Condoleezza Rice testimony

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Condoleezza Rice testimony <br />
National Security Advisor's statement, as prepared, for delivery to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United StatesUpdated: 9:08 a.m. ET April 08,...

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More importantly, we recognized that no counterterrorism strategy could succeed in isolation. As you know from the Pakistan and Afghanistan strategy documents that we made available to the Commission, our counterterrorism strategy was part of a broader package of strategies that addressed the complexities of the region.

Integrating our counterterrorism and regional strategies was the most difficult and the most important aspect of the new strategy to get right. Al-Qaida was both client of and patron to the Taliban, which in turn was supported by Pakistan. Those relationships provided al-Qaida with a powerful umbrella of protection, and we had to sever them. This was not easy.

Not that we hadn't tried. Within a month of taking office, President Bush sent a strong, private message to President Musharraf urging him to use his influence with the Taliban to bring Bin Laden to justice and to close down al-Qaida training camps. Secretary Powell actively urged the Pakistanis, including Musharraf himself, to abandon support for the Taliban. I met with Pakistan's Foreign Minister in my office in June of 2001. I delivered a very tough message, which was met with a rote, expressionless response.

America's al-Qaida policy wasn't working because our Afghanistan policy wasn't working. And our Afghanistan policy wasn't working because our Pakistan policy wasn't working. We recognized that America's counterterrorism policy had to be connected to our regional strategies and to our overall foreign policy.

To address these problems, I made sure to involve key regional experts. I brought in Zalmay Khalilzad, an expert on Afghanistan who, as a senior diplomat in the 1980s, had worked closely with the Afghan Mujahedeen, helping them to turn back the Soviet invasion. I also ensured the participation of the NSC experts on South Asia, as well as the Secretary of State and his regional specialists. Together, we developed a new strategic approach to Afghanistan. Instead of the intense focus on the Northern Alliance, we emphasized the importance of the south - - the social and political heartland of the country. Our new approach to Pakistan combined the use of carrots and sticks to persuade Pakistan to drop its support for the Taliban. And we began to change our approach to India, to preserve stability on the subcontinent.

While we were developing this new strategy to deal with al-Qaida, we also made decisions on a number of specific anti-al-Qaida initiatives that had been proposed by Dick Clarke. Many of these ideas had been deferred by the last Administration, and some had been on the table since 1998. We increased counterterror assistance to Uzbekistan; we bolstered the Treasury Department's activities to track and seize terrorist assets; we increased funding for counterterrorism activities across several agencies; and we moved quickly to arm Predator unmanned surveillance vehicles for action against al-Qaida.

When threat reporting increased during the Spring and Summer of 2001, we moved the U.S. Government at all levels to a high state of alert and activity. Let me clear up any confusion about the relationship between the development of our new strategy and the many actions we took to respond to threats that summer. Policy development and crisis management require different approaches. Throughout this period, we did both simultaneously.

For the essential crisis management task, we depended on the Counterterrorism Security Group chaired by Dick Clarke to be the interagency nerve center. The CSG consisted of senior counterterrorism experts from CIA, the FBI, the Department of Justice, the Defense Department (including the Joint Chiefs), the State Department, and the Secret Service. The CSG had met regularly for many years, and its members had worked through numerous periods of heightened threat activity. As threat information increased, the CSG met more frequently, sometimes daily, to review and analyze the threat reporting and to coordinate actions in response. CSG members also had ready access to their Cabinet Secretaries and could raise any concerns they had at the highest levels.

The threat reporting that we received in the Spring and Summer of 2001 was not specific as to time, nor place, nor manner of attack. Almost all of the reports focused on al-Qaida activities outside the United States, especially in the Middle East and North Africa. In fact, the information that was specific enough to be actionable referred to terrorist operations overseas. More often, it was frustratingly vague. Let me read you some of the actual chatter that we picked up that Spring and Summer:

• "Unbelievable news in coming weeks"
• "Big event ... there will be a very, very, very, very big uproar"
• "There will be attacks in the near future"

Troubling, yes. But they don't tell us when; they don't tell us where; they don't tell us who; and they don't tell us how.

In this context, I want to address in some detail one of the briefing items we received, since its content has frequently been mischaracterized. On August 6, 2001, the President's intelligence briefing included a response to questions he had earlier raised about any al-Qaida intentions to strike our homeland. The briefing item reviewed past intelligence reporting, mostly dating from the 1990s, regarding possible al-Qaida plans to attack inside the United States. It referred to uncorroborated reporting from 1998 that terrorists might attempt to hijack a U.S. aircraft in an attempt to blackmail the government into releasing U.S.-held terrorists who had participated in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. This briefing item was not prompted by any specific threat information. And it did not raise the possibility that terrorists might use airplanes as missiles.

Despite the fact that the vast majority of the threat information we received was focused overseas, I was also concerned about possible threats inside the United States. On July 5, Chief of Staff Andy Card and I met with Dick Clarke, and I asked Dick to make sure that domestic agencies were aware of the heightened threat period and were taking appropriate steps to respond, even though we did not have specific threats to the homeland. Later that same day, Clarke convened a special meeting of his CSG, as well as representatives from the FAA, the INS, Customs, and the Coast Guard. At that meeting, these agencies were asked to take additional measures to increase security and surveillance.

Throughout this period of heightened threat information, we worked hard on multiple fronts to detect, protect against, and disrupt any terrorist plans or operations that might lead to an attack. For instance:

• The Department of Defense issued at least five urgent warnings to U.S. military forces that al-Qaida might be planning a near-term attack, and placed our military forces in certain regions on heightened alert.

• The State Department issued at least four urgent security advisories and public worldwide cautions on terrorist threats, enhanced security measures at certain embassies, and warned the Taliban that they would be held responsible for any al-Qaida attack on U.S. interests.

• The FBI issued at least three nationwide warnings to Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, and specifically stated that, although the vast majority of the information indicated overseas targets, attacks against the homeland could not be ruled out. The FBI also tasked all 56 of its U.S. Field Offices to increase surveillance of known or suspected terrorists and reach out to known informants who might have information on terrorist activities.

• The FAA issued at least five Civil Aviation Security Information Circulars to all U.S. airlines and airport security personnel, including specific warnings about the possibility of hijackings.

• The CIA worked round the clock to disrupt threats worldwide. Agency officials launched a wide-ranging disruption effort against al-Qaida in more than 20 countries.

• During this period, the Vice President, DCI Tenet, and the NSC's Counterterrorism staff called senior foreign officials requesting that they increase their intelligence assistance and report to us any relevant threat information.

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This is a brief sample of our intense activity over the Summer of 2001. <br />
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Yet, as your hearings have shown, there was no silver bullet that could have prevented the 9/11 attacks. In hindsight, if...

[fulmetaljackass]

Maybe I'm blowing my lid off by speaking without reading that whole testimony first, but I don't think so. I don't think I need to read the whole testimony.

The reason I say this is why do we need a committee to find out who's fault the attacks made on 9-11-01 was? This committee does not even need to be in existence. It was too late for this committee the FIRST frickin' time the WTC was attacked.

[yellowwing]

I hope this reopens Saudi Arabia's duplicity in terror support. They need our money, weapons, and training a lot more than we need their oil. Put their royal feet to the fire!

[namgrunt]

I just watched much of the televised testimony on NBC. This lady has it together. She stuck to her facts and didn't back down when badgered by the commissioners.

All those fine tuned brain cells, and she has nice legs too. Can't help but notice the important things. :D

[Super Dave]

I heard on the radio that when National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice was in High School her guidance counselor advised her that the didn't have the necessary skills for college. Now if I remember correctly she graduated collage by the age of 19 or 20 and she does speak 4 languages.
How'd you like to be that counselor??

[MillRatUSMC]

http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/images/100-DrRice-S161-31-th.jpg
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
National Security Advisor

http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ricebio.html

With those "good looking legs" goes this...

Born November 14, 1954 in Birmingham, Alabama, she earned her bachelor's degree in political science, cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa, from the University of Denver in 1974; her master's from the University of Notre Dame in 1975; and her Ph.D. from the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver in 1981. She is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and has been awarded honorary doctorates from Morehouse College in 1991, the University of Alabama in 1994, the University of Notre Dame in 1995, the Mississippi College School of Law in 2003, and the University of Louisville in 2004. She resides in Washington, D.C.

Semper Fi
Ricardo

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Originally posted by yellowwing
I hope this reopens Saudi Arabia's duplicity in terror support. They need our money, weapons, and training a lot more than we need their oil. Put their royal feet to the fire!

What I didn't like hearing that Ms. Rice stated she was unaware of until after 9-11 is that the Saudi had special priviages and were not run for security checks when they obtained their visa to enter the US.

[d c taveapont]

I say she blew it, why? there was reports of suspicious people taking flying lessons in fla and az, on 8.5.01. and i can't believe the senator from utah mr. hatch. saying that he was impressed with her. i do see things different and they do protect their own......the mouse

[Catz1611]

I think she did great..she was poised and as Namgrunt said she had it together.

This is just a guess..but from seeing the Action taken by Bush after the bombings..I'd think that if they had any indication that the bombs were going to happen I'd think they'd of taken action to prevent it.