Khe Sanh and PEGASUS

[thedrifter]

Khe Sanh and PEGASUS <br />
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The base at Khe Sanh remained relatively quiet throughout the first week of the enemy Tet offensive, but the lull ended with a heavy ground attack on the morning of 5...

[thedrifter]

Helicopters were greatly affected by the weather. When the helicopters were grounded, life became hard on the marines in the outposts. One period of weather when the helicopters could not fly persisted for nine days and created such a water shortage that one small position was authorized to conduct a two-hour march to obtain water from the nearest stream. The patrol surprised a group of enemy soldiers and eliminated many of them.

Fighting on the ground in Operation SCOTLAND, a Marine designation, continued through the end of February. The last day of the month, 29 February, General Tompkins and Colonel Lownds pieced together the relevant facts to reason that a big enemy push was imminent. Each day brought better weather and longer flying hours. Numerous intelligence reports pointed to a massing of North Vietnamese units at three points around the main base. Although the enemy had failed to gain control of the hill outposts, he could not afford to let the weather improve much more before he acted.

During the early evening hours of 29 February, a string of sensors indicated a major movement of troops along Route 9. The fire support control center at the base directed all available assets against the area. The firepower was massive. Artillery, radar-guided fighter bombers, and minor and major B-52 strikes pounded the enemy's route of march.

A battalion of the 304th North Vietnamese Army Division made the first strike at 2130 on 29 February. The 37th Vietnamese Army Ranger Battalion received the brunt of the initial assault, and all available supporting fire was given the rangers. Hit with this concentrated firepower, the enemy was unable to breach the outer defenses. His second attempt two hours later met a similar fate. So did the third at 0315 on 1 March. The supporting fires had prevented the assault waves from gaining momentum.

Although the enemy continued to harass the base, to probe the weakness along the perimeter, and to shell it from a distance, he had changed his basic tactics. He assumed a less aggressive posture and began waiting for the Marine patrols to come to him. But this did not help him either. As time passed and the weather improved, indications by mid-March were that major North Vietnamese Army units were leaving the area around Khe Sanh.

The Marine's last significant clash during Operation SCOTLAND took place on 30 March when a company, moving under a closely co-ordinated artillery support package, swept 850 meters south of the Khe Sanh perimeter and assaulted a heavily fortified enemy position. Surprise was with the attackers, however, and the marines drove the enemy out of his positions, destroyed the fortifications, and returned to their base.

Planning for Pegasus



The next day at 0800, SCOTLAND was officially ended. At that time, the operational control of the 26th Marine Regiment at Khe Sanh passed to the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) which initiated Operation PEGASUS.

Elsewhere in northern I Corps Tactical Zone, it became apparent during late March that the enemy was continuing to build his base areas along Route 547 and had constructed an alternate route, 547A, from the A Shau Valley east towards Hue. These routes provided the enemy with a major artery for the movement of troops, supplies, and equipment out of the valley and into the denser jungle area between the valley and Hue. Reconnaissance of the area revealed a sophisticated communications system using wire lines and the presence of heavy automatic and antiaircraft weapons. Numerous caches of weapons, ammunition, and other equipment had been located by elements of the 101st Airborne Division operating along Route 547 and 547A west of Hue. These caches indicated the presence of 37-mm. antiaircraft cannons and tracked vehicles, probably tanks, in the area. General Westmoreland, after his 17 March visit to Provisional Corps, Vietnam, directed B-52 tactical airstrikes to interdict Route 547 and 547A.

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Khe Sanh, Vietnam, 1968 An ammunition dump struck by a shell explodes in front of U.S. Marines. This picture was on the cover of Newsweek on March 18, 1968.
ROBERT ELLISON

Final preparations were being made for relieving the siege of Khe Sanh by the reinforced 1st Cavalry Division. On 22 March General Rosson held a meeting with division commanders at Camp Evans, 15 kilometers southeast of Quang Tri City and formulated plans for the relief of 1st Cavalry Division elements from their area of operation along the coastal areas of Quang Tri Province by units of the 101st Airborne Division. To insure that a sufficient force would be available to offset a new enemy threat at Hue, General Rosson requested that the Vietnamese Marine Task Force be retained at Hue. If the force could not be retained, he requested that a fourth Vietnamese Airborne Battalion and U.S. forces be made available for employment in the Hue area. General Cushman forwarded General Rosson's report to General Westmoreland with a recommendation that the airborne task force be raised to four battalions for the Con Thien-Gio Linh operation. The Con Thien operation was envisioned as a deception plan for Operation PEGASUS. This operation would also place the airborne task force closer to the ultimate zone of action in the Khe Sanh Operation.

General Rosson, Captain Smith, the commanding officer of Task Force CLEARWATER and the Commander of the Naval Support Activity in Da Nang met at the III Marine Amphibious Force headquarters with General Cushman to discuss the deception plan and to determine the details of its implementation and its effect on logistical support in northern I Corps Tactical Zone.



Operation Orders



The Third Marine Division issued its operation order on 25 March to cover both the Con Thien-Gio Linh operation, which would be executed in conjunction with U.S. Army elements and the 1st Vietnamese Division, and Operation PEGASUS. The 4th Marine Regiment was to secure Route 9 and provide convoy security in its area. The 9th Marine Regiment was to provide security for Route 9 in its sector. The 12th Marine Regiment was instructed to support the attack of the 1st Cavalry Division within its artillery capabilities.

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As the enemy activity around Khe Sanh tapered off, it appeared that Operation PEGASUS might go much quicker than originally anticipated. If true, this would relieve elements of the 1st Cavalry Division for earlier commitment to attacks in the A Shau Valley area. General Westmoreland expressed the view that Operation PEGASUS was to exact the maximum destruction of enemy forces and facilities, and its duration would therefore have to depend on the tactical situation as it developed. General Cushman and General Rosson assured General Westmoreland that all preparations for Operation PEGASUS would be ready for the planned 1 April attack. General Westmoreland also approved the concept for a later operation in the A Shau Valley presented by the III Marine Amphibious Force. Thus, the logistical planning for the operation into the A Shau Valley was conducted concurrently with logistical support for PEGASUS and it was envisioned that the second operation would continue as a smooth transition from the first.


Provisional Corps, Vietnam, Operation Plan 1-68 was redesignated Operation Order 1-68 with D-day, H-hour, established as 01001 April. General Tompkins, Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, ordered the execution of a deception operation with D-day, H-hour, established as 0600 on 30 March. The U.S. elements participating in the combined operation were designated Task Force KILO and the Vietnamese Army portion of the operation designated LAM SON 203. The deception operation envisioned a task force attacking northeast from Dong Ha toward the demilitarized zone.

As the final co-ordination was being accomplished to insure all units were ready for the pending operation, some elements were already at work. In addition to the U.S. Air Force actions in preparation for the operation, the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry of the 1st Cavalry Division, was directing strikes to eliminate antiaircraft positions in the area before the airmobile division committed the bulk of its helicopters. Heavy U.S. Air Force strikes had stripped away much of the concealment needed by the enemy. With the addition of the reconnaissance squadron of the 1st Cavalry Division, the effectiveness of artillery and air strikes directed against the enemy antiaircraft positions was almost total. As the final hours of March ticked away, the Free World Forces awaited the signal to strike.

Opening Operations


At 0600, 30 March, U.S. Army, Marine, and Vietnamese Army forces initiated their planned deception operation northeast of Dong Ha. The U.S. element consisted of the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry; Company C, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor; Company A, 1st Battalion, 502d Airborne, 101st Airborne Division; and 2d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment; all controlled by the 3d Marine Division. The Vietnamese Army element consisted of the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, and the 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, under the control of the 1st Vietnamese Army Infantry Division. The maneuver elements attacked generally north toward the demilitarized zone along the coastal plains near Gio Linh. All units reached their objectives that afternoon. Following only light action, the operation was terminated on the afternoon of 1 May.

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Naplam strike on perimeter of Khe Sanh

continued....

[thedrifter]

The broad concept for the relief of Khe Sanh envisioned the 1st Cavalry Division attacking west from Ca Lu to seize the high ground along Highway 9 in a series of successive air mobile assaults....

[thedrifter]

The final battle of the operation took place on Easter Sunday, 14 April. The location was ironically between Hills 881 S and 881 N where the battle for Khe Sanh had started on 20 January. The 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, attacked from Hill 881 S to seize Hill 881 N and met heavy resistance. The marines prevailed, and the enemy withdrew leaving over 100 dead behind.

On 10 April, General Rosson had visited General Tolson, the commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division, and told him to begin extracting units from PEGASUS to continue preparations for the assault into the A Shau Valley. The weather in the valley was ideal for airmobile operations at the time, and General Rosson was anxious to get the new action underway before the end of the month.

The next day, 11 April, Route 9 was officially declared open at 1600. The engineers had rebuilt 14 kilometers of road, replaced 9 key bridges, and constructed 17 by-passes. General Westmoreland described their achievement as herculean.

At 0800, on April 15, Operation PEGASUS and Operation LAM SON 207A were officially ended. The 2d Brigade came under the operational control of the 3d Marine Division, joined Task Force GLICK, and initiated Operation SCOTLAND II in the vicinity of Khe Sanh. The Vietnamese Army Airborne Task Force relocated to Hue.

The rapid and successful conclusion of Operation PEGASUS can be laid first to detailed planning and preparation. Second, the enemy was either unable to, or did not know how to, react against airmobile maneuvering of large numbers of combat troops and supporting artillery around and behind enemy positions. Third, an unprecedented degree of bomber and fighter air support was provided to the ground forces, and this combat power punched the enemy along the front line and throughout positions to his rear. Over 100,000 tons of bombs and 150,000 rounds of artillery were expended during the operation. More important, this ordnance was expended in response to excellent intelligence. Fourth, the ability to keep Khe Sanh and the troops in the field supplied was considerable. Fifth, of extreme significance was the determination and courage of the individual fighting man in the ranks.

Additional Sources:
www.vwam.com
iml.jou.ufl.edu
www.mikerian.com
www.pieceuniquegallery.com
www.3rdmarines.net
www.qmfound.com
www.informationwar.org
www.beal-net.com
www.arance.net
www.tallcomanche.org
www.wardogs.com
es.geocities.com/namspeak

CONCLUSIONS


Intelligence firmly believes that Operation Pegasus had caught the NVA totally by surprise, leaving them so badly beaten, that they couldn’t properly bury their dead, having to leave a lot of their wounded behind. It is also believed that what was left of the 304th and 325th NVA Divisions, were in no shape to take their supplies and equipment in their retreat.

"Victory Was Ours" But viewing the bodies of hundreds of NVA killed in action, the devastation and destruction they suffered, and most of all the badly wounded NVA left behind crying out, caused a feeling of sickness deep within, and left us in a very quiet somber mood, knowing that like us, they also had family's back home

The reality of war had settled in, and it was not a time to celebrate our victory.

Route 9, a logistical vital supply route was secured and re-opened, and the NVA units were forced to retreat from the area, heading back North toward the DMZ to re-supply

Final Stats Pegasus “Operation Pegasus”


1,304 NVA confirmed killed
(un-official estimates place NVA KIA's at 3500 - 5000)
21 NVA regulars captured, and provide interrogation teams with vital detailed information on NVA activity in the area of Khe Sanh & I-Corp


U.S. & Allied Casualties


51 US Marines Killed in Action
42 US Army Killed in Action
33 ARVN troops Killed in Action
approx. 370 were wounded in "Operation Pegasus"


Tactical Air Support


5 B52 Arc Light Strikes conducted
1,625 tactical air strikes were flown as follows:
650 by Marine pilots
463 by Air Force pilots
436 by Carrier-Based Task Force 77 US Navy pilots
58 by US Army pilots
18 by South Vietnamese Air Force pilots

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U.S. heavy artillery pounds the area around the embattled base. Near Khe Sanh, April 1968



Ellie

[DELTA2ALPHA]

Operation Pegasus was said to be the relief of Khe Sanh. Not so. The 26th Marines,with attatched units, had already broken the back of the attacking NVA units before this operation was launched.
Although the Marines were glad to see additional US troops in the area after 77 days of constant bombardment, once there,the Air Mobile only helped to chase the enemy to scattered positions.All the ARMY did was relieve the Marines of the perimeter resposnability of the Combat base.
Once relieved, the Marine garrison then proceded to futher pursue and attack the NVA units in the field of battle,far from the confines of the wire
for an additional two weeks in the AO assigned to them.When the enemy was driven far from the base ,then and only then did the Marine Corps withdraw from the area for some well deserved rest and rebuilding.
The Combat Base was abandoned less than three months later. I was ****ed off at the time,but after 35 years of reflection, can see the wisdom of the move to a more defensive position.
To this day,and every day of my life, I remember the 500 plus Marines that gave the ultimate,the supreme honor,to dedicate thier lives,to guarantee that we have the opertuninty to live our lives in freedom.... Please, Please remember them as I do....MIKE Delta 1/26