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thedrifter
03-09-04, 01:22 PM
Disbursing Goes to War

by LtCol James A. Hogberg

Disbursing services during wartime range from contracting
to ensuring that Marines receive their pay in the combat zone.


As a Service operation that rarely deploys beyond a Marine expeditionary unit, disbursing services were used extensively and in depth throughout Operations ENDURING FREEDOM/IRAQI FREEDOM in support of the Marine expeditionary force (MEF). Sixty-six Marines were assigned to disbursing billets within I MEF, and another 25 billets were assigned to 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade and Marine Logistics Command disbursing operations. Additionally, 60 disbursing Marines were assigned to other duties such as company commanders, watch officers, force protection, assistant machinegunners, mortuary affairs, and first sergeants. Disbursing agents not only displaced far into Iraq with combat service support units, they also were placed in direct support of the ground combat element (GCE) at the battalion level. The latter suggests that disbursing operations might also be described as a reaffirmation that every Marine is first, and foremost, a rifleman. More than a few disbursing agents earned combat action ribbons while deployed.


Combat Service Support Battalion 12 (CSSB–12), with a general support mission to the MEF, served as the hub for disbursing operations. With a table of organization of 36 billets (including the disbursing officer), CSSB–12 disbursing operations not only provided routine pay support, it was the central bank for the 5 other disbursing detachments located within the MEF. Activities included providing functional oversight for all disbursing operations, the collection and processing of all payrolls, liaison with U.S. Army Finance Command and the Marine Logistics Command, distribution of cash, establishment of captured currency collection points, maintaining reachback support with Camp Pendleton, and facilitating commercial contracting operations within Iraq/Kuwait.


While the 1st Force Service Support Group (1st FSSG) disbursing officer deployed with $2.5 million in order to begin startup operations, sustained cash resupply in theater came from the Army Finance Command. The 336th Army Finance Battalion maintained the theater-level central funding vault at Arif-jan, Kuwait. They provided currency and coin in all denominations. Throughout the deployment the central funding vault was used to receipt for more than $20 million in currency necessary to support Marine Corps deployed pay operations.


During the planning stage, disbursing operations were oriented toward (1) making cash available to Marines (split pay, casual pay, check cashing), (2) commercial vending and contracting support, and (3) currency/deposit support for the field exchanges and postal detachments. Interestingly, as combat operations commenced and the need for these services expectedly lessened, the need for other, less practiced disbursing support areas increased. Combat forces seized large amounts of Iraqi and U.S. currency from government vaults and buildings requiring the establishment of disbursing captured currency collection points. Civil affairs units used disbursing agents extensively to make small purchases on the local economy, often as a token of goodwill as much as they were to buy needed goods and services. I MEF also initiated guidance for solatium payments, or payments that offer a small token of money as an expression of sympathy or remorse for an indigenous victim. Additionally, disbursing agents were used to help pay civil servants and Free Iraqi Forces soldiers.


The most unexpected use of disbursing agents, however, was their direct support assignment with the 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv) at the battalion level. The 1st MarDiv Commanding General, MajGen James N. Mattis, had made limited use of paying agents while in Afghanistan and wanted to replicate that success on a larger scale in Iraq. As a result, disbursing agents were sent to division units on or around G+5 (fifth day of the ground war). Their purpose was twofold. First was to buy goods and services the Marines might need, such as translators, day laborers, short-term property rentals, and construction materials. Second was to promote goodwill among the Iraqi people; even small purchases went a long way in demonstrating to the Iraqis that we were not there as conquerors. The intent was to establish disbursing agent, field ordering agent, and translator teams that could communicate with the local citizenry. These disbursing agents lived and moved forward with their respective units (tanks, infantry battalions, etc.). As they reached Baghdad some were consolidated in the Palestine Hotel where they were used to make more substantial purchases from the larger downtown economy. Most worked with the civil affairs groups as they made their rounds among the communities. Some of these Marines were put in harm’s way and earned combat action ribbons. In one instance, Cpl Morales, a disbursing agent, was involved in a downtown Baghdad shootout while the civil affairs team to which he was assigned sought to confiscate weapons and apprehend illegal arms merchants. As the MEF moved into stabilization operations, these disbursing agents were each assigned to a regional governorate established at each of the major cities within the I MEF area of responsibility (AOR). Assigned to a governorate, the disbursing agents worked with translators and field ordering agents to make necessary purchases on the local economy. Disbursing agents also assisted in the payments of civil servants and other government employees. The funding sources varied from appropriated funds to seized currency to approved reconstruction funds. Each funding source had to be accounted for separately.


It is important to note that the majority of disbursing agents were noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Normally, paying agent responsibilities are reserved for officers or staff NCOs; however, because of the sheer volume of support necessary to service a MEF, NCOs were required to assume greater responsibilities. These disbursing pay agents made over 260,000 individual cash payments totaling nearly $27 million to Marines and other servicemembers. It was not unusual for a corporal to sign out several hundred thousand dollars and then, as a member of a mobile support team, drive from unit to unit making payments to Marines. In some instances these Marines would be cash couriers for deliveries between disbursing detachments and tasked with carrying over $500,000.


Pay support was provided to all servicemembers (Marines, sailors, soldiers), as the Marine disbursing agents, at times, represented the only pay support present within the I MEF AOR. This deployment also represented the most extensive support provided to other Services by Marine Corps disbursing in decades. With over 22,000 Marines signed up for the Marine Corps split pay program, other Marines and other servicemembers were offered casual payments ($100 per month) as well as check cashing services. The support provided by disbursing agents was not only extensive but also encompassing. Marine disbursers deployed well forward with over 90 percent of the overall number of disbursing agents placed in Iraq. Again, pay services were heavily utilized as Marines were provided access to the tactical field exchanges where they could purchase hygiene items, sundry food items, and miscellaneous field gear.


Another success story worth expanding on is the relationship between the civil affairs teams and their designated field ordering officer, translators, and disbursing agents. Together this team provided the commander with an important tool in winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. Small purchases from local vendors went a long way in bridging cultural gaps and establishing working relationships; the sooner local Iraqis could be convinced that our intent was positive, the sooner the reduction in distrust and tension.


continued......

thedrifter
03-09-04, 01:23 PM
Support for I MEF contracting exceeded $600 million in payments. More than 6 months before the deployment, coordination was made with the National Bank of Kuwait for the purpose of establishing a local depository account. Approval for establishing this account was required by the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait. With an account established at the National Bank of Kuwait, payments could be made by local check and currency. This capability proved to be the lifeline for the MEF, necessary to procure major sources of goods and services that were required but unavailable through normal supply channels. Items purchased included vehicle rentals, food service, bottled water, and construction materials. Again, this was a transparent service to the end user yet managed by the disbursing officer (directing account activity through his designated disbursing agent in Kuwait City), as coordination was required with reachback services at Camp Pendleton for funds transfers from the Federal Reserve Bank to the overseas account.


The disbursing Marines assigned to 1st FSSG contributed in different ways. With many trained as vehicle drivers, to include the 7-ton medium tactical vehicle replacements (MTVRs), they were frequently required to support unit movements and the transportation of things. During the first days of the war, disbursing Marines drove ammunition convoys north into Iraq directly supporting the division movement. Other duties included augmenting the battalion-level force protection teams, manning crew-served weapons, and combat operation center watch standers.


The overall concept of support for disbursing was based on simplicity—focus on pay support, make access to cash by Marines unencumbered, and provide a transparent service. Obtaining money was as easy as showing an identification (ID) card and signing your name. Mobile pay support was in coordination with the warfighter express service teams and, along with the exchange, postal, and legal services, traveled from unit to unit. These mobile support teams even went into downtown Baghdad where Marines from Task Force Tarawa were in desperate need of exchange services. Some Marines had had their uniforms and other gear destroyed in battle and appreciated the mobile exchange and disbursing services where they could purchase hygiene and uniform items. Some Marines used their dog tags (attached to their boots) as identification for payment as they had even lost their ID cards.


Disbursing management of captured currency was another unique, operationally oriented mission. Marine units seized almost 3 billion Iraqi dinars and 10 million U.S. dollars. Most of the money came from government buildings, Ba’athist safe houses, or disrupted bank robberies. The volume of Iraqi dinars was enough to literally swim in as it at times filled a 20-foot container more than waist high. The seized currency was earmarked as funds for the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (later to be called the Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority). As such, commanders were authorized to spend some of the monies on various civil projects or to aid the Iraqi people. In one instance captured Iraqi dinars helped to pay for repairs to a university after rioters looted it. Disbursing agents managed the payment schedule set in place by contracting officials. The bill for the university repairs totaled approximately $170,000 (U.S.); however, it was paid in equivalent Iraqi dinar notes. Because the devalued Iraqi dinar was used for payment, it took an MTVR truck for disbursing pay agents to deliver the currency, and special containers were used to keep the notes from spilling over the sides.


Disbursing operations also supported the tactical field exchanges and post offices. Disbursing officers receipted for over $9 million in exchange receipts. The exchange sales were deposited with the disbursing office each night and then consolidated for a weekly electronic funds transfer payment to preestablished stateside bank accounts. The monies were then able to be recycled through this “I MEF economy” via check cashing and split payments, thereby helping to limit the need for cash resupply into Iraq. Disbursing also supported the exchange and postal units with currency support. More than $50,000 in quarters and over $200,000 in $1 bills would be required to support these operations throughout the deployment.


Disbursing operations were conducted primarily in a field environment (desert, urban, temperate). Unlike Operation DESERT STORM where disbursing operations were mostly static, disbursing moved well forward and into Iraq. Perhaps the most extensive disbursing field operations since Vietnam, disbursing agents lived and operated alongside other CSS units, some even with the GCE. Marines were paid out of general purpose tents as well as from the back of 7-ton trucks. The demand for disbursing services was unprecedented and received only a nominal number of complaints and an overwhelming number of compliments. It may have been an unanticipated surprise, something that was possibly overlooked or perhaps frowned upon as less than necessary in the planning processes yet turned out to be of great benefit to commanders and a necessity while deployed for individual Marines.


Value to the Marine Air-Ground Task Force
Marine disbursing was a business force multiplier to the MEF. It facilitated and made transparent to the average Marine the procurement of large-scale goods and services necessary to conduct the I MEF campaign. Marines and other servicemembers enjoyed an unencumbered pay service that did not carry a large logistical footprint. Because the Marine Corps split pay program allowed monies to accumulate, commanders were not tied to twice a month paydays and therefore, when engaged in combat operations, could forego payments for a later time when Marines had the opportunities to spend money. The commanders and individual Marines were able to tell disbursing when they wanted to be paid. This paid big dividends and added to the overall Service mission—unencumbered support.


>LtCol Hogberg was the 1st FSSG disbursing officer for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

http://www.mca-marines.org/Gazette/2004/04hogberg.html


Sempers,

Roger
:marine: