thedrifter
04-02-04, 05:47 AM
04-01-2004
A Second Look at the Greeneville Collision
By Ray Perry
In a recent article, I examined the leadership issues involved in the firing of two senior Navy officers following submarine accidents in which their subordinates, the two subs’ commanding officers, had also been relieved of command (“Why Are Navy COs Getting the Ax?”, DefenseWatch, March 2, 2004).
Following the collision of the USS Oklahoma City with a Norwegian tanker in late 2002, and the grounding of the USS Hartford 11 months later, not only did the two skippers find themselves relieved of command, but the two officers who commanded their respective submarine squadrons were also fired.
On Nov. 13, 2002, the attack submarine USS Oklahoma City collided with a Norwegian tanker in the straits of Gibraltar while ascending to periscope depth. Less than a year after that, a sister ship, the USS Hartford strayed into shallow water while training in the Mediterranean Sea and ran aground on Oct. 25, 2003.
In both cases, the commanding officers’ superiors were on board the sub at the time of the mishap.
However, in a far more controversial submarine accident in 2001, the collision of the USS Greeneville with the Japanese Fisheries Training Ship Ehime Maru, a senior Pacific Submarine Force staff officer was also embarked at the time of the accident. Capt. Robert Brandhuber, the Pacific Submarine Force’s chief of staff was on board throughout the day of the collision.
This anomaly piqued my interest, and I decided to review in detail the records of the Navy Court of Inquiry into the Greeneville incident.
When he ordered the Court of Inquiry, then-Pacific Fleet commander Adm. Thomas B. Fargo stated that the court “is directed to inquire into all facts and circumstances of the collision.” At the same time the order directed the court to “examine and make findings as to whether [Capt. Brandhuber] was in a position to intervene and prevent the chain of events leading to the collision.”
However, my analysis of the proceedings reveals that the court never asked whether Brandhuber’s presence might have contributed to the chain of events as it appeared to have happened with the two squadron commanders aboard the Oklahoma City and Hartford during their accidents.
The following disturbing information can readily be found in the Court of Inquiry record:
* Brandhuber testified that he was unaware of the sub proceeding to test depth until he heard the general announcing system announcement that the ship was at test depth.
* Brandhuber stated that he harbored concerns about the pace of events that the ship’s captain, Cmdr. Scott Waddle, was driving.
* Brandhuber stated that he had not asked to go on this DV cruise even though it was sponsored by retired Adm. Richard Macke, the former commander of U.S. Pacific Command.
* Brandhuber stated that he was not on board as an inspector but just as a visitor.
* Brandhuber stated that at no time did he seek out the ship’s CO and ask for any special treatment or reports of any kind.
Other testimony points to an atmosphere of unusual tension within the Greeneville’s control room right before the collision.
Why was an enlisted crew member such as Fire Control Technician 1st Class Patrick Thomas Seacrest so subdued in his response to a CO in whom he apparently held such confidence? He was a hotshot sailor. Waddle in his own testimony had made it clear that his people were free to provide contrary information. Why did this man stand mute at a critical moment?
In statements to the National Transportation Safety Board, several of the civilian passengers noted some odd behavior by Cmdr. Waddle after the high-speed maneuvering but before the emergency-blow evolution that ended in the collision. One specifically noted a conversation between Waddle and Lt. Cmdr. Gerald K. Pfeifer, his executive officer, just prior to the evolution. The civilian noted that although he did not hear the conversation, it was clearly odd by the body language of Waddle and his executive officer.
Lt. Keith Sloan, the sub’s navigator, noted in his written statement to the preliminary inquiry officer that the CO had initially decided not to do the Emergency Blow evolution. This raises the question, with all of the interfering evolutions and the delay in the schedule, why did the CO order the emergency blow after he had previously decided to skip it?
With the key people in front of them, why did the Court not ask the obvious questions:
“Cmdr. Waddle, why did you choose to do the emergency blow when you appear to have earlier chosen not to do it?”
“Capt. Brandhuber, did you in any way direct the CO to conduct the emergency blow? Or say anything that the skipper might interpret as directing him to do the emergency blow?”
I believe these to be critical questions that the Court did not ask because the charter imposed upon them was narrowly drafted regarding Capt. Brandhuber. This begs the question of why it was drawn up in such a way as to essentially preclude a critical examination of this senior officer’s role onboard Greeneville that day.
As an embarked senior officer, Brandhuber was given on arrival several 3 x 5 cards with key information including one with the schedule of events for the day. He surely read it and then tucked it in his pocket, referring to it several more times that day. He could not have failed to notice both the test-depth event and the emergency-blow evolution on his card.
Based on my experience over a 29-year naval career, I know that a senior captain such as Brandhuber would never be reluctant to sidle up to a more junior officer and quietly tell him something like, “Slow down, skipper, slow down.”
