thedrifter
06-21-04, 08:35 AM
Operation Forager:
The Battle for Saipan
Plans to launch an offensive against the Japanese in the islands of the Pacific were initiated in 1943 at the Quadrant Conference held in Quebec. President Franklin Roosevelt received the proposal that the Allied effort in the Pacific should be directed first toward the Gilbert Islands, then the Marshalls, followed by Wake, the Eastern Carolines, and finally the Marianas. It was at Saipan that American military planners were presented with the problem of how to cope with a dense civilian population, the first to be encountered in the Pacific war. American forces were to be under the overall command of Admiral Chester Nimitz.
The American drive across the Pacific would be two-pronged. While Nimitz fought his way across the central Pacific, General MacArthur would advance across the southwest Pacific to the Philippines. The islands of the central Pacific either succumbed one by one under the sheer weight of American forces or were bombed, neutralized and bypassed. With their supply lines cut, the defenders of by-passed islands were left to starve. After the fall of the Marshall islands, no other island in the central Pacific would be invaded by American ground forces until the American armada reached the waters off the Marianas and the island of Saipan.
American war strategy in the western Pacific was developed around the premise that Japan would never surrender and that the nation would fight to the last man, woman, and child, particularly if the home islands were invaded. It was anticipated that such an invasion, if it were to occur, would result in the loss of one million American lives. In planning for this eventuality, air bases in the Marianas were essential in order to accommodate the new B-29 Superfortress, a U.S. bomber that was just beginning to be mass-produced in early 1944 and which had a flying range equal to the distance from Saipan, Tinian and Guam to Japan and back. The B-29's normal range was 2,850 miles at 358 m.p.h. with a 20,000 ton carrying capacity at 32,000 feet. The capture of the island of Saipan thus became crucial in the preparations for this massive invasion.
The assault on Saipan began on June 15,1944, almost a week after the invasion of Europe. An armada of 535 ships carrying 127,570 U. S. military personnel (two-thirds of whom were Marines of the 2nd and 4th Divisions) converged on the island. The ships of the invasion force carried 40,000 different items to support the assault - everything from toilet paper to government-issue coffins. A single supply ship carried enough food to feed 90,000 troops for one month. Navy tankers transported the gigantic quantity of petroleum products required to support the invasion. Aircraft alone consumed over 8 million gallons of aviation fuel during the battle, while the aircraft carriers burned more than 4 million barrels of fuel.
Seven American battleships and 11 destroyers shelled Saipan and Tinian for 2 days before the landings, firing 15,000 16-inch and 5-inch shells at the islands along with 165,000 other shells of other caliber. To even begin to comprehend the magnitude of this onslaught, one needs to realize that a single 16-inch round weighs slightly more than a Volkswagen Beetle, besides being packed with high explosives. On the second day of the bombardment, this force was joined by 8 more battleships, 6 heavy cruisers and 5 light cruisers. The islands were ringed by American warships with their guns blazing. Shells rained down on the island, its villages, inhabitants, and defenders, gouging huge craters in the sand and coral. The earth trembled under the tremendous explosions of naval bombardment and simultaneous air attacks.
The Battle
The main attack of the Marine Divisions was centered near Chalan Kanoa, just as planned. The 2nd Marine Division was to land at Red and Green Beaches north of the town while the 4th marine Division would land on Blue (opposite the town) and Yellow Beaches. As with most amphibious operations, not everything went as planned. The tractors moved faster than the tanks and in several cases blocked the ability of tank to fire. 2nd Marine Division's landings in the south were made slightly to the north of their planned objectives, this caused a gap to occur between the flanks of the two divisions. Although the original plan had allowed for a small gap between the two divisions, the northward landing of the 2nd Battatlion, 8th Marines more than doubled the size of this gap. By 0907, the first wave had reached the beach with only minimal losses and 8,000 marines were ashore.
Besides the large gap between the two divisions, another problem that occurred during the landing was in the use of the amphibious tanks and tractors. In the 2nd Marine Division's area, the tanks were to move ahead of the tractors and advance inland about 1,500 yards and then set up defensive positions and lay down defensive fire while the initial wave of tractors moved up to this defensive line and the troops off loaded. The second - fourth waves were to unload their troops on the beach. In the 4th Marine Division area, the tanks were to lead the first two waves of tractors all the way to the objective, about a mile inland on some high ground. These tanks would then support the troops as they moved inland. The follow-on would be unloaded at the beaches.
In general, although most of the tanks and tractors made it to the beaches unharmed, the combination of their thin armor and slow movement made them easy targets for the Japanese artillery once ashore. The amphibious vehicles were under-powered and were easily stopped by obstacles (loose sand, trenches, holes, and trees) that normal tanks would not have had a problem with. This significantly slowed the movement of the amphibious vehicles. The lack of suitable paths inland from the beaches also inhibited the inward movement of the marines. By nightfall, despite the various delays, both divisions were fully ashore and had established a defensive belt over 1,000 yards deep and over 10,000 yards long. Seven battalions of artillery had also landed and so had two heavy tank battalions. Division command posts were also established ashore. One of the benefits of using the troop carrying amphibious tractors was that it allowed the men to be carried ashore in armored vehicles, rather than having to wade ashore as at Tarawa.
http://images5.fotki.com/v80/photos/1/133612/1039874/p09-vi.jpg
Aerial view of Saipan, July 1944. (National Archives)
http://images6.fotki.com/v83/photos/1/133612/1039874/Saipanbeach-vi.jpg
http://images5.fotki.com/v85/photos/1/133612/1039874/USMC19-vi.jpg
continued.........
The Battle for Saipan
Plans to launch an offensive against the Japanese in the islands of the Pacific were initiated in 1943 at the Quadrant Conference held in Quebec. President Franklin Roosevelt received the proposal that the Allied effort in the Pacific should be directed first toward the Gilbert Islands, then the Marshalls, followed by Wake, the Eastern Carolines, and finally the Marianas. It was at Saipan that American military planners were presented with the problem of how to cope with a dense civilian population, the first to be encountered in the Pacific war. American forces were to be under the overall command of Admiral Chester Nimitz.
The American drive across the Pacific would be two-pronged. While Nimitz fought his way across the central Pacific, General MacArthur would advance across the southwest Pacific to the Philippines. The islands of the central Pacific either succumbed one by one under the sheer weight of American forces or were bombed, neutralized and bypassed. With their supply lines cut, the defenders of by-passed islands were left to starve. After the fall of the Marshall islands, no other island in the central Pacific would be invaded by American ground forces until the American armada reached the waters off the Marianas and the island of Saipan.
American war strategy in the western Pacific was developed around the premise that Japan would never surrender and that the nation would fight to the last man, woman, and child, particularly if the home islands were invaded. It was anticipated that such an invasion, if it were to occur, would result in the loss of one million American lives. In planning for this eventuality, air bases in the Marianas were essential in order to accommodate the new B-29 Superfortress, a U.S. bomber that was just beginning to be mass-produced in early 1944 and which had a flying range equal to the distance from Saipan, Tinian and Guam to Japan and back. The B-29's normal range was 2,850 miles at 358 m.p.h. with a 20,000 ton carrying capacity at 32,000 feet. The capture of the island of Saipan thus became crucial in the preparations for this massive invasion.
The assault on Saipan began on June 15,1944, almost a week after the invasion of Europe. An armada of 535 ships carrying 127,570 U. S. military personnel (two-thirds of whom were Marines of the 2nd and 4th Divisions) converged on the island. The ships of the invasion force carried 40,000 different items to support the assault - everything from toilet paper to government-issue coffins. A single supply ship carried enough food to feed 90,000 troops for one month. Navy tankers transported the gigantic quantity of petroleum products required to support the invasion. Aircraft alone consumed over 8 million gallons of aviation fuel during the battle, while the aircraft carriers burned more than 4 million barrels of fuel.
Seven American battleships and 11 destroyers shelled Saipan and Tinian for 2 days before the landings, firing 15,000 16-inch and 5-inch shells at the islands along with 165,000 other shells of other caliber. To even begin to comprehend the magnitude of this onslaught, one needs to realize that a single 16-inch round weighs slightly more than a Volkswagen Beetle, besides being packed with high explosives. On the second day of the bombardment, this force was joined by 8 more battleships, 6 heavy cruisers and 5 light cruisers. The islands were ringed by American warships with their guns blazing. Shells rained down on the island, its villages, inhabitants, and defenders, gouging huge craters in the sand and coral. The earth trembled under the tremendous explosions of naval bombardment and simultaneous air attacks.
The Battle
The main attack of the Marine Divisions was centered near Chalan Kanoa, just as planned. The 2nd Marine Division was to land at Red and Green Beaches north of the town while the 4th marine Division would land on Blue (opposite the town) and Yellow Beaches. As with most amphibious operations, not everything went as planned. The tractors moved faster than the tanks and in several cases blocked the ability of tank to fire. 2nd Marine Division's landings in the south were made slightly to the north of their planned objectives, this caused a gap to occur between the flanks of the two divisions. Although the original plan had allowed for a small gap between the two divisions, the northward landing of the 2nd Battatlion, 8th Marines more than doubled the size of this gap. By 0907, the first wave had reached the beach with only minimal losses and 8,000 marines were ashore.
Besides the large gap between the two divisions, another problem that occurred during the landing was in the use of the amphibious tanks and tractors. In the 2nd Marine Division's area, the tanks were to move ahead of the tractors and advance inland about 1,500 yards and then set up defensive positions and lay down defensive fire while the initial wave of tractors moved up to this defensive line and the troops off loaded. The second - fourth waves were to unload their troops on the beach. In the 4th Marine Division area, the tanks were to lead the first two waves of tractors all the way to the objective, about a mile inland on some high ground. These tanks would then support the troops as they moved inland. The follow-on would be unloaded at the beaches.
In general, although most of the tanks and tractors made it to the beaches unharmed, the combination of their thin armor and slow movement made them easy targets for the Japanese artillery once ashore. The amphibious vehicles were under-powered and were easily stopped by obstacles (loose sand, trenches, holes, and trees) that normal tanks would not have had a problem with. This significantly slowed the movement of the amphibious vehicles. The lack of suitable paths inland from the beaches also inhibited the inward movement of the marines. By nightfall, despite the various delays, both divisions were fully ashore and had established a defensive belt over 1,000 yards deep and over 10,000 yards long. Seven battalions of artillery had also landed and so had two heavy tank battalions. Division command posts were also established ashore. One of the benefits of using the troop carrying amphibious tractors was that it allowed the men to be carried ashore in armored vehicles, rather than having to wade ashore as at Tarawa.
http://images5.fotki.com/v80/photos/1/133612/1039874/p09-vi.jpg
Aerial view of Saipan, July 1944. (National Archives)
http://images6.fotki.com/v83/photos/1/133612/1039874/Saipanbeach-vi.jpg
http://images5.fotki.com/v85/photos/1/133612/1039874/USMC19-vi.jpg
continued.........