thedrifter
01-31-04, 07:32 AM
01-27-2004
The ‘Peace Dividend’ Returns to Haunt Us
By William F. Sauerwein
Remember the “Peace Dividend” of the 1990s as we begin a long-overdue national debate on the proper size of the U.S. military.
The Army Times on Jan. 26 featured a story entitled, “Is the Military too Small?” It concerns the battle between Congress and the Pentagon for increasing Army end-strength. Congress wants an increase of 40,000 personnel for the Army, and smaller increases for the Air Force and Marine Corps.
The most frustrating aspect of this story is that anyone with minimal active duty experience saw this train wreck coming a long time ago. Congress now calls for this increase, but is responsible for reducing it by about 283,000 during the last decade. When the Cold War ended in 1992 the Armed Forces end-strength was 2.1 million, with about 772,000 in the Army. Following these reductions the numbers are about 1.3 million total, with 489,000 Army personnel.
Unlike after other times in our history, those deactivated troops were not draftees or mobilized reservists, anxiously anticipating a return to civilian life. All were regulars, many of whom anticipated promising military careers, most with families. Ironically, members of Congress, who bemoan corporate downsizing, gave these “laid off” soldiers no concern.
The reasoning was that we faced no significant threat, and it was time for providing a “peace dividend.” Since personnel costs account for about two-thirds of military spending, this would represent the biggest savings. Our advanced technology, another major cost, would compensate for the reduced numbers.
The key phrase for this strategy was, “We can do more with less,” which the soldier’s wry humor modified to fit then-Defense Secretary Les Aspin. Aspin had been a key member of the House Armed Services Committee for many years. He was well-known for opposing military expenditures, and eagerly implemented defense reductions.
Of importance is that while the Defense Department was indeed shrinking, the rest of the federal government was expanding. Advertisements in the Army Times advised those leaving active duty to pursue expanding opportunities in other federal agencies. The official line was that the entire federal government was being “put on a diet.” The better comparison is of someone losing 50 pounds by cutting off one leg.
Meanwhile, the Army still needed to fulfill its missions, which did not shrink proportionately with its personnel numbers. Since no one foresaw a significant future threat, many missions were turned over to the Army National Guard and Reserve components.
During the initial stages, military leaders cautioned against these reductions on grounds that the world was still dangerous. The collapse of the Soviet Union left rogue nations, previously restrained by their need for Soviet assistance, as “loose cannons.” However, those leaders found themselves fighting both Congress and the Pentagon’s new civilian leadership. They were subsequently retired, and replaced with those more compliant.
As the remaining superpower, the United States suddenly found itself with more deployments than troops. The 1990s saw a dramatic increase of the operations tempo (optempo) by about 300 percent. Troops sometimes returned from one deployment, only to begin preparing for another. Many of these new missions were U.N. mandated humanitarian missions, outside the traditional combat role.
Morale suffered, and many soldiers, especially mid-level NCOs and junior officers, left the service. More of the burden fell on the Guard and Reserves, who now began deploying for six months with increasing frequency. This created havoc with their civilian careers and families, causing many of them to leave the service.
Midway through the 1990’s the strain was becoming apparent, and some military leaders warned of an impending crisis. This triggered some congressional hearings, which degenerated into sparring matches that ended with inconclusive results. Military leaders, now muzzled by civilian leaders, changed their minds when testifying in front of Congress. The verbal tap dance was that everything is fine now, but “could get worse if current trends continue.” Congress, split between those who wanted to increase military spending, and those who did not, did nothing.
Now we are engaged in a war of global proportions with a military force worn down by the previous decade’s deployments. The Army, in particular, is struggling to meet its many long-term commitments. Twenty-four of its 33 combat brigades were deployed during 2003, leaving little time for rest, refit and other commitments. The current solution is stop-loss, which prevents deployed soldiers from leaving active duty, and tour extensions for deployed reservists.
The previous solution of using Guard and Reserve components created many problems. First, facing angry constituents, Congress has called for reducing the Army’s reliance on Guard and Reserve units. Second, many of these units are already deployed, or scheduled for deployment. Finally, many are needed for homeland security duties, something unanticipated during the cheery days of downsizing.
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld’s main objection to increasing the force structure is that it would take billions from weapons modernization, training and other priorities. A friend told me it takes about $39 billion to maintain a heavy division. Without an emergency spending package, any legislated increase in personnel would not take effect until FY 2005. It then would take another two years to recruit and adequately train the new division.
Congress supports increasing the active duty end-strength, but from “restructuring” the current military budget. During President Bush’s State of the Union speech, he called for giving our troops everything they need prompted every member of Congress to stand and applaud. But it seems they do not really mean it. Even in the midst of war, congressional priorities are not with the troops, but with their own interests.
During this election year the politicians are out, trying either to achieve power, or maintain their current power. If you watch the presidential “wannabes,” they are busy promising “free” universal health care, “free” prescription drugs and “free” college tuition. When you include the “freebies” promised by those running for lesser offices, it amounts to a huge amount.
The Council for Citizens Against Government Waste (CCAGWA) on Jan. 22, 2004 blasted the Congress for “pork barrel” spending. It seems that while the Defense Department must wage war within its current means, the same does not hold true for non-defense programs. The CCAGWA is referring to H.R. 2673, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, fiscal 2004.
This package consolidates seven appropriations bills amounting to about $820 billion, containing over 9,000 “pork” projects. A list of the projects, conservatively estimated to cost 22.5 billion dollars, can be found on the organizations website, www.cagw.org.
I believe this represents the tip of the iceberg, since the entire federal budget spends about$2.3 trillion. If the question arises about paying for all these programs, the answer is from the “bloated” defense budget. However, the Heritage Foundation cites that since 9/11, less than half of all new federal spending was for national defense.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released its report on the Gross Domestic Product for the third quarter of fiscal year 2003 on Dec. 23, 2003. It showed that federal government consumption of the GDP overall increased by 1.2 percent. However, defense spending during the same period decreased by 1.3 percent, so much for a “bloated” defense budget.
How much “pork” can be squeezed from non-defense spending is a matter of conjecture. But I believe it is time to apply the same standards to these programs as that applied to defense during the 1990s.
The “peace dividend” was diverted to these social programs because we foresaw only a peaceful future. Now, during wartime, it is time for transferring that funding back into our military. Certainly a new federal courthouse, or an indoor rain forest, does not have priority over our troops. I certainly know it is more important than a congressional pay raise.
Congress, and other political leaders, created this mess by pandering to special interest voting blocs. It is time they demonstrate some leadership, instead of putting their personal political agendas first.
It is time for all of us who care about our national security and the lives of our troops, to hold them accountable. Research your congressional delegation’s voting record concerning national security issues. Do not rely on their election year statements. Many of these politicians are the same ones who demanded the massive reductions during the 1990s. They now ask for 40,000 soldiers, after they fired 283,000.
Maybe it is they who should be fired.
William F. Sauerwein is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at mono@gtec.com.
http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=343&rnd=641.4431532772448
Sempers,
Roger
:marine:
The ‘Peace Dividend’ Returns to Haunt Us
By William F. Sauerwein
Remember the “Peace Dividend” of the 1990s as we begin a long-overdue national debate on the proper size of the U.S. military.
The Army Times on Jan. 26 featured a story entitled, “Is the Military too Small?” It concerns the battle between Congress and the Pentagon for increasing Army end-strength. Congress wants an increase of 40,000 personnel for the Army, and smaller increases for the Air Force and Marine Corps.
The most frustrating aspect of this story is that anyone with minimal active duty experience saw this train wreck coming a long time ago. Congress now calls for this increase, but is responsible for reducing it by about 283,000 during the last decade. When the Cold War ended in 1992 the Armed Forces end-strength was 2.1 million, with about 772,000 in the Army. Following these reductions the numbers are about 1.3 million total, with 489,000 Army personnel.
Unlike after other times in our history, those deactivated troops were not draftees or mobilized reservists, anxiously anticipating a return to civilian life. All were regulars, many of whom anticipated promising military careers, most with families. Ironically, members of Congress, who bemoan corporate downsizing, gave these “laid off” soldiers no concern.
The reasoning was that we faced no significant threat, and it was time for providing a “peace dividend.” Since personnel costs account for about two-thirds of military spending, this would represent the biggest savings. Our advanced technology, another major cost, would compensate for the reduced numbers.
The key phrase for this strategy was, “We can do more with less,” which the soldier’s wry humor modified to fit then-Defense Secretary Les Aspin. Aspin had been a key member of the House Armed Services Committee for many years. He was well-known for opposing military expenditures, and eagerly implemented defense reductions.
Of importance is that while the Defense Department was indeed shrinking, the rest of the federal government was expanding. Advertisements in the Army Times advised those leaving active duty to pursue expanding opportunities in other federal agencies. The official line was that the entire federal government was being “put on a diet.” The better comparison is of someone losing 50 pounds by cutting off one leg.
Meanwhile, the Army still needed to fulfill its missions, which did not shrink proportionately with its personnel numbers. Since no one foresaw a significant future threat, many missions were turned over to the Army National Guard and Reserve components.
During the initial stages, military leaders cautioned against these reductions on grounds that the world was still dangerous. The collapse of the Soviet Union left rogue nations, previously restrained by their need for Soviet assistance, as “loose cannons.” However, those leaders found themselves fighting both Congress and the Pentagon’s new civilian leadership. They were subsequently retired, and replaced with those more compliant.
As the remaining superpower, the United States suddenly found itself with more deployments than troops. The 1990s saw a dramatic increase of the operations tempo (optempo) by about 300 percent. Troops sometimes returned from one deployment, only to begin preparing for another. Many of these new missions were U.N. mandated humanitarian missions, outside the traditional combat role.
Morale suffered, and many soldiers, especially mid-level NCOs and junior officers, left the service. More of the burden fell on the Guard and Reserves, who now began deploying for six months with increasing frequency. This created havoc with their civilian careers and families, causing many of them to leave the service.
Midway through the 1990’s the strain was becoming apparent, and some military leaders warned of an impending crisis. This triggered some congressional hearings, which degenerated into sparring matches that ended with inconclusive results. Military leaders, now muzzled by civilian leaders, changed their minds when testifying in front of Congress. The verbal tap dance was that everything is fine now, but “could get worse if current trends continue.” Congress, split between those who wanted to increase military spending, and those who did not, did nothing.
Now we are engaged in a war of global proportions with a military force worn down by the previous decade’s deployments. The Army, in particular, is struggling to meet its many long-term commitments. Twenty-four of its 33 combat brigades were deployed during 2003, leaving little time for rest, refit and other commitments. The current solution is stop-loss, which prevents deployed soldiers from leaving active duty, and tour extensions for deployed reservists.
The previous solution of using Guard and Reserve components created many problems. First, facing angry constituents, Congress has called for reducing the Army’s reliance on Guard and Reserve units. Second, many of these units are already deployed, or scheduled for deployment. Finally, many are needed for homeland security duties, something unanticipated during the cheery days of downsizing.
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld’s main objection to increasing the force structure is that it would take billions from weapons modernization, training and other priorities. A friend told me it takes about $39 billion to maintain a heavy division. Without an emergency spending package, any legislated increase in personnel would not take effect until FY 2005. It then would take another two years to recruit and adequately train the new division.
Congress supports increasing the active duty end-strength, but from “restructuring” the current military budget. During President Bush’s State of the Union speech, he called for giving our troops everything they need prompted every member of Congress to stand and applaud. But it seems they do not really mean it. Even in the midst of war, congressional priorities are not with the troops, but with their own interests.
During this election year the politicians are out, trying either to achieve power, or maintain their current power. If you watch the presidential “wannabes,” they are busy promising “free” universal health care, “free” prescription drugs and “free” college tuition. When you include the “freebies” promised by those running for lesser offices, it amounts to a huge amount.
The Council for Citizens Against Government Waste (CCAGWA) on Jan. 22, 2004 blasted the Congress for “pork barrel” spending. It seems that while the Defense Department must wage war within its current means, the same does not hold true for non-defense programs. The CCAGWA is referring to H.R. 2673, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, fiscal 2004.
This package consolidates seven appropriations bills amounting to about $820 billion, containing over 9,000 “pork” projects. A list of the projects, conservatively estimated to cost 22.5 billion dollars, can be found on the organizations website, www.cagw.org.
I believe this represents the tip of the iceberg, since the entire federal budget spends about$2.3 trillion. If the question arises about paying for all these programs, the answer is from the “bloated” defense budget. However, the Heritage Foundation cites that since 9/11, less than half of all new federal spending was for national defense.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released its report on the Gross Domestic Product for the third quarter of fiscal year 2003 on Dec. 23, 2003. It showed that federal government consumption of the GDP overall increased by 1.2 percent. However, defense spending during the same period decreased by 1.3 percent, so much for a “bloated” defense budget.
How much “pork” can be squeezed from non-defense spending is a matter of conjecture. But I believe it is time to apply the same standards to these programs as that applied to defense during the 1990s.
The “peace dividend” was diverted to these social programs because we foresaw only a peaceful future. Now, during wartime, it is time for transferring that funding back into our military. Certainly a new federal courthouse, or an indoor rain forest, does not have priority over our troops. I certainly know it is more important than a congressional pay raise.
Congress, and other political leaders, created this mess by pandering to special interest voting blocs. It is time they demonstrate some leadership, instead of putting their personal political agendas first.
It is time for all of us who care about our national security and the lives of our troops, to hold them accountable. Research your congressional delegation’s voting record concerning national security issues. Do not rely on their election year statements. Many of these politicians are the same ones who demanded the massive reductions during the 1990s. They now ask for 40,000 soldiers, after they fired 283,000.
Maybe it is they who should be fired.
William F. Sauerwein is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at mono@gtec.com.
http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=343&rnd=641.4431532772448
Sempers,
Roger
:marine: