for the Services was that units could not be definitely alerted until the deployment order was signed. For the Reserves it meant that decisions sometimes came very late.

Although this process was nonstandard and caused many difficulties for the Services, the basic structure is likely to continue. However, the Marine Corps Reserve can adapt itself to this challenging process by leaning forward. Even when requirements are uncertain and guidance is evolving, units need to take preparatory actions to speed reaction and improve unit performance. Potential actions include additional drills for key leaders, holding an administrative drill for all, conducting double drills, even accelerating annual training. These actions are difficult because they entail bureaucratic risk-taking. The key, however, is to do what is right to prepare Marines.

(12) Sustainability of Reserve tempo of operations: Are Reserve forces being used too much? During the 1990s use of Reserve forces increased greatly, a trend accelerated by 11 September 2001 and subsequent events. Many observers and reservists worry that the use may be too great. As with active duty forces the test is whether troops vote with their feet by leaving or whether prospective recruits are deterred from joining. For some reservists even the 38 days a year becomes too onerous. Others would stay on active duty indefinitely if offered the chance. No policy will make everyone happy.

Data are inconclusive now. On the one hand, many Marines expressed negative opinions, in the surveys and in interviews, about continuing in the Reserves as a result of their mobilization. On the other hand, survey data suggest that attitudes are less negative than after ODS where, despite very negative attitudes expressed in surveys done just after the conflict, there was little retention loss.

Recruiting and retention, therefore, need to be monitored to detect signs of weakness. In particular, the Marine Corps needs to monitor units mobilized for extended periods.

Finally, there is a lot of interest at the highest levels in using Reserve volunteers more extensively. Volunteers do not entail the political and personal costs of involuntary activation. The study results do suggest that for major contingencies there is a large pool of potential volunteers available. However, volunteers are not a viable substitute for mobilizing cohesive and capable units.

Learning the Lessons
The Marine Corps cannot rest on its laurels. First, it must continue to do those things that produce success. Many elements of the Marine Corps Reserve system are sound, even exemplary, and should be recognized and reinforced.

Second, the Reserve community must fix its shortcomings. Identifying the lessons of a conflict is not enough. A lesson is not learned until the organization makes the changes necessary to prevent recurrence. The Corps’ leadership is working on many of these fixes. That work must be expanded, expedited, and pushed forward to completion.

>Editor’s Note: The team’s full report with its 170 pages of text and data is available in several places on the web, for example, the MarForRes and HQMC (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) sites and at http://www.mcrassn.org.

http://www.mca-marines.org/Gazette/0704cancian.html

Ellie

thedrifter

07-22-04, 05:09 PM

RB High alum recovering from injures suffered in Iraq

By: ERIKA AYN FINCH - For the North County Times

RAMONA ---- Stephen and Connie Halfaker knew the dangers their daughter faced as an officer serving with the U.S. Army in Iraq, but few parents are ever really prepared for the kind of 4 a.m. phone call they received June 19.

First Lt. Dawn Halfaker, a Rancho Bernardo High School graduate and popular hometown athlete, was badly injured. She would eventually lose her right arm and end up fighting for her life.

Weeks later, as Halfaker recovers from her injuries, friends and loved ones in North County said her strength in the midst of adversity is no surprise.

"She is an amazing person," said Stephanie Hancock, a close friend of Halfaker's since middle school. "She is one of the toughest people I know both mentally and physically. There is no challenge she can't overcome ..."

Halfaker, 24, a member of the 293rd Military Police Division of the Army, had been in her vehicle June 18 when it was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade in the town of Baqubah, 35 miles north east of Baghdad. Halfaker and another member of her division were critically injured in the attack.

Her parents were notified the next day by military officials.

"They said that Dawn had been seriously wounded in combat and that she was in serious condition," said Stephen Halfaker, superintendent of the Lakeside Union High School District. "They told me she had taken shrapnel to her upper arm and had received lung contusions."

After being taken to an Army hospital in Landstuhl, Germany, Dawn Halfaker was transported to Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C. Stephen and Connie Halfaker joined their daughter at the hospital on June 23, but Halfaker did not regain full consciousness until June 30.

Meanwhile, Halfaker's life was in jeopardy. She developed ARDS, or acute respiratory distress syndrome; her right lung was swollen and she was breathing with the help of a ventilator. She also lost her right arm from the shoulder down after it became infected from the shrapnel wounds. After six surgeries on her shoulder and arm, Dawn Halfaker awoke to realize her arm had been amputated.

"She was extremely sad," Stephen Halfaker said. "She was disappointed and just crushed."

Those emotions would be expected from anyone who lost a limb, but especially from Dawn Halfaker, a star basketball player at Rancho Bernardo High School.

After graduating in 1997, Halfaker attended the U.S. Military Academy at West Point on a basketball scholarship. She majored in Spanish and computer science and, upon graduating in 2001, began her 5-year hitch in the Army.

"Dawn went to Korea right away in her first year," Stephen Halfaker said. "She became a military police officer because it was the most active branch a female could become involved with. She chose the action branch because she always liked to be close to the action."

When Dawn Halfaker was deployed to Iraq in March, Stephen Halfaker said she was ready to go.

"She expected to go," Halfaker said. "She was anxious to go because she had friends over there and she felt trained and prepared to go. We were anxious and nervous, but supportive of her."

Connie Halfaker, who works for the Ramona Unified School District, has been staying with her daughter in Washington to help her recover. Stephen Halfaker spends his time traveling back and forth.

Dawn Halfaker was awarded a Purple Heart on July 14 and, on Monday, she and three other soldiers met with President Bush, Collin Powell and Condoleezza Rice at the White House. Stephen Halfaker said Bush thanked Dawn for her service to her country. Halfaker said his daughter called it "an awesome experience."

Dawn Halfaker continues to work on her mental and physical rehabilitation at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. She will eventually transfer to Fisher House, a facility at the medical center for armed services personnel recovering from amputations. Stephen Halfaker said she is healing well and her lungs continue to improve.

"After the first three days (she was awake), she did 100 crunches," Stephen Halfaker said. "That's just the kind of kid she is. She is in tremendous shape and she is physically very strong."

For now, Stephen and Connie Halfaker are just thankful their daughter is alive.

"We're doing very well," Stephen Halfaker said. "We have been blessed to have the support of San Diego County. The prayers, thoughts and cards have been tremendously uplifting to the family."

http://www.nctimes.com/content/articles/2004/07/22/military/15_22_007_21_04.jpg

1st Lt. Dawn Halfaker at her 2001 graduation from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Halfaker was injured June 18 in Iraq.
Photo courtesy of the Halfaker family

http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2004/07/22/military/15_22_007_21_04.txt

Ellie

thedrifter

07-22-04, 06:26 PM

The General Departs, With a Scandal to Ponder 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
By JOHN F. BURNS 
The New York Times 
July 22, 2004 
 
BAGHDAD, Iraq...

thedrifter

07-22-04, 07:48 PM

Bird's eye on Baghdad

By Gary Anderson

THE IRAQ WAR
John Keegan

Knopf, $24.95, 254 pages, illus.

John Keegan's latest book, "The Iraq War," might have been better titled "A Primer on Iraq." The first half of the book is a brief history of that nation, going back to the dawn of civilization and culminating in events leading up to the military confrontation with an American-led coalition in March 2003. This alone makes the book worth its price.
Although he doesn't claim to cover events beyond the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, after 21 days of fighting, Mr. Keegan provides a basis for understanding the embers of the insurgent conflagration that became the second part of the war and continues to burn today.
For example, few Americans know that Iraq's claim to Kuwait as its 19th province is not merely an affectation of a power-mad Saddam Hussein, but a belief held by the majority of Iraqis. Mr. Keegan also goes on to outline the roots of the Kurdish problem; his explanation of how deep those roots are should sound a cautionary note for Iraqi and American planners, who are prone to take Kurdish cooperation for granted.
Perhaps the part of this book that could have been useful to former U.S. Special Envoy L. Paul Bremer and planners at the Coalition Provisional Authority, had it been published at an earlier date, deals with the Ba'ath Party leadership of the government before it was hijacked by Saddam.
Contrary to popular American myth, the Ba'ath Party was one of the most popular institutions in the country in the 1960s and early 1970s. It was largely responsible for turning Iraq from a dusty former Turkish backwater into one of the bright spots in the Middle East, prior to Saddam's ascension and his bloody repressions and wars.
The Ba'athists built highways, a first-class power grid and a superb education system. Many older Iraqis I know still proudly carry their pre-Saddam Ba'ath Party cards. In retrospect, treating the whole Ba'ath movement as we treated the Nazis in Germany was a failure of cultural intelligence.
Chapters in "The Iraq War" dealing with the actual fighting are concise and well-written. (The maps are broad-brushed but comprehensible.) Mr. Keegan credits the Americans with superb operational planning and logistical execution. In this he differs from many retired U.S. military officers, who felt that logistics was a shoestring operation.
The author gives his beloved British army justifiable credit for their usual dauntless professionalism. He believes that the decision to give them the Basra sector emphasized their urban strengths and played down their weaknesses in long-term logistics, and he reminds readers that the Iranians tried to take Basra with a much larger force for nearly a decade. To this day, the British sector remains the best-managed postwar part of Arab Iraq.
Mr. Keegan also does a good job explaining this elusive, but prominent, thing called military transformation. He describes how improved sensor capability and precision weapons allowed American planners to pursue a campaign with a much smaller force, and over far greater distances, than was possible in the first Gulf War.
The story of why it might take a larger force to occupy a country than to conquer it in the first place is probably best left to his next book.
"The Iraq War" is not without faults. It leaves units out of the order-of-battle appendix at the end, most notably the Marine Corps 3rd Light Armored Infantry Battalion, which played a major role in the capture of Tikrit and in rescuing American prisoners of war. However, the overall approach is clear and free of inessential clutter.
Mr. Keegan is a noted and prolific military historian with a number of fine books to his credit, most notably "The Face of Battle," which ranks with the works of S.L.A. Marshall as one the finest studies of soldiers in combat written in modern times. Other of his books include "The Price of Admiralty" and "The Mask of Command," along with several excellent volumes on World War II.
Readers desiring a more detailed operational account will have to wait for a book currently being researched by Michael Gordon and Gen. Bernard Trainor, authors of the best book on operational art in the first Gulf War, "The Generals' War."
Still, Mr. Keegan gives us a superb strategic overview of the second Iraq conflict in this slim but concise account. There will undoubtedly be a second volume because much has happened in the interim since this book went to press; Mr. Keegan has laid solid groundwork for his next project.

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps officer who lectures on the Revolution in Military Affairs at George Washington University.

http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20040719-084057-3277r.htm

Ellie