thedrifter
01-25-04, 07:45 AM
01-21-2004
In Iraq, Velvet Gloves or Iron Fist?
By Ralph Omholt
However unpopular the term might be, “tribalism” is an escapable reality in Iraq. The Iraqis, in general, hated Saddam, and now they hate the occupation forces.
However there is an ancient sub-set of hatred between Iraqi Sunnis and Shi’ites. The Kurds are yet another tribe long in conflict with the others. How does one sort it out?
To start with, the essential concept is “The enemy of my enemy - is my friend.” That’s endemic to Muslim culture. Momentary convenience and deceit aside, there simply will be no deviations in that logic.
Thus, U.S. military forces are faced with the tribal regions of Iraq demanding a compartmentalized treatment, one where one size does not fit all. Political theory aside, that’s not likely to change in anyone’s current lifetime.
According to a recent New York Times article, another form of tribalism is at the forefront – inter-service rivalry between the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. The Marines in the south of Iraq have achieved success with the “velvet glove” approach toward the Shi’ites. They can’t fathom the Army’s lack of success in the north in the Sunni Triangle. Beyond an “expected” rivalry, the open debate suggests the lack of a cohesive peacekeeping and stabilization plan from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Shi’ites, long oppressed by Saddam and his Sunni clansmen, have a vested interest in being friendly to the occupation forces. The Shi’ite strategy may lead to Shi’ite dominance in a newly formed Iraqi government. America is currently their friend, even though America remains the “infidel.”
The Sunnis in the central region of Iraq see only a methodical tearing down of the power and affluence which they enjoyed under Saddam. Confronted by the loss of political predominance, the Sunnis have nothing to be gained and much to be lost if the occupation succeeds. Therefore, America is the enemy and democracy is a serious poison to them.
To U.S. soldiers, the Sunni Triangle has become the territory of the enemy. The combat encounters and related casualties attest to this region being a “hot” zone. Whether one cares to view them as thieves, freedom fighters or terrorists, there is a force of Iraqis dedicated to securing, hiding, selling – and using – any military arms they can get their hands on. Moreover, this is the area where foreign “Jihadist” fighters have been drawn in their campaign to kill Americans.
So it is obvious that a “be nice” approach is not working in this region. There are, naturally, some Iraqis in the heart of Saddam’s “home” country who love Americans. But the ones who hate America are effectively conveying their message, via American casualties. These are desperate people doing desperate things.
The American soldier doesn’t have the luxury of “feeling good” about the loving Iraqis when he or she is faced with a roadside bomb, a volley of AK-47 fire or an RPG. To the American GI, this campaign is now about personal survival.
In principle, the “velvet glove” approach favored by the Marines has worked to bring friendly Iraqis over to the American side. It also has served to isolate any of the former regime participants from the general population. So goes the laboratory theory. But in the crucible of the Sunni Triangle , there is a conflicting survival mandate for our troops to take a hard approach toward the die-hard former regime members.
If a patrol discovers a band looting military goods, the troops don’t have the luxury of assuming simple thievery. In such a scenario, there is assured to be very quick firefight.
Compared with the “velvet glove” approach of the Marines, this might seem harsh. Yet, what other choice does a patrol have? To stop such looting helps eliminate the threat of remote-controlled mines and rocket-propelled grenades getting into the hands of those dedicated to killing Americans and Iraqi “friendlies.”
Writing in The New York Times article on Jan. 19, reporter Gian P. Gentile noted that some Marine Corps leaders are criticizing the Army units operating in the Sunni Triangle, charging that the “get tough” methods are counter-productive. They insist on contrasting the Marine “velvet glove” success in the south, while almost totally disregarding the difference in cultural and political climates in the two regions.
Marine leaders assert that their prudent use of military power led to their success in building close ties with the Iraqi Shi’ites. The implied question is, “If it worked in southern Iraq, why wouldn't it work in the Sunni Triangle?”
Any Army Grunt on patrol there will quickly advise that the Sunni Triangle can’t be appropriately compared to southern Iraq, or even the part of Kurdish northern Iraq around Mosul. The cultural and political differences in the Sunni Triangle represent a uniquely dangerous troubled and rebellious area.
The goal of peace in Iraq demands a sophisticated and complex strategy. The task requires the occupation forces to identify and separate the insurgent forces from the general Iraqi population. That goal aims to strengthen the rule of law in Iraq, while convincing the Iraqis themselves that the American will to win is unshakeable.
The current U.S. priority is to demonstrate the political legitimacy of the new Iraqi government, while using military force as the situation requires. Unfortunately, there have been a significant number of attacks in and around Baghdad, as well as the Sunni Triangle, that have called for harsh military measures. The choices are often being made by the other side.
In theory, the “velvet glove” approach can work in Iraq, but not until the insurgent energy is depleted – if ever. In the meantime, the Marines may yet need to resort to the same stern measures that the Army units have needed to apply.
Meanwhile, we should all view the inter-service rivalry underlining the debate over tactics with particular chagrin. Divided forces are likely to fail. Instead, Army and Marine commanders should be sharing their “lessons learned” and together closely analyzing the fluid situation on the ground.
As a Vietnam veteran, I can only hold my breath at the hard choices confronting our troops in Iraq. We have all been here before, in a place called Vietnam.
Until the last Iraqi insurgent has laid down his weapon, the “soft” approach can yet be a terrible mistake. American forces hear the constant question, “Why are you here?”
The regional tribalism in Iraq is unforgiving of outsiders. This is far from over.
Ralph Omholt is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at skydrifter@comcast.net.
http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=337&rnd=93.48614698610402
Sempers,
Roger
:marine:
In Iraq, Velvet Gloves or Iron Fist?
By Ralph Omholt
However unpopular the term might be, “tribalism” is an escapable reality in Iraq. The Iraqis, in general, hated Saddam, and now they hate the occupation forces.
However there is an ancient sub-set of hatred between Iraqi Sunnis and Shi’ites. The Kurds are yet another tribe long in conflict with the others. How does one sort it out?
To start with, the essential concept is “The enemy of my enemy - is my friend.” That’s endemic to Muslim culture. Momentary convenience and deceit aside, there simply will be no deviations in that logic.
Thus, U.S. military forces are faced with the tribal regions of Iraq demanding a compartmentalized treatment, one where one size does not fit all. Political theory aside, that’s not likely to change in anyone’s current lifetime.
According to a recent New York Times article, another form of tribalism is at the forefront – inter-service rivalry between the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. The Marines in the south of Iraq have achieved success with the “velvet glove” approach toward the Shi’ites. They can’t fathom the Army’s lack of success in the north in the Sunni Triangle. Beyond an “expected” rivalry, the open debate suggests the lack of a cohesive peacekeeping and stabilization plan from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Shi’ites, long oppressed by Saddam and his Sunni clansmen, have a vested interest in being friendly to the occupation forces. The Shi’ite strategy may lead to Shi’ite dominance in a newly formed Iraqi government. America is currently their friend, even though America remains the “infidel.”
The Sunnis in the central region of Iraq see only a methodical tearing down of the power and affluence which they enjoyed under Saddam. Confronted by the loss of political predominance, the Sunnis have nothing to be gained and much to be lost if the occupation succeeds. Therefore, America is the enemy and democracy is a serious poison to them.
To U.S. soldiers, the Sunni Triangle has become the territory of the enemy. The combat encounters and related casualties attest to this region being a “hot” zone. Whether one cares to view them as thieves, freedom fighters or terrorists, there is a force of Iraqis dedicated to securing, hiding, selling – and using – any military arms they can get their hands on. Moreover, this is the area where foreign “Jihadist” fighters have been drawn in their campaign to kill Americans.
So it is obvious that a “be nice” approach is not working in this region. There are, naturally, some Iraqis in the heart of Saddam’s “home” country who love Americans. But the ones who hate America are effectively conveying their message, via American casualties. These are desperate people doing desperate things.
The American soldier doesn’t have the luxury of “feeling good” about the loving Iraqis when he or she is faced with a roadside bomb, a volley of AK-47 fire or an RPG. To the American GI, this campaign is now about personal survival.
In principle, the “velvet glove” approach favored by the Marines has worked to bring friendly Iraqis over to the American side. It also has served to isolate any of the former regime participants from the general population. So goes the laboratory theory. But in the crucible of the Sunni Triangle , there is a conflicting survival mandate for our troops to take a hard approach toward the die-hard former regime members.
If a patrol discovers a band looting military goods, the troops don’t have the luxury of assuming simple thievery. In such a scenario, there is assured to be very quick firefight.
Compared with the “velvet glove” approach of the Marines, this might seem harsh. Yet, what other choice does a patrol have? To stop such looting helps eliminate the threat of remote-controlled mines and rocket-propelled grenades getting into the hands of those dedicated to killing Americans and Iraqi “friendlies.”
Writing in The New York Times article on Jan. 19, reporter Gian P. Gentile noted that some Marine Corps leaders are criticizing the Army units operating in the Sunni Triangle, charging that the “get tough” methods are counter-productive. They insist on contrasting the Marine “velvet glove” success in the south, while almost totally disregarding the difference in cultural and political climates in the two regions.
Marine leaders assert that their prudent use of military power led to their success in building close ties with the Iraqi Shi’ites. The implied question is, “If it worked in southern Iraq, why wouldn't it work in the Sunni Triangle?”
Any Army Grunt on patrol there will quickly advise that the Sunni Triangle can’t be appropriately compared to southern Iraq, or even the part of Kurdish northern Iraq around Mosul. The cultural and political differences in the Sunni Triangle represent a uniquely dangerous troubled and rebellious area.
The goal of peace in Iraq demands a sophisticated and complex strategy. The task requires the occupation forces to identify and separate the insurgent forces from the general Iraqi population. That goal aims to strengthen the rule of law in Iraq, while convincing the Iraqis themselves that the American will to win is unshakeable.
The current U.S. priority is to demonstrate the political legitimacy of the new Iraqi government, while using military force as the situation requires. Unfortunately, there have been a significant number of attacks in and around Baghdad, as well as the Sunni Triangle, that have called for harsh military measures. The choices are often being made by the other side.
In theory, the “velvet glove” approach can work in Iraq, but not until the insurgent energy is depleted – if ever. In the meantime, the Marines may yet need to resort to the same stern measures that the Army units have needed to apply.
Meanwhile, we should all view the inter-service rivalry underlining the debate over tactics with particular chagrin. Divided forces are likely to fail. Instead, Army and Marine commanders should be sharing their “lessons learned” and together closely analyzing the fluid situation on the ground.
As a Vietnam veteran, I can only hold my breath at the hard choices confronting our troops in Iraq. We have all been here before, in a place called Vietnam.
Until the last Iraqi insurgent has laid down his weapon, the “soft” approach can yet be a terrible mistake. American forces hear the constant question, “Why are you here?”
The regional tribalism in Iraq is unforgiving of outsiders. This is far from over.
Ralph Omholt is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at skydrifter@comcast.net.
http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=337&rnd=93.48614698610402
Sempers,
Roger
:marine: