thedrifter
04-14-04, 05:53 AM
04-13-2004
His Leaders Failed a Marine Commander
By Raymond Perry
Even though the incident occurred more than a year ago, new details about the firing of a Marine Corps regimental commander in the heat of Operation Iraqi Freedom have emerged. The underlying issue of what is effective leadership in battle demands our attention.
First, we need to recount what happened to the First Marine Regiment.
As reported in depth in The Wall Street Journal on Apr. 5 (“How a Marine Lost his Command In Race to Baghdad”), Marine Col. Joe Dowdy led one of two 6,000-man Marine regiments dispatched by First Marine Division commander Maj. Gen. James Mattis to drive from Kuwait to Baghdad.
The plan called for Dowdy’s First Marine Regiment to drive through the city of Nasiriyah – where Mattis had dispatched a Marine unit named Task Force Tarawa to capture it – and proceed northwest toward the city of al Kut. This was a diversion designed to speed the way for Mattis’ other regiment.
As the Journal article revealed, however, when Dowdy’s regiment arrived on the outskirts of Nasiriyah, Task Force Tarawa had gotten bogged down in intensive fighting with heavy casualties including 18 killed. It was the same day the Iraqis ambushed the Army’s 507th Maintenance Co. outside the city, killing 11 soldiers (including two from another unit), wounding nine and taking six prisoner including Pfc. Jessica Lynch. Dowdy’s route through Nasiriyah was blocked.
With several hundred of his 900 combat vehicles lacking armor, Dowdy faced the dilemma of attempting to force his unit through the city anyway, or attempting a 150-mile detour around it, the Journal reported.
This decision goes to the heart of the dilemma any commander faces in the heat of battle: Whether to press on under the original operational order, or to modify his movement and actions to minimize the loss of life among his troops. In this case, it would prove effective to his men but fatal to his career.
While Dowdy and his Marines waited for the situation to clear, assistant division commander Brig. Gen. John Kelly arrived. According to several officers interviewed by the Journal, Kelly threatened to fire Dowdy as regimental commander if he did not get his unit moving (Kelly in an interview denied saying that).
After a 24-hour halt, the First Regiment drove through the city and proceeded up a narrow country road that passed through dozens of Iraqi villages brimming with enemy soldiers. The official after-action report noted that Dowdy’s men also endured a major sandstorm mixed with rain, describing the action as a “running gunfight through the Mesopotamian mud.”
But relations between Dowdy and Kelly apparently soured further at this point, the Journal noted. Having moved without sleep for days, Dowdy fell asleep in his Humvee when the unit paused to medevac an injured Marine, only to have the assistant division commander show up for another meeting. “Some of Col. Dowdy's men who were there say they believe that made a lasting impression,” the newspaper added.
By March 27, the First Marine Regiment was 50 miles southeast of Kut, capturing a local airport that attracted the attention of some Iraqi units that were still resisting. However, Marine officials told the newspaper, the regiment’s overall mission of deceiving the Iraqis had worked: As planned the other regiment under Mattis’ command had succeeded in racing around the west of Nasiriyah and were well on their way to Baghdad. The Journal article continued:
“In an unexpected move, Gen. Kelly ordered Col. Dowdy to head into Kut on a ‘limited objective’ mission. Once Col. Dowdy got there, he was to decide if his regiment should go through the city, which could trim several hours of travel time.”
“Col. Dowdy didn’t think pushing through Kut would be wise. It would be a quicker route to Baghdad, but he thought it would be dangerous. His men had seen fortified foxholes, sandbagged buildings, mines along road shoulders and several thousand Iraqi fighters. With its narrow bridges and urban tangle, Kut looked even more perilous than Nasiriyah. Was saving a few hours worth the risk? …
“His superiors confirm that he wasn't ordered to take his regiment through the city. But an aggressive Marine could have chosen to plow through to get to Baghdad faster.”
At this point, Dowdy and other Marine officers told the Journal, Kelly again threatened to have Dowdy relieved of command if he didn’t immediately move into Kut. The regiment quickly found itself in a battle with dug-in Iraqis. However, the division headquarters at one point ordered him to withdraw. Dowdy ultimately decided to make an end-around move and his unit 18 hours later rendezvoused with the rest of the division at the city of Numaniyah.
There, Mattis summoned Dowdy to his command tent and relieved him of command of the First Marine Regiment.
In an article last year (“A Failure of Our Ethos,” DefenseWatch, July 10, 2003), I took on the Air Force during the Air Force Academy scandal for its leaders kowtowing to appearances at the expense of the military profession. There are clear elements of this in the sacking of Joe Dowdy.
Much of the focus of the Journal article was on the dichotomy of men versus mission. The reporter missed the point on military leadership: A military leader is called upon to husband his troops. Even as he makes them sweat he must love them, knowing full well that he may be called upon to sacrifice every one of them to a greater purpose.
continued....
His Leaders Failed a Marine Commander
By Raymond Perry
Even though the incident occurred more than a year ago, new details about the firing of a Marine Corps regimental commander in the heat of Operation Iraqi Freedom have emerged. The underlying issue of what is effective leadership in battle demands our attention.
First, we need to recount what happened to the First Marine Regiment.
As reported in depth in The Wall Street Journal on Apr. 5 (“How a Marine Lost his Command In Race to Baghdad”), Marine Col. Joe Dowdy led one of two 6,000-man Marine regiments dispatched by First Marine Division commander Maj. Gen. James Mattis to drive from Kuwait to Baghdad.
The plan called for Dowdy’s First Marine Regiment to drive through the city of Nasiriyah – where Mattis had dispatched a Marine unit named Task Force Tarawa to capture it – and proceed northwest toward the city of al Kut. This was a diversion designed to speed the way for Mattis’ other regiment.
As the Journal article revealed, however, when Dowdy’s regiment arrived on the outskirts of Nasiriyah, Task Force Tarawa had gotten bogged down in intensive fighting with heavy casualties including 18 killed. It was the same day the Iraqis ambushed the Army’s 507th Maintenance Co. outside the city, killing 11 soldiers (including two from another unit), wounding nine and taking six prisoner including Pfc. Jessica Lynch. Dowdy’s route through Nasiriyah was blocked.
With several hundred of his 900 combat vehicles lacking armor, Dowdy faced the dilemma of attempting to force his unit through the city anyway, or attempting a 150-mile detour around it, the Journal reported.
This decision goes to the heart of the dilemma any commander faces in the heat of battle: Whether to press on under the original operational order, or to modify his movement and actions to minimize the loss of life among his troops. In this case, it would prove effective to his men but fatal to his career.
While Dowdy and his Marines waited for the situation to clear, assistant division commander Brig. Gen. John Kelly arrived. According to several officers interviewed by the Journal, Kelly threatened to fire Dowdy as regimental commander if he did not get his unit moving (Kelly in an interview denied saying that).
After a 24-hour halt, the First Regiment drove through the city and proceeded up a narrow country road that passed through dozens of Iraqi villages brimming with enemy soldiers. The official after-action report noted that Dowdy’s men also endured a major sandstorm mixed with rain, describing the action as a “running gunfight through the Mesopotamian mud.”
But relations between Dowdy and Kelly apparently soured further at this point, the Journal noted. Having moved without sleep for days, Dowdy fell asleep in his Humvee when the unit paused to medevac an injured Marine, only to have the assistant division commander show up for another meeting. “Some of Col. Dowdy's men who were there say they believe that made a lasting impression,” the newspaper added.
By March 27, the First Marine Regiment was 50 miles southeast of Kut, capturing a local airport that attracted the attention of some Iraqi units that were still resisting. However, Marine officials told the newspaper, the regiment’s overall mission of deceiving the Iraqis had worked: As planned the other regiment under Mattis’ command had succeeded in racing around the west of Nasiriyah and were well on their way to Baghdad. The Journal article continued:
“In an unexpected move, Gen. Kelly ordered Col. Dowdy to head into Kut on a ‘limited objective’ mission. Once Col. Dowdy got there, he was to decide if his regiment should go through the city, which could trim several hours of travel time.”
“Col. Dowdy didn’t think pushing through Kut would be wise. It would be a quicker route to Baghdad, but he thought it would be dangerous. His men had seen fortified foxholes, sandbagged buildings, mines along road shoulders and several thousand Iraqi fighters. With its narrow bridges and urban tangle, Kut looked even more perilous than Nasiriyah. Was saving a few hours worth the risk? …
“His superiors confirm that he wasn't ordered to take his regiment through the city. But an aggressive Marine could have chosen to plow through to get to Baghdad faster.”
At this point, Dowdy and other Marine officers told the Journal, Kelly again threatened to have Dowdy relieved of command if he didn’t immediately move into Kut. The regiment quickly found itself in a battle with dug-in Iraqis. However, the division headquarters at one point ordered him to withdraw. Dowdy ultimately decided to make an end-around move and his unit 18 hours later rendezvoused with the rest of the division at the city of Numaniyah.
There, Mattis summoned Dowdy to his command tent and relieved him of command of the First Marine Regiment.
In an article last year (“A Failure of Our Ethos,” DefenseWatch, July 10, 2003), I took on the Air Force during the Air Force Academy scandal for its leaders kowtowing to appearances at the expense of the military profession. There are clear elements of this in the sacking of Joe Dowdy.
Much of the focus of the Journal article was on the dichotomy of men versus mission. The reporter missed the point on military leadership: A military leader is called upon to husband his troops. Even as he makes them sweat he must love them, knowing full well that he may be called upon to sacrifice every one of them to a greater purpose.
continued....