Tikrit, South to Babylon

[thedrifter]

Tikrit, South to Babylon

by BGen John F. Kelly

Major combat operations ended in Iraq during April 2003. Marine and coalition forces, however, were just entering into Phase IV of the operation. This phase—security and stabilization operations—has received little attention. Following is the first of a three-part series providing details about 1st Marine Division’s Phase IV operations.
I would imagine that by now the readership has been fully exposed to the specifics of the 1st Marine Division’s (1st MarDiv’s) attack across Mesopotamia to Baghdad, Tikrit, Bayji, and beyond. As I have only just returned from the theater, I am behind in my professional reading and do not know what I have missed in terms of the operations treatment in the literature. By now I would suppose that all are somewhat aware of a plan that focused on speed—indeed, in generating so much speed that the resulting tempo would itself, in reality, be a weapon. It was also a plan that depended on mental and physical agility, multiple thrusts, bypassing resistance, reinforcing success wherever it was achieved, and creating chaos—then thriving on that chaos. Every commander was expected to be at the point of decision, not to micromanage events but to feel the battle and be in a position to exploit even the smallest successes that are always fleeting. Additionally, it looked to set conditions so ambiguous that enemy commanders, from small units in bunkers strung along the border to Saddam himself, would not understand what was taking place. That their every reaction, like the French in 1940, might in fact be the right one at the time they made the decision, but would also be irrelevant as our pace of operations had made it so. Logistically the division’s “log dogs,” heroes all to include our embedded Combat Service Support Group 11 (CSSG–11), pushed materiel and themselves to the limit—and did not wait to be asked. They were also innovative, and we deployed with fuel test kits in every unit to live off the land and use Saddam’s stocks if need be, and we did occasionally, just to say we could. We never ran out of food although there were a few minor, local “crises” at the end, but ammunition and fuel win. The entire division understood that getting there fast was far more important than arriving with full stomachs.


We were ordered into the attack early and unexpectedly on 20 March 2003. The division, over 22,000 strong and with 8,000 vehicles, met the timeline. Two very powerful regimental combat teams (RCTs) attacked directly into the Ramaylah oilfields, while a third moved toward the critical road and bridge network just south of An Nasiriyah astride the Euphrates River. The Marine expeditionary force’s (MEF’s) second division, 1st United Kingdom (1st UK), was attacking on the right focused on Basra. The basic plan had an amazing amount of flexibility built in, and just as importantly, commanders and staff throughout the division had so socialized every eventuality that an audible was all it took to redirect an action or execute the unexpected. With an apparent focus on Iraq’s most productive oilfield and facilities, one can only wonder if Saddam really did think it was all about oil. Worst case from his perspective might have been that if the invasion continued it would follow the failed British 1915 example making its way along the Tigris River-Highway 6 corridor from Basra to Baghdad. His defensive dispositions certainly suggested this was his expectation, and the MEF avoided them. What could not have been readily apparent to him or his generals was that while the three RCTs and 1st UK were taking the oilfields and associated infrastructure intact, Task Force (TF) Tarawa was already closing on An Nasiriyah and the Euphrates crossings. They also could not have known that the soldiers of the 3d Infantry Division (3d ID), “The Rock of the Marne,” were out of Kuwait attacking northwest through the flat and uninhabited desert toward the capital.


Readers might be aware that after the “opening gambit” we executed a rapid relief in place with 1st UK in the oilfields, reoriented west, and by 23–24 March, after rearming and refitting in stride along Highway 1, were pushing furiously across the Euphrates. Both RCT–5 and RCT–7 would cross the Euphrates west of An Nasiriyah, while RCT–1 crossed through the eastern edge of the urban area moving directly north on Highway 7. From this point on, the attack, with the exception of an unexpected and unneeded pause, would not slow until 9 April when all three RCTs isolated Baghdad east and north of the city. Neither of the two divisions (1st MarDiv and 3d ID) were ever in favor of taking ground by a series of armored raids, then withdrawing. I cannot speak for the 3d ID, but we very definitely had our own ideas and very strong feelings in this regard and had no intention of ever again surrendering ground taken.


In reality the division’s effort in the conventional stage of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) continued even after Baghdad’s fall. With nothing more than a verbal from the I MEF, in well under a day TF Tripoli was organized and on 13 April attacked to Tikrit. Combining all three light armored reconnaissance battalions for the first time ever; an artillery battalion in 5th Battalion, 11th Marines (5/11); a detachment of SEALs; and CSS and Marine wing support squadron elements, Tripoli stole out of the capital under the cover of darkness attacking over 100 miles north to seize Saddam’s hometown. A few days later the attack, this time conducted very gently, pushed an additional 45 kilometers to take the surrender and enjoy the hospitality of the city of Bayji delivered up by the enthusiastic inhabitants of the region. At this point the MEF battlespace extended some 900 kilometers from its start point in Kuwait and, in fact, Tripoli was closer to the Mediterranean or Black Sea than the Persian Gulf.


The division’s main effort along Highway 1 has received the lion’s share of discussion. I thought, however, for a view of how the plan was designed and executed, RCT–1’s efforts (Highway 7) might provide another perspective. The battlespace was more swamp than desert and was a maze of thousands of irrigation ditches—all significant impediments to vehicular movement. The division moved in multiple thrusts with RCT–1 separated from the main body by 65 miles. Once the RCT had successfully negotiated a stressful passage of lines through TF Tarawa, forcing a crossing of the Euphrates River at An Nasiriyah, it followed a line directly north on Route 7 toward Al Kut. The Baghdad Division of the Republican Guard (RG) defended the city, but we had no intention of fighting in Al Kut. We were also not concerned about another division, the 10th Armored, 65 miles to the east of RCT–1 at Al ‘Amarah.


With little regard for its flanks, RCT–1 cut loose entirely from its support base south of the Euphrates. Moving north, with speed as its primary metric, it pushed into one of the most densely populated regions of Iraq fighting through numerous urban-based ambushes. The RCT was not tasked to reduce or eliminate resistance in detail but, rather, to threaten Al Kut and fix enemy forces in the city. It could take this risk for two reasons, one of which was the innovative use of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion as a maneuver battalion, and also to screen the RCT’s eastern flank as required. Among many missions, to include taking its turn in maneuvering against urban ambushes along Highway 7, the battalion stood ready to detect any thrust from the east and call in hell as delivered by the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW), and this was the second reason. Although in the MEF—and not division zone—we could only hope the 10th Armored would be lured out of its prepared positions. An armored force attacking along the very canalized axis into the division’s flank would have triggered the preplanned swarming of 3d MAW. The result would surely have been a “highway of death” all the way back to the enemy’s original defenses. The lesson again is that there is nothing you cannot accomplish, no risk too great, if you have Marine air on station not only in a close support role, but working the zone “deep” as well for the Marine air-ground task force commander. As it was, these units—both the 10th Armored and Baghdad Divisions—received virtually nonstop attention by the MAW and other coalition assets and, as it turned out, were either dead, happy to remain stationary, and a long way from their vehicles—or they would desert.

By D+6 Saddam certainly had surmised that 1st UK’s attack on Basra was to capture that city, and the expected attack up Highway 6 was not to materialize. He must have known powerful mechanized forces moving on Baghdad along three of the four avenues of approach from the south threatened him, all sidestepping his Highway 6 defenses. Without knowing which units, he certainly must have been aware that the coalition was speeding toward him on Highways 8 (V Corps), 1, and 7 (I MEF). He could not have guessed, however, that the Marines would soon turn almost 90 degrees east along Highway 27 toward An Numaniyah and grab, almost in a coup de main, the Tigris crossings upstream of Al Kut. This maneuver would “shoot the gap” identified early on by the division between the powerful artillery assets of the Baghdad Division in Al Kut and the Al Nida RG Division north on the approaches to Baghdad. Most of these systems were generally of greater range capability than our own—and also chemical capable—always a major concern during the conflict. This move also set the division up to threaten Baghdad from the east and north and, just as importantly, isolate it from possible reinforcement by RG divisions positioned near Tikrit, Mosul, and Kirkuk.

continued.

[thedrifter]

All of this I am confident has been addressed in articles and perhaps even books by now. What I am sure has not been documented, however, is the phase of OIF that evolved from 10 to 20 April when the division repositioned from its Phase III to Phase IV positions in the south. This was the phase in which we formally transitioned from conventional military operations to security and stabilization operations (SASO). In reality this phase began long before the repositioning with the establishment of a division civil-military operations center (CMOC) in Baghdad, organized by the 11th Marine Regiment (artillery). The CMOC was up and functioning even before hostilities ended as it was clear that some form of civil control was required amidst the chaos of looting, retribution, and crime. Even in faraway Tikrit the emphasis had quickly shifted from combat operations to the reestablishment of police, civil services, and production and distribution of potable water. I also do not think that there is a full appreciation for the environment in which we fought after assuming the zone, through the departure of the last battalion in early October. It was tough, stressful, and dangerous work in humidity and heat that climbed steadily until it peaked in August at 130-plus degrees! In addition to repairing infrastructure and winning over an initially hostile population, it involved day and night urban patrolling, nightly ambushes in rural areas, and forever seeking to kill or neutralize an enemy that by June 2003 was increasingly organized and determined. All of these actions, however, were executed while steadfastly avoiding injury to innocent civilians and minimizing damage to their property.


The division now faced the even greater challenges of providing security, stability, and humanitarian assistance to a country and a people devastated by decades of brutal repression and neglect. This may have seemed from some reporting like a pickup program cobbled together without much consideration, but the reality was that nearly a year prior the MEF opened discussions and worked solutions assuming the worst and disregarding the hope that some predicted for the situation once Saddam’s regime was dead. As hope is never a course of action, we implemented our program first in Baghdad, then in a large swath of southern Iraq across an area the size of Missouri with nearly half the population of the country. As many of the division’s units began the long trek home after turning the hard-won Phase III battlespace over to the Army’s 3d and 4th IDs, those left behind opened an entirely new chapter of OIF.


SASO in Baghdad
The doctrinal definition for the business that lay ahead—SASO—made the mission sound unambiguous and concise. Neat doctrinal terms did not capture the realities on the ground, however, and “Blue Diamond” (division’s call sign) embarked on an effort that although planned for in general terms, few outside the MEF, in my view, foresaw the eventual length, size, scope, and complexity of the commitment. With the removal of the regime leadership an enormous power vacuum was created, a vacuum that the Coalition Provisional Authority was simply not ready to fill. Due to the ethnic, religious, tribal, and cultural fissures that are the reality of Iraqi society, it was quite likely that the unstable security situation would degenerate into bloody civil war. Even before combat operations ended, a multitude of factions were jockeying for their piece of the post-Saddam pie. There was no time to pause and catch a breath as looting, factional violence, and tribal vendettas had already begun. Mindful of its motto, “no better friend, no worse enemy,” operations to restore a sense of normalcy to the lives of ordinary Iraqis and to help set the conditions for restoring public order and services commenced. Yet, the attention paid to these new tasks did not detract the force from continuing combat actions. There were still a great many former regime loyalists, foreign terrorists, and jihadists active. For those who sought a return to repression or worked to bring violence to the streets of Iraq, the men and women of Blue Diamond responded in no uncertain terms; however, the vast majority of the population would enjoy our protection and a freedom they are still unsure how to deal with.


What became immediately obvious was that we could never sustain half of a city that contained 6 million people. To coordinate the resumption of critical services the CMOC operated out of the centrally located Palestine Hotel. Initial CMOC meetings were specifically designed to take place with participation by the city’s secular and religious leaders, all recruited as full partners in the effort to repair and rebuild. With this partnership, progress was made in restoring the civil bureaucracy and the establishment of a reasonably safe environment. Both of these factors would be critical if we hoped to lure nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to the city. In this regard we advertised an extended hand of cooperation and protection and that we looked forward to working with every NGO willing to help. Additionally, liaison was established early with the 3d ID to ensure the harmonization of civil-military operations on both sides of the Tigris River.


Coincident with the CMOC actions in early April, the RCTs shifted positions as the division received tasks to assume new missions. An internal relief in place was executed to free RCT–5 to move 50 miles north of Baghdad to Samarra and provide support for TF Tripoli’s operations in Tikrit. Throughout this period all units hunted members of the former regime, and many by this time began to turn themselves in or risk identification, or worse, from local citizens. The vast majority of Iraqis welcomed us as liberators, but a wary eye and lightning quick life-and-death decisions were required of every member of the force regardless of rank, age, or occupational specialty. There was no front, no rear, no secured area, only reliance on a buddy to cover your “six,” and the professional maturity to know when and how to act. This was Gen Charles C. Krulak’s “three block war,” and the Marines understood it and performed as if they were born to it.


With no help from without, the CMOC established functional areas for police, fire, electricity, water, and medical care. It appointed an interim police chief and opened a police academy. Electrical engineers were gathered up and set to work reestablishing the power grid, an effort central to restoring the most basic of human services. A wide range of philanthropic agencies like CARE (Cooperation for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc.), Red Crescent, and the World Food Program arrived and joined the effort. Psychological operations messages were produced and disseminated via broadcast and leaflet to assist in informing and protecting the innocent of eastern Baghdad. We encouraged civilian media coverage of all CMOC-NGO meetings and activities as it provided objective reporting regarding our level of determination and progress on the restoration of order. Radio broadcasts, in particular, assisted local leaders and security forces by appealing to the citizens of Baghdad that, for their own safety, they remain in their homes between the calls to evening and morning prayers. The CMOC’s activities accelerated in the face of these and many more challenges—and successes. By the combined efforts of the CMOC, NGOs, local citizens, and American military units on both sides of the Tigris, the reestablishment of the city’s services and repair of its infrastructure was given organization, efficiency, and hope.

By 15 April, the MEF/division was well into preparations for the turnover of eastern Baghdad to the 3d ID. The staffs and subordinate commanders worked out the details of turning the slowly recovering eastern half of the city over, even as Blue Diamond forces had commenced their move south. The relief was initiated on 18 April. First out was RCT–7, and after handing over its sectors of the city, it headed south to staging areas near Al Iskandariyah. Elements of RCT–5, to include 2/5 and 3/5, began their move from the vicinity of Samarra where it had supported TF Tripoli’s actions for over a week. TF Tripoli came out last from Tikrit-Bayji, another 100 miles north of Samarra. On 21 April Blue Diamond completed its move to an interim assembly area and planted its colors in the vicinity of Ad Diwaniyah in an abandoned tank repair facility.

>Editor’s Note: Look for Part II of BGen Kelly’s series in our March 2004 issue.


>>BGen Kelly is the Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine Division.

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http://www.mca-marines.org/Gazette/0204kelly.html


Sempers,

Roger
:marine:

[thedrifter]

Part II: Tikrit, South to Babylon

by BGen John F. Kelly

This is Part II of a three-part series concerning Phase IV—security and stabilization operations—during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
The division’s zone of occupation amounted to the entire southern half of the country (excluding 1st United Kingdom’s zone in the southeast corner around Basra), with over 40 percent of Iraq’s population. Borders with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the southern suburbs of Baghdad bound it. A complicating factor in our repositioning to the south was the unexpected movement of thousands of Shia faithful participating in the Arba’een pilgrimage. Out of respect and necessity we delayed movement into some Phase IV positions until the pilgrimage was completed. The fact that thousands of Shia were, for the first time in decades, participating freely in one of their most revered traditions was a historic event. We took full advantage of this opportunity as well and, where we could, handed out fresh water and provided medical support to a disbelieving mass of worshipers. This is perhaps the first example of our opening initiatives to establish positive relations with a still very suspicious and even hostile population. In any event, by 24 April 2003 the division successfully staged those units preparing to return to Camp Pendleton and deployed the battalions slated to remain in their Phase IV zones taking responsibility for the following provinces: Al Muthanna (2d Battalion, 5th Marines (2/5)), Karbala (3/7), Babil (1/4), Al Qadisiyah (3/5), and An Najaf (1/7). Additionally, the provinces of Wasit and Dhi Qar were added when 2/25, 3/23, and 4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion were attached from Task Force (TF) Tarawa—already in the process of retrograding to Kuwait and home. These battalions were in place in An Nasiriyah, Al Kut, and on the Iranian border, respectively.


The battlespace assumed by the division was unique. Labeled “south-central” by a still all but absent Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the population was overwhelmingly Shia. Recent combat operations, 12 years of United Nations sanctions, and willful neglect on the part of the regime all resulted in the south’s infrastructure being in a condition of collapse. This created a major series of challenges for the newly designated military governors—read battalion commanders—in control of the seven provinces. Generally speaking there was no reliable water purification system, no intact power grid, and not even basic sanitation, sewage treatment, or trash collection. It was among the world’s highest malaria threat areas. Years of filth piled high along roadsides made an outbreak of serious disease a major concern, with both coalition forces and local inhabitants at risk. Local police never protected or served the community but were a cog in the regime’s machine of repression. They were overwhelmingly corrupt and on the take at every level. The real power at the local level—below the Ba’ath Party’s interest—rested with tribal sheikhs, many themselves corrupt, often in league with the regime, and generally only interested in maintaining hold on power and petty perquisites. In addition to tribal affiliations the Shia community was made up of many different religious factions. Allegiance to one cleric or another defined the southern Shia almost as much as clan loyalties. Religious spats between rival clerical groups were often violent and were to have a significant impact on stability.


The battalions thrown into this complex, dangerous, and unhealthy environment responded with valiant efforts. They were, from commanders to squad leaders on patrol, in essence benevolent dictators with the wisdom of a Solomon required to cut through the maze of competing agendas and emotions that dominate Iraqi society. They were well-suited to the task as they were outfitted with the high ethical and moral foundations common to American military professionals, and set to work armed with their initiative, their imaginations, and the power of their wills to restore basic services and security throughout scattered cities, towns, and villages. They were no doubt hobbled in their efforts by the poor material condition of the infrastructure and the lack of competent technicians to operate it. They were also initially handicapped financially as the CPA, and the dollars for recovery they would eventually provide, were themselves in the organization phase and not yet able to take up the task. The commanders leaned into the mission undeterred, however, and not only unshackled the people but set their provinces on a true course for eventual recovery.

The immediate task at hand was to evaluate each province and design a coordinated strategy tailored to the needs of each. This strategy included an assessment of infrastructure, threats to good order, and identification of local authorities who could help bring order out of the chaos. Provinces were different and each had its own challenges. To help focus the efforts in each province and provide a more effective battalion to division connection, understudy officers were assigned by Blue Diamond and immersed themselves in local issues with the aim of becoming objective experts. They were soon invaluable in keeping commanders and staffs informed of intelligence trends, local gossip, clerical proclamations (fatwahs), and events on the street. They met frequently among themselves trading information and experiences, and ensured that everyone concerned benefited from lessons learned across the zone.


The approach was to decentralize with local commanders piloting the endeavor as those closest to the “rocks and shoals” in each region. The overall goal was to quickly bring the maximum benefit to the greatest number of people, avoiding at almost any cost the accidental death or injury of an innocent civilian, farm animal, or damage to crops. By starting their work in the largest population centers then moving outward into the countryside, the program enjoyed almost immediate success; although even this logical approach encountered problems due in large measure to the ages old tension between city dwellers and rural communities. It seemed that every action taken to benefit one village, group, or tribe would serve to alienate another. The battalions walked a tightrope until they understood to link initiatives and demonstrate advantages for all. As they grew more skilled in Iraqi diplomacy, workable compromises emerged and improvements benefited every group. Electrical power, for instance, in the city also translated into pumps irrigating crops in rural areas. Functioning sanitation for urban dwellers meant raw human waste was no longer trucked out into the country and dumped indiscriminately on fields, alongside roads, or into rural water sources. As time passed, this effort built trust with the local citizens across the republic.


Each province, city, and even village had its own unique personality, but two—Karbala and Najaf—were particularly difficult to manage. These two holiest cities in the Shia tradition have rather direct ties to Iran—the only entirely Shia nation in Islam. The sensitivities of the religious community based in these holy cities were of tremendous concern and unbelievably complicated. Predictions were dire. The “experts” and “Arabists” advised that as unbelievers, largely Christian and (worst of all) Americans, these cities would be tinderboxes of discontent and resistance. Karbala, with a population of nearly 550,000, was home to the shrine of Imam Abi Abdillah Al-Husain, the martyred grandson of Mohammed and a founder of the Shia sect of Islam. Najaf, slightly larger than Karbala, was the site of the tomb of Hussein, son-in-law of the prophet. Both cities are filled with highly sensitive religious sites, mosques, and revered tombs. As the spiritual centers of Shiite Islam they also contain the offices of many of the sect’s most important and influential ayatollahs—all with some relationship to Iran. As it turned out, however, these were success stories as were the other five provinces—just more complicated.

All of us learned early that Islam is very much a part of every aspect of Iraqi life—including civil government—unlike anything we experience as Americans. There is little separation between church and civil authority as we understand it or would ever allow. It is completely intertwined, seemingly inseparable and, as we learned, not necessarily what the population desires. As with every city, however, the approach taken was one that assumed we already had the “hearts and minds” of the people, even if they did not necessarily know it yet. We worked to conquer whatever reservations and animosities some might have toward us with respect for their culture, opinions, and religion. By treating every member of the society with fairness and dignity we were confident we would, over time, gain the trust and cooperation of even the most unconvinced. Our sense was that if the power of American openness, decency, and ideals could not win, no amount of military power could. This was, however, tougher than we thought. It was, and remained, a dangerous place as former regime loyalists, radical religious fanatics, and violent criminals were present in relative force. Additionally, the local population held us in great suspicion, and even animosity, as they blamed America for what they perceived to be our lack of action after Operation DESERT STORM. They are convinced that the United States broke its promises of support if they would only rise up and attempt the overthrow of Saddam. They made the attempt and for their trouble reportedly suffered many hundreds of thousands dead and tortured when his butchers were finished. This fact, they will tell you, is borne out by the many mass gravesites throughout the region.

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Considering these factors, and many more, the force was warned to be ever on their guard as scattered throughout the population were a small number of violent men seeking to discredit our civil-military initiatives, draw us into responses that would cause us to inadvertently injure and kill the greatest number of innocent civilians possible and, finally, send as many of us home in body bags as they could. Blue Diamond was also introduced to a new watchword—“do no harm”—and instructed to add this to their philosophy of dealing with the Iraqi population, the overwhelming numbers of whom were simply trying to survive.


Police, Power, and Government
Assessments in every province identified that the three most pressing needs were for police, electric power and fuel deliveries, and local governmental structures. The restoration of police services was a challenge made more difficult by the suspicion with which the population held every member of every department in the country. Winning the public’s trust and confidence here would be a daunting task. Formerly, the police were underpaid with full expectation that these officers would make up for their low income by extortion and bribery. In spite of the urgent requirement to put police on the streets right away, it was more important to send a signal to the officers themselves that their role had changed. Improper conduct by police officers and officials would not be tolerated in the new force. In almost every case, the battalion commanders fired the entire force and then rehired those they were personally convinced were salvageable. Some commanders invited trusted local officials and private citizens to participate in this process. Commanders established their own police academies with programs of instruction that included ethics training, basic police techniques, weapons use, and community relations. “You can’t shake down the locals anymore,” was lesson one. Joint patrols operated on the streets in this opening stage, building trust and confidence in departments that historically had not deserved either.


After initial training programs came longer term initiatives including expanded training opportunities, internal affairs functions, management, expanded ethics sessions, and instruction in the law. In As Samawah, for instance, a 10-day course was established by 2/5 that graduated over 700 officers. In many of the provinces, commanders requested and received the services of Reserve Marines who were police officers in their civilian lives. Marine and Army military policemen were instrumental throughout, adding their talents and expertise to the daily functioning of the departments. This once hated institution evolved into relevant law enforcement and service departments under the careful instruction and supervision of noncommissioned officers and junior officers—backed by Marine quick reaction forces. By July 2003 these initiatives had matured to the point that joint patrols were all but eliminated. The streets were placed almost entirely into the hands of Iraqi policemen with departments working in close concert with the battalions for more complex or dangerous operations. This by no means meant the police were unsupervised, as they were monitored continuously by our commanders and their attached Army military police and backed by Marine reaction forces, but it did mean that the process of putting an Iraqi face on security was well underway.


Energy Starved in Iraq
Electrical power and fuel, or more accurately sufficient and reliable quantities, were the bane of our existence during the entire security and stabilization operations period. This was a major issue and the test of our effectiveness as all sources of energy, including diesel, benzene (gas), and propane, were essential. Elements of energy included the facility infrastructure, sources of fuel, and distribution system. Each element was burdened with corruption, inefficiency, and shortages. The infrastructure was decrepit with little maintenance conducted since the uprisings and repression after the Gulf War. For the battalions that inherited this system, and were supposed to restore it to working order, it was unbelievable that a country so rich in these products had little available for local use. Commanders assaulted all three problems at once, seeking out engineers and workers too afraid to come to work and ensuring their protection. Most distribution pipelines, for example, were out of service. Those in service had much of their fuel stolen by thieves who for years made a living tapping into the lines and selling their pickings on the black market outside Iraq. This was the case with natural gas lines as well. There was also a rise in sabotage as the former regime criminals worked to undermine and discredit us. Until pipelines were repaired and protected, precious fuel had to be trucked long distances from the refineries around Basra. This was not a very practical solution as power facilities required more than 100,000 gallons of fuel daily, and there were many to feed.


A similar situation existed with the electrical infrastructure. One of the major problems was looters who made a living of tearing down high-tension lines and stripping them for the copper. As with pipelines, saboteurs were also active. In Karbala 3/7 organized the repair of a series of downed 200-foot-high pylons and worked out an equitable means to ration electricity between industrial and residential users. An Nasiriyah and 2/25 faced a unique power dilemma as a huge circuit involving a number of interconnected grids required repair. With time, money, perseverance, and installation of a huge transformer, the electric grid between Baghdad-Hillah-Nasiriyah was completed and power restored as far south as Basra and the Kuwaiti border.


The answer was security, but it was impossible to patrol many thousands of miles of pipeline and power systems. Over the road movement was also unreliable as convoys were subject to frequent hijackings and, even at that, could only be a stopgap considering the amount of fuel required. There was no single answer to the problem. In Najaf 1/7 organized TF Rio to provide security to the lines within its zone. Another was to involve the I Marine Expeditionary Force’s aviation element with all pilots directed to fly the lines and report. This was a secondary mission on every flight, and we tied reaction forces to these reports. The arrival of the aircraft alone, however, was often enough to deter the activity and set the thieves scurrying into the desert. The problem certainly never went away, but we were well along in getting out in front of it when we redeployed home at mission’s end.

Reinventing Local Government
The difficulty of running half a country can be summed up by a lack of a dependable public service bureaucracy. With over 10 million inhabitants, and all of the associated functions of providing utilities, schools, sanitation, medical care and nutrition, this level of organization was critical—and nonexistent. Recovery would not be as easy as simply rehiring the Iraqis who had previously held these posts. The regime’s method for civil service had been irrationally centralized and inefficient. Loyalty to the party was, of course, infinitely more important than competence as this was a key component in how the regime penetrated to the lowest level of Iraqi life, entered the home, and exercised control. The system was almost entirely corrupt and nepotistic in the worst way, without concern or interest in the well-being of constituents. Town councils or city managers had no concept of how to do anything that required a decision. As in the past it was safer to execute instructions issued directly from Baghdad. The absence of the regime’s corrupt henchmen, however, left the now vetted local leadership without even basic instructions. Again, battalion commanders, assisted in this case by the government support teams organized out of necessity that someday will be taken over by CPA, stepped into the role.


The tactics were the same throughout the Marines’ area of responsibility. Commanders at all levels met with local government officials, technocrats, and sheikhs, and vetted them in terms of how connected to the former regime they may have been. Pledges of commitment to granting political power to the people in a newly organized civil structure came quickly. In Al Hillah, for example, 1/4 held initial meetings and convinced officials and government workers to create a city council to provide a check and balance on the new government’s actions. Meetings were also held with religious and tribal leaders to identify independent delegates for the council. The goal was to establish a council that was not dominated by a single constituency and included not only the majority Shia, but women as well.

Similarly in Karbala, the city council, led by a serving official, was engaged by representatives of 3/7 to start the process of restoring city services and critical infrastructure. Trouble developed, however, when hundreds of citizens demonstrated over the retention of the incumbent, a man they accused as a high-ranking and corrupt Ba’ath Party goon. The commander met with the demonstrators and reached a solution. In mid-May, elections for a new interim city council were held, with all positions temporary and performance-based until the establishment of a more permanent structure once the CPA decided on future political structures. The end result, once approved by the commander, was, for the first time in any Iraqi’s memory, a council with real leadership ability and the interests of the community at heart. From this initiative a more pragmatic and responsible group of public servants emerged and were almost immediately making real and measurable progress.

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In As Samawah 2/5 took advantage of a unique set of circumstances that made the environment more conducive to honest government. Under the firm direction of the commander, the city’s government made a miraculous turnaround in its ethical service orientation to the populace. With the effort led by the battalion’s legal officer, the first structure rebuilt was the local criminal and civil court system. The effort gained credibility by partnership with the 12 most prominent tribal leaders. In May the new judiciary was stood up with four honest and popularly screened judges sworn in. City payroll procedures were next with checks and balances in place to minimize extortion, corruption, and skimming by senior officials. The city council, once a tool of the regime, was reelected in a way that would make Americans proud. A viable, responsive, and all-inclusive council went to work for the first time in anyone’s memory. As a check to the power of the sheikhs, technocrats were included, as were a total of nine political and religious parties.


An Najaf—ever the thorn—serves as a final example. Citizen groups appealed to 1/7 and expressed a complete lack of confidence in any of the sitting judges, all of whom were charged as corrupt and closely associated with the terrible repression the regime focused on this city in the past. The commander investigated and, when convinced, removed all but a very few who could convince him of their honesty. At the same time the mayor, also identified as corrupt and murderous, stood as an impediment to honest government. The mayor’s removal became the first real test case of the Iraqi judicial system in south-central—a system reformed by Americans who were not experts but understood what a legal justice system was supposed to be from at least high school civics classes, if from nowhere else. The mayor, Abu Haydar Abdul Mun’im, was a former army colonel set in office by American forces a month before. The process of removing him began almost immediately after 1/7’s assumption of the zone. The mayor was wildly unpopular before the appointment, and his popularity declined even more as he conducted himself in a way reminiscent of the previous regime hacks. Less than 3 months after his appointment, an Iraqi investigative judge, supported and shown the way by the battalion staff, ordered his arrest on corruption and murder charges. Once the warrant was issued, Marines strode into the mayor’s compound, surrounded by his Praetorian Guard of special police and bodyguards, and took him into custody. Delivered to the newly reformed national court system in Baghdad, he was scheduled to be the first high-profile prosecution. Immediately after his arrest the city’s governing council chose an interim mayor, approved by the commander, who was eager to institute reforms.


In virtually every province, city, and village it was the same. Corrupt governing councils and courts, the former regime’s local means of control and repression, were replaced by the most honorable men and women that commanders could locate and convince to serve. These emerging leaders assumed the roles of popular representatives, something denied Iraqis for longer than some of the new appointees had been alive. Remember, there had not been a single honest and fair election in Iraq since long before even Saddam. The citizens also looked to the commanders, and the civil affairs soldiers attached from our Army to every battalion headquarters, for the lessons on how to govern democratically. Just as importantly, the Iraqis gazed at us in American and British uniforms for their first glimpse of what selfless dedication and ethical public service were all about.

>Editor’s Note: Look for Part III of BGen Kelly’s series in our April 2004 issue. Part I was published in February 2004.


>>BGen Kelly is the Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine Division.

http://www.mca-marines.org/Gazette/0304kelly.html


Sempers,

Roger
:marine:

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Part III: Tikrit, South to Babylon

by BGen John F. Kelly

This is the third of a three-part series on security and
stabilization operations (SASO) during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
A key responsibility inherited after the collapse of the regime was the territorial sovereignty of Iraq. Air and ground patrols were periodically dispatched to the border with Saudi Arabia where we found crossing points well controlled by their officials. The Iranian border was a more significant issue. Unlike the border with Saudi Arabia that was hundreds of miles from Iraqi centers of population with almost no trade, religious, or family links, the Iranian border north of Al Kut had all of these and more. Many argued that Iran had a vested interest in a weak and destabilized Iraq. Others made the point that Tehran would attempt to exert anti-American pressure on the Shia in Iraq through the clerics, particularly those in Karbala and Najaf. The most immediate issue on the border, however, was the violent, abusive, and reportedly criminal behavior of the Iranian border guards. These guards had taken to extorting and abusing the hordes of religious pilgrims now free to travel into Iraq exercising religious freedom as a result of Saddam’s removal. For the first time since Saddam established his murderous regime, the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala were open to all Shia. Pilgrims poured in from Iran, primarily in family units, to worship at religious sites and even bury long dead loved ones in the earth adjacent to the sacred mosques. Additionally, refugees desired entry, as did Iranians, seeking to visit family—a privilege denied them since before the Iran-Iraq War. Screening every individual who desired entry in an effort to “keep the terrorists out” proved impossible without a system of passports, visas, and databases with which to work. The good will generated by allowing the free movement of Shia made closing the border ill-advised, and we resisted suggestions to do so.


The border region was remote, sparsely populated, and very difficult terrain. Again, to put an Iraqi face out front, the reestablishment of an Iraqi border guard force in the area by 3d Battalion, 23d Marines (3/23) was a major step forward. Like the police and government officials, these officers were first vetted, then trained, and finally supervised. As there were insufficient Marine assets initially to maintain a permanent presence on the border, we covered the requirement with regular aerial reconnaissance flights and intermittent short-term missions by 4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (4th LAR). By July sufficient forces were made available due to the increasingly cooperative environment in Al Kut to the south, allowing 3/23 to permanently assign an infantry company to the border. The task fell to Company I, 3/23, with Marines and corpsmen from Arkansas, Utah, and Pennsylvania. Setting up living spaces in one of the many abandoned Iraqi concrete forts that line the border, the company—true to form—began to work the few villages in the region, mark the numerous minefields left unrecorded from the Iran-Iraq War, and generally provide a presence and “stiffener” for the Iraqi border officials with whom they worked and supervised daily.


Cross border activity increased exponentially during the summer. Only documented individuals were allowed passage with no vehicles allowed either way. The operation remained generally organized and benign with the presence force from 3/23 overseeing the Iraqi operation of the crossing, patrolling the few roads running parallel to the border, and monitoring the many smuggler routes through the hills and along the washes of the rough desert terrain. There were sporadic occasions of abuse by the Iranian guards when in early August a dangerous incident of violence occurred as Iranian soldiers began assaulting travelers waiting in the buffer zone. A number were injured by beatings with truncheons. Without reason the Iranians began to deliver a large volume of AK–47 fire in the direction of the crowd, just above their heads, and into Iraq. A squad of Marines maintained at the crossing deployed just outside the buffer standing ready to protect the unarmed civilians, but with this action the cowardly Iranian guards fled back to Iran and safety. The squad leader on the scene, truly a “strategic corporal,” closed the crossing until the situation cooled and later opened the border for traffic. The company continued working the border in true beau geste fashion and circumstances until relieved by the Ukrainian brigade in September.


The Northern Babil Province Heats Up
Although the entire zone was dangerous—with criminals and unrepentant Saddam loyalists active throughout—our efforts with the local population assisted us in all but eliminating violence by midsummer. I should add that having the people on your side means more than anything in this environment, but it also helps when it is widely known that no one had yet beat the Marines in the “10-second firefight.” There was, however, a far northern slice of our zone where we had not yet spent much effort that grew increasingly active with hit and run violence. During May, as the Army continued its buildup at the end of the conventional stage of the conflict, Forward Logistics Base Dogwood was established at a former military base in northern Babil Province astride the Euphrates River 12 miles southwest of Baghdad. This area of Iraq was a faultline between the predominately Shia south and Sunni north. Nearly all roads to Baghdad from the south passed through this zone. The main supply route—Highway 1 from Kuwait—and alternate supply routes (ASRs)—Highways 8 from Al Hillah and 9 from the west and Karbala—all converged here. Most notably, however, was ASR “Sue,” a narrow two-lane road that meandered through the lowland villages and agricultural fields for 22 miles. ASR Sue was a connector route and an important logistical lifeline for soldiers in Baghdad. It was used by up to 90 convoys a day.


By early June Blue Diamond-Main, now collocated with I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) in the ancient ruins complex of Babylon near Al Hillah, received frequent reports of convoy ambushes along ASR Sue, although the number of actual attacks was difficult to determine. There was no system in place to verify reports as they came through any of a number of command channels, seldom timely, often turning incomplete and inaccurate initial reports, including double reporting, into “fact.” For instance, in the first 2 weeks of June there were 51 reported attacks along this route, although the standard by which an attack was measured ranged from a single driver thinking he had been shot at to the tragic wounding or death of a soldier and vehicles destroyed by combined automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) fire. Thankfully there were few of these. Reports at the time indicated there had been, on average, three attacks per day by small arms—two per day involving RPGs. During this period another weapon made an occasional appearance—the improvised explosive device (IED)—a weapon that is today the weapon of choice for the guerrillas. In any event, regardless of the confusion, we owned the terrain and, in response to the local commander’s immediate concerns, Blue Diamond organized and deployed Task Force (TF) Scorpion named for the base unit’s call sign.

TF Scorpion’s mission and task organization evolved over time as the tactical situation changed and the enemy reacted to our increasingly successful initiatives. Initially the threat was against defenseless logistics convoys that some described as “manatees.” Convoy personnel on interview typically revealed they had not been briefed that the nature of the threat changed significantly once they put Kuwait in their rearview mirrors. Even convoys coming out of Dogwood or down from Baghdad were not always taking the precautions prudent while operating in such a threat. This made the vehicles easy targets for a host of Iraqi predators. In the beginning the ambush action was no more than one or two assailants standing next to the road in plain sight during the day, emptying an AK–47 magazine at the approaching vehicles, and walking away. Occasionally an RPG might be fired. The convoy’s immediate action was to drive through the “kill zone.” It was difficult to determine if fire was ever returned or if there was any effort on the part of convoy personnel to maneuver against the renegades. This is not a criticism, but we had to understand the facts to design a campaign.

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On 13 June, TF Scorpion, organized around the 4th LAR, moved into its battlespace carved out of 1/4’s zone and thereafter referred to as the “Northern Babil.” It was reinforced with a number of smaller units and capabilities. The first order of business was the obvious requirement to secure ASR Sue from the paid Iraqi thugs who preyed upon the convoys unmolested. This was accomplished in short order by saturating the immediate vicinity of the roadway with aggressive Marine patrols. Instead of manatees the terrorists encountered hunters. Every would-be ambusher soon knew the capability of the light armored vehicle (LAV). Like the Cobras, the “light horsemen” of the LAR community were respected—and feared—their reputations earned and well-deserved. The second task was to work with senior Army leaders in Dogwood and Baghdad to encourage them to improve the awareness, and encourage defensive reaction by convoy personnel when departing secure logistics bases.


TF Scorpion’s initial “do something right away” action was to intersperse LAVs in among the convoy’s vehicles in the hopes that ambushers might engage. The terrorists were ruthless but not particularly suicidal, and this tactic failed to lure many into our kill zone. Another technique in this “cat and mouse” game was to run small “Trojan horse” convoys through the area. The “bait” vehicles themselves had been hardened with a continuous wall of meals, ready-to-eat boxes filled with sand lining the outer edges of the vehicle beds to give the appearance of a defenseless logistics vehicle. The vehicles were not defenseless, however, because in addition to the driver and assistant driver in the cab—who were riflemen as well as logistics professionals—there were Marines hidden within the wall of boxes “chomping at the bit” to return fire and deploy. Terrorist fighters must have been amazed as convoys of HMMWVs or medium tactical vehicle replacements now were just as likely to stop on contact, return fire, and deploy riflemen, as rush past to safety. After only a few days of operations the enemy adjusted tactics. They were no longer willing to stand next to the road and shoot at American vehicles regardless of how slow they traveled and helpless they appeared. The ambushers adjusted by moving farther and farther back from the road in order to survive, resulting in their fire growing increasingly ineffective. By mid-June the number of attacks had fallen off to a fraction of what they had been. By early July there were no direct fire attacks at all.


As effective as the combat tactics were, working the convoy routes in hopes of killing a few not so dedicated trigger-pullers was treating the “symptom” and not the “disease” of suspicion and hostility toward the coalition in this contested region. There were those outside the MEF who encouraged us to go more “kinetic” and consider the use of AC–130s, close air support, and artillery against suspected hostile sites. We took a different approach. We needed to do here what had worked so well for us throughout the rest of the zone—to win the trust of the locals whom we were here to help and who were here to stay. The Scorpion team implemented a parallel program of civil affairs activities in the population centers with explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) serving as a particularly effective tool in helping penetrate the civilian communities, many of which lived in terror of anticoalition forces. The use of U.S. fire support assets had been heavy here, as units fought through the area in April on the way to Baghdad. There was a massive amount of unmarked unexploded ordnance (UXO) spread across the fields and villages. A tremendously effective psychological operations and information campaign, developed by the Army soldiers attached to the division from the 432d Civil Affairs Battalion (from Green Bay, WI), first warned local citizens of the dangers of UXO and provided posters and handbills to help identify the objects. The second aspect of the campaign was to encourage the Iraqi citizens to contact the newly arrived Marines for removal of dangerous materials from their fields, homes, schools, and neighborhoods. The EOD Marines began a nonstop campaign that ultimately, over a period of many weeks, resulted in the removal of 250,000 pounds of UXO, but at the cost of several dead and wounded. This common interest also began a process of extending TF Scorpion’s influence and trust into the population. The real intelligence sources would be found among the people—a reality, again, we had learned previously. Soon the people were overtly and covertly stepping forward with tips and warnings to the Marines and soldiers with whom they had developed a fragile relationship of trust.


By early July the enemy once again changed tactics. They gave up on the ineffective—and highly dangerous to themselves—direct fire ambush, altering their tactics to the almost exclusive use of IEDs. These were most often mortar or artillery shells “daisy chained” together and command detonated. Soon the TF found its stride here as well, and although IED attacks rose to a high average of three a day in the first 2 weeks of July, they began to fall in number almost immediately to near zero by the end of the month. In dealing with the evolving threat it was clear the LAR-centric TF had the mobile patrols covered but was in need of “grunts” to do the dirty work off-road and in the towns. The need for infantrymen to hunt down and kill this elusive enemy working in the shadows along the roadsides at night or cordon target sites for search or ambush was obvious; however, just as obvious was the need to get “boots on the ground” in amongst the citizenry of the Northern Babil and in those places where we were warned by friends, and threatened by our few enemies, not to tread. We went there first.


In late June two rifle companies—Company I, 3/7, traveling up from Karbala, and Company E, 2/5, As Samawah—were attached. In the first case the company commander selected a position adjacent to Al Mahmudiyah and directly astride a very active IED “mixing bowl.” The company had not yet even unrolled their sleeping mats when they were out prowling the night on initial patrols. In exactly the same way, Company G selected a similarly dangerous position near the city of Al Yusufiyah, one that would give it access to both the population and active IED zones. Many of these tough young men were in ambush sites the first night seeking early contact and were not disappointed. The impact of the infantry’s arrival, along with the combined efforts of the TF of nearly 1,000 personnel from 3 Services, clearly presented the enemy with more dilemmas than he could handle. The anticoalition forces were forced to alter their tactics a third time. We now saw the introduction of sporadic mortar attacks from hastily laid ground or vehicleborne tubes. These attacks were obviously conducted by men who were not only unskilled with the weapons but also very interested in not directly confronting the infantry who were everywhere and nowhere at the same time. Great tactical headwork by junior leaders was quick to figure the enemy’s procedures, predict his routines, and set ambushes and sniper teams in those places that presented a mortar threat—and they ceased. We once again resisted the suggestion to reply to these attacks with heavy firepower, a response that we felt would likely wound or kill innocent Iraqis. Even if innocents were not hit—and more importantly from a hearts and minds perspective—we felt it would severely erode our message that innocent Iraqi lives were as precious to us as were our own. We calculated that the use of bombs and artillery against a fleeing enemy long gone before the first ordnance struck made no tactical sense, was in fact counterproductive, and would send the message that we held the lives of Iraqis in low regard. Some argued it would show Iraqis who was boss, or our resolve and power. We elected to rely on a high degree of field craft and the tactical expertise and confidence of our company grade infantry leaders.


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The final stage of operations for TF Scorpion, before their relief by elements of the 82d Airborne Division, was a spoiling attack against a large number of unrepentant former regime supporters just prior to their own offensive. Our counteractions were made possible by the wealth of actionable intelligence the small units were gleaning from the many sheikhs, clerics, police, and private citizens throughout the zone but particularly in Babil. Long before being alerted by Commander, Joint Task Force 7 in Baghdad of the pending offensive, the G–2 (intelligence) sections at MEF and Blue Diamond, in collaboration, detected an unmistakable increase in indications and warnings focused on a 4-day period corresponding to the 14 July anniversary of the founding of the Ba’ath Party in Iraq. The intelligence unquestionably pointed toward an aggressive campaign of IED and other terrorist-type attacks. Our response was a simultaneous counteroffensive against a number of these suspected individuals designed and executed to disrupt the expected attack. Building up a large number of detailed target folders we held off striking suspected individuals until 12 July in order to maximize the disruption of this plan and minimize the period of time they had available to recover. So successful was this initiative that the division continued this tactic in an effort to round up senior regime officials, fedayeen, and terrorists until we departed the zone. By continuing the attack and taking the fight to the enemy, we greatly reduced hostile influence against us in Northern Babil. Each raid led to the next and were most often conducted by the infantry companies or attached force reconnaissance assets from the Reserves. These raids, or “cordons and knocks” as we first termed them, were typically executed at night and were backed by invaluable Cobra and Huey support from the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. These actions were highly successful in capturing large arms and ordnance caches, IED production facilities and their technicians, Ba’ath Party stalwarts responsible for hiring local trigger-pullers, and even occasional cells working against our soldiers to the north in Baghdad.


The Division Heads Home
By early summer, forces from as many as 24 nations began to descend on Babylon to begin the process of turning southern Iraq over to the Polish-led multinational division (MND). Among the first to arrive was an advance party from the Italian Defense Ministry arriving in the Dhi Qar Province to prepare the way for the arrival of the Garibaldi brigade and the relief of 2/25. The Garibaldi brigade’s main body arrived on 26 June and included Carabinieri as well as Romanian soldiers. On 9 July the relief progressed with the Italians establishing command and control nodes at Qalat Sukkar and Ash Shattrah, scenes of heavy fighting in March along Highway 7 south of Al Kut. The Dhi Qar Province was turned over on 20 July.


Six more reliefs were accomplished in rapid succession. The pattern was similar for each of them. Planners and liaison officers were exchanged followed by advance parties arriving shortly thereafter. Finally, the main body of replacement troops would arrive. I do not think it is an understatement to say that the multinational soldiers were shocked at the unexpected level of danger that was the reality in the zones they were assuming. Most were also visibly impressed—even intimidated—by the air of quiet confidence and obvious indifference to hazard demonstrated by the members of Blue Diamond as they commenced their “left seat-right seat” patrols. It was the 130-degree heat they were already enduring, the threat of instant violence all around them taken for granted by those they were replacing, and the Spartan conditions these Marines considered “living large,” that made the allies understand they were replacing expeditionary warriors of the first order.


End of Operations
The MEF commander handed the formal responsibility for the zone to the MND commander in a Babylon ceremony conducted on 3 September 2003, although 1/7 was delayed by the unwillingness on the part of the Spanish brigade to assume responsibility for Najaf until a number of U.S. Central Command issues were sorted out delaying the transfer until early October. We Marines, with our attached Army professionals, had certainly conducted operations differently in the south than SASO had been executed in the north. What had worked for us may not have worked in Baghdad, Kirkuk, or Mosul, but the results for us were startling.

Some have said we have no doctrine for what we did in Phase IV, but I disagree. I know it is not technically doctrine, but I suggest our Small Wars Manual for a starter, not to mention our documented successes learned for us in Vietnam by some very brave men. There is also a wealth of knowledge available for those who read in the lessons of our southern colonies during the Revolution, Napoleon’s peninsula campaign, Forrest’s Tennessee-Mississippi-Alabama campaign, Lawrence’s Arab revolt, Tito’s Yugoslavia, the French in Indochina and Algeria, and the British in Malaysia and Northern Ireland. Luckily we had men who were very familiar with these campaigns and many, many more. In reality, however, we do have a doctrine and a warfighting philosophy that opens the mind to problem-solving and avoids the set piece. The debate about maneuver warfare is thankfully over. I would be lying to you, and kidding myself, if I said everyone was an avid practitioner, and I do not know if the schools have it right even now. I do know it very much depends on the person, his or her traits, and life’s experiences. What we do have, I can assure you, are sufficient leaders at every level who run through the loop very fast—and act without hesitation. These are individuals who will employ a 2,000-pound joint direct attack munition or pass out water to anticoalition protesters, situation depending. I think for much of this we can thank Cols John Boyd, USAF(Ret) and Mike Wyly, USMC(Ret), and certainly my friend, William Lind, from Ohio, all men I have known and worked with in the past.


Basic to everything we did was a sense that we were freeing a people and not conquering a nation. We had flown from March Air Force Reserve Base in southern California or floated from the 32d Street pier in San Diego with the attitude that the Iraqi people were victims of a terrible disaster and that we were going to help. This was as important a message as the search for weapons of mass destruction ever was to those of us who deployed. We had already gained the “hearts and minds” of the Iraqis during combat operations, of that we were sure. The wild demonstrations of Iraqi joy delivered that message clearly. We also knew that these hearts and minds were ours to lose and that possession was a fragile thing. We treated the people with dignity and respect, and it was returned. We also won every firefight in Phase IV and, from 28 April 2003 until our departure in October, lost no Marines from hostile fire. During this time when those foolish enough decided to contest our presence, we responded with civic action programs, medical treatment, and lastly, a very deliberate and discriminating application of deadly force. Our first instinct had been to do no harm to the innocent, and we left a trail of good will behind. We had made friends one Iraqi at a time. Our belief is that they, over time, appreciated the sacrifices made on their behalf. As one Iraqi told someone, his change of heart came one day on departing his mosque in Al Kut after Friday prayers. For weeks his cleric had ranted about the Americans and how we had only come to steal their oil—that we were a godless people who brought pornography, drugs, and alcohol to their society, and would do nothing good for Iraq. The man then would exit the mosque into the furnace that is the afternoon heat during Iraq’s summer and see Marines patrolling at the risk of their lives, Army military policemen apprehending violent criminals, and SeaBees rehabilitating schools and hospitals, repairing bridges, and all of the other examples of our actions on the ground. Over time the clerics had no choice but to adjust their rhetoric as seeing was believing.


We are now redeploying our forces and people are asking if we will do the same thing in 2004 as we did in 2003. The answer, of course, is every situation is different. We are already working our way through the history books and reports of units now in the zone we will assume. Whatever is ultimately decided, I believe we will still seek to first and foremost do no harm to those who mean us none.

>Editor’s Note: Part I of this series was published in our Feb04 issue and Part II in Mar04.


>>BGen Kelly is the Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine Division.

http://www.mca-marines.org/Gazette/0404kelly.html


Ellie