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thedrifter
05-20-04, 10:20 AM
Peleliu, battle for (Operation Stalemate II) - The Pacific War's Forgotten Battle, September-November 1944

Introduction
By 1944, the Japanese, while being far from defeated, were well and truly on the defensive. In Southeast Asia, British and Commonwealth forces had halted the Japanese offensive towards Kohima and Imphal and begun an offensive of their own which was pushing the Japanese back into central Burma. In the Pacific, the Americans had their two-prong drive well underway with the securing of Guadalcanal (Solomon Islands) and Tarawa (Gilbert Islands), followed up with the landings on Bougainville (Solomon Islands) and New Britain (Admiralty Islands) in 1943 and on Luzon (Philippines), Guam, Tinian and Saipan (Mariana Islands) in 1944, as well as continued fighting in New Guinea. As 1944 progressed, the Americans started to look towards securing targets much closer to the Japanese home base in order to have staging areas to prepare for their final attack on Japan, eventually codenamed Operation Downfall. These were likely to include Iwo Jima, Okinawa and Formosa, all of which had significant garrisons on them, MacArthur favouring the Formosa / China route, while Nimitz favoured the Iwo Jima / Okinawa (Ryukus Islands) one.
The Palau Islands
The Palau Islands lie in an archipelago that stretches for over a hundred miles in a line running roughly from the northeast to southwest, starting with the largest island of Babelthuap and then continuing with Koror, Arakabesan Island, Urukthapel, Eil Malk, Ngemelis Island, Ngeregong Island, Garakayo Island, Ngesebus-Kongauru Island, Peleliu and finally Angaur. Peleliu is just over twenty square miles in size, and has a similar shape to that of a lobster claw. The southern end of the island is flat and open (well suited to the construction of an airfield) while the centre is dominated by the Umurbrogol Mountain that is, in actual fact, a series of limestone coral ridges, much of which is blanketed by thick jungle. Spanish missionaries discovered the islands in 1712 (although some claim that Spanish explorers under the Portuguese navigator Ruy Lopez de Villalobos chanced upon the island in 1543) and while the Spanish never really developed the islands, they were sold to Germany in 1899 after its defeat in the Spanish-American War. The Germans started to exploit the extensive phosphate reserves, particularly on Angaur, but their tenancy was short-lived as the Japanese declared war on Germany on 14 August 1914 and seized their Pacific possessions, including the Palau islands by the South Seas Squadron under Rear Admiral Tatsuo Matsumara on 4 October 1914. The League of Nations awarded the mandates to Japan in 1920, despite opposition from the United States, and a civil government (South Sea Bureau) was installed in 1922 with the South Sea Defence Force created to defend the mandate. Between the wars, Japan established a major presence on the Palau Islands that was somewhat shrouded in secrecy - it was on Koror that Lt Col Earl (Pete) Ellis, USMC died in mysterious circumstances in 1922 while touring the Pacific (he was in fact spying for the US Government). With the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations in 1935, the islands were closed to Westerners and the military facilities expanded to include airfields, seaplane bases and some coastal defences. The outbreak of war in 1941 soon saw the importance of the Palau Islands grow, as it soon became a forward supply, training and staging point for the Armed Forces.
The Americans Prepare
The next stage in the Central Pacific campaign under Admiral Chester W Nimitz was seen as supporting General Douglas MacArthur's drive to retake the Philippines as quickly as possible, something he managed to convince both Admiral Nimitz and President Franklin D Roosevelt of, during their meeting in Honolulu in July 1944. He managed to secure the loan (again) of the 1st Marine Division as he had done in the Solomons campaign. The 1st Marine Division had already received a warning order in May 1944 to participate in Operation Stalemate. This plan saw the 1st Marine Division with the 81st Infantry Division (under III Amphibious Corps) assault Peleliu and Angaur (also sometimes spelt Anguar), alongside the 7th and 77th Infantry Divisions (under XXIV Corps) that would land on Babelthuap, all part of the Palau Island group. The 27th Infantry Division would remain in reserve on New Caledonia and the target date was set as 8 September 1944.
The delays in securing the Marianas had three immediate impacts upon the Peleliu operation in that it firstly, delayed the arrival of the new III Amphibious Corps commander, Major General Roy S Geiger until planning (undertaken by a temporary staff headed by Major General Julian Smith commanding Task Force 36, called X-Ray Provisional Amphibious Corps) was at quite an advanced stage and any major changes would be difficult to implement. Secondly, it caused major friction between the Army and the Marine Corps as Lieutenant General Holland ("Howlin' Mad") Smith had relieved Major General Ralph C Smith of his command of the 27th Infantry Division for 'defective performance'. This was to have serious repercussions all the way back to Washington DC and on the Peleliu operation, although the two formation commanders would actually work very well together. Thirdly, it continued to tie up troops, resources and shipping (particularly the III Amphibious Corps and 77th Infantry Division on Guam and the 27th Infantry Division on Saipan). Additionally, intelligence (including the capture of the 31st Army files and a Japanese Intelligence Officer on Saipan) revealed that Babelthuap had only marginal utility in regard to the potential expansion of the airfield facilities there and had a large Japanese garrison, while Peleliu already had an excellent operational airfield that once in American hands, could neutralise the northern one. So the planning was altered and the target date (for the first phase) changed to 15 September 1944, the same day as MacArthur's forces would take Morotai. The new plan would be known as Operation Stalemate II, the first phase of which would involve the III Amphibious Corps (still the 1st Marine and 81st Infantry Divisions) assaulting Peleliu and Angaur. The second phase would see XXIV Corps (now consisting of the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions) attacking the atolls of Yap and Ulithi on October 8th, while the 77th Infantry Division would become the operation's floating reserve and the 5th Marine Division acting as a general reserve on Hawaii. The two phases would be supported by the US Navy's Western Pacific Task Force from the Third Fleet. The Covering Forces and Special Groups (Task Force 30) would remain directly under Halsey, the Third Amphibious Force (Task Force 31) was divided into the Western Attack Force (Task Force 32) bound for Peleliu and Angaur under Rear Admiral George H Fort and the Eastern Attack Force (Task Force 33) bound for Yap and Ulithi under Vice Admiral Theodore S Wilkinson. Task Force 32 was itself split into the Peleliu Attack Group (1st Marine Division) directly under Fort and the Angaur Attack Group (81st Infantry Division) under Rear Admiral H P Blandly.

Halsey Steps In
Admiral William F 'Bull' Halsey, Commander of the Western Pacific Task Force, had overall responsibility for conducting supportive attacks against a number of Japanese bases both in the Palau Islands and in the Philippines. As these raids were taking place, the invasion force was heading towards Peleliu, but to Halsey's surprise, these raids were only lightly contested, making Halsey suspect that the Philippines (in particular) were not as heavily defended as first thought. He ordered his Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral R B Carney to send an urgent message to Admiral Nimitz just two days (13 September) before the assaults on Peleliu and Morotai were to take place, recommending that firstly, the assaults be abandoned, secondly, that the ground forces that were to be used be transferred to MacArthur for use in the Philippines and thirdly, that the invasion of Leyte be conducted at the earliest opportunity.
Nimitz in turn, quickly sent a message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who were, at that point, meeting in Quebec for the Octagon Conference with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The Joint Chiefs, after consultation with General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz, decided on the 14 September (the day before D-Day) that the landings on Leyte should be brought forward by two months, thus accepting the third point in Halsey's recommendations. Halsey therefore, cancelled the second phase of Stalemate II on 17 September, with the exception of the landing on Ulithi, which would be now be carried out by the 323rd Regimental Combat Team (RCT), 81st Infantry Division. The XXIV Corps was transferred to MacArthur's command and landed on Leyte on 20 October 1944, fulfilling MacArthur's promise to return to the Philippines as soon as possible.

The Peleliu and Morotai assaults would go ahead however. While this would have no serious consequences for the 31st Infantry Division assaulting Morotai, the consequences for the 1st Marine and 81st Infantry Divisions would be severe. It was argued that the invasion forces were already at sea and the assault was on the verge of taking place and therefore too late to call it off, the Palau Islands had excellent airfields from which to threaten any invasion force for the Philippines and had a large number of first rate troops that could be used to reinforce them once the invasion was underway. Halsey would always disagree with this decision, claiming these factors could have been neutralised by air and sea bombardment, and whatever their value, the cost in taking them was likely to be too high. The controversy continues to this day.

To Read More
http://www.rickard.karoo.net/battlesmain18.html

Ellie

WillManning
05-20-04, 12:30 PM
Major Earl H. "Pete" Ellis
The following is an exerpt for "Blood Warriors" by Michael Lee Lanning
Chapter 13 "US Marine Corps Force Reconnaissance: History"

pages 210-213

"Major Earl H. "Pete" Ellis-who had gained his commission in 1900 and, after service in the Philippines, Japan, and the Mariana Islands, earned the Navy Cross, the service's second highest award for valor, on the Western Front during World War I- tried to prepare the navy for the future.

Despite health problems, which included kidney disease and lingering psychological disorders from his combat experiences- both compounded by alcohol abuse- Ellis sought new adventures and challenges after the armistice of 1918. On Sept 4, 1920, he wrote to the commandant of the corps, "In order that the Marine Corps may have the necessary information on which to base its plans for furture operations in South America and in the Pacific Ocean, I have to request that I be ordered to those areas for the purpose of making the necessary reconnaissance."

The commandant forwarded Ellis's letter to the director of naval intelligence, who approved the request. There is no evidence that Ellis investigated South America, but his accomplishments in the Pacific easily ranked among the most significant in the history of reconnaissance and intelligence.

Before departing for the Pacific, Ellis prepared and submitted a 30,000 word paper titled "Advance Base Operations in Micronesia" based on his observations of the region prir to the war. The department of the Navy approved Ellis's recommendations and redisignated the study Operations Plan 712 on January 28, 1921.

Ellis's reprot is one of the most amazing and insightful studies in American military history. Less than two years after the Great War, Ellis predicted that the US would be drawn into the Second World War a little more than 2 decades later. He wrote, "Japan is a world power, and her army and navy will doubtless be up to date as to training and material. Considering our consistent policy of nonaggression, she will probably initiate the war."

Ellis continued with a detailed analysis of Japan's military capabilities and a discussion of the sea, air, land, climate, and mative populations of the Pacific region. He concluded the paper with a strategy that the US could use to retake key islands so as to establish forward bases for an eventual invasion of the Japanese homeland. He included requirments for airplanes capable of delivering torpedoes against watercraft and the development of large, automatic guns for shipboard defense.

During the following years the navy made slight modifications of Operations Plan 712 and renamed is War Plan Orange. After the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941, many of the American efforts against Japan-including mobilization requirements, timetables, and the island-hopping strategy- closely followed Ellis's outline of events.

Upon completion of his reprot Ellis sailed throughout the Pacificto validate his findings. Few of his observations, however, made their way back to the Department of the Navy. On May 21, 1923, the Japanese governor of the South Sea islands reported to the American authorities in Yokosuka, Japan, that Ellis was dead. When the Japanese provided no official cause of his demise, some fellow marines theorized that the Japanese had murdered him because he had discovered some aspect of their war plans. Others speculated that he had become so despondent because of his war experiences that he commited suicide, or that he died from his medical ailments. A somewhat dubious account from a German merchant, Mr. O. Herrman, also made the rounds. Herrman, who briefly traveled with Ellis, stated that the major had become seriously ill after consuming a meal of canned eels and beer.

Japanese involvement became more viable when the naval attache at Yokosuka dispatched Chief Pharmacist Lawrence Zembsch to recover Ellis's remains. When Zembsch returned to Japan form the south Sea islands on Aug 14, 1923, he was, accoring to the attache, "...incoherent, his walk was unsteady and he was in a highly nervous condition. He would burst into tears, apparently without reason, talked of taking his own life, etc."

Zembsch also cringed in fear when approached by any Japanese-even those who had been close friends before his mission. It is likely that the Japanese officials in the South Sea islands drugged and tortured Zembsch. Naval officials deffered further debriefing until Zembsch could regain his health. That never occurred; both Zembsch and his wife died in a fire following an earthquake on Sep 1.

The cause of Ellis's death remains as mysterious as his visions and recommendations for the preparation and execution of the war against Japan remain extraordinary. Most Americans, however, languished in the belief that WWI was truely "the war to end all wars", supporting defense budget cuts and military manpower reductions. Those who remained in uniform did their best to prepare for future conflicts. Planners within the Marine Corps developed doctrines for amphibious warfare, emphasizing the need for advanced reconnaissance operations."

End of excerpt

mikekier
09-15-05, 08:05 AM
Hats off to the heros of the battle for Peleliu, assaulted 61 years ago today.

http://home.sprynet.com/~kier/peleliu.htm

Mike