thedrifter
02-26-04, 06:17 AM
02-25-2004
The Death of ‘Robo-Copter’
By Ralph Omholt
Let us not mourn the death of the RAH-66 Comanche, a “stealth” helicopter that – like all helicopters – was far from stealthy and could be shot down
with a crossbow.
The Comanche was the U.S. Army’s proposed new Reconnaissance and Attack Helicopter, under development by a Boeing-Sikorsky joint venture since 1983. It was first conceived when our war plans focused on halting a Soviet-led invasion of western Europe, but the first operational model was not scheduled to fly until 2007, some 16 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The reason for the mercy killing this week was, of course, money. The Comanche’s original unit cost was $12 million, but production delays and design problems ratcheted that up to $58.9 million apiece, more than ten times the $4.5-million unit cost of the RQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.
Even with the proposed “buy” reduced from 2,000 to 650 units, the Comanche program cost still came in at $38 billion. So it was no surprise when Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker and acting Army Secretary Les Brownlee announced the program cancellation on Monday.
There was nothing stingy about the Comanche’s design.
According to the proposal, the airframe was to be crashworthy, with ballistic tolerance against 23-mm. gunfire. The aircraft radar cross-section was designed to be minimized via a precisely shaped fuselage, with a basic internal weapons configuration.
The Comanche was designed with two identical cockpits for the pilot and co-pilot. These were supposed to be sealed, with a positive pressure air system for protection against chemical and biological agents.
The aircraft utilized “fly-by-wire” flight control system, triple redundant, at that. The aircraft was to be fitted with an advanced night-vision system, including a Helmet Integrated Display Sighting System (HIDSS). The aircraft would feature an “integrated cockpit” with flat-screen liquid-crystal displays, a color digital moving map system, tactical situation and night operation display.
The Comanche would have internally carried its primary weapons, with an external weapons mount capability. The missile inventory would be mounted on fold-out weapon-bay doors. The internal weapons bay could be fitted with almost any missile in the current Army inventory. The Comanche would hold six Hellfire or twelve Stinger missiles.
If stealth could be safely sacrificed, the helicopter could be reconfigured with the usual stub wings/pylons, adding an additional capacity of four Hellfire or eight Stinger missiles.
(Why anybody would fit a helicopter with a load of Stingers, is beyond me; that’s what fighter jets are for.)
Then there was the Comanche’s gun system. It was to be equipped with a turreted and stowable 20-mm. Gatling gun capable of firing 750 or 1,500 rounds per minute. The aircraft could hold 500 rounds of ammunition – approximately 45 seconds of firepower.
(That is, for $58.9 million, you would 45 seconds of firepower.)
The intended mission for the Comanche was to recognize and identify battlefield targets, with a digital transmission capability to send targeting data back to the battlefield commander. The idea was for the commander then to select the optimum force deployment for any targets and co-ordinate the attack.
Okay, back to reality.
The track record of helicopters in the modern battlefield simply doesn’t warrant spending that amount of money to place the Comanche in the bore-sight of a Third World fighter with an RPG. That was the sternest “lesson learned” for all helicopter pilots in an intense battlefield environment, whether Vietnam or Iraq. They simply aren’t effective.
So after 20 years and an estimated $8 billion already spent, the Comanche is officially dead. But that’s not the full cost. Writing in Defense Week, reporter Megan Scully revealed that the Pentagon will have to pay another $2-4 billion to Boeing-Sikorsky in contract termination fees.
With the program cancellation, the expense will be on the order of $13 billion wasted. Against the $38 billion completion cost, it is a relative bargain. With UAV technology growing by leaps and bounds, the U.S. military will likely enjoy the battlefield reconnaissance and targeting capability the Comanche promised, but a far lower cost.
War is expensive. Just ask the Pentagon leadership, who fear the ongoing costs of the Iraqi occupation may gut the DoD budget in the next 6-8 months or so. It is imperative that Pentagon acquisition managers plan carefully and well, and understand the long-term consequences of planning for and buying sophisticated weapons systems.
In this case, they seem to have been so stuck on completing the Comanche that they ignored the fact that both the strategic situation and the very nature of warfare had changed enough to make it unnecessary. The Comanche concept – just like the MV-22 Osprey – was an easily forecast failure that no one seemed to recognize.
History teaches that there is no replacement for wisdom gained from experience. National security remains a legitimate concern in this post-9/11 era, but more needs to be spent on troop welfare and less on Hollywood dream machines like the RAH-66 Comanche.
Ralph Omholt is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at skydrifter@attbi.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=380&rnd=100.90809316393518
Sempers,
Roger
:marine:
The Death of ‘Robo-Copter’
By Ralph Omholt
Let us not mourn the death of the RAH-66 Comanche, a “stealth” helicopter that – like all helicopters – was far from stealthy and could be shot down
with a crossbow.
The Comanche was the U.S. Army’s proposed new Reconnaissance and Attack Helicopter, under development by a Boeing-Sikorsky joint venture since 1983. It was first conceived when our war plans focused on halting a Soviet-led invasion of western Europe, but the first operational model was not scheduled to fly until 2007, some 16 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The reason for the mercy killing this week was, of course, money. The Comanche’s original unit cost was $12 million, but production delays and design problems ratcheted that up to $58.9 million apiece, more than ten times the $4.5-million unit cost of the RQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.
Even with the proposed “buy” reduced from 2,000 to 650 units, the Comanche program cost still came in at $38 billion. So it was no surprise when Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker and acting Army Secretary Les Brownlee announced the program cancellation on Monday.
There was nothing stingy about the Comanche’s design.
According to the proposal, the airframe was to be crashworthy, with ballistic tolerance against 23-mm. gunfire. The aircraft radar cross-section was designed to be minimized via a precisely shaped fuselage, with a basic internal weapons configuration.
The Comanche was designed with two identical cockpits for the pilot and co-pilot. These were supposed to be sealed, with a positive pressure air system for protection against chemical and biological agents.
The aircraft utilized “fly-by-wire” flight control system, triple redundant, at that. The aircraft was to be fitted with an advanced night-vision system, including a Helmet Integrated Display Sighting System (HIDSS). The aircraft would feature an “integrated cockpit” with flat-screen liquid-crystal displays, a color digital moving map system, tactical situation and night operation display.
The Comanche would have internally carried its primary weapons, with an external weapons mount capability. The missile inventory would be mounted on fold-out weapon-bay doors. The internal weapons bay could be fitted with almost any missile in the current Army inventory. The Comanche would hold six Hellfire or twelve Stinger missiles.
If stealth could be safely sacrificed, the helicopter could be reconfigured with the usual stub wings/pylons, adding an additional capacity of four Hellfire or eight Stinger missiles.
(Why anybody would fit a helicopter with a load of Stingers, is beyond me; that’s what fighter jets are for.)
Then there was the Comanche’s gun system. It was to be equipped with a turreted and stowable 20-mm. Gatling gun capable of firing 750 or 1,500 rounds per minute. The aircraft could hold 500 rounds of ammunition – approximately 45 seconds of firepower.
(That is, for $58.9 million, you would 45 seconds of firepower.)
The intended mission for the Comanche was to recognize and identify battlefield targets, with a digital transmission capability to send targeting data back to the battlefield commander. The idea was for the commander then to select the optimum force deployment for any targets and co-ordinate the attack.
Okay, back to reality.
The track record of helicopters in the modern battlefield simply doesn’t warrant spending that amount of money to place the Comanche in the bore-sight of a Third World fighter with an RPG. That was the sternest “lesson learned” for all helicopter pilots in an intense battlefield environment, whether Vietnam or Iraq. They simply aren’t effective.
So after 20 years and an estimated $8 billion already spent, the Comanche is officially dead. But that’s not the full cost. Writing in Defense Week, reporter Megan Scully revealed that the Pentagon will have to pay another $2-4 billion to Boeing-Sikorsky in contract termination fees.
With the program cancellation, the expense will be on the order of $13 billion wasted. Against the $38 billion completion cost, it is a relative bargain. With UAV technology growing by leaps and bounds, the U.S. military will likely enjoy the battlefield reconnaissance and targeting capability the Comanche promised, but a far lower cost.
War is expensive. Just ask the Pentagon leadership, who fear the ongoing costs of the Iraqi occupation may gut the DoD budget in the next 6-8 months or so. It is imperative that Pentagon acquisition managers plan carefully and well, and understand the long-term consequences of planning for and buying sophisticated weapons systems.
In this case, they seem to have been so stuck on completing the Comanche that they ignored the fact that both the strategic situation and the very nature of warfare had changed enough to make it unnecessary. The Comanche concept – just like the MV-22 Osprey – was an easily forecast failure that no one seemed to recognize.
History teaches that there is no replacement for wisdom gained from experience. National security remains a legitimate concern in this post-9/11 era, but more needs to be spent on troop welfare and less on Hollywood dream machines like the RAH-66 Comanche.
Ralph Omholt is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at skydrifter@attbi.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=380&rnd=100.90809316393518
Sempers,
Roger
:marine: