Terrorists Target Mass Transit [Archive] - Marine Corps

thedrifter

04-29-04, 06:18 AM

Lessons: Multiple, near-simultaneous mass-casualty attacks against separate targets remain a trademark of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The relative short time between the times the terrorists placed the IEDs and the detonations, the crowds, and the ability to carry luggage inconspicuously on the trains lessened the chance that commuters or authorities would notice the abandoned bags. The coordinated timing of the blasts meant that passengers and authorities had little time to evacuate other trains. The operation demonstrated that suicide bombers are not necessarily the preferred modus operandi, although the events in the subsequent manhunt demonstrated members of the cell were willing to kill themselves when surrounded by police. The IED construction was relatively simple, yet effective. The terrorists' utilization of timing devices to initiate the IEDs did not allow them to compensate for delays in trains' schedules and thus precisely pinpoint where on the lines the explosions would occur. The discovery of the unexploded IEDs underscores the threat of post-incident explosions - whether the devices are deliberately left behind, timed to target responders, or the result of a malfunction.

Intent

The target, timing and method of attack, to include IED construction, demonstrated the intent of the bombings was to produce significant commuter casualties. We do not believe the terrorists plotted to achieve second-order consequences or destroy the train stations. The size/power of the IEDs was sufficient to destroy individual train cars, but not enough to destroy the stations.

The bombings occurred three days before Spain 's national elections, which contributed to the ouster of the sitting government. While we suspect the attacks were scheduled to coincide with the elections, we are not sure the terrorists deliberately attempted to influence the elections or manipulate its outcome. Since the attacks, we have learned al Qaeda may be encouraged to conduct attacks in the United States in advance of the November 2004 elections given the reaction of the Spanish electorate to the Madrid bombings. Al-Qaeda has threatened other countries for cooperating with the United States and the War on Terrorism; some of these countries, to include several European states, Japan, and Australia, are scheduled to hold national elections this year. (The 2004 elections in European states are primarily for the European Union Parliament).

Lessons: Islamic extremists continue to aspire to high-casualty producing attacks, with relatively soft targets the most appealing, particularly for less sophisticated, less developed groups. We suspect that, based on the success of the Madrid attacks, post-Madrid thwarted rail sector attacks in Spain and elsewhere, and previous indications of al Qaeda’s interest in attacking the rail sector, terrorists will look closer at further attacks against surface public transport. Al Qaeda’s assessment of the political fallout from the Madrid attacks, combined with the previously held assessment of the susceptibility of Western states to “cut and run” when sustaining high casualties, ensures Islamic extremists increasingly will factor political effects into future attacks. This is likely to include analyses of the impact of conducting attacks against or near elections of key countries, particularly those deemed by al-Qaeda to be weak links in the War on Terrorism.

Logistics

A Spaniard with ties to the mining community helped the terrorists obtain approximately 200 kilograms of gelatin dynamite (about 150 kilograms was used in the train bombings) and the detonators used in the attacks, but claimed he did not know their intended use. The explosives were stolen in northern Spain over a period of time, then provided to the terrorist cell in late February. One cell member, who died in the 3 April police raid, rented a house near Madrid where the terrorists constructed the IEDs. The terrorist cell purchased the cell phones legitimately in early March. A van used to transport the explosives also was stolen in Madrid in February 2004. At this juncture, it appears the terrorist cell financed the attacks independently via criminal activity, primarily narcotics trafficking.

Lessons: The terrorists made use of local, readily available material in pursuing the plot, but exposed themselves to risk of discovery by engaging in criminal activity. However, the theft of explosives from mining and construction firms is fairly common in Spain, as well as the [U.S.] Homeland, and even relatively small thefts provide sufficient quantities for high impact terrorist attacks. The cell’s involvement in criminal activity underscores the modus operandi of other North African extremist networks in Europe and North America that have engaged in common criminal activity to fund their terrorist activity. Financing the attacks probably amounted to no more than a few thousand dollars.

http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=453&rnd=911.0703168787552

Ellie