The Battle For Tarawa

[thedrifter]

THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA <br />
A Validation of the U.S. Marines <br />
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THE ROAD TO TARAWA <br />
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At the Quebec conference in August of 1943, the Allied high command announced it's intention to launch an...

[thedrifter]

NOVEMBER 21: THE SECOND DAY <br />
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At the beginning of the second day, three marine battalions held a small foothold on Betio's lagoon beach. They were ordered to attack at 6:00 A.M. while the 2nd...

[thedrifter]

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THE VALUE OF TARAWA


In the 76-hour fight for Betio, 1,056 marines and sailors were killed, died of wounds or were missing and presumed to be dead. Some 2,300 men were wounded, but recovered. Meanwhile, at home, Americans were appalled by the losses at Tarawa, flooding Admiral Nimitz's mail with angry letters. But Tarawa had taught the navy and the marines some vital lessons in amphibious warfare which in the near future, would save thousands of lives. More amphtracks were to be built with better armor, including side protection for marines. Higgins boats were removed from landing operations. Landing craft were converted into supporting gunboats, able to come in close on the beach. Underwater demolition teams were organized to destroy natural and artificial obstacles before future atoll landing would take place. Precision rocket and naval attacks had proven their worth against the near impregnable fortifications. And the role of the tank in turning the tide of battle proved critical. All these lessons would be applied to future campaigns with great success.

The price for Betio had been relatively high, but within days, Betio was converted into a forward base for the assault on the Marshalls, with bomber and fighter sorties flying out within hours of the marines victory. And within nine weeks of the battle, an invasion task force under Admiral Nimitz left Tarawa to take the Marshall Islands.


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[thedrifter]

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Marines who would not have their deeds recorded, or recognized by earning a medal went about the deadly business of survival and winning a battle. Here and there small groups of Marines, most led by brave privates, took tiny patches of ground. The extraordinary requirement to wade across 700 yards of coral reef, totally exposed to withering machine gun fire and accurately registered artillery salvos, was faced be almost every single Marine in the Division. That simple act required braver and fortitude to succeed. PFC. Bill Clear, 8th Marines, recalled the wade in, "Jeez, the fire was heavy as hell as we went in. I was scared to death." Lieutenant Commander Robert A. McPherson, a pilot flying over the atoll, described what he saw, "The water never seemed clear of tiny men, their rifles held over their heads, slowly wading beach wards. I wanted to cry." "Yet this reef was crossed by men wading the reef with the determination, courage and endurance to carry on to the end in order to secure the island of Betio," declared Lt. General Julian Smith. "In the chaos, the life of every Marine depended quite simply on his willingness to risk it." How or why did Marines in small groups or singularly, usually on their own or under the direction of a local leader, and all completely removed from the doctrine of amphibious warfare, move forward? Inside enough men, willing to risk their lives, were qualities not listed in the Tentative Man2walfor Landing Operations.

The qualities can best be identified by men who lead the marines into battle. Colonel T. A. Culhane, Jr., Operations Officer, 2nd Marines identified the intangible qualities, "More important than all the techniques [of amphibious assault], was the high state of training and discipline of the individual Marine, his morale, and his confidence and determination to continue the attack even though those about him became casualties." Lt. Colonel Howard J. Rice, Exec., 2/2 focused in on the morale factor, "Before we hit the beach we knew it would be grim business. But we intended and expected to win, even when we held only a narrow naked beach. But, I must admit this confidence was based on nothing more tangible than a faith, a faith shared by all Marines, that Marines always finished a job assigned." Lt. Colonel William T. Bray, C.O., Company All/2, was even more succinct, "The value of sound training and the spirit of comradeship, which comprises a fundamental pillar of Marine Corps life, still stand foremost in my mind as the primary reason for victory at Tarawa." Joseph Alexander believes that an important factor from training permitted the marines to sustain morale and operations longer than the Japanese in the intense battle. Alexander writes, "The Marines' intensive, preliminary field training and strenuous conditioning prior to combat gave them an edge as the battle entered into the third day." Edwin Hoyt saw the training in a different beneficial light, "here the hard training of the marines showed itself; men, from the remnants of several different companies, adjusted to complete change of command and operating procedure under heavy fire without a whimper, and moved on to fight as though it had all been planned this way." These were officers and leaders viewing from the topside of command down to the ranks. The men in the ranks may have reacted that way from training but self -motivation may have been more personal and human related.

The espirt de corps of the Marines was operating in the inferno of the battle. The esprit de corps was extremely high in the Second Marine Division. But how did that play out on a individual basis? Richard Wheeler, a marine veteran who fought on Iwo, explained, in his book, A Special Valor, how the esprit emerged on Tarawa, "They were all Marines, and they were in this thing together, and they would do the best they could to uphold the Corps' reputation and sustain one another. Few men talked in terms of 'death before dishonor," but the ancient code applied." Robert Sherrod who witnessed it up close and personal described it this way, "It was inconceivable to most Marines that they should let another Marine down, or that they could be responsible for dimming the bright reputation of their corps."

This was demonstrated by the feeling among the Marines who held the tiny strip of beach on the first night. "There was no sense of panic in the lines as the Marines set up for night defenses." No one dared to let the Corps down or to let down the Marine lying next to him. It even extended to unknown Marines. Marines fought and died for other Marines, unknown and even unseen. "In those first desperate hours there had been only one way to get at the Japanese, and that was to get in and kill them, which usually meant getting killed oneself in the process. But enough marines had given their lives to let the beachhead live." Even fifty years later marines recall why they carried on. Norman Moisie, an amtrak driver in Company A, 2nd Amtrac Battalion, wrote on the fiftieth anniversary, "Still, not a day passes without memories of Tarawa, the spirit of the Marine Corps, and of all the good men with whom I served.

Tarawa did turn out to be a "productive proving ground" for the amphibious doctrine. In fact every subsequent move in the drive across the central pacific was to be made with the mistakes of Tarawa in mind. The lessons learned and adjustments made to the doctrine helped take the Marshalls twice as fast with half the casualties. The practical lessons of amphibious warfare [at Tarawa] provided for adjustments and improvements in all six parts of the doctrine. But what must be recognized and remembered about Tarawa was that it was the individual marine, his courage, bravery and training which bought the victory and time for adjustment which sold the doctrine.

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[thedrifter]

The doctrine may have been sound, and the correct method to seize an enemy base, island or hostile shore, but it was in disarray and failing on Tarawa. It took the Marines to catch and save it from failure; Marines who relied on traditional bedrock foundations of the Corps. Edwin Hoyt put it best, "without the heroism of the Marines at Tarawa, the entire course of the Central Pacific might have changed." Tarawa should not stand as the proof of amphibious doctrine, but as the symbol of raw courage and Marine tradition.

Additional Sources:
www.mcu.usmc.mil
www.history.navy.mil
www.ibiblio.org


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'The 2nd Marine Division has been especially chosen by the High Command for the assault on Tarawa...what you do there will set a standard for all future operations in the central pacific area.'
Major General Julian C. Smith
Commander of the U.S. 2nd Marine Division - November 1943

'Casualties many; Percentage of dead not known; Combat efficiency; we are winning.'

Colonel David M. Shoup, USMC,
Tarawa, 21 November 1943.

'The Marines fought almost solely on esprit decorps, I was certain. It was inconceivable to most Marines that they should let another Marine down, or that they could be responsible for dimming the bright reputation of their Corps.
The Marines simply assumed that they were the world's best fighting men.'

Robert Sherrod,
1943, regarding the battle at Tarawa

Ellie

[Lock-n-Load]

:marine:....Thx Ellie for more on the first US Marine amphibious assault that the Japs put up a fearsome resistance to...a year before it happened, I was an 11 yr kid into WW2 on a daily basis...I was learning to be good at sandlot baseball thx to a local teenager named John Markey...one day John went away to join the US Marines...he never came back...Pfc John Markey-USMC FMF...was KIA at Tawara...he has a memorial marker [stone/monument] at the busy intersection of Winthrop St and Lawrence Road in Medford, Mass...I have decorated his site every year so far...the first films released in 1944 well after the Tawara graphic slaughter brought terrible anguish to us here as well as across the country...scenes of lifeless/dead Marines awash in the tides and all over the beach area brought thousands & thousands of angry telephone complaints to the Navy Department...American mothers were grief stricken, etc..through it all, I can still remember John's joy at teaching us kids to be better baseball players...God bless Pfc John Markey-USMC FMF [KIA Tawara atoll 1943].:marine: Semper Fidelis

[Osotogary]

I believe that the Battle for Tarawa was captured on film by correspondents who landed with the Marines. Comparisions to the Tarawa Beachhead were compared to the visuals of the Normandy Invasion as portrayed in the film "..Private Ryan"....only worse.

[Lock-n-Load]

:marine: US Marine combat photographer, Sgt Norm Hatch, filmed the graphic scenes in tecnicolor no less...now a retired US Marine major,Norm Hatch was featured on a history channel documentary with antecdotal/reminiscences of that horrific day of frontal assault from the sea...look for it to be repeated as Norm is outstanding, blunt and definitive as to what he witnessed,he shows more archieval film that has never been released, etc...I think it's entitled, "Bloody Tawara"..."Pvt Ryan" movie tries hard but real combat films by combatants are far more brutal to mortal close/combat in my opinion and Marine photographers are rated best...Tawara taught the Marine honchos mucho and the mistakes made at Tawara were never repeated..the Jap Marines bloodied us but good; however, only a handful of Japs survived once the Fleet Marine Force fought their way ashore. S/F :marine: