thedrifter
05-17-04, 06:24 AM
05-14-2004
Abu Ghraib Exposes Myth of Reserve Competence
By Matthew Dodd
The world is rightfully shocked by the documented abuse of Iraqi prisoners at the hands of U.S. soldiers from the 372nd Military Police Co. of the 320th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade. As a career Marine officer, I, too, am shocked and terribly disappointed by the shameful and cowardly acts committed by a small number of undisciplined soldiers and permitted by incompetent leaders at many levels.
However, as the details of this abuse are made public, I am regretfully not surprised to learn that the soldiers responsible for these un-soldierly acts are reservists. I realize that statement will probably incite tremendous emotional responses, so let me share my perspective on this issue.
I have always been on active duty throughout my approximately 20-year military career. I have worked with reservists as my peers and as my subordinates. I have had many friends and acquaintances from all the military services who have either worked directly with reserve units, or who were or became reservists after serving on active duty. I do believe I have had enough exposure to and experience with reservists to have an informed opinion about the reserves from probably a fairly typical active duty perspective.
For as long as I can remember, individual reservists have always been regarded as part of the “second-string,” or part of the “junior varsity squad.” While I always sensed that reservists were generally welcomed and treated with basic courtesy and respect, I also always felt that there was an unspoken skepticism and general unease about integrating reservists with the active-duty force. I once had a fellow active-duty officer tell me the difference between the reserves and active-duty forces: “Active duty forces have to prove that they cannot do everything, while reservists have to prove that they can do something.”
As far as reserve units are concerned, for as long as I can remember, they have always been described to me as either “good-to-go” or extremely screwed up. Most individual reservists I have known have described their parent reserve units and the reserve organization in general in unfavorable terms. The overall impression those reservists left with me is that the reserves are full of unfocused, undisciplined, incompetent, self-preserving folks who expect to be treated as equals with their active-duty counterparts and receive the same benefits, yet they enjoy and protect their “civilian-soldier” dual-citizenship status with only a half-hearted devotion to the standards expected of their active-duty counterparts.
The general perception about reserve units is that if a such a unit is integrated with and under the direct supervision of an active-duty unit, that reserve unit stands a good chance to probably do well and quickly come up to the standards of the active-duty unit. Usually the strongest active-duty units with the strongest leadership get the opportunities to integrate reserve units because of the additional challenges of dealing with reserve units of unknown leadership and capabilities.
However, the other side of that general perception is that if a reserve unit is employed independently and not integrated and under the direct supervision of an active-duty unit, there is a greater chance of that reserve unit struggling to meet the standards expected of an equivalent active-duty unit. A reserve officer once confided to me that with an active-duty unit, you pretty much know what to expect, but with reserve units, you never know what to expect.
Early in my career, I had an active-duty captain company commander who was probably the weakest boss I ever had. He was a terrible leader for the company, but his leadership deficiencies did help galvanize his subordinates’ leadership to compensate for his personal and professional weaknesses. He was subsequently passed over once for promotion to major, which came as no surprise to any who served under his command. I was surprised years later to see him at a Marine Corps birthday ball as a lieutenant colonel. I learned that he had gotten out of active duty after he was passed over for major, joined the reserves, and got promoted to major and then lieutenant colonel. He was proof to me of what I heard from many others: it is much easier to get promoted and move up the system in the reserves than it is on active duty, especially for officers.
Please don’t misinterpret what I have said. I am not saying that all reservists and all reserve units are screwed up or questionable. I have known, seen, and served with good reservists and good reserve units throughout my career, so I know from firsthand experience that they do exist. I also know that the reserves continue to make significant contributions and provide certain skills and capabilities from their civilian expertise that the active-duty force cannot match.
However, I have seen and heard enough personally and professionally about the reserves in general and believe that the overall percentage of questionable individuals and units is higher in the reserves than it is in the active duty force.
The perceptions I have just shared about the reserves are certainly not new. Besides being shared and well known by many active-duty persons I know, they contradict the so-called “party line” of most of the Defense Department’s senior leadership. My gut instincts have told me that publicly expressing these perceptions would be a sure-fire way to get the career-ending “non-team-player” label and reputation. In my DefenseWatch article on Feb. 6, 2002, “Ten More Things I Do Not Know or Understand,” I introduced this issue with the question:
“Why do so many senior officials (O-6 and above) use such glowing terms to describe the reserve component, but so many juniors (O-5 and below) express a general unease and skepticism when talking about reserve component capabilities (e.g. Total Force vs. Total Farce)?”
Shifting back to our unraveling Iraqi prisoner-abuse situation, I am deeply disappointed, yet regretfully not surprised, to learn that a small number of reservists are at the core of the unprofessional actions that have been dominating the global news media the last couple of weeks:
* A unit was deployed that was not properly trained, and apparently made little effort to train properly according to the new requirements it was faced with;
* The unit leaders allowed the unit to be employed in a situation way beyond their individual and collective skills and capabilities;
* The senior leader responsible for overall supervision admitted to and used as an excuse for the lack of appropriate supervision that the chain-of-command was nebulous and ineffective;
* The soldiers who actually committed the abuse did so willingly and apparently would have continued those acts had they not been exposed by another soldier with the moral courage to do what was right;
* The soldiers who actually committed the abuse said that they were not properly trained and allegedly ordered to commit the abuse and used their lack of training and illegal orders as excuses for their inhumane and un-American acts;
* The soldiers who actually committed the abuse documented their acts with photos and video that looked more for personal enjoyment than for professional archival use;
Some leaders somewhere knew at least something about what was happening and they chose to do nothing. The ignorance and apathy that was apparently epidemic in that prison command began well before deploying to Iraq. Who knew about the individuals’ and unit’s readiness for their combat missions, and when did they know it? How could anyone allow that kind of unit to deploy and be employed without being ready? How many other similarly unprepared reserve units have been deployed and employed in Iraq? How many other similarly unprepared reserve units are getting ready to deploy to Iraq?
With the increased use of our reserve forces, I believe it is time to face up to the fact that our “Total Force” rhetoric does not match the “Total Farce” reality that I have seen, heard, sensed, and read about from many diverse sources. We either need to fix the reserves (make them more like the active-duty forces) or we need to stop using them as short-term “tempo relievers” because we are setting ourselves – military decision-makers and civilian policymakers – up for failure in the long run.
Lt. Col. Matthew Dodd USMC is a Senior Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at mattdodd1775@hotmail.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=484&rnd=327.72215638264623
Ellie
Abu Ghraib Exposes Myth of Reserve Competence
By Matthew Dodd
The world is rightfully shocked by the documented abuse of Iraqi prisoners at the hands of U.S. soldiers from the 372nd Military Police Co. of the 320th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade. As a career Marine officer, I, too, am shocked and terribly disappointed by the shameful and cowardly acts committed by a small number of undisciplined soldiers and permitted by incompetent leaders at many levels.
However, as the details of this abuse are made public, I am regretfully not surprised to learn that the soldiers responsible for these un-soldierly acts are reservists. I realize that statement will probably incite tremendous emotional responses, so let me share my perspective on this issue.
I have always been on active duty throughout my approximately 20-year military career. I have worked with reservists as my peers and as my subordinates. I have had many friends and acquaintances from all the military services who have either worked directly with reserve units, or who were or became reservists after serving on active duty. I do believe I have had enough exposure to and experience with reservists to have an informed opinion about the reserves from probably a fairly typical active duty perspective.
For as long as I can remember, individual reservists have always been regarded as part of the “second-string,” or part of the “junior varsity squad.” While I always sensed that reservists were generally welcomed and treated with basic courtesy and respect, I also always felt that there was an unspoken skepticism and general unease about integrating reservists with the active-duty force. I once had a fellow active-duty officer tell me the difference between the reserves and active-duty forces: “Active duty forces have to prove that they cannot do everything, while reservists have to prove that they can do something.”
As far as reserve units are concerned, for as long as I can remember, they have always been described to me as either “good-to-go” or extremely screwed up. Most individual reservists I have known have described their parent reserve units and the reserve organization in general in unfavorable terms. The overall impression those reservists left with me is that the reserves are full of unfocused, undisciplined, incompetent, self-preserving folks who expect to be treated as equals with their active-duty counterparts and receive the same benefits, yet they enjoy and protect their “civilian-soldier” dual-citizenship status with only a half-hearted devotion to the standards expected of their active-duty counterparts.
The general perception about reserve units is that if a such a unit is integrated with and under the direct supervision of an active-duty unit, that reserve unit stands a good chance to probably do well and quickly come up to the standards of the active-duty unit. Usually the strongest active-duty units with the strongest leadership get the opportunities to integrate reserve units because of the additional challenges of dealing with reserve units of unknown leadership and capabilities.
However, the other side of that general perception is that if a reserve unit is employed independently and not integrated and under the direct supervision of an active-duty unit, there is a greater chance of that reserve unit struggling to meet the standards expected of an equivalent active-duty unit. A reserve officer once confided to me that with an active-duty unit, you pretty much know what to expect, but with reserve units, you never know what to expect.
Early in my career, I had an active-duty captain company commander who was probably the weakest boss I ever had. He was a terrible leader for the company, but his leadership deficiencies did help galvanize his subordinates’ leadership to compensate for his personal and professional weaknesses. He was subsequently passed over once for promotion to major, which came as no surprise to any who served under his command. I was surprised years later to see him at a Marine Corps birthday ball as a lieutenant colonel. I learned that he had gotten out of active duty after he was passed over for major, joined the reserves, and got promoted to major and then lieutenant colonel. He was proof to me of what I heard from many others: it is much easier to get promoted and move up the system in the reserves than it is on active duty, especially for officers.
Please don’t misinterpret what I have said. I am not saying that all reservists and all reserve units are screwed up or questionable. I have known, seen, and served with good reservists and good reserve units throughout my career, so I know from firsthand experience that they do exist. I also know that the reserves continue to make significant contributions and provide certain skills and capabilities from their civilian expertise that the active-duty force cannot match.
However, I have seen and heard enough personally and professionally about the reserves in general and believe that the overall percentage of questionable individuals and units is higher in the reserves than it is in the active duty force.
The perceptions I have just shared about the reserves are certainly not new. Besides being shared and well known by many active-duty persons I know, they contradict the so-called “party line” of most of the Defense Department’s senior leadership. My gut instincts have told me that publicly expressing these perceptions would be a sure-fire way to get the career-ending “non-team-player” label and reputation. In my DefenseWatch article on Feb. 6, 2002, “Ten More Things I Do Not Know or Understand,” I introduced this issue with the question:
“Why do so many senior officials (O-6 and above) use such glowing terms to describe the reserve component, but so many juniors (O-5 and below) express a general unease and skepticism when talking about reserve component capabilities (e.g. Total Force vs. Total Farce)?”
Shifting back to our unraveling Iraqi prisoner-abuse situation, I am deeply disappointed, yet regretfully not surprised, to learn that a small number of reservists are at the core of the unprofessional actions that have been dominating the global news media the last couple of weeks:
* A unit was deployed that was not properly trained, and apparently made little effort to train properly according to the new requirements it was faced with;
* The unit leaders allowed the unit to be employed in a situation way beyond their individual and collective skills and capabilities;
* The senior leader responsible for overall supervision admitted to and used as an excuse for the lack of appropriate supervision that the chain-of-command was nebulous and ineffective;
* The soldiers who actually committed the abuse did so willingly and apparently would have continued those acts had they not been exposed by another soldier with the moral courage to do what was right;
* The soldiers who actually committed the abuse said that they were not properly trained and allegedly ordered to commit the abuse and used their lack of training and illegal orders as excuses for their inhumane and un-American acts;
* The soldiers who actually committed the abuse documented their acts with photos and video that looked more for personal enjoyment than for professional archival use;
Some leaders somewhere knew at least something about what was happening and they chose to do nothing. The ignorance and apathy that was apparently epidemic in that prison command began well before deploying to Iraq. Who knew about the individuals’ and unit’s readiness for their combat missions, and when did they know it? How could anyone allow that kind of unit to deploy and be employed without being ready? How many other similarly unprepared reserve units have been deployed and employed in Iraq? How many other similarly unprepared reserve units are getting ready to deploy to Iraq?
With the increased use of our reserve forces, I believe it is time to face up to the fact that our “Total Force” rhetoric does not match the “Total Farce” reality that I have seen, heard, sensed, and read about from many diverse sources. We either need to fix the reserves (make them more like the active-duty forces) or we need to stop using them as short-term “tempo relievers” because we are setting ourselves – military decision-makers and civilian policymakers – up for failure in the long run.
Lt. Col. Matthew Dodd USMC is a Senior Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at mattdodd1775@hotmail.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=484&rnd=327.72215638264623
Ellie