thedrifter
07-06-04, 07:27 AM
07-02-2004
Guest Column: Much to Learn in Iraq
Editor’s Note: The following comments were written by a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army Special Forces in Iraq identifying what he concludes are key issues facing the U.S. military occupation there. The memorandum was forwarded to DefenseWatch by one of our readers.
Subject: A View from Baghdad Rapid Equipping Force
By SF Lieutenant Colonel
(Disclaimer: These are my own personal views of what I’ve seen in Iraq thus far in eight weeks from an SF LTC in a conventional theater operating against an unconventional threat) It’s my humble opinion on problems and recommendations for you Warriors (Future Bn/Bde/Div Cdrs and Staffers) to chew on. I don’t purport to be the quintessential warrior/diplomat with all the answers. I’m sure there are big pieces of info that I am not privy to that might change some of my recommendations or give you the other side of the story. Take this for what it is worth and do with it what you may. Please forward to anyone you want if you feel that they can get some usefulness out of this)
In No Particular Priority:
1. Civilian-Miltiary Operations: are almost negligible, unorchestrated, undermanned, etc. We taught you that CMO in SASO [stability and support operations] has to be a main effort/it is not here hence this may become a 10-year-war fought one year at a time.
2. MSRs/Logistics: Remember the long-long, 3-country MSR [main supply route] that we glazed over in the Caspian Sea scenario, forget it - Impossible unless you dedicate 6-10 Divisions to secure. A small band of insurgents have almost paralyzed the U.S. army in Iraq in terms of shutting down MSRs through IED [improvised explosive devices] attacks, RPGs, complex attacks. Hard to fight a sustained campaign when you have interrupted CL1/3/V plus other things.
Go back and figure out how to offensively take control of MSRs through the use of combat power in conjunction with an IO/Psyops/Civil Affairs to secure the populace support along MSRs. Think through securing MSRs from the short term (tactical) perspective to the long term (op/strat) perspective of turning security over to the host nation by phasing US/ICDC and Iraqi Police patrols/Ops over time. Have that thought process finalized to the 75 percent mark before you go into another conflict like this. Hard to back up and rethink the right equation once you’ve started on the bus to Abilene.
3. Information Operations: Go back to someone else's books, NOT US, to figure out what this is and how to employ it in a synchronized campaign strategy. Don’t let anyone blow smoke back there about a great IO plan here which I’m including (EW/Psyops/PAO/CMO/Intell). We are not getting the Bde/Div-level IO assets readily down to Plts that are executing in the bad areas daily.
The young Plt Ldrs are using common sense to figure out what needs to be done to influence the Imams/Mosques/local leaders but are not getting access to well thought out Psyop/Civil Affairs projects/messages in a timely manner. We (OIF 1) units promised a lot and didn’t deliver in terms of improving quality of life in a lot of key areas. As a result, the civilian populace is turning a blind eye towards the insurgents, because they would rather see the U.S. occupation force leave. Yes, the educated folks in a district I patrolled (Ministry official, PhDs, etc.) view us as occupiers that have not quickly added value to their daily lives.
4. Working with Indig: SF had to turn this mission over to conventional troops because our efforts during OIF/OEF were reprioritized towards two different mission sets other than FID [foreign internal defense]. The conventional folks are having a hard time getting past rapport building skills that come as a result of time and experience training indigenous forces.
I would rather see SF split its effort now and focus 75 percent on FID (Consulting with Regular Units) and 25 percent DA/SR/CT [direct action/strategic reconnaissance/counter-terrorism]. Strategically, this will become more important as time passes, especially after 30 June transition to Iraqi control. WE MUST WORK OURSELVES OUT OF A JOB IN A SMART, SUSTAINABLE WAY. SF guys MUST be a part of this plan due to our experience and expertise in this area. The longer we stay
away from this, the harder it will be.
5. Staff Work: Some staff guys still think they are more important than shooters. The Fantasyland effect gets bolstered as more hardstand mess halls/MWR facilities/PXs start popping up. Yes, we have softball tournaments for the folks on the big base that is not hurting for luxuries.
STAFF TOADS MUST get out on patrols at least once every two weeks to realize who the customers are and what the REAL PROBLEMS are. If not, they create work for work’s sake that adds little value, because it becomes disconnected from the realities on the ground. The moral of the story is, “SLIP AWAY from staff jobs if you can, especially on staffs higher than Division level.” Corps level folks are having a hard time in my opinion adding to a primarily Bde and below fight. Now, we’ve introduced another echelon of command in an already staff/higher command saturated environment. Every layer of staff dilutes responsiveness - agility. We’re supposed to have 31 general officers in Iraq now.
6. Equipping: The Army is doing a great job overcoming/improvising/adapting. By that, I mean that there are numerous units in the Active and Reserve components over here doing jobs that they are not by MTOE/TDA [modified table of organization and equipment/table of distribution and authorization] manned/equipped/trained to do. They are doing an admirable job with what they have on hand. The Army is doing a mediocre job of creating a Theater TDA for units conducting SASO security ops (The Ops common denominator in theater).
If in the future you are associated with an attached Reserve or other units redesignated (ie. FA/ADA/EN units doing mobile infantry stuff), think it through for them in terms of home station training/equipping/manning. Trying to do it in theater will be A LOT HARDER than doing it in the States. Assigning a Washington State reserve unit to conduct perimeter security on your main base w/o giving them proper
NODs/Thermals/Sniper Rifles/Optics/Commo may not be a wise thing to do. Think 2d/3d/4th order effects (ie. Past your rotation) and help establish a theater standard TDA for any unit to fall into once they arrive in Kuwait or Iraq.
7. Property Accountability: Save yourselves a lot of trouble and Report of Survey/15-6 time and maintain standard U.S. Army property accountability procedures (not that hard). OIF 1 did not establish a theater property book account. This created several nightmares (missing a few small items like lots of Humvees, a few tanks, 400 connexes of unclaimed “Frustrated Cargo” sitting in Kuwait and not in soldier’s hands, etc.) It gets worse when you start talking about the commercial off-the-shelf stuff that was bought.
continued..............
Guest Column: Much to Learn in Iraq
Editor’s Note: The following comments were written by a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army Special Forces in Iraq identifying what he concludes are key issues facing the U.S. military occupation there. The memorandum was forwarded to DefenseWatch by one of our readers.
Subject: A View from Baghdad Rapid Equipping Force
By SF Lieutenant Colonel
(Disclaimer: These are my own personal views of what I’ve seen in Iraq thus far in eight weeks from an SF LTC in a conventional theater operating against an unconventional threat) It’s my humble opinion on problems and recommendations for you Warriors (Future Bn/Bde/Div Cdrs and Staffers) to chew on. I don’t purport to be the quintessential warrior/diplomat with all the answers. I’m sure there are big pieces of info that I am not privy to that might change some of my recommendations or give you the other side of the story. Take this for what it is worth and do with it what you may. Please forward to anyone you want if you feel that they can get some usefulness out of this)
In No Particular Priority:
1. Civilian-Miltiary Operations: are almost negligible, unorchestrated, undermanned, etc. We taught you that CMO in SASO [stability and support operations] has to be a main effort/it is not here hence this may become a 10-year-war fought one year at a time.
2. MSRs/Logistics: Remember the long-long, 3-country MSR [main supply route] that we glazed over in the Caspian Sea scenario, forget it - Impossible unless you dedicate 6-10 Divisions to secure. A small band of insurgents have almost paralyzed the U.S. army in Iraq in terms of shutting down MSRs through IED [improvised explosive devices] attacks, RPGs, complex attacks. Hard to fight a sustained campaign when you have interrupted CL1/3/V plus other things.
Go back and figure out how to offensively take control of MSRs through the use of combat power in conjunction with an IO/Psyops/Civil Affairs to secure the populace support along MSRs. Think through securing MSRs from the short term (tactical) perspective to the long term (op/strat) perspective of turning security over to the host nation by phasing US/ICDC and Iraqi Police patrols/Ops over time. Have that thought process finalized to the 75 percent mark before you go into another conflict like this. Hard to back up and rethink the right equation once you’ve started on the bus to Abilene.
3. Information Operations: Go back to someone else's books, NOT US, to figure out what this is and how to employ it in a synchronized campaign strategy. Don’t let anyone blow smoke back there about a great IO plan here which I’m including (EW/Psyops/PAO/CMO/Intell). We are not getting the Bde/Div-level IO assets readily down to Plts that are executing in the bad areas daily.
The young Plt Ldrs are using common sense to figure out what needs to be done to influence the Imams/Mosques/local leaders but are not getting access to well thought out Psyop/Civil Affairs projects/messages in a timely manner. We (OIF 1) units promised a lot and didn’t deliver in terms of improving quality of life in a lot of key areas. As a result, the civilian populace is turning a blind eye towards the insurgents, because they would rather see the U.S. occupation force leave. Yes, the educated folks in a district I patrolled (Ministry official, PhDs, etc.) view us as occupiers that have not quickly added value to their daily lives.
4. Working with Indig: SF had to turn this mission over to conventional troops because our efforts during OIF/OEF were reprioritized towards two different mission sets other than FID [foreign internal defense]. The conventional folks are having a hard time getting past rapport building skills that come as a result of time and experience training indigenous forces.
I would rather see SF split its effort now and focus 75 percent on FID (Consulting with Regular Units) and 25 percent DA/SR/CT [direct action/strategic reconnaissance/counter-terrorism]. Strategically, this will become more important as time passes, especially after 30 June transition to Iraqi control. WE MUST WORK OURSELVES OUT OF A JOB IN A SMART, SUSTAINABLE WAY. SF guys MUST be a part of this plan due to our experience and expertise in this area. The longer we stay
away from this, the harder it will be.
5. Staff Work: Some staff guys still think they are more important than shooters. The Fantasyland effect gets bolstered as more hardstand mess halls/MWR facilities/PXs start popping up. Yes, we have softball tournaments for the folks on the big base that is not hurting for luxuries.
STAFF TOADS MUST get out on patrols at least once every two weeks to realize who the customers are and what the REAL PROBLEMS are. If not, they create work for work’s sake that adds little value, because it becomes disconnected from the realities on the ground. The moral of the story is, “SLIP AWAY from staff jobs if you can, especially on staffs higher than Division level.” Corps level folks are having a hard time in my opinion adding to a primarily Bde and below fight. Now, we’ve introduced another echelon of command in an already staff/higher command saturated environment. Every layer of staff dilutes responsiveness - agility. We’re supposed to have 31 general officers in Iraq now.
6. Equipping: The Army is doing a great job overcoming/improvising/adapting. By that, I mean that there are numerous units in the Active and Reserve components over here doing jobs that they are not by MTOE/TDA [modified table of organization and equipment/table of distribution and authorization] manned/equipped/trained to do. They are doing an admirable job with what they have on hand. The Army is doing a mediocre job of creating a Theater TDA for units conducting SASO security ops (The Ops common denominator in theater).
If in the future you are associated with an attached Reserve or other units redesignated (ie. FA/ADA/EN units doing mobile infantry stuff), think it through for them in terms of home station training/equipping/manning. Trying to do it in theater will be A LOT HARDER than doing it in the States. Assigning a Washington State reserve unit to conduct perimeter security on your main base w/o giving them proper
NODs/Thermals/Sniper Rifles/Optics/Commo may not be a wise thing to do. Think 2d/3d/4th order effects (ie. Past your rotation) and help establish a theater standard TDA for any unit to fall into once they arrive in Kuwait or Iraq.
7. Property Accountability: Save yourselves a lot of trouble and Report of Survey/15-6 time and maintain standard U.S. Army property accountability procedures (not that hard). OIF 1 did not establish a theater property book account. This created several nightmares (missing a few small items like lots of Humvees, a few tanks, 400 connexes of unclaimed “Frustrated Cargo” sitting in Kuwait and not in soldier’s hands, etc.) It gets worse when you start talking about the commercial off-the-shelf stuff that was bought.
continued..............