thedrifter
02-18-04, 06:06 AM
02-17-2004
A Man, a General, and a Father
By William F. Sauerwein
As a boy, I enjoyed February because we learned in school of the accomplishments of George Washington, honored as the “Father of Our Country.” Without Washington’s dedication we can easily assume that the United States of America, as we know it, would not exist. Yet in recent years, it seems that we have gone out of our way to discredit him, denigrate his accomplishments and even remove his name from schools.
Many sociologists state that part of today’s juvenile crime problems stem from the lack of a “positive male influence.” It seems possible that some of our national problems stem from our rejection of the positive images of our national “father.” Otherwise, why would ordinary Americans spy for other nations and join terrorist organizations at war with their country.
Was Washington perfect? No, but let “he who is without sin cast the first stone.” Washington lived by the standards of his time, and did the best he could for his country under extraordinary conditions. If the American Revolution failed, Washington could have been hanged as a traitor, and our country never born.
It is the story of Washington’s rise from Virginia planter to our nation’s first commander-in-chief that we should retell each February.
The Continental Congress recommended Washington for commander-in-chief, not based on his military prowess, but for his place of birth. At the time the thirteen colonies lacked cohesion, and each region was deeply suspicious of the others. The rebellion was largely seen as a New England affair, and the delegates saw Washington, a Virginian, as a unifying factor.
As a lieutenant colonel of the Virginia Militia during the French and Indian War, he had been disdained as a “provincial” by the British “professionals.” Yet at the battle called “Braddock’s Defeat,” Washington took command when Maj. Gen. Edward Braddock was killed and rallied the survivors. He exemplified personal leadership and had two horses shot from under him, though he escaped unwounded. Following this battle Washington said, “I heard the bullets whistle, and believe me, there is something charming in the sound.”
Washington’s assumption of the American command was not universally popular; the army was still primarily composed of New Englanders. They had fought the British at Lexington and Concord, and harassed the British retreat into Boston. At the Battle of Bunker Hill, they had stood their ground until out of ammunition, inflicting horrendous losses on the enemy. Many New England generals, men more experienced than Washington, resented his appointment, and several resigned.
He answered to the Continental Congress, through which he received troops, supplies and other funding. Congress appointed all of his general officers, not based on military experience, but for regional political considerations. Furthermore, Congress often undermined Washington’s efforts, and never adequately provided for the army.
The United States was a colonial region in rebellion against its “mother country,” with about one-third of the population remaining “loyal.” The Continental Congress had no real authority and depended on the generosity of the individual states for all of its needs. Continental currency was worthless, not accepted by the public, placing most soldiers and their families in financial distress. People did not think of themselves as Americans, but citizens of their states, an attitude Washington sought to overcome.
The majority of Washington’s officers had less experience than he, yet he capitalized on their individual skills without “micromanaging.” There were men like Henry Knox, who moved cannon overland from Fort Ticonderoga, N.Y., to Boston’s Dorchester Heights. John Glover’s regiment of Marblehead fishermen used their skills in “amphibious operations,” including the famous crossing of the Delaware River. Perhaps the most important was Baron Friedrich von Steuben, whose training skills transformed the Continental Army at Valley Forge.
Despite Washington’s lack of experience at senior command, he proved a “quick study,” learning from his mistakes. He understood the value of intelligence, and established a network that ably served him throughout the war. This enabled him to deduce British intentions for moving on New York City in 1776, and the capital, Philadelphia, in 1777. It also helped his deception plan for holding Maj. Gen. Henry Clinton’s force in New York while moving most of his army to trap Lt. Gen. Charles Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown.
Washington’s leadership established an example for leaders today of “doing well what the boss checks.” In 1775, the army was little more than a mob, with training and discipline at the discretion of the officers and men involved. Men refused to obey their officers and wandered through the camp as they pleased. He energetically embraced the disciplining of the army, establishing punishment for offenders and rewarding merit.
He involved himself with the army’s administration, something today’s commanders avoid like the plague. His efforts helped expose corruption, including doctors taking bribes for certifying healthy soldiers as unfit. He punished some officers for fraudulent accounting and others for sending soldiers to work on their private farms.
Like soldiers of all armies, the troops watched Washington constantly, seeking not only chinks in his armor, but clues to their future. He seemed to miss nothing, frequently inspecting their fighting positions, living conditions and training. They determined him hard, but fair, and equally concerned with their needs, as well as their shortcomings. Virginia troops informed the others of Washington’s iron discipline, including his hanging of mutineers during the French and Indian War.
However, much of Washington’s charisma with the average soldiers remains a mystery to this day. This charisma kept the Continental Army together, despite being largely unpaid, ill-equipped and underfed. Washington exhibited personal courage, and was often in the forefront of battle, rallying troops even in defeat.
Part of his mystique came from his ability to avoid disaster following defeat, surprising even the British. When his army was trapped on Long Island, he executed a nighttime withdrawal, difficult for the most professional soldiers. Following the retreat across New Jersey, he ordered all boats along the Delaware River confiscated, denying their use by the British.
Washington used these same boats for crossing the Delaware, at nighttime under the most hazardous conditions. He persuaded his defeated, demoralized soldiers for one last effort before their enlistments expired in less than ten days. The subsequent victories at Trenton and Princeton caught the enemy by surprise, and breathed new life into the American cause.
Of course, Washington’s success was helped by the incompetence and indifference of the British commanders. After defeating the Americans on Long Island, the British pursuit was lackadaisical and allowed the trapped army to escape. An immediate attack across the Delaware River could have finished the rebellion decisively. After capturing Philadelphia, the British Army went into winter quarters, instead of pursuing the defeated Continentals. Considering the Americans as a “rabble,” their strategy was uncoordinated, leading to piecemeal defeats at Saratoga and Yorktown.
Following the victory at Yorktown in 1781, the Continental Army returned to New York, and the war settled into a stalemate. The French Army departed in 1782 for defending French possessions in the West Indies. With idle time on their hands the Continental soldiers began to reflect on their poor conditions.
continued...
A Man, a General, and a Father
By William F. Sauerwein
As a boy, I enjoyed February because we learned in school of the accomplishments of George Washington, honored as the “Father of Our Country.” Without Washington’s dedication we can easily assume that the United States of America, as we know it, would not exist. Yet in recent years, it seems that we have gone out of our way to discredit him, denigrate his accomplishments and even remove his name from schools.
Many sociologists state that part of today’s juvenile crime problems stem from the lack of a “positive male influence.” It seems possible that some of our national problems stem from our rejection of the positive images of our national “father.” Otherwise, why would ordinary Americans spy for other nations and join terrorist organizations at war with their country.
Was Washington perfect? No, but let “he who is without sin cast the first stone.” Washington lived by the standards of his time, and did the best he could for his country under extraordinary conditions. If the American Revolution failed, Washington could have been hanged as a traitor, and our country never born.
It is the story of Washington’s rise from Virginia planter to our nation’s first commander-in-chief that we should retell each February.
The Continental Congress recommended Washington for commander-in-chief, not based on his military prowess, but for his place of birth. At the time the thirteen colonies lacked cohesion, and each region was deeply suspicious of the others. The rebellion was largely seen as a New England affair, and the delegates saw Washington, a Virginian, as a unifying factor.
As a lieutenant colonel of the Virginia Militia during the French and Indian War, he had been disdained as a “provincial” by the British “professionals.” Yet at the battle called “Braddock’s Defeat,” Washington took command when Maj. Gen. Edward Braddock was killed and rallied the survivors. He exemplified personal leadership and had two horses shot from under him, though he escaped unwounded. Following this battle Washington said, “I heard the bullets whistle, and believe me, there is something charming in the sound.”
Washington’s assumption of the American command was not universally popular; the army was still primarily composed of New Englanders. They had fought the British at Lexington and Concord, and harassed the British retreat into Boston. At the Battle of Bunker Hill, they had stood their ground until out of ammunition, inflicting horrendous losses on the enemy. Many New England generals, men more experienced than Washington, resented his appointment, and several resigned.
He answered to the Continental Congress, through which he received troops, supplies and other funding. Congress appointed all of his general officers, not based on military experience, but for regional political considerations. Furthermore, Congress often undermined Washington’s efforts, and never adequately provided for the army.
The United States was a colonial region in rebellion against its “mother country,” with about one-third of the population remaining “loyal.” The Continental Congress had no real authority and depended on the generosity of the individual states for all of its needs. Continental currency was worthless, not accepted by the public, placing most soldiers and their families in financial distress. People did not think of themselves as Americans, but citizens of their states, an attitude Washington sought to overcome.
The majority of Washington’s officers had less experience than he, yet he capitalized on their individual skills without “micromanaging.” There were men like Henry Knox, who moved cannon overland from Fort Ticonderoga, N.Y., to Boston’s Dorchester Heights. John Glover’s regiment of Marblehead fishermen used their skills in “amphibious operations,” including the famous crossing of the Delaware River. Perhaps the most important was Baron Friedrich von Steuben, whose training skills transformed the Continental Army at Valley Forge.
Despite Washington’s lack of experience at senior command, he proved a “quick study,” learning from his mistakes. He understood the value of intelligence, and established a network that ably served him throughout the war. This enabled him to deduce British intentions for moving on New York City in 1776, and the capital, Philadelphia, in 1777. It also helped his deception plan for holding Maj. Gen. Henry Clinton’s force in New York while moving most of his army to trap Lt. Gen. Charles Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown.
Washington’s leadership established an example for leaders today of “doing well what the boss checks.” In 1775, the army was little more than a mob, with training and discipline at the discretion of the officers and men involved. Men refused to obey their officers and wandered through the camp as they pleased. He energetically embraced the disciplining of the army, establishing punishment for offenders and rewarding merit.
He involved himself with the army’s administration, something today’s commanders avoid like the plague. His efforts helped expose corruption, including doctors taking bribes for certifying healthy soldiers as unfit. He punished some officers for fraudulent accounting and others for sending soldiers to work on their private farms.
Like soldiers of all armies, the troops watched Washington constantly, seeking not only chinks in his armor, but clues to their future. He seemed to miss nothing, frequently inspecting their fighting positions, living conditions and training. They determined him hard, but fair, and equally concerned with their needs, as well as their shortcomings. Virginia troops informed the others of Washington’s iron discipline, including his hanging of mutineers during the French and Indian War.
However, much of Washington’s charisma with the average soldiers remains a mystery to this day. This charisma kept the Continental Army together, despite being largely unpaid, ill-equipped and underfed. Washington exhibited personal courage, and was often in the forefront of battle, rallying troops even in defeat.
Part of his mystique came from his ability to avoid disaster following defeat, surprising even the British. When his army was trapped on Long Island, he executed a nighttime withdrawal, difficult for the most professional soldiers. Following the retreat across New Jersey, he ordered all boats along the Delaware River confiscated, denying their use by the British.
Washington used these same boats for crossing the Delaware, at nighttime under the most hazardous conditions. He persuaded his defeated, demoralized soldiers for one last effort before their enlistments expired in less than ten days. The subsequent victories at Trenton and Princeton caught the enemy by surprise, and breathed new life into the American cause.
Of course, Washington’s success was helped by the incompetence and indifference of the British commanders. After defeating the Americans on Long Island, the British pursuit was lackadaisical and allowed the trapped army to escape. An immediate attack across the Delaware River could have finished the rebellion decisively. After capturing Philadelphia, the British Army went into winter quarters, instead of pursuing the defeated Continentals. Considering the Americans as a “rabble,” their strategy was uncoordinated, leading to piecemeal defeats at Saratoga and Yorktown.
Following the victory at Yorktown in 1781, the Continental Army returned to New York, and the war settled into a stalemate. The French Army departed in 1782 for defending French possessions in the West Indies. With idle time on their hands the Continental soldiers began to reflect on their poor conditions.
continued...