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thedrifter
02-11-04, 05:43 AM
2-09-2004

Technology Can’t Replace Soldier Skills



By William F. Sauerwein



One of the greatest strengths of the U.S. armed forces today is our technological advantage. Maintaining this edge in military technology is crucial, and it has demonstrated its worth both in combat and deterrence. However, this edge can lead to an arrogance and complacency, which often leads to other weaknesses.



We often feel that this technological advantage renders our enemies helpless before our might. Therefore, we do not adequately study our enemies’ own military capabilities to adequately prepare our troops for combat. In contrast, our enemies study everything about us, which is how they discover our weaknesses.



The 2001 book by H. John Poole and William S. Lind, Phantom Soldier, emphasizes that this phenomenon is nothing new. During the Iwo Jima campaign in World War II, the Japanese totally negated our aerial photography technology. They knew exactly how the Americans defended terrain, so with little technology they developed effective deception plans. Since the Japanese had constructed their defenses largely underground, these photos showed much of the island undefended.



The United States prepared to invade the Japanese home islands (code named Operation Downfall) for ending the war. Documents captured after the war revealed that Japanese intelligence predicted with uncanny accuracy the time and place of the American invasion. They based these predictions on the American pattern set by previous operations.



We flaunt our latest military technological breakthroughs, again as if our enemies are helpless to counter them. In a democracy we want to demonstrate that the public is getting its money’s worth. But must we go into such great detail about the particular system’s capabilities, especially when public view includes potential enemy spies?



Gordon Prange’s book on Pearl Harbor At Dawn We Slept, showed that the Japanese Honolulu consulate obtained much intelligence from our openness. Extensive information regarding the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s movements, as well as other critical information, was published in The Honolulu Star-Bulletin. In August 1941, a Japanese consular official openly drove onto then-Wheeler Field. This was an open-to-the-public demonstration on how America’s latest fighter aircraft would defend the island from attack.



Another danger is that our perceived technological advantage causes us to take short cuts regarding our total strategy. Once plans are adopted they often become “set in stone,” and challenges to the status quo are often ridiculed. When an enemy employs a strategy which overcomes our technology all too often we view it as a fluke, and do not adapt our strategy.



Following World War II the United States held the technology edge with sole possession of the atomic bomb. This ushered in the “push button warfare” theory, supposedly eliminating the need for bloody, World War II-scale ground combat. Ground troops were only needed for occupying the enemy’s territory after it had been bombed. Since little was known about the effects of atomic radiation, the strategy seemed sound.



Military technological superiority is both temporary and illusionary. When the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb in 1949, it suddenly nullified our supremacy and negated our ground strategy (given the Soviets’ manpower advantage and that of ally, China. Most disturbing is that the Soviets achieved this technology through well-placed Soviet agents in our nuclear facilities.



The Korean War in 1950 proved our total unpreparedness for ground combat just five years after victory in World War II. We maintained four infantry divisions in nearby Japan, but these troops were far from combat-ready. Though many officers and NCOs had combat experience, they were softened by five years of occupation duty. Japanese roads and bridges could not handle the weight of American tanks, so they mostly sat in motor pools.



The initial commitments of American troops resulted in horrendous casualties, and shattered the aura of American invincibility. The North Korean army was well-trained, well-equipped, containing hardened veterans of the Chinese civil war. We averted disaster largely through American air supremacy which disrupted the North Korean supply lines. American troops learn quickly, and with timely reinforcements, went on the offensive.



Then we ignored Chinese threats of intervention, believing that our air superiority would deter China or that it would decimate their forces before they could enter combat. The Chinese moved their army during the night, when our air supremacy was negated, and hid during the day. Because we believed so strongly in our air power, MacArthur and his staff ignored intelligence reports of Chinese troops.



Dreams of victory and “home by Christmas” predictions ended with the massive Chinese offensive. Victory would require a major escalation of American and allied forces, and threatened other theaters. Because of the Soviet threat in Europe, including nuclear warfare, the Pentagon decided on a limited war.



A recent example of a good mix of technology and personnel was the buildup of our armed forces during the 1980s. While we maintained the credible threat of a nuclear response, it was not our first response. This buildup ultimately prepared us for all levels of warfare, from special operations through full-scale conventional war. Most importantly, we took the Soviet threat seriously, studied their military capabilities and planned for the “worst-case scenario.”



We took this training and planning into Operation Desert Storm against the Soviet-trained and equipped Iraqi forces. Our shocking victory demonstrated our superiority not only in technology, but the tactical proficiency of our troops as well. It further humbled a “saber-rattling” Kim Il-sung, and led to the Soviet collapse in 1992.



Our Cold War victory produced a dark side, because we saw no credible threat, we assumed no one would try. We touted our technological advances, again making a lot of technical information open to the general public. With this technology we again downplayed the importance of ground combat.



This strategy proved flawed in Somalia, where we engaged the technology-limited Somali militias. We arrogantly announced the arrival of our Rangers and Delta Force, and their mission. These raids established a pattern, to which the Somalis quickly adapted, and exploited.



In the Mogadishu raid featured in Mark Bowden’s book, Black Hawk Down, the Pentagon denied the heavy forces requested by the commander on the ground. Operating in urban terrain neutralizes much of our technology by its very nature. Supposedly, the time of the raid was changed to daylight hours for providing a proper media image.



Perhaps the biggest disadvantage of our technology is its effect on the attitudes and training of our personnel. Poole analyzes this effect in his critique of the Army’s “Land Warrior” exercise at Fort Polk, La., in September 2000. This exercise seemed to remove the individual soldier’s skills and initiative, creating instead an information-gathering, gun-platform.



The heart of “Land Warrior” loads the soldier down with about 90 extra pounds of computer-radio gear. In a nutshell, it is like the individual soldier having his/her own personal computer on the battlefield. It provides a laser range finder, digital maps, graphics, pull-down menus, and video imagery of his/her field of fire.



Despite this technology, the “Land Warrior” may be less aware of his/her environment than previous soldiers. For example, one eye will be on the computer screen; one ear will be attuned to the radio; and the trigger hand must manipulate a computer mouse. He or she may not detect the low-tech enemy suddenly appearing, and this heavy gear may slow reaction time.



continued......

thedrifter
02-11-04, 05:43 AM
This gear also allows commanders to “see” the location of each member of their command and what that soldier sees. As nothing more than an extension of headquarters, the individual soldier will have minimal control over using this technology. Individual initiative may become stifled and junior leadership skills may erode, waiting for the “correct” solution from headquarters.



As this concept matures, NCO leadership will become more focused on training troops on the use and maintenance of their equipment. The increasing complexity of equipment sometimes minimizes the NCO’s tactical input into operations. The stifling of NCO leadership in turn reduces unit effectiveness, particularly in those first crucial moments of a firefight.



Unfortunately, as technological advances result in deterioration of individual combat skills, the favored solution seems to be more technology. Poor marksmanship has led to the development of more expensive, high-tech rifles. Leadership problems have led to concentrating more responsibility at higher levels through more expensive technology.



Yet what happens if this technology fails, and soldiers must resort to “old fashioned” techniques? Most of this expensive high-tech gear depends on cheap batteries for operation, which often fail at the most inopportune times. This equipment is vulnerable to weather conditions, damage from normal field operations and improperly trained personnel. Our superior night-vision goggles can be neutralized by the use of a very cheap, old-fashioned flare.



I full support using advanced technology to enhance the performance and survivability of our forces. But this technology does not compensate for common sense and individual soldier skills. At the strategic level, we must closely guard our military secrets to deny our enemies means of countering them. We must understand that our enemies will never follow our plans, and be prepared for all levels of warfare.



Our soldiers must be trained in using this technology as an extension of their individual skills. They must further be trained in contingency plans for when this technology fails and enemy countermeasures prove effective. Above all, we must respect our enemies’ capabilities and not suffer the illusion that they are incapable of hurting us.



William F. Sauerwein is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at mono@gtec.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.

http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=360&rnd=958.3184883251637


Sempers,

Roger
:marine: