thedrifter
02-29-04, 10:46 AM
Movement and Maneuver of MAGTFs in
Mine Environments: Gordian Knot or Not?
by Col James A. Marapoti, USMC(Ret)
Mines and IEDs in expeditionary maneuver warfare environments: obstacles or nuisances? Fixing MAGTF mine countermeasures is essential.
Tactical flexibility of Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) in expeditionary maneuver warfare (EMW) requires confident, routine planning and execution of movement and maneuver in mine, improvised explosive device (IED), unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other obstacle environments so tactical commanders can stay “focused on the enemy” and not the obstacles. Operations IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), and DESERT STORM (ODS) provided sufficient time to obtain and train with required, new capabilities—to get ready. During these operations Marine forces (MarFor) were challenged by a Gordian knot1 of mines and obstacles that could thwart movement and maneuver and that could not be “untied” with current MAGTF mobility enhancement capabilities. The knot had to be “cut by a sword” fashioned of new capabilities gained through funding plus-ups to buy or borrow off-the-shelf capabilities—and time to train.
“Leap ahead” transformational technologies programmed to provide MAGTFs advanced warfighting capabilities—for all elements of EMW—should be “balanced” by similar transformations in mobility enhancement systems like mine countermeasures (MCM) and assault bridging. If not, MAGTFs with cutting-edge tactical capabilities will streak ahead at warp six to leverage opportunities at created gaps the enemy hasn’t anticipated, only to have operational pauses and interrupted battle rhythm caused by mines and IEDs—and mobility enhancement systems that can’t support required rates of advance and force momentum.
Since 1991 the Navy has made great strides in sea MCM—not matched by similar strides in MAGTF or land MCM capabilities. This adversely affects visions of Sea Power 21 to confront future challenges.
Science and technology (S&T) investments, including aggressive experimentation initiatives, are necessary now in advanced MAGTF MCM systems to match other advanced warfighting capabilities programmed between now and 2015 with maximum leverage of U.S. Army MCM programs and new Marine Corps S&T for initiatives and capabilities that cannot be leveraged.
Key to exploiting gaps created within enemy forces and creating positional advantage—and uninterrupted battle rhythm—in EMW is assured access and rapid, agile, dynamic, seamless movement and maneuver during ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM), other expeditionary operations, or sustained operations ashore (SOA). Mines, IEDs, UXO, and other obstacles can easily thwart movement and mobility. Even a few mines on lines of communications or during cross-country movements can slow, canalize, or stop maneuver forces. This makes forces vulnerable to direct and registered fire, causes operational pauses and interruption of planned battle rhythm, and wreaks lingering psychological havoc.
Good intelligence preparation of the battlefield identifies many obstacles. When feasible, obstacles will be bypassed. However, buried or side- and top-attack mines and IEDs are extremely difficult to detect, especially during rapid movements to contact, screening, covering and search, and find/destroy missions as experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq. Bridges may be intact before hostilities but then destroyed by planned demolitions or registered fire. Movement and maneuver routes may be limited, so bypass options must be accompanied by tactically effective mobility enhancement capabilities to breach obstacles.
“Tactical flexibility” and “planning and executing movement and maneuver” are included in the Marine Corps’ EMW capability list. MAGTF “land” MCM helps form the backbone of effective tactical mobility and maneuver and should be considered an “essential” capability in the program objective memorandum process.
Let’s take a look at MAGTF MCM required to support EMW, current “deficiencies,” and some initiatives to provide required enhancements to tactical movement and maneuver. Requirements and material solutions are important, but first let’s look at a few background mobility enhancement issues.
• Beachheads, bridgeheads, ambush sites, and operational pauses. A critical element of EMW is to avoid operational pauses caused by mines and IEDs at beaches, bridgeheads, and likely ambush sites. Current MCM systems provide marginal support for rapid movement and maneuver for some MAGTF elements. Ambushes initiated with single, buried mines and IEDs pose major threats in current operational environments. Future EMW operations will require a range of organic MCM capabilities for MAGTF engineers—and other MAGTF elements—to assure uninterrupted battle rhythm.
•MCM—a MAGTF issue. MCM is viewed as a combat engineer responsibility. Combat engineer battalions—reinforced by engineer support battalions—have the mission to execute deliberate (explosive) obstacle breaches. Tanks possess the track width mine plow (TWMP), and assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs) possess the Mk154 three-shot line charge. But waiting for “engineers up” or tanks or AAVs for specialized obstacle breaching in future EMW will not be effective or practical. Under many tactical circumstances, combat engineers and specialized MCM capabilities are not available. To assure uninterrupted movement and maneuver—and battle rhythm—organic, tactically effective MCM capabilities are required by other elements of the MAGTF besides combat engineer, tank, and AAV units.
Marine wing support groups—supported by explosive ordnance disposal—are responsible to clear mines and UXO from aviation forward operating bases. Runway removal of mines and UXO is slow and dangerous. Small, advanced clearance systems (for mines, IEDs, and UXO) are required to effectively support such operations.
But to make MCM a truly functional concept and component of EMW will require rethinking doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for what must be done, when, how, and by whom.
• MCM. Mines range from simple, single-impulse, pressure-fused to complex systems with magnetic and seismic fuses. Mines are a classic example of an asymmetric weapon—astonishingly cheap for the tactical and psychological effects caused compared to their cost, size, availability, and simplicity of use.
• Required MAGTF MCM capabilities. MAGTFs essentially require five MCM functional capabilities: detection—standoff, close-in (vehicle-mounted), and hand-held; neutralization (breaching, clearance, proofing); marking; MCM command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I); and enhanced survivability to mine effects. MCM requirement documents currently do not support these required capabilities.
• MAGTF MCM capabilities and deficiencies. Current MAGTF MCM capabilities and deficiencies (see Figure 1) are essentially the same as during ODS—no major leap aheads in technology. Major deficiencies exist in all MCM functions. Bright spots include marginal to good neutralization (assault breaching) systems: AAV with Mk154, M1 with TWMP or full width mine plow (FWMP), and planned assault breacher vehicle (ABV) with FWMP for deliberate and follow-on, single-pass breaching.
• Fixing MAGTF MCM. The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) conducted a MAGTF MCM study in 2002 for the Office of Naval Research (ONR). The study work group, chaired by the Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Engineer School, identified requirements, assessed capabilities and deficiencies, reviewed current and emerging MCM technologies, and recommended a technology and material initiatives plan to make MCM a functional concept of EMW by 2015. Modeling MAGTF MCM in an approved 2015 amphibious Marine expeditionary brigade STOM scenario validated the recommendations.
• MCM initiatives. In 2002, based on the study, the Commander, Marine Corps Warfigting Laboratory (MCWL)/Vice Chief, ONR recommended “buy now” experimentation items as near-term initiatives as well as near- to far-term S&T initiatives that can and cannot be leveraged from the U.S. Army. These initiatives were endorsed by the Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies, and Operations (DC PP&O) and constitute several major leap ahead technologies and capabilities. Figure 2 outlines currently planned Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) MCM special capability items.
• Marine Requirements Oversight Council (MROC) MCM work group. In April 2003 the MROC chartered an MCM work group chaired by DC PP&O to “fix MCM.” The work group is well on its way to laying out a MAGTF MCM master plan that will address all doctrine, organization, training, material, personnel, logistics, and facilities issues to fix MAGTF MCM by 2015.
• MCM leap ahead technologies. It’s useful to look at some major leap ahead technologies required to fix MAGTF MCM—obsolete capabilities and new capabilities for forces not equipped with tanks or the ABV.
continued.......
Mine Environments: Gordian Knot or Not?
by Col James A. Marapoti, USMC(Ret)
Mines and IEDs in expeditionary maneuver warfare environments: obstacles or nuisances? Fixing MAGTF mine countermeasures is essential.
Tactical flexibility of Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) in expeditionary maneuver warfare (EMW) requires confident, routine planning and execution of movement and maneuver in mine, improvised explosive device (IED), unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other obstacle environments so tactical commanders can stay “focused on the enemy” and not the obstacles. Operations IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), and DESERT STORM (ODS) provided sufficient time to obtain and train with required, new capabilities—to get ready. During these operations Marine forces (MarFor) were challenged by a Gordian knot1 of mines and obstacles that could thwart movement and maneuver and that could not be “untied” with current MAGTF mobility enhancement capabilities. The knot had to be “cut by a sword” fashioned of new capabilities gained through funding plus-ups to buy or borrow off-the-shelf capabilities—and time to train.
“Leap ahead” transformational technologies programmed to provide MAGTFs advanced warfighting capabilities—for all elements of EMW—should be “balanced” by similar transformations in mobility enhancement systems like mine countermeasures (MCM) and assault bridging. If not, MAGTFs with cutting-edge tactical capabilities will streak ahead at warp six to leverage opportunities at created gaps the enemy hasn’t anticipated, only to have operational pauses and interrupted battle rhythm caused by mines and IEDs—and mobility enhancement systems that can’t support required rates of advance and force momentum.
Since 1991 the Navy has made great strides in sea MCM—not matched by similar strides in MAGTF or land MCM capabilities. This adversely affects visions of Sea Power 21 to confront future challenges.
Science and technology (S&T) investments, including aggressive experimentation initiatives, are necessary now in advanced MAGTF MCM systems to match other advanced warfighting capabilities programmed between now and 2015 with maximum leverage of U.S. Army MCM programs and new Marine Corps S&T for initiatives and capabilities that cannot be leveraged.
Key to exploiting gaps created within enemy forces and creating positional advantage—and uninterrupted battle rhythm—in EMW is assured access and rapid, agile, dynamic, seamless movement and maneuver during ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM), other expeditionary operations, or sustained operations ashore (SOA). Mines, IEDs, UXO, and other obstacles can easily thwart movement and mobility. Even a few mines on lines of communications or during cross-country movements can slow, canalize, or stop maneuver forces. This makes forces vulnerable to direct and registered fire, causes operational pauses and interruption of planned battle rhythm, and wreaks lingering psychological havoc.
Good intelligence preparation of the battlefield identifies many obstacles. When feasible, obstacles will be bypassed. However, buried or side- and top-attack mines and IEDs are extremely difficult to detect, especially during rapid movements to contact, screening, covering and search, and find/destroy missions as experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq. Bridges may be intact before hostilities but then destroyed by planned demolitions or registered fire. Movement and maneuver routes may be limited, so bypass options must be accompanied by tactically effective mobility enhancement capabilities to breach obstacles.
“Tactical flexibility” and “planning and executing movement and maneuver” are included in the Marine Corps’ EMW capability list. MAGTF “land” MCM helps form the backbone of effective tactical mobility and maneuver and should be considered an “essential” capability in the program objective memorandum process.
Let’s take a look at MAGTF MCM required to support EMW, current “deficiencies,” and some initiatives to provide required enhancements to tactical movement and maneuver. Requirements and material solutions are important, but first let’s look at a few background mobility enhancement issues.
• Beachheads, bridgeheads, ambush sites, and operational pauses. A critical element of EMW is to avoid operational pauses caused by mines and IEDs at beaches, bridgeheads, and likely ambush sites. Current MCM systems provide marginal support for rapid movement and maneuver for some MAGTF elements. Ambushes initiated with single, buried mines and IEDs pose major threats in current operational environments. Future EMW operations will require a range of organic MCM capabilities for MAGTF engineers—and other MAGTF elements—to assure uninterrupted battle rhythm.
•MCM—a MAGTF issue. MCM is viewed as a combat engineer responsibility. Combat engineer battalions—reinforced by engineer support battalions—have the mission to execute deliberate (explosive) obstacle breaches. Tanks possess the track width mine plow (TWMP), and assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs) possess the Mk154 three-shot line charge. But waiting for “engineers up” or tanks or AAVs for specialized obstacle breaching in future EMW will not be effective or practical. Under many tactical circumstances, combat engineers and specialized MCM capabilities are not available. To assure uninterrupted movement and maneuver—and battle rhythm—organic, tactically effective MCM capabilities are required by other elements of the MAGTF besides combat engineer, tank, and AAV units.
Marine wing support groups—supported by explosive ordnance disposal—are responsible to clear mines and UXO from aviation forward operating bases. Runway removal of mines and UXO is slow and dangerous. Small, advanced clearance systems (for mines, IEDs, and UXO) are required to effectively support such operations.
But to make MCM a truly functional concept and component of EMW will require rethinking doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for what must be done, when, how, and by whom.
• MCM. Mines range from simple, single-impulse, pressure-fused to complex systems with magnetic and seismic fuses. Mines are a classic example of an asymmetric weapon—astonishingly cheap for the tactical and psychological effects caused compared to their cost, size, availability, and simplicity of use.
• Required MAGTF MCM capabilities. MAGTFs essentially require five MCM functional capabilities: detection—standoff, close-in (vehicle-mounted), and hand-held; neutralization (breaching, clearance, proofing); marking; MCM command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I); and enhanced survivability to mine effects. MCM requirement documents currently do not support these required capabilities.
• MAGTF MCM capabilities and deficiencies. Current MAGTF MCM capabilities and deficiencies (see Figure 1) are essentially the same as during ODS—no major leap aheads in technology. Major deficiencies exist in all MCM functions. Bright spots include marginal to good neutralization (assault breaching) systems: AAV with Mk154, M1 with TWMP or full width mine plow (FWMP), and planned assault breacher vehicle (ABV) with FWMP for deliberate and follow-on, single-pass breaching.
• Fixing MAGTF MCM. The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) conducted a MAGTF MCM study in 2002 for the Office of Naval Research (ONR). The study work group, chaired by the Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Engineer School, identified requirements, assessed capabilities and deficiencies, reviewed current and emerging MCM technologies, and recommended a technology and material initiatives plan to make MCM a functional concept of EMW by 2015. Modeling MAGTF MCM in an approved 2015 amphibious Marine expeditionary brigade STOM scenario validated the recommendations.
• MCM initiatives. In 2002, based on the study, the Commander, Marine Corps Warfigting Laboratory (MCWL)/Vice Chief, ONR recommended “buy now” experimentation items as near-term initiatives as well as near- to far-term S&T initiatives that can and cannot be leveraged from the U.S. Army. These initiatives were endorsed by the Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies, and Operations (DC PP&O) and constitute several major leap ahead technologies and capabilities. Figure 2 outlines currently planned Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) MCM special capability items.
• Marine Requirements Oversight Council (MROC) MCM work group. In April 2003 the MROC chartered an MCM work group chaired by DC PP&O to “fix MCM.” The work group is well on its way to laying out a MAGTF MCM master plan that will address all doctrine, organization, training, material, personnel, logistics, and facilities issues to fix MAGTF MCM by 2015.
• MCM leap ahead technologies. It’s useful to look at some major leap ahead technologies required to fix MAGTF MCM—obsolete capabilities and new capabilities for forces not equipped with tanks or the ABV.
continued.......