Marine siblings follow similar path to Iraq

[thedrifter]

Marine siblings follow similar path to Iraq
Submitted by: 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing
Story Identification #: 200471473836
Story by Staff Sgt. Houston F. White Jr.



AL ANBAR PROVINCE, Iraq(July 14, 2004) -- Even if the distinctive facial features, identical rank insignias and name tapes didn't betray their family ties, just observing the sibling rivalry between 1st Lts. Frederik J. Easterly, aide de camp to the commanding general of 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing and Anja M. Easterly, adjutant, 9th Communications Battalion, Headquarters Group, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, might be enough to convince anyone that the two grew up in the same household.

What may not be as evident however, is the fact that although they took similar paths to get here, the sometimes rocky-road the two traveled down during their childhood helped forge the bond they share today.

"We had a love-hate relationship growing up," laughed 26-year-old Frederik. "We got along really well sometimes, but other times we were at each other's throat.

"My sister and I got into some pretty good brawls as kids and she's a lot tougher than she looks, to be so small," he confessed.

"Our relationship is definitely a lot different now than it was when we were growing up," agreed 23-year-old Anja, born in Viborg, Denmark, while her father was stationed there in the Air Force.

"(Frederik and Air Force 2nd Lt. Chris Easterly) would hardly ever let me into their exclusive little 'boys club' when we were kids and if they did, they did so grudgingly," said the 5-foot-1-inch sister who is the youngest of three siblings. "No matter what I did, they would never accept me as one of the guys."

Undeterred, Anja answered a challenge from her father to become tough enough to earn her brothers' acceptance, which she has no regrets about today.

"All the disappointment from being picked on and teased by my brothers while we were young made me tough," she remarked. "Now that I look back on it, I'm glad I listened to my dad and stuck with (trying to gain their respect) and made it through."

"Now everyone says I'm like a miniature version of (Frederik)," continued the diminutive first lieutenant dubbed "Little Beast" after her oldest brother, whose nickname is "Beast."

Little did Frederik know when he began fulfilling his lifelong dream of joining the military by attending the U.S. Naval Academy that he was providing his sister a blueprint she would eventually seek to emulate.

"At first, I told my brother he was crazy for wanting to join the Marine Corps," she stated. "I wanted to go to Stanford University at first, but after seeing the way the Naval Academy brought out my brother's true character, I decided to follow his example."

Though her older brother initially felt "the princess of the family" was far too "girly" to become a Marine Officer, before he could say "midshipman," his determined sibling was following in his footsteps at the historical military academy in Annapolis, Md.

"I didn't think my sister would go into the military," Easterly offered. "I was very surprised when Anja ended up going to the Naval Academy and chose the Marine option her senior year."

Frederik's feelings of shock and amazement were eventually replaced by pride and admiration following her graduation from his alma mater.

"I was pretty proud of her when she graduated," he continued. "I took special leave from a (military school) to attend her graduation because I knew she was on her way to becoming one of the best of the best."
Courtesy of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the siblings currently find themselves serving in the same war zone, which provides a touch of home, as well as creating another chapter of their special sibling history.

"I wish I could see more of her now, but we were both together at Camp Commando in Kuwait during OIF I for several months and we had a great time together," noted Frederik. "It felt good to see Anja every single day and know that we are out here together."

"(Frederik) and my father made me the person I am and helped me get to where I am today," expressed Anja. "So being deployed here and knowing my brother is here is great. When we were at Camp Commando, we always ate lunch, (conducted physical training) together and bonded.

"We also spent time talking about the future," she added. "We were discussing how when we're older, we'll be able to say we actually served in Iraq in the Marines at the same time."

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf/main5/577D1010E28A74B085256ED1003FF59B?opendocument


Ellie

[thedrifter]

Duty in Iraq's dry climate still leaves the dogs barking
Submitted by: 1st Marine Division
Story Identification #: 200471454151
Story by Cpl. Shawn C. Rhodes



CAMP MAHMUDIYAH, Iraq(July 12, 2004) -- Ask most infantrymen what will take them out of the fight the fastest and their answers will range from bullets to shrapnel to heat casualties.

The one injury every infantryman risks when on patrol has nothing to do with bullets or mortars - it has to do with his feet.

"When they're out in the field it's a hot, wet environment inside their boots. That's the perfect breeding ground for all kinds of foot problems," said Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Barry C. Gibson, the independent duty hospital corpsman and triage officer for 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment from Orottoes, Va. "It's a never ending battle to keep their feet healthy. Every day they live in the worst possible conditions for feet to be in."

Gibson explained that many Marines' feet were in their boots for 10-12 hours a day. Combine that with life in the field and rare changes of socks if any and it's a combination for trouble, he added.

"We've given out enough foot medication to treat half the battalion at one time," Gibson said. "Trouble with feet is always a problem, you just can't avoid it," Gibson said.

Many Marines blame their boots for the trouble they have with their feet. Complaints range from the boots not allowing feet to breathe to lack of arch support.

"These desert boots wear out way too fast. I've gone through two pairs since the beginning of the deployment and the heels on these are about done," said Gunnery Sgt. Tracy A. Naylor, company gunnery sergeant for Company E from Punta Gorda, Fla. "The boots also are rarely available in the right size for the Marines, so they have to settle for boots that are too large or too small for their feet."

Another long-standing complaint among infantrymen is the age-old debate on the difference between white and black socks. Marines are ordered to wear black socks that make some Marines' feet worse for wear. The logic behind not wearing cotton athletic socks because the cotton sucks in and holds the moisture making a bad problem worse.

However, some Marines believe the black socks need to go.

"The black socks don't allow the feet to breathe. In these hot conditions that's really important," said Pfc. Mark A. Valez, a squad automatic weapon gunner from Miramar, Fla. "When an infantryman's feet go down it means he can't keep the pace on a patrol. In a worst-case scenario it means he's out of the battle, recovering."

Naylor added the dye in new black socks sometimes gets into blisters and infect feet. He came up with a common solution among Marines.

"We're told to wear black or green socks, so I just wear those over my white ones."

Marines find different ways to take care of their feet as best they can.

"We tell Marines to change their socks twice a day if they're out on patrol and to let their feet air out as much as they can," Gibson said. "A lot of times the Marines can't do that because of mission requirements. So we recommend using anti-fungal powder and airing their feet out whenever possible."

An old infantryman's trick is to turn used socks inside out and wear them again. Gibson recommended using this method only as a last resort.

"Turn your socks inside out when you don't have any other choice," he said. "It's better for your feet not to have friction in the same place all the time and will help them in the long run."

The result of not taking care of feet is often painful. Marines here experienced everything from athlete's foot to trench foot during their deployment. Both come from poor hygiene and keeping feet in a warm, moist environment.

"Airing your feet out is a really good thing to do," Gibson said. "In the evenings the Marines should walk around in sandals whenever they can. In the field they can put twigs or rocks in between their toes to help them air out when taking a rest with their socks off. Getting them into the sun is also good. Sunlight will kill most bacteria out there."


http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/image1.nsf/Lookup/200471454558/$file/Feet1lr.jpg

This rifleman's feet put him out of action. The conditions the Marines live in while in the field -- long hours in wet, dirty socks -- contribute to problems with their feet.
(USMC photo by Cpl. Shawn C. Rhodes) Photo by: Cpl. Shawn C. Rhodes

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf/main5/1A847C439B4B4AAA85256ED100354572?opendocument

Ellie

[thedrifter]

Car Bomb Kills at Least Ten in Baghdad

By SAMEER N. YACOUB

BAGHDAD, Iraq - A massive car bomb exploded Wednesday at a checkpoint near the area housing the U.S. Embassy and offices of the interim Iraqi government in Baghdad, killing at least 10 people and wounding 40, including one U.S. soldier, authorities said.

The car was packed with 1,000 pounds of explosives, said Iraqi police Col. Majid Abdel Hamid. It exploded before it was searched at a checkpoint leading to the parking lot, sending clouds of thick, black smoke pouring into the air.

"We were gathering outside the convention center seeking jobs," said one witness, Alla Hassan. "We were thrown on the ground. Then I saw many dead people."

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The area, formerly known as the Green Zone, was once the headquarters of the U.S. occupation authorities. Now renamed the International Zone, it houses the U.S. and British Embassies, as well as the offices of the interim Iraqi government.

Iraq's interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi later toured the site to assess the damage. He said the bombing came in retaliation for arrests of terrorism suspects, though he offered no details on who the suspects were or when they were arrested.

"This is a new crime that shows that the forces of evil are trying to harm the Iraqi people," Allawi said. "The civilians who met martyrdom today were jobseekers. The government will do its best to arrest those criminals."

He said 10 people were killed and 40 were injured. Touring the site in a gray suit, Allawi gathered a handful of reporters around him and promised that those responsible would be caught.

"We will crush those terrorists soon," Allawi said.

An American solider was wounded, but the injury was slight, said Col. Mike Murray of the 1st Cavalry Division.

A Reuters driver suffered a shrapnel injury to his leg in the blast, Susan Allsopp, a spokeswoman for the news agency, said while speaking in London. The injuries to the Iraqi driver, who wasn't identified, were not considered serious.

At al-Yarmouk hospital, Iraqis waited anxiously outside as the ambulances arrived. Doctors worked frantically to cut bandages and tend to the wounded. Men arrived on stretchers, splattered with blood.

The blast occurred on a holiday marking the 46th anniversary of the overthrow of the monarchy.

In 1958, a nationalist coup killed King Faisal II and set in motion years of political unrest as deep political divisions quickly solidified among coup leaders who stood at opposite ends of the political spectrum.

The royals who survived fled into exile, while the communists were banned under former leader Saddam Hussein.

http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2004/07/14/ap/headlines/d83qevcg0.txt


Ellie

[thedrifter]

Pendleton Marines killed in vehicle accident

By: North County Times

CAMP PENDLETON ---- Four Camp Pendleton Marines were killed Saturday in a Humvee accident in the Al Anbar Province of Iraq, the Department of Defense announced Tuesday.

The Marines were all part of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division of the I Marine Expeditionary Force.

They are: Cpl. Terry Holmes, 22, of Hollywood, Fla.; Sgt. Krisna Nachampassak, 27, of Burke, Va.; Pfc. Christopher J. Reed, 20, of Craigmont, Idaho, and Staff Sgt. Trevor Spink, 36, of Farmington, Mo.


The military released little information about the accident that killed the men except to say it was not combat-related.

Earlier in his career, Spink appeared on recruitment posters and billboards nationwide, leading friends and family to call him the Marines' "poster boy," half-brother Lucas Kozloski told the St. Louis Post-Dispatch earlier this week.

Spink joined the Marine Corps in 1998. Kozloski told the Post-Dispatch that Spink was a single, career Marine who left for Iraq about three weeks ago after taking a few last rides on his Harley-Davidson motorcycle. According to the Marines, he had earned a number of awards, including the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal, the Combat Action Ribbon, the Marine Corps Good Conduct Medal, the National Defense Service Medal and the Sea Service Deployment Ribbon.

Holmes joined the Marine Corps in 2002. His personal awards include the National Defense Service Medal and the Sea Service Deployment Ribbon.

Nachampassak joined the Marines in 1995. His awards include the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal, the Marine Corps Good Conduct Medal, the National Defense Service Medal and the Sea Service Deployment Ribbon.

Reed joined the Marine Corps Aug. 1, 1995. His awards include the National Defense Service Medal.

http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2004/07/14/military/18_01_127_13_04.txt


Ellie

[thedrifter]

Fight for Ramadi exacts heavy toll on Marines <br />
By Gregg Zoroya, USA TODAY <br />
RAMADI, Iraq — In this violent city where more Marines have died than anywhere else in Iraq, one was thought to be blessed...

[thedrifter]

Politics, Iraqi Style
The new government may be blustering and brutal. But at least it's focusing on the issues that matter WEB-EXCLUSIVE COMMENTARY
By Christopher Dickey

July 13 - As I drove into Baghdad from the airport on Sunday, Iraqi cops were all over the streets. In some parts of town there seemed to be a road block on every corner. They stopped cars. They searched the trunks. They searched what was in the trunks—and in the glove compartments, and in my computer bag. No smiles. No pleasantries. These guys had new uniforms, but their pot bellies, their moustaches, and their AK-47 assault rifles were just the same as in the old Saddam Hussein days.


I never thought I'd be glad to see them. But I was. And so are most of the Iraqis I've talked to. "Things are more quiet these last weeks," a young baker explained to me this afternoon. He spread his hands as if he were smoothing the sheet on a bed. "I hope this is not the calm before the storm."

I hope so, too. And if it's not—if it really is a turning point toward peace and prosperity for Iraq—then there's a simple reason: The quasi-sovereign government installed June 28 is playing politics Iraqi style. Sure there's a lot of bluster and a fair dose of brutality. No doubt there's plenty of corruption, too. But there's also a feel for the mood on the street that the U.S.-run Coalition Provisional Authority, now defunct, never even began to have.

A first priority of the new government is to make the capital city safe and restore public services. That's obviously what you'd want to do, right? But Proconsul L. Paul Bremer, based in the American city-within-the-city known as the Green Zone, lived in a world of self-serving denial every bit as delusional as that of his betters in Washington. His constant blather about free markets and democracy, mouthed in Iraq but meant to be heard inside the Beltway, was matched by a persistent failure to stabilize and revitalize Baghdad itself.

Iraqis remember too well that their capital city was surrendered virtually intact, and only destroyed in the days after the Americans rolled into town. The troops stood back while liberated looters stripped the infrastructure of the city to the bone. Since then, Baghdadis have watched with sheer incredulity the Americans' inability to restore regular electrical service. They've learned to fear the ferocious, random firepower of the American soldiers patrolling their streets. At the same time, they've seen criminal gangs turn kidnapping into an industry. "People say the Americans wanted to make us suffer," an Iraqi doctor who works in the air-conditioned Green Zone told me before going home to her sweltering, lightless home.

The new Iraqi interim government may not be able to solve all these problems, but at least it's focused on them. And if it can focus on a few more, then truly there may be hope that Iraq will pull out of its death spiral, and Americans will pull out of Iraq.

The next step is the amnesty proposal due out this week. In an interview with The Financial Times, interim President Ghazi Yawer said, "We are offering a silky hand to law-abiding people, and we are offering a sharp sword to anybody who wants to be above the law." Inside the Green Zone, the Stars and Stripes newspaper distributed to soldiers headlined the hard line: "Iraqi president announces crackdown on insurgents; Al-Yawer vows 'sharp sword' against militants". But, in fact, it's the silky hand that will be extended first to many Iraqis who've fought and killed American troops. "If it's just the people of this city, some of them killed 10 soldiers, we are offering an amnesty," said Al-Yawer. "We have to do that, we have to be brave enough to accept our people and embrace all Iraqis."

Yeah, that quote makes me cringe, too. Amnesty for rebels who've killed five or 10 Americans? But Yawer's just being realistic. The next crucial step is for this Iraqi government to start reaching agreements with the major tribes in the countryside, especially in the west, to end their role in the insurgency. A lot of them have been fighting what they see as a righteous battle against invaders, and taking revenge for their relatives who've died these last 15 months.

A key to the problem was the U.S. effort in March and April 2003 to kill individual Iraqi leaders with precision munitions. The smart bombs were guided by dumb people, as it turned out, who dropped them on the basis of execrable intelligence. In the go-go days of Iraqi Freedom, in mid-April last year, such respected reporters as Con Coughlin of Britain's Daily Telegraph would quote their friendly intelligence sources' claims that Saddam's son Uday, the bespectacled diplomat Tariq Aziz and even the clownish information minister "Baghdad Bob" Sahaf had all been taken out by precision-guided bombs.

"So he's toast, you think?" Bill O'Reilly on Fox News asked about Sahaf. "That's what I'm told," said Coughlin. As we now know, Con was told wrong. As many of us were. Human Rights watch has since blamed the stupid use of smart bombs, as blunt instruments of assassination, for killing many of the innocent civilians who died during Operation Iraqi Freedom. It appears they killed few or none of the targets they were supposed to hit.

One incident was worse than the others, however, because it turned the course of the long-term war against us. On April 11, two days after American Marines pulled down the statue of Saddam in the middle of Baghdad, the United States tried to kill Saddam's half-brother, Barzan al-Tikriti, by dropping six J-Dam guided bombs on a large villa about 11 miles outside of the city of Ramadi.

They didn't get Barzan, if he was ever there, but they did kill Malik Al-Kharbit, a tribal leader who had worked with the Americans and Jordanians since the mid-1990s to try to overthrow Saddam Hussein. In addition to Malik, another 21 members of his family died under those bombs, including a dozen children.

War is war, with all its collateral implications. But some actions in war are more foolish and self defeating than others. Members of the Kharbit clan are considered the leading figures in an extended tribe called the Dulaym, who number as many as two million. Their strongholds are in Fallujah, Ramadi, Ka'em, Rutbah—places now well known to the U.S. public as "The Sunni Triangle," where so many Americans have gone to die since that precision strike on the wrong target in April 2003..

How do you fix a screw-up like the killing of Malik Kharbit and his family? The Americans never did figure that out. In fact, they've made things worse. A few weeks ago, after Malik's brother Mudher refused once again to cooperate with the United States and rein in the insurgents, eight members of his family were thrown into Abu Ghraib prison, including one brother who'd lost all his children in the April 2003 bombing.

"We are looking to the future," Mudher told me when I saw him in Jordan over the weekend. He doesn't trust Allawi. But he doesn't want to fight the central government forever. He'd like to work with it, have his tribe have a place in it. If Allawi can find a way to accommodate the Kharbit clan, then once again he may be moving his country from war toward peace. An amnesty for those who've killed Americans is one way to start.

Of course, when you think of all the blood and money we've been spent here, all this could seem pretty demoralizing. But given the mess we've made of this place, it's surprising how reassuring it is to see the Iraqis reverting to their old ways.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5431857/site/newsweek


Ellie

[thedrifter]

07-13-2004

A Soldier Reports From Iraq



By Chris Murphy

81ST BDE – IRAQ

ALAD, Iraq - June 22 was a day I'll never forget. The week before it, six long-range rockets hit the base here - Camp Anaconda, about 50 miles north of Baghdad - and one of them hit the PX, killing two soldiers and wounding 25 others. I had a feeling something else bad was going to happen.

It's one of the hardest things to deal with: knowing that incoming rockets and mortars come in on a regular basis. I've learned to deal with it, though, just like everyone else around here. Sometimes we don't even hear the boom; all we hear is the alarm going off to tell us to get to hardened shelter. But what I saw and what happened on June 22 will be something much harder for all of us here to deal with.

The day started off with a 3 a.m. wakeup. No one had gotten much sleep because they didn't put the mission out until 11 the previous night. So at best most of us slept only four hours. This wouldn't have been too much of a problem because this sort of thing happens a lot. But usually we would only go out and do mounted patrols and area coverage. On this day we were walking through about eight different places. It was way too big of an area to cover on foot with just two squads. We were at the first site around 5 a.m. Everyone who was going on the foot patrol dismounted from the vehicles. Since I'm a driver, I usually have to sit with the vehicle. I did for an hour or two, and when we met up with the group the lieutenant - Andre Tyson of Riverside - decided to switch me out with another specialist. I didn't mind too much. I actually wanted to go stomping through the terrain. I also carried the mine detector, along with my M203 [grenade launcher] and all my grenades. The areas we walked through were densely vegetated. The ground wasn't flat, and there were small canals every 25 feet. We're walking through brush neck high, trying to keep our footing and hoping our next step doesn't land us in a canal.

"It's like being in Vietnam" was the running joke. After an hour and a half of searching this area we finally got out of the "jungle." It was at this point where we linked up with a platoon of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC). They're the new Iraqi Army that we've been training. I've heard on the news that they're more than ready to take over after we're gone.

But from what I've seen, that news couldn't be more wrong.

For the two weeks leading up to June 22, our "off" days had been spent babysitting the ICDC and giving them some training. As if we didn't have enough to do already. But on this day, they were going to be patrolling with us.

Up until now, my squad and another squad were sticking close together. Since each squad had a radio and we could cover more area, Lt. Tyson split us up.

He sent the first squad back through the "jungle" and then it was to head east along the Tigris River. We headed south towards the Tigris. This area wasn't much better. It was tall grass, dried wheat fields and big spiky weeds. I don't know which terrain was worse. We ended up marching through some farmers' crops. We linked up with the vehicles to get resupplied on water and to get a little food in us. By now it was 10:30 a.m. It had been go, go, go since 5 this morning with no breakfast.

It was getting hot, and my squad leader, Staff Sgt. Sarla, had already come down with heat exhaustion. Specialist Patrick Ryan McCaffrey gave him an IV bag. McCaffrey, from Tracy, is a combat lifesaver, whose job is to help a victim until a medic arrives. Meanwhile, our medic, PFC Woodbury, treated another member of our group for a mild case of heat exhaustion. I talked with medics later and they said they should've ended the mission right there.

They took Sarla back to base and switched out the other heat stroke victim with Spc. Hemmelright, who was a gunner in first squad's humvee. We only got a 20-minute break and then it was back on again. So now it's myself, Lt. Tyson, Spc. McCaffrey (who was carrying the radio), Spc. Camaya, Sgt. Antonio, Spc. Hemmelright, Spc. Ulen and about 12 ICDC along with an interpreter.

We headed southeast towards a town. We walked across large dirt clumps for awhile and then came to a stop and circled around the lieutenant. The ICDC wanted to know why we were out walking around; they didn't think there was anything here. Of course, they were talking through the interpreter and all the questions and gripes were aimed at the lieutenant.

Lt. Tyson explained to them that we had to search these areas for caches of rockets, mortars, weapons or anything else that they might be hiding. He said they wouldn't be in these open areas and that we were going to search where it was more dense to the southeast where some tall palm trees were. From here the lieutenant decided to split us up. One group would go north towards the town and the other would head into the dense area towards the palms.

I wasn't sure which group to go with; I stopped and looked at Lt. Tyson. He looked at me as if he were going to tell me to come along with him. He didn't say anything so I went with Camaya, Ulen and Antonio along with some of the ICDC towards the town. Lt. Tyson, McCaffrey, Hemmelright and the rest of the ICDC went southeast towards the palm trees.

We were supposed to meet back up where the palm trees were. I remember McCaffrey saying (and he said this a lot): "This is b-------, man. They're not going to stop pushing us until someone gets hurt or killed. Then maybe they'll let up." That was the last thing I remember him saying.

As my group headed towards the town, I could still see the other group, and they were still heading towards the trees. We then went east along the right side of the road. We started making our way off the road into the fields where we were to link up with the other group. We were all wondering why the lieutenant split us up like this. Our group didn't even have a radio. It didn't make any sense, but a lot of the things we undertake rarely do.

continued.......

[thedrifter]

We came to a wall and started yelling for Lt. Tyson and the other group. We asked a farmer if she had seen any other Americans in the area. She said she saw some walking towards the town. I didn't think it was the other group. They shouldn't have been walking back that way.

Besides, we had already covered that area. Soon after that we heard some automatic fire, followed by some single shots. At first I thought it was the police shooting off their guns or an attack on the police station. We knew it came from the police station. We all got on our knees and looked in the direction of the fire. Some more single shots went off. From the way it sounded, I knew it was an M16.

Then I saw a bunch of Humvees speeding towards the police station. We decided to get back on the road and go back towards the police station. After a while I knew something bad had happened and we started to run. I ran through some vehicles and saw McCaffrey on the ground. He was all pale and almost green. He wasn't moving and his eyes were wide open.

I rushed to pull his mine detector equipment off and throw it in a truck. From what I saw, he didn't look good and was shot up pretty bad. I didn't see much bleeding, but I saw a large wound in his leg and in his stomach. Ulen, Antonio, Camaya and the driver of the five-ton truck lifted Mac up onto the vehicle.

I got on the radio trying to tell the task force what was going on. It was total chaos. I didn't see the lieutenant or Hemmelright anywhere. I was wondering why it was just Mac. I grabbed a weapon and a bloody Kevlar helmet I saw lying on the ground and threw it in the truck. Ulen started CPR on McCaffrey in the back of the five-ton while Camaya and Antonio were holding pressure to the wounds. I was directly behind the five-ton while we were escorting them back to base. I had to watch them try to bring Mac back to life while speeding back to base. From the way he looked, I didn't think he was going to make it.

Then we had to return to the police station to get the rest of the vehicles and the ICDC. This whole time I'm trying to stay focused and not break down. A million questions are going through my head. Why did the lieutenant split us up? What if I had gone with that group?

I'm trying to hear what is going on over the radio. The reason I didn't see the lieutenant or Hemmelright is because they had already been evacuated from the scene before I got there. The Kevlar I threw in the back was the lieutenant's. I found out that he was shot in the back of the head twice. He probably died almost instantly. I looked at the helmet and knew it was his.

He got hit right under where the helmet stops. I also found out that Hemmelright was wounded, but he was going to be OK. I guess he took four shots to the body armor and one got him in the ass. By now, the entire task force was out and there were Humvees and tanks everywhere surrounding the town. There were vehicle checkpoints on the main roads to inspect all vehicles.

I guess three of the ICDC are missing, and there is some confusion as to whether or not they did it. The captain got the names of the three ICDC and we headed to the town where they supposedly lived to talk to the sheik to find out where exactly they lived. I'm not exactly sure what was said because after he talked to the sheik we went back to the police station.

By this time it is confirmed that Lt. Tyson and Spc. McCaffrey are KIA - killed in action - and SPC. Hemmelright is in critical condition. It's just sad that it had to be Mac. No matter how strong he was or how tough he was, he couldn't stop all the bullets that hit him. McCaffrey was hit on both sides of his body where there was no protection from the body armor. There was nothing the medics could do for either of them. Mac had too much internal bleeding and Lt. Tyson had a serious head wound. It was an ambush, plain and simple.

When we came back in we dropped the ICDC off at their camp and searched all of them because Mac's watch was still missing. Antonio said that he had thrown it in the back of the five-ton. We weren't able to find the watch.

There were a lot of sad faces and folks crying. We could all finally break down. Sgt. Maj. Menard said to go back to the headquarters tent and that the chaplain would be over. We went back to the tent and tried collecting ourselves. Later that night the task force went to the airfield and stood on each side of the plane as they loaded McCaffrey and Lt. Tyson. It's going to be hard for those of us that were close to these individuals. McCaffrey was in my squad and was a good friend of mine. I spent a lot of time with Lt. Tyson since I was his driver.

We still have to keep on fighting and continue the mission. We still have at least nine more months here. I can only take it day by day here. June 22 was definitely the worst. I hope no more will have to die. It looks like it's going to get worse before it will get better.

But what is done is done, and there is no going back. I just pray for the families that have lost their loved ones and for the soldiers here who lost their friends. And I know these friends are in a better place.

http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=Special%20Reports.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=271&rnd=379.601277995215


Ellie

[thedrifter]

Iraqi Official Assassinated in Capital <br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
BAGHDAD, Iraq - Gunmen killed an auditor for the Industry Ministry in a drive-by shooting as he was leaving his office in Baghdad, authorities said...

[thedrifter]

Marine Forces Reserve

by LtGen Dennis M. McCarthy, USMCR

The Reserves are leveraging recent successes to shape the flexible,
responsive Reserve Component needed for the global war on terrorism.


Introduction
Since the events of 11 September 2001, the Marine Corps Reserve has convincingly demonstrated its ability to augment and reinforce the Active Component (AC) in time of war. We have rapidly and efficiently activated nearly 30,000 Marines in support of Operations NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). These Marines have deployed worldwide and performed missions across the full spectrum of military operations.


Today and for the foreseeable future, Marine Forces Reserve (MarForRes) will remain fully engaged and prepared to provide trained, balanced, and sustainable forces in support of the ongoing global war on terrorism (GWOT). Our recent success has demonstrated that MarForRes was, overall, well-prepared for the challenges posed by the current conflict, and we have validated many key elements of MarForRes structure and our operational planning processes.


However, it is vital to acknowledge that the extended nature and global reach of the GWOT places the Marine Corps Reserve into truly uncharted territory. Many, if not most, of the underlying doctrines, foundational concepts, and policies regarding employment of the Reserve and Guard Components remain deeply and stubbornly rooted in the framework of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath.


Our success in responding to the rapid requirements of the last 2 years has often been achieved in spite of manpower policies, mobilization processes, command relationships, and family support networks that were designed to support a single, major mobilization of the Reserve followed by a conflict of fairly limited duration that concluded with a rapid demobilization. In other words—the Cold War model of Reserve and Guard employment—a model derived from decisions made during the post-Vietnam era of the early and mid-1970s. That is manifestly not the situation we find ourselves in today, and we need to undertake significant efforts to change a number of policies in very specific areas to ensure we are effectively positioned to support operations in the much different conflict we currently confront.


Below I divide these required changes, or initiatives, into two categories: (1) operational initiatives—those steps that MarForRes can take in the near future to better prepare and sustain forces for the GWOT, and (2) strategic initiatives—the pillars that will support and positively influence the Marine Corps Reserve’s ability to meet its responsibilities to both the AC Marine Corps and the Nation during the coming decade. Taken together these initiatives constitute a vision for establishing a 21st century capable and relevant Marine Corps Reserve. Let the discussion begin.


Operational Initiatives
North Command (NorthCom) componency. The Commandant has decided to recommend several changes with regard to Marine component commanders to the Secretary of Defense, including the assignment of Commander, MarForRes (ComMarForRes) to the additional duty of Commander, Marine Forces North (ComMarForNorth). In addition to alleviating the burden currently borne by the Commander, Marine Forces Atlantic (ComMarForLant), who serves as Marine component commander to multiple unified and naval commanders, the assignment of ComMarForRes as ComMarForNorth allows one Marine commander to focus on the emerging missions and requirements of homeland defense.


ComMarForRes has proposed changes to several tables of organization in order to move a modest number of Marines—some active duty and some Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)—to duty at the NorthCom headquarters in Colorado Springs, CO. Two active duty officers will report there for duty this summer. Others will follow shortly. Several other billets are being realigned in New Orleans to create a direct reachback capability into ComMarForRes headquarters for homeland defense issues. MarForRes has exchanged liaison officers with the National Guard Bureau headquarters, and an Army National Guard officer in New Orleans will be a part of the homeland defense cell there. MarForRes has also directed the assignment of one officer and one staff noncommissioned officer (SNCO) to additional duty at the National Guard state headquarters in every state, creating a liaison capability to augment the Marine emergency preparedness liaison officers who, for several years, have been functioning in each of the Federal Emergency Management Agency regional headquarters.


Improving junior officer manning. Currently only 25 percent of MarForRes company grade officer billets are filled with officers of the correct grade. The shortage is particularly acute in combat arms billets and impacts the combat readiness of these key units. In most cases, exemplary SNCOs have assumed duties as platoon commanders in these units, and the evidence we have gathered indicates they have done an extraordinary job. However, using SNCOs as a matter of course to fill these billets is not so much a “solution” as it is a response driven by necessity.


To a great extent the shortage of company grade officers within the Marine Corps Reserve is a matter of deliberate—and correct—institutional choice. In excess of 90 percent of the officers who serve in MarForRes have completed successful AC tours of 3 1/2 to 6 or more years in length. Therefore, a majority of officers transitioning into the Marine Corps Reserve often do so as senior captains. That the overwhelming majority of Marine Corps Reserve officers have extensive AC service and experience is a source of strength for the Reserve Component (RC). This policy has historically paid significant dividends and should not be fundamentally altered or replaced. However, the challenge to fill the billets designated for lieutenants in combat arms battalions is not very well-addressed. We wind up with captains serving as platoon commanders or with platoons and sections without officer leadership.


The Reserve Enlisted Commissioning Program (RECP), formerly known as the Direct Commissioning Program, is a valuable avenue for certain highly qualified enlisted Marine reservists to pursue commissioning as officers while continuing their service in the Reserves. However, because the program requires Marine reservists to voluntarily serve nearly 1 1/2 years on active duty in order to complete Officer Candidates School, The Basic School, and a full-length military occupational specialty (MOS)-producing school, the RECP is not the right fit for many reservists and is unlikely to ever successfully produce the number of company grade officers MarForRes requires to significantly reduce our ongoing officer shortage.


An additional approach, tailored to fit the unique needs of MarForRes and the equally unique population of potential officer candidates, is to fill company grade officer billets with additional Reserve warrant officers. I have recommended that the Marine Corps establish a new program to recruit, select, and train warrant officers in combat arms MOSs where they previously have not existed and would not exist in the AC (0302 (infantry), 0802 (artillery), 1302 (engineer), 1802 (tank/assault amphibious vehicle), etc.). These warrant officers would be drawn largely from the population of college educated, combat arms qualified NCOs and SNCOs currently serving in platoon commander billets. Their MOS credibility, combined with completion of the Reserve warrant officer course and a Reserve combat arms MOS-producing course, would provide MarForRes with a potentially large population of qualified candidates from which to select future warrant officers. The intent would be for these warrant officers to remain in platoon commander billets for 3 to 5 years with the further potential rotation to other lieutenants’ billets within their battalion as a part of their career progression.


This combination of accession programs—the traditional transfer of officers leaving active duty, the RECP, and a new warrant officer program—will fill our officer ranks and enhance our combat readiness.


Material readiness improvement. Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) units have, over the last 3 years, transitioned from maintaining partial tables of equipment (T/Es) to established training allowances (T/As). Unit T/As reflect realistic limitations to equipment maintenance and unit training capabilities requisite to each Reserve training center’s geographic location. At mobilization, gaining force commanders (GFCs) make up the differences between a Reserve unit’s equipment holdings (T/A) and the authorized allowance (A/A); that is, the type and quantity of equipment necessary for the SMCR unit to accomplish the GFC’s assigned mission. Sourcing this “T/A-A/A delta” becomes especially difficult with regard to the provision of low-density, high-value equipment (weapons systems, optics, rangefinders/target designators, radios), and other “leading technology” assets. It is both unrealistic and a potential threat to continued combat readiness to expect the GFC to provide the full complement of critical equipment assets immediately prior to deployment into a combatant area of responsibility. MarForRes must acquire more of these critical items and store them in a central facility for distribution to units as they are activated, thus reducing the burden those units place on the resources of their GFCs.


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Within MarForRes we are rapidly combining a post-OIF confirmation of SMCR unit T/As with an expansion of the very successful single site storage facility concept; that is, centralized management, with emphasis on equipment readiness and a prompt distribution capability of critical assets, under MarForRes authority. The Critical Asset Rapid Distribution Facility, Marine Corps Logistics Command (MCLC) Albany is a prototype facility designed to help alleviate the GFC’s burden to source critical equipment assets for SMCR units at mobilization and prior to employment. Institutionally, we must revise acquisition objectives in two ways. First, we must make a reality out of the stated Marine Corps policy of “horizontal fielding.” Consistently providing new equipment to MarForRes units at the tail end of a buy is a recipe for readiness failure. Secondly, acquisition objectives can frequently be reduced, recognizing the likelihood that only portions of MarForRes will be deployed at any one time, thus reducing the need to provide a full-up T/E to the entire force simultaneously. Lastly, it is imperative to increase the in-stores readiness of assets held for MarForRes by MCLC while refining material readiness reporting systems to provide commanders more timely and accurate visibility of these MarForRes organic assets.


Employing MarForRes units without mobilization. To effectively support a long-term effort like the GWOT, we must not only plan for mobilization but also determine how best to employ previously activated Marines who desire to serve and volunteer for operational deployments. Certainly, a return to normal training activities is important, as is the process of integrating the steady flow of newly joined Marines into these veteran units. However, I believe we can do more.


What our manpower and force planners must do is to identify predictable, short-duration deployments suitable for standard or composite units that provide true operational tempo relief for the Marine expeditionary forces (MEFs). We will give particular consideration to activities that support homeland defense and regional combatant commanders’ theater security cooperation efforts.


UNITAS represents one model of such a deployment. In 2002, and again this year, hundreds of Marines and sailors volunteered to form MarForUNITAS, serving on active duty for approximately 6 months to work up, and then execute, a U.S. Southern Command-sponsored deployment. Last fall, a similar unit executed a portion of the West African Training Cruise, deploying for approximately 30 days to Ghana to execute a U.S. European Command-sponsored event. We will aggressively seek other such opportunities, enabling continued Marine Corps presence around the world while reducing the strain on AC forces.


Lastly, we must determine the feasibility of forming composite units of MarForRes AC Marines and SMCR volunteers who wish to perform additional periods on active duty. These composite units can then be deployed for GWOT missions, thus extending our force in areas in which our depth of a particular capability may be relatively low.


Inspector-instructor (I&I) integration and the peacetime/wartime support team (PWST). The PWSTs have enabled us to successfully integrate AC I&I personnel into their SMCR unit, or to offer those Marines to other GFCs as individual augmentees. Unlike during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, we are not leaving this rich pool of talent “on the bench” to manage empty training centers. However, we have learned that it is not necessary to place a PWST in direct support of every MarForRes unit or home training center as we originally planned.


MarForRes now seeks to staff PWSTs for deploying units with the right number of well-trained Marines to fill gaps at the home training center left by I&I integration and deployments, recognizing that different units have differing requirements for site support augmentation. In short, all PWSTs are in general support of MarForRes, reducing manning requirements but still enabling I&Is to deploy when and where required.

We further reduce premobilization demands on SMCR units by managing the PWST program at the newly redesignated Marine Corps Mobilization Command in Kansas City, MO that is responsible for recruiting, training, and assigning personnel as required.


Strategic Initiatives
MarForRes/Reserve Affairs (RA) consolidation. By law, the duties of the ComMarForRes include being “the principal advisor to the Commandant of the Marine Corps on Marine Forces Reserve matters,” as well as the traditional command responsibilities for a force of 39,600 SMCR Marines and 60,000 members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Some of these duties require a near-full-time presence in the National Capital Region (NCR), while those of a force commander are best performed at a separate headquarters.


I believe that a realignment of general officers is required in order to fully support both the policy development and coordination of the MarForRes within the NCR currently conducted by both ComMarForRes and RA at Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) and the force commander responsibilities currently conducted at MarForRes headquarters in New Orleans. An effective means to achieve this is to shift the RA portfolio from the Deputy Commandant (DC), Manpower and RA, moving the RA general officer billet from Manpower and assigning that officer as Deputy Commander (DepCom), MarForRes (Forward) with an office in the NCR. I propose eliminating the active duty deputy commander billet from New Orleans and converting that billet back to an IMA assignment for a Reserve general officer. I further propose the division of the current RA Division staff along functional lines, with those personnel filling manpower-type duties transferred to the DC, Manpower. DepComMarForRes (Forward) would retain those staff functions and personnel directly related to MarForRes issues. The DepComMarForRes (Forward) could provide further value by being available in Washington, DC to assist all of the DCs with Reserve issues.


New headquarters/installation in New Orleans. MarForRes, like its counterpart MarFor Pacific and MarForLant, respectively, exercises command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence responsibilities across a widely dispersed and frequently deployed force. Even during normal peacetime operations, MarForRes units are located at 187 different sites in 48 states and Puerto Rico. Units frequently deploy for training within and outside the continental United States. Effective connectivity throughout the force requires a headquarters with the communications infrastructure to effectively lead and coordinate the varied activities of a nationwide and worldwide organization. Emerging NorthCom responsibilities intensify this need.


Although overall quality of life has dramatically improved in New Orleans in recent years due to an aggressive public-private venture housing program, the establishment of an outstanding on-base charter school, and other locally based initiatives, MarForRes remains housed in an aging, outmoded warehouse building with poor communications infrastructure. This, coupled with a recent shift in Navy Reserve interests in New Orleans that is marked by significant declines in the number of functions performed there and a proposed reduction in individuals and units based at Naval Support Activity (NSA) New Orleans and Naval Air Station-Joint Reserve Base Belle Chasse, means MarForRes is faced with several critical facilities challenges.


MarForRes must begin planning for a new headquarters facility or an upgrade of the existing facility. One possible means to achieve these improvements would be to initiate a consolidation of existing Army and Navy managed facilities in New Orleans to a new joint service headquarters aboard NSA New Orleans.

MarForRes staff reorganization (including military to civilian conversions). One of the key elements in ensuring effective MarForRes support for the GWOT will be manpower flexibility. This flexibility runs the gamut from the processes we use to mobilize individual Marines to eliminating the personnel and administrative barriers that prevent Marine reservists from smoothly and efficiently moving across different duty statuses. Reorganizing the staff of MarForRes headquarters is a critical means toward achieving greater manpower flexibility as well. The force headquarters and the “ministaffs” of the 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, and 4th Force Service Support Group are all substantially smaller than their AC counterparts. Efficient manning and operation are not only laudable goals—they are essential. Any future reorganization of the MarForRes staff should be conducted in order to take advantage of the broader military to civilian conversion initiative currently underway throughout the Department of Defense. The unique nature and responsibilities of many of the staff functions within MarForRes headquarters means some could readily be performed by civilian personnel who have the proper military experience and background. An example is the billet of the DepComMarForRes, a general officer billet located in New Orleans. This AC brigadier general’s billet has either been gapped or filled with a retired Reserve general officer since 2001. Given foreseeable operational requirements for Marine Corps general officers, it is highly unlikely the Marine Corps will be able to fill this billet again. Therefore, redesignating this billet within the context of military-civilian conversion would both alleviate a senior leadership vacancy MarForRes has confronted for several years and permanently free up a general officer for assignment to the NCR.

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Active Reserve (AR) officer integration into the AC. Related to increased manpower flexibility is the realization that existing assignment patterns have not kept pace with the steady improvement in the overall quality and capability of the AR officer population. More than 350 officers currently serve in the AR program. Most do so in billets that support the training, administration, and operational support of the RC; however, a number also fill critical roles in AC Marine Corps organizations as well. The AR program has its own accession process, promotion boards, officer monitors, and a career path unique to the requirements of the Marine Corps Reserve.


While this may have been an adequate solution in the past, it unduly limits the service of AR officers and fails to provide these officers with the absolutely critical experiences such as routine deployment with the Operating Forces, command, and billet variety that are essential elements in the maturation of all Marine Corps officers. For this reason, an across the board reexamination of the AR officer program—the reason for its existence (including Title 10 guidance and requirements), the current form it takes, and the future resource it represents—is required.


The MarForRes goal—in coordination with HQMC—should be to expand assignment opportunities for AR officers while ensuring that statutory mandates and the needs of the Marine Corps Reserve remain fulfilled.


The first step toward achieving this goal is by shifting management responsibilities for all AR personnel to Manpower Management Division. As soon as possible thereafter, merge the 350 AR officers into the pool of AC officers for assignment purposes. This merger would not only permit greater career opportunities for current AR officers, but would also open up the possibility for AC officers to serve in billets currently held by AR personnel based on individual preferences and the needs of the Marine Corps. This would be the initial step toward eliminating most of the differences between AR and AC officers. Allowing AR officers to apply for command screening as well as the full range of career opportunities open to AC officers (for example special education program, advanced degree program, assignment to joint specialty officer designated billets, etc.) would subsequently follow. This will require adjustments to authorized end strength and controlled grade ceilings of the AC and RC. In order to ensure that AR officers are afforded full and fair opportunities for promotion it will be necessary to create a “grandfather” provision that will allow AR officers in the grade of major and above to compete for promotion in a separate category until eventual augmentation or retirement. A further step would be to monitor the effect of this effort and evaluate its applicability to the AR enlisted population in the future.


Rebalancing the force. Existing MarForRes structure does not yet completely complement Marine Corps requirements. Our long-term requirement is to determine AC needs for augmentation and reinforcement and restructure MarForRes to meet those needs while sustaining itself; i.e., remaining a force that can attract and retain the right number of high-quality Marines.


MarForRes will participate fully and proactively in Marine Corps efforts to determine AC needs and RC capabilities to meet those needs. We are moving aggressively to restructure MarForRes through particular initiatives including the establishment of a MEF augmentation command element at III MEF, the standup of a Reserve intelligence support battalion, and the establishment of two security battalions with antiterrorism/force protection and military police capabilities.


Conclusion
The thread that ties these operational and strategic initiatives together is the enhancement of MarForRes capability to fulfill its statutory responsibilities. For ComMarForRes to fulfill these responsibilities, three main attributes are required: (1) credibility within both the AC and RC, (2) the physical means to effectively exercise command and control over a geographically dispersed force, and (3) adequate manning and positioning of a staff composed of personnel with the background, training, and motivation to make possible the successful achievement of the Marine Corps Reserve’s missions.


Implementing each of the operational and strategic initiatives discussed in this article is directly related to these three attributes. While the initiatives must be addressed separately, and the timing of each initiative may be different, each mutually supports the others. A failure to achieve one will adversely affect one or more of the others.


The success of MarForRes depends in large part on achieving recognition inside and outside the Marine Corps as a MarFor with the operational orientation to train, equip, and prepare for mobilization, combat-ready units, detachments and individuals for service with the other Operating Forces of the Marine Corps across the full spectrum of conflict in a joint or combined environment. The importance of this role has never been greater, particularly in light of the obvious need to sustain partial mobilization and continued worldwide deployment in the varied environments presented by the GWOT. The type of change we require within MarForRes is achievable and within our grasp. However, in this instance, patience will not be a virtue. The ongoing operational requirements levied by the GWOT will require us to change quickly while maintaining a constant level of support to the AC Marine Corps—“modifying the aircraft while it’s flying” so to speak. The Marines and sailors of MarForRes are up to this challenge, and I fully expect will embrace these initiatives with the same enthusiasm, professionalism, and degree of commitment they have shown each day since 11 September 2001.

>LtGen McCarthy is the ComMarForRes.

http://www.mca-marines.org/Gazette/0704mccarthy.html


Ellie

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Tearful Goodbyes To Daughters, Sons, Friends, Lovers


WMAQ-TV12:28 p.m. CDT July 13, 2004 - Marines at the Great Lakes Naval base shipped out for Iraq early Tuesday morning.

Images:Great Lakes Farewell

Video:Marines Ship Out

NBC5's Kim Vatis said 90 men headed out, after saying goodbye to their families and friends.

"They know they are going on what could be a year's tour of duty," Vatis said. "They go at a time when the Pentagon admits that troops are stretched very thin over in Iraq right now. They are trying to beef up forces."

The first shift of Marines left around 2:30 a.m.

"They are with Marine Wing Communications Squadron 48," Vatis said. "Already they have undergone four weeks of intensive predeployment combat training, according to the sergeant here."

Althought their tour is one year, Vatis said, it could end up being two years, under the current partial mobilization authorized by President Bush.

"We will be supporting other units for the Marine Expeditionary Force that is there," according to Sgt. Paul McPheeters. "We will do everything we can to ensure marines have proper communications so they can get the mission done."

"Last year they said a year," another Marine said. "We were back in five months. This year, they say seven months. Hopefully, we get there and get back."

Vatis said many of the Marines and families told her they volunteered for this second tour.

"They said they saw firsthand how much it was needed," Vatis said. "After seeing how much it was needed, they decided to step up and go back again."

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5430751/


Ellie

[thedrifter]

Reform lingo


By Nir Boms and Erick Stakelbeck
THE WASHINGTON TIMES


One of the more intriguing aspects of last week's transfer of power in Iraq was the reaction it drew from neighboring governments in the region, particularly those that, traditionally, have been anything but democracy-friendly.
Iran's mullahs, for instance, "welcomed" the transfer as giving "sovereignty back to the majority of the Iraqi people." Likewise, Jordanian government spokeswoman Asma Khader labeled the move "a step toward rebuilding political, economic, security and social institutions in Iraq," while Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher called it "an opportunity for [the Iraqi people] to take control of their own affairs and restore complete sovereignty."

Senior Syrian Information Ministry official Ahmad Haj Ali voiced similar concern for the welfare of the Iraqi people, telling al Jazeera, "There will be great security problems as a result of the U.S. presence and problems created by the Americans themselves."
Judging by these comments, it seems that some of the same Arab and Muslim governments that for years largely ignored the atrocities committed under Saddam Hussein's regime have now become staunch advocates for democracy and human rights in Iraq.
This is no accident, as the ruling elites in these countries are acutely aware that the U.S. drive to democratize the Middle East has brought the reform debate to the forefront in their own backyards. And like the new reality in Iraq, it is here to stay.
Indeed, while most governments in the Middle East maintain that they will never accept reform dictated from outside sources — particularly the United States — widespread internal debate over the issue is already underway. Conferences on reform have been held this year alone in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and Tunisia, and media outlets throughout the region discuss the issue on a daily basis.
Reform also has become an integral part of virtually every speech made in recent months by Arab leaders, including Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and members of the Saudi royal family.
"People won't admit it, but three years ago reform was something few talked about," a Jordanian diplomat told Newsweek recently. "Today it's everywhere."
Just last month, more than 100 Arab democracy advocates, political leaders and reformers participated in the Doha Conference on Democracy and Reform in Qatar. Its concluding declaration contained the strongest language seen thus far from an Arab or Muslim source concerning Mideast reform, asserting, "Democratic change has become a non-negotiable choice that cannot be postponed."
Similarly, in May, several Arab foreign ministers met in Cairo to draw up a joint reform plan based on proposals from a number of countries, including Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Tunisia and Yemen.
The 22-member Arab League, however, has approached the reform issue much more warily. Given that pro-democracy movements are perhaps the most serious threat to the survival of the highly autocratic structure that exists throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds, it's no surprise that the league's members did not intend to put reform on the agenda of their latest summit.
The conference — which was originally scheduled for March — ended up being postponed until May due to disagreement over the content of the U.S. Greater Middle East Initiative for democratic change in the region. In the end, though, despite several contentious moments, the Arab League ultimately adopted a 13-point program that represented the first joint pledge for reform in its history.
While it has received a chilly reception from Arab leaders, the initiative has succeeded in spurring heightened competition from Europe in the area of democracy promotion. The European Union has increased funding for "The Barcelona Process," an outreach plan that was originally launched in 1995 and targets 12 Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority.
The European Union recently allocated $6.6 billion to the program to help "establish a common Euro-Mediterranean area of peace and stability based on fundamental principles including respect for human rights, democracy, rule of law, the need for good relations between neighbors."
Whether Middle Eastern governments will be willing partners in the EU plan remains to be seen. Still, although the recent talk of reform by Arab leaders may merely be cosmetic, it does offer an entry point for the promotion of genuine change in the region.
The distinction between "imported" and "homegrown" reform is secondary to the fact that the discussion is finally on the table throughout the Middle East, creating a unique window of opportunity for the United States and its democratic allies to advance liberty in countries where freedom is forbidden.

Nir Boms is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democraciesandco-founderof www.pulseoffreedom.org. Erick Stakelbeck is senior writer for the Investigative Project.

http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20040713-080938-8215r.htm

Ellie