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thedrifter
05-06-04, 04:53 AM
05-05-2004

Intelligence Failure – or Negligence?



By William F. Sauerwein



The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was formed in part to investigate and offer solutions for our pre-9/11 intelligence failures. However, the panel hearings quickly degenerated into political grandstanding and became a waste of time and money.



Unfortunately, our intelligence failures are institutional, and until the government can fix these institutions, nothing will change.



The strongest vignette from the commission hearings came in quotes from CIA director George Tenet and FBI chief Robert Mueller, respectively. “The terrorists declared war on us, but we did not declare war on them,” Tenet said. “They fought us with bombs and suicide boats and we fought them with arrest warrants and subpoenas,” Mueller stated. Those statements demonstrate a policy failure that is much much deeper than vaguely worded presidential daily intelligence briefings.



Anyone with any military experience understands that knowledge of your enemy’s intentions is crucial for defeating them. However, in the post-Cold War euphoria we saw no enemy, and became complacent with our power. Convinced that no “rational” nation would confront us, we arrogantly ignored the hazards presented by “rogue states.” We became like someone with diabetes or cancer who ignored the symptoms. The disease only gets worse.



Terrorism expert Laurie Mylroie details in her book, Bush vs. The Beltway, that our intelligence agencies, like all government agencies, are entrenched bureaucracies. These bureaucrats feel themselves the “real” power in government, and merely tolerate the transient political appointees. Often the “grunts on the ground” believe that these bureaucrats’ primary job is creating obstacles to efficiency.



Mylroie explains that a bureaucrat’s overriding concern is career enhancement and “access” to higher-ups. In 1998, a highly regarded Middle East expert told her, “Everyone must do what he must do for his career.” Goals are often defined for positioning one’s agency as an effective player in overall policy. Mid-level managers protect the “credibility” of their own administrative division within the parent agency.



This may require covering up previous errors, even at the cost of national security. For example, one analyst in the post-9/11 investigation ignored direct links between al Qaeda and Iraq. On the same day that CIA Director Tenet testified before Congress, others within the agency released a contradictory report.



Following the Cold War, U.S. intelligence agencies struggled with a strategy for the changing world. Facing a “downsizing” which eliminated about 25 percent of their personnel, career protection became an obsession. During such times those threatened tend to “eat their own,” and those remaining become more malleable “team players.”



Subsequently, the accepted threat became “stateless terrorism,” of which Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda network achieved prominence. I in his book, Losing Bin Laden, journalist Richard Miniter recalls that bin Laden’s first attack on America occurred in December 1992. The target was American Marines stationed in Yemen, and while no injuries occurred, Washington quickly withdrew the Marines for security reasons.



This was during the transition period between the Bush (41) and Clinton administrations, which changed all agency chiefs. Protocol was that “lame duck” President George H.W. Bush seek the approval of President-elect Bill Clinton before launching a military strike. Nothing was done, convincing bin Laden that by attacking Americans he could prompt them to withdraw.



Within two months came the then-worst domestic terrorist attack, the first World Trade Center (WTC) bombing. The FBI determined that while the terrorist angle seemed the most promising, it was also the most confusing. Seventeen different callers representing many factions and cults claimed responsibility for the attack, creating more confusion.



The CIA was cut out of the investigation, even though gathered evidence leaned toward Islamic terrorists supported from abroad. Under then-current legal procedures had the FBI shared this information with other government agencies, a judge could rule it inadmissible in court or require sharing it with the terrorists’ lawyers. Sharing this information could have “connected the dots” between these terrorists and who they coordinated with abroad, but the FBI’s policy prior to 9/11 was to treat the WTC bombing as a crime and not an act of war..



Officials also dismissed possible links between bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, despite substantial evidence supporting that theory. Ramzi Yousef, also known as “Rashid, the Iraqi” masterminded this attack, and one of the conspirators fled to Baghdad. A deeper investigation could have revealed an Iraqi connection, but the case was hurried to court.



For years, the FBI had tracked growing numbers of Islamic terrorist cells, many training at target ranges in Connecticut and Pennsylvania. However, bureaucratic rules required that agents have some evidence of a significant crime before launching an investigation. Some of these suspects were illegal aliens, yet nothing was done to deport them.



In the post-Cold War era Iraq became our major military threat. Yet, the CIA was incapable of establishing an agent network in the 12 years between Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Despite numerous contacts within the Kurdish-held region and other Iraqi opposition groups our intelligence seemed non-existent.



continued....

thedrifter
05-06-04, 04:53 AM
Both Miniter and Mylroie believe the lack of accurate intelligence concerning Iraq was deliberate. Early in the Clinton administration it became implied policy to ignore Saddam’s threat. Through the years, those who suggested confronting Iraq were either removed, or changed their thinking. The bureaucrats then deceived themselves into thinking they had adequately “contained” Saddam inside his “box.”



Though focusing on “stateless terrorists,” the CIA possessed limited information on bin Laden. From his headquarters in Khartoum, Sudan, bin Laden supported the Somali warlord Mohammed Farrah Aideed against us. His best fighters had armed and trained Aideed’s “technicals” and he celebrated our failure as his “greatest victory.” It was now open season on America, dismissed by bin Ladn as a “weak giant.”



In Sudan, bin Laden’s thugs shadowed American intelligence officers, and even attacked some. We responded by protesting to the Sudanese government and then closing the embassy in early 1996. Without diplomatic cover, American intelligence could not track terrorists, or contact local sources. Sudanese intelligence kept detailed records on bin Laden’s activities, including meetings with Iraqi intelligence, information we subsequently turned down.



Another problem at this time was Clinton’s cool relationship with his own CIA director, James Woolsey. During Woolsey’s tenure he never met privately with Clinton, and had only two semi-private meetings. These two meetings occurred in January and October of 1994, after the first WTC bombing and the Somalia debacle.



Woolsey also fought other bureaucratic battles, such as the critical shortage of translators in the Arabic, Farsi and Pashto languages. In the most terror-prone region of the world, the CIA was virtually blind, deaf and dumb. Congressional opponents routinely blocked increases in the CIA’s budget, some because they personally disliked Woolsey.



Bin Laden faced none of these bureaucratic problems; his personal fortune financed his operations. He maintained command and control over his vast network through the most modern communications systems. His operations were highly decentralized, meaning that eliminating him does not end the threat. Furthermore, he enjoyed sanctuary and support from “rogue states,” something we did little to end.



In a public address in October 1996 bin Laden declared war on the United States, and subsequently four more times. Yet we ignored these implications, continuing to regard terrorist attacks as law enforcement problems, not national security problems. I recall seeing his poster in the post office as “Public Enemy No. 1,” as if he would one day be spotted in the rural Midwest.



Following the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, the Clinton administration half-heartedly went after bin Laden, now operating in Afghanistan. According to Miniter a four-man covert team landed in Northern Alliance-held territory. Their two-day effort was limited to instructing the Afghans in using and repairing electronic eavesdropping equipment. Northern Alliance commanders quickly concluded we were “not serious” about defeating bin Laden.



Retired Air Force Lt. Col. Robert Patterson, in his book, Dereliction of Duty, describes in detail the 1995 terrorist plot called Operation Bojinka. The conspiracy was discovered by Filipino intelligence investigating a bomb which exploded aboard a Filipino commercial airliner, a precursor to the terrorists’ plan to blow up eleven commercial airliners at the same time, hopefully causing about 4,000 casualties. One captured terrorist confessed that the group was also thinking about crashing hijacked aircraft into U.S. government buildings.



Shortly thereafter Vice President Al Gore became chairman of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety. One of the recommendations for improving airport security was a system for profiling passengers. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) refused to implement that policy on the grounds that it would violate civil liberties. No further action was taken.



Despite officials’ repeated claims that a more robust intelligence system could not have identified the 9/11 plot, there is no excuse for our level of unpreparedness and the complacency which left us unprepared.



A prime lesson that we should draq from the 9/11 panel is that until everyone from our political leaders down through the bureaucracy puts national security first and careerism last, we are still not safe.



William F. Sauerwein is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at mono@gtec.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.


http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=469&rnd=57.12994434476221


Ellie