A senior captain who is in an admiral-making job would also surely know that he can add points to his resume by assisting in the good impression made on a retired four star’s civilian guests. Paperwork or not, I believe Brandhuber consciously chose to attend these guests.
Any skipper worth his salt knows that his ship is under “inspection” at all times. Treating any embarked senior, such as the Pacific Submarine Force chief of staff, properly is not only a long-standing custom but to fail to do so is just plain dumb.
Such a senior person on board, particularly one with a detailed memo outlining expected customs and courtesies, would not have to speak to the CO to get what he wanted. The long-standing custom is clear and simple: The skipper would not ask. He would provide these automatically.
Curiously, members of the Greeneville Court of Inquiry spent an inordinate amount of time explaining why they felt Brandhuber had no authority over Waddle that day. Their comments suggest that they were telling this to Brandhuber himself. Moreover, no one asked Brandhuber what he thought his authority was.
However, one entry in the record suggests otherwise – that Brandhuber clearly did think he had authority over the Greeneville’s commander. This was Brandhuber’s testimony that in the aftermath of the collision he did consider relieving Waddle of command, but then felt that there was no need to do so.
It is clear from both news accounts and the Court of Inquiry record that Waddle’s crew respected him enormously. The mark of a good ship, and Waddle knew this, was the crew’s ability to continue to perform professionally with the unavoidable distraction posed by civilian visitors on board. Why would they become so subdued at a critical moment?
The following evidence causes me to conclude that some other force was at work on the Greeneville that day. This includes:
* Waddle’s initial decision not to do the Emergency Surfacing evolution as stated by the navigator.
* The passivity of good sailors and officers on board Greeneville that day in the face of their misgivings.
* The statements by the civilian guests regarding odd behavior by key people just prior to the ill-fated emergency surfacing evolution.
* The passivity of key witnesses under examination by the Court.
* The seemingly extraordinary effort by the court to deny that Capt. Brandhuber had any authority over Cmdr. Waddle – and therefore any culpability stemming from the collision.
The Court of Inquiry appears to have adroitly avoided an absolutely critical question: To what degree was the Pacific Submarine Force chief of staff responsible for the accident that killed nine crewmen (including four students) from the Ehime Maru.
And why was he let off the hook?
Lt. Raymond Perry USN (Ret.) is a DefenseWatch Contributing Editor. He can be reached at cos1stlt@yahoo.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=429&rnd=315.0388181662223
Ellie
A Second Look at the Greeneville Collision
By Ray Perry
In a recent article, I examined the leadership issues involved in the firing of two senior Navy officers following submarine accidents in which their subordinates, the two subs’ commanding officers, had also been relieved of command (“Why Are Navy COs Getting the Ax?”, DefenseWatch, March 2, 2004).
Following the collision of the USS Oklahoma City with a Norwegian tanker in late 2002, and the grounding of the USS Hartford 11 months later, not only did the two skippers find themselves relieved of command, but the two officers who commanded their respective submarine squadrons were also fired.
On Nov. 13, 2002, the attack submarine USS Oklahoma City collided with a Norwegian tanker in the straits of Gibraltar while ascending to periscope depth. Less than a year after that, a sister ship, the USS Hartford strayed into shallow water while training in the Mediterranean Sea and ran aground on Oct. 25, 2003.
In both cases, the commanding officers’ superiors were on board the sub at the time of the mishap.
However, in a far more controversial submarine accident in 2001, the collision of the USS Greeneville with the Japanese Fisheries Training Ship Ehime Maru, a senior Pacific Submarine Force staff officer was also embarked at the time of the accident. Capt. Robert Brandhuber, the Pacific Submarine Force’s chief of staff was on board throughout the day of the collision.
This anomaly piqued my interest, and I decided to review in detail the records of the Navy Court of Inquiry into the Greeneville incident.
When he ordered the Court of Inquiry, then-Pacific Fleet commander Adm. Thomas B. Fargo stated that the court “is directed to inquire into all facts and circumstances of the collision.” At the same time the order directed the court to “examine and make findings as to whether [Capt. Brandhuber] was in a position to intervene and prevent the chain of events leading to the collision.”
However, my analysis of the proceedings reveals that the court never asked whether Brandhuber’s presence might have contributed to the chain of events as it appeared to have happened with the two squadron commanders aboard the Oklahoma City and Hartford during their accidents.
The following disturbing information can readily be found in the Court of Inquiry record:
* Brandhuber testified that he was unaware of the sub proceeding to test depth until he heard the general announcing system announcement that the ship was at test depth.
* Brandhuber stated that he harbored concerns about the pace of events that the ship’s captain, Cmdr. Scott Waddle, was driving.
* Brandhuber stated that he had not asked to go on this DV cruise even though it was sponsored by retired Adm. Richard Macke, the former commander of U.S. Pacific Command.
* Brandhuber stated that he was not on board as an inspector but just as a visitor.
* Brandhuber stated that at no time did he seek out the ship’s CO and ask for any special treatment or reports of any kind.
Other testimony points to an atmosphere of unusual tension within the Greeneville’s control room right before the collision.
Why was an enlisted crew member such as Fire Control Technician 1st Class Patrick Thomas Seacrest so subdued in his response to a CO in whom he apparently held such confidence? He was a hotshot sailor. Waddle in his own testimony had made it clear that his people were free to provide contrary information. Why did this man stand mute at a critical moment?
In statements to the National Transportation Safety Board, several of the civilian passengers noted some odd behavior by Cmdr. Waddle after the high-speed maneuvering but before the emergency-blow evolution that ended in the collision. One specifically noted a conversation between Waddle and Lt. Cmdr. Gerald K. Pfeifer, his executive officer, just prior to the evolution. The civilian noted that although he did not hear the conversation, it was clearly odd by the body language of Waddle and his executive officer.
Lt. Keith Sloan, the sub’s navigator, noted in his written statement to the preliminary inquiry officer that the CO had initially decided not to do the Emergency Blow evolution. This raises the question, with all of the interfering evolutions and the delay in the schedule, why did the CO order the emergency blow after he had previously decided to skip it?
With the key people in front of them, why did the Court not ask the obvious questions:
“Cmdr. Waddle, why did you choose to do the emergency blow when you appear to have earlier chosen not to do it?”
“Capt. Brandhuber, did you in any way direct the CO to conduct the emergency blow? Or say anything that the skipper might interpret as directing him to do the emergency blow?”
I believe these to be critical questions that the Court did not ask because the charter imposed upon them was narrowly drafted regarding Capt. Brandhuber. This begs the question of why it was drawn up in such a way as to essentially preclude a critical examination of this senior officer’s role onboard Greeneville that day.
As an embarked senior officer, Brandhuber was given on arrival several 3 x 5 cards with key information including one with the schedule of events for the day. He surely read it and then tucked it in his pocket, referring to it several more times that day. He could not have failed to notice both the test-depth event and the emergency-blow evolution on his card.
Based on my experience over a 29-year naval career, I know that a senior captain such as Brandhuber would never be reluctant to sidle up to a more junior officer and quietly tell him something like, “Slow down, skipper, slow down.”
A senior captain who is in an admiral-making job would also surely know that he can add points to his resume by assisting in the good impression made on a retired four star’s civilian guests. Paperwork or not, I believe Brandhuber consciously chose to attend these guests.
Any skipper worth his salt knows that his ship is under “inspection” at all times. Treating any embarked senior, such as the Pacific Submarine Force chief of staff, properly is not only a long-standing custom but to fail to do so is just plain dumb.
Such a senior person on board, particularly one with a detailed memo outlining expected customs and courtesies, would not have to speak to the CO to get what he wanted. The long-standing custom is clear and simple: The skipper would not ask. He would provide these automatically.
Curiously, members of the Greeneville Court of Inquiry spent an inordinate amount of time explaining why they felt Brandhuber had no authority over Waddle that day. Their comments suggest that they were telling this to Brandhuber himself. Moreover, no one asked Brandhuber what he thought his authority was.
However, one entry in the record suggests otherwise – that Brandhuber clearly did think he had authority over the Greeneville’s commander. This was Brandhuber’s testimony that in the aftermath of the collision he did consider relieving Waddle of command, but then felt that there was no need to do so.
It is clear from both news accounts and the Court of Inquiry record that Waddle’s crew respected him enormously. The mark of a good ship, and Waddle knew this, was the crew’s ability to continue to perform professionally with the unavoidable distraction posed by civilian visitors on board. Why would they become so subdued at a critical moment?
The following evidence causes me to conclude that some other force was at work on the Greeneville that day. This includes:
* Waddle’s initial decision not to do the Emergency Surfacing evolution as stated by the navigator.
* The passivity of good sailors and officers on board Greeneville that day in the face of their misgivings.
* The statements by the civilian guests regarding odd behavior by key people just prior to the ill-fated emergency surfacing evolution.
* The passivity of key witnesses under examination by the Court.
* The seemingly extraordinary effort by the court to deny that Capt. Brandhuber had any authority over Cmdr. Waddle – and therefore any culpability stemming from the collision.
The Court of Inquiry appears to have adroitly avoided an absolutely critical question: To what degree was the Pacific Submarine Force chief of staff responsible for the accident that killed nine crewmen (including four students) from the Ehime Maru.
And why was he let off the hook?
Lt. Raymond Perry USN (Ret.) is a DefenseWatch Contributing Editor. He can be reached at cos1stlt@yahoo.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=429&rnd=315.0388181662223
Ellie