thedrifter
03-09-04, 07:36 AM
03-03-2004
Time to Reassess Combat Helicopters’ Role
By Ralph Omholt
As the U.S. military occupation of Iraq nears the first anniversary of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the debate over the role and effectiveness of helicopters on the battlefield is continuing within the Army, DoD and the defense industry.
Rather than allowing defense industry analysts and military leaders debate the issue in worthless techno-babble, it is time to address the subject in plain English.
The helicopter’s stark legacy from the Vietnam War was that up to a third of a helicopter assault force would be lost in any high-intensity combat. Measured either in percentages of the fleet, or in dollars lost, that remains an unacceptably high figure. As I noted in a previous article (“The Helicopter’s Grim Future in Modern Combat,” DefenseWatch, Dec. 2, 2003), the harsh reality is that the loss figure would be even more staggering against a reasonably sophisticated enemy who is able to field combat aviation assets of its own.
Just for non-combat operations, helicopters typically require three hours – or more - of maintenance for each flight hour. That translates to a team of mechanics reducing the “down time”: Theoretically, six mechanics can do three hours of maintenance in 20 minutes.
Beyond the maintenance dollar expense, aircraft availability quickly becomes critical during combat operations. A finite number of mechanics produces a finite number of “blade hours.” Any down-time cost of combat damage further reduces the availability – and the effectiveness – of the helicopter as a combat asset. The more complex the machine, the more time-consuming will be the maintenance; such is war.
Paradoxically, even combat successes tax helicopter operations since the maintenance and armament support units must reasonably follow the advance of the battle (or any pull-backs). That entails the transportation of major parts inventories, as well as special test and maintenance equipment, not to mention specialized personnel including spare pilots.
During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the initial overwhelming force of American B-52 strikes alone assured a military victory over Iraq. The surviving Iraqi forces that attempted to use conventional equipment and tactics quickly lost. During the rout of the Iraqi army, the American attack helicopter contributed greatly to the speed of the Iraqi defeat. Unfortunately, this fostered a false sense of security inside Army aviation regarding the helicopter’s combat role.
It is not surprising that in Operation Iraqi Freedom, some of the Iraqi forces quickly adopted unconventional approaches to try to counter the force of U.S. combat power. The first instance occurred on March 23, 2003, during the U.S. advance toward Baghdad.
Ambushes utilizing massed small-arms fire and RPG grenades succeeded in damaging 90 percent of an AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopter force during a concentrated U.S. attack against the Iraqi Republican Guard. The Iraqi forces were highly mobile and scattered, denying any kind of “massed” target for effective AH-64 counterattacks. These guerilla forces attacked, then quickly dispersed into the cities. It worked.
The damage to one Apache battalion was sufficiently severe that the unit did not engage in any major action for the duration of the war.
The news media quickly began to forecast that the days of the Apache Longbow – if not attack helicopters in general - were numbered.
While grounding or even retirement of the attack helicopter fleet is unlikely, it’s possible that future conflicts will see the aircraft pushed back into a support – rather than combat – role.
The recent cancellation of the AH-66 “Comanche” helicopter program underscores that statement.
Obviously, the helicopter is a special-use aircraft defined by an undeniable combat frailty. It has a very limited speed, load and loiter capability. Except for highly- controlled situations, the attack helicopter has a very limited mission capability. Both the American or Russian military over the past 30 years have learned that to use an attack helicopter against units on the run is one thing. To use it against units that are dug in with reasonable anti-aircraft defenses, is quite another.
This was true in Vietnam, in Somalia, in the Russian occupation of Afghanistan, and it is true in Iraq today. With rare exception, a helicopter is effective only as a support and clean-up aircraft – period!
The Apache was acclaimed to have proved its worth and effectiveness during the Gulf War I, and the 2002 war in Afghanistan. Again, this was only true in the case of low-intensity operations or where we had enemy units on the run.
The U.S. military was far too slow to recognize the effectiveness and portability of the successful anti-helicopter tactics the CIA taught the Afghan Mujahadeen to use against the Soviets during 1980-88; now being used against us in Iraq (and to a limited degree, in Afghanistan).
After the March 23 debacle, the Army relegated its helicopter fleet essentially to a support, often shepherding the rotary-wing aircraft underneath the cover of close air support (CAS) A-10 attacks. Only with overwhelming force on their side, were the Apache helicopters able to conduct effective armed reconnaissance and concentrated attack missions. In this safer environment, the Apaches effectively served the ground forces, supporting the rapid defeat of the Republican Guard divisions surrounding Baghdad.
Following the defeat of major Iraqi units, AH-64 teams were able to confront the remaining Iraqi guerrillas in support and “mop-up” missions that provided the necessary close-in fire.
Subsequent losses in Iraq further underscore the limitations of the helicopter and confirmed the pressing need for specialized aircrew training and tactics. The one “lesson Learned” the Army cannot afford to ignore is that technological sophistication alone doesn’t necessarily enhance mission effectiveness.
Conversely, the high cost of such technology decreases the more desirable quantity of airframe availability, thereby detracting from combat effectiveness.
The U.S. Army has a potentially harsh lesson in waiting, should it ever be necessary to engage a military force more advanced than the Third World-level. Now is the time for intelligent planning for that more severe test.
Ralph Omholt is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at skydrifter@comcast.net. Send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=392&rnd=924.7017172377832
Sempers,
Roger
:marine:
Time to Reassess Combat Helicopters’ Role
By Ralph Omholt
As the U.S. military occupation of Iraq nears the first anniversary of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the debate over the role and effectiveness of helicopters on the battlefield is continuing within the Army, DoD and the defense industry.
Rather than allowing defense industry analysts and military leaders debate the issue in worthless techno-babble, it is time to address the subject in plain English.
The helicopter’s stark legacy from the Vietnam War was that up to a third of a helicopter assault force would be lost in any high-intensity combat. Measured either in percentages of the fleet, or in dollars lost, that remains an unacceptably high figure. As I noted in a previous article (“The Helicopter’s Grim Future in Modern Combat,” DefenseWatch, Dec. 2, 2003), the harsh reality is that the loss figure would be even more staggering against a reasonably sophisticated enemy who is able to field combat aviation assets of its own.
Just for non-combat operations, helicopters typically require three hours – or more - of maintenance for each flight hour. That translates to a team of mechanics reducing the “down time”: Theoretically, six mechanics can do three hours of maintenance in 20 minutes.
Beyond the maintenance dollar expense, aircraft availability quickly becomes critical during combat operations. A finite number of mechanics produces a finite number of “blade hours.” Any down-time cost of combat damage further reduces the availability – and the effectiveness – of the helicopter as a combat asset. The more complex the machine, the more time-consuming will be the maintenance; such is war.
Paradoxically, even combat successes tax helicopter operations since the maintenance and armament support units must reasonably follow the advance of the battle (or any pull-backs). That entails the transportation of major parts inventories, as well as special test and maintenance equipment, not to mention specialized personnel including spare pilots.
During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the initial overwhelming force of American B-52 strikes alone assured a military victory over Iraq. The surviving Iraqi forces that attempted to use conventional equipment and tactics quickly lost. During the rout of the Iraqi army, the American attack helicopter contributed greatly to the speed of the Iraqi defeat. Unfortunately, this fostered a false sense of security inside Army aviation regarding the helicopter’s combat role.
It is not surprising that in Operation Iraqi Freedom, some of the Iraqi forces quickly adopted unconventional approaches to try to counter the force of U.S. combat power. The first instance occurred on March 23, 2003, during the U.S. advance toward Baghdad.
Ambushes utilizing massed small-arms fire and RPG grenades succeeded in damaging 90 percent of an AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopter force during a concentrated U.S. attack against the Iraqi Republican Guard. The Iraqi forces were highly mobile and scattered, denying any kind of “massed” target for effective AH-64 counterattacks. These guerilla forces attacked, then quickly dispersed into the cities. It worked.
The damage to one Apache battalion was sufficiently severe that the unit did not engage in any major action for the duration of the war.
The news media quickly began to forecast that the days of the Apache Longbow – if not attack helicopters in general - were numbered.
While grounding or even retirement of the attack helicopter fleet is unlikely, it’s possible that future conflicts will see the aircraft pushed back into a support – rather than combat – role.
The recent cancellation of the AH-66 “Comanche” helicopter program underscores that statement.
Obviously, the helicopter is a special-use aircraft defined by an undeniable combat frailty. It has a very limited speed, load and loiter capability. Except for highly- controlled situations, the attack helicopter has a very limited mission capability. Both the American or Russian military over the past 30 years have learned that to use an attack helicopter against units on the run is one thing. To use it against units that are dug in with reasonable anti-aircraft defenses, is quite another.
This was true in Vietnam, in Somalia, in the Russian occupation of Afghanistan, and it is true in Iraq today. With rare exception, a helicopter is effective only as a support and clean-up aircraft – period!
The Apache was acclaimed to have proved its worth and effectiveness during the Gulf War I, and the 2002 war in Afghanistan. Again, this was only true in the case of low-intensity operations or where we had enemy units on the run.
The U.S. military was far too slow to recognize the effectiveness and portability of the successful anti-helicopter tactics the CIA taught the Afghan Mujahadeen to use against the Soviets during 1980-88; now being used against us in Iraq (and to a limited degree, in Afghanistan).
After the March 23 debacle, the Army relegated its helicopter fleet essentially to a support, often shepherding the rotary-wing aircraft underneath the cover of close air support (CAS) A-10 attacks. Only with overwhelming force on their side, were the Apache helicopters able to conduct effective armed reconnaissance and concentrated attack missions. In this safer environment, the Apaches effectively served the ground forces, supporting the rapid defeat of the Republican Guard divisions surrounding Baghdad.
Following the defeat of major Iraqi units, AH-64 teams were able to confront the remaining Iraqi guerrillas in support and “mop-up” missions that provided the necessary close-in fire.
Subsequent losses in Iraq further underscore the limitations of the helicopter and confirmed the pressing need for specialized aircrew training and tactics. The one “lesson Learned” the Army cannot afford to ignore is that technological sophistication alone doesn’t necessarily enhance mission effectiveness.
Conversely, the high cost of such technology decreases the more desirable quantity of airframe availability, thereby detracting from combat effectiveness.
The U.S. Army has a potentially harsh lesson in waiting, should it ever be necessary to engage a military force more advanced than the Third World-level. Now is the time for intelligent planning for that more severe test.
Ralph Omholt is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at skydrifter@comcast.net. Send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=392&rnd=924.7017172377832
Sempers,
Roger
:marine: