thedrifter
01-09-04, 05:33 AM
01-07-2004
Tactical Evolution, or Tactical Desperation?
By Ralph Omholt
It’s time to be blatant: the U.S. military is getting desperate in Iraq.
On one hand, the military is obviously desperate to retain all soldiers, while suffering recruiting shortfalls. The military is desperate to get more, from less; that’s an issue, by itself.
On the other hand, the military is radically changing its tactics within Iraq, while changing the pre-deployment training standards for soldiers slated for future deployment there. Effectiveness is the obvious goal.
The Army’s proposed changes include enhancing survival skills, particularly those oriented around convoy movements and urban warfare. Army officials have announced that the new training and procedures will begin this month and plans are to integrate them at all basic training units by spring.
The described changes are radical. Many of the changes return to the strategies and tactics used in the Vietnam War. The new “skills” include the recognition and evasion of booby traps and how to search towns and urban environments for guerrillas.
The changes subtly betray the administration’s worst fears – that Iraq is becoming another Vietnam. While there are some elementary differences, the Vietnam veteran quickly says, “Same-same.”
The Iraq operation, however, continues to illustrate that the U.S. military is incredibly resistant to learning from history. In Iraq for instance, we again have seen the tactics which were used to defeat the Russians in Afghanistan, particularly the regular ambush of convoys on known or predictable routes. The lesson here is for the Army to resurrect one tactic from the Vietnam era for troop mobility: replacing truck convoys with UH-1 Huey and CH-47 Chinook helicopter air convoys. It’s academic that if the roads serve as ambush environments, one avoids road travel. That’s apparently still not the Army’s conclusion - yet.
While the helicopter is still vulnerable to attack, quantity can make up for much of the risk. Attackers would think twice, if they knew that response could be only seconds away, whether troops or gunships.
The Army is also intelligently adding an increase in weapons training, teaching recruits not only how to fire the M-16, but other weapons, including a variety of machine guns.
The new training includes the identification and counter-insurgency methods against remote-controlled bombs, known as IEDs - Improvised Explosive Devices. These improvised bombs have proven quite deadly and seem to be a primary weapon of choice for Iraqi guerrilla fighters. Unfortunately, the lesson not being learned here is, “Evade known and predictable routes.”
In the same training will be convoy tactics and teaching recruits how to respond to simulated ambushes. The new training is supposed to illustrate such tactics as placing sandbags inside the various vehicles, for protection against a variety of bombs, grenades and machine guns.
The training is also supposed to include a course in urban combat, with emphasis on tactics for fighting guerillas who blend in with the local civilians.
The new training is also a paradox, as it also emphasizes PR with the civilian population. Unfortunately, the new tactics paint the U.S. forces as a desperate and unpopular occupation force. Just in terms of the Islamic culture; the coalition forces cannot be accepted. Thus, the PR component is essentially “mission impossible.”
The inherent role of the soldier is to be aggressive. Being nice is difficult. The Vietnam veteran quickly gets nauseated at the restrictive rules of engagement (“Do not fire unless fired upon.”) We’ve heard this before – the return of a formula for defeat.
It has already been established that the psyops guys blew it in Iraq. The ethnic and cultural divisions are incredibly deep among the Iraqis. For anyone to anticipate Iraqi acceptance of Americans, in particular, is naïve nigh unto stupid. Yet our troops are now encouraged to be diplomats first. That’s just not the way it works – not in Iraq.
The classroom solution is logical enough. It assumes that local residents can be won over if American troops treat them with a high degree of dignity, patience and understanding. Theoretically, popular support for the United States is supposed to grow, with the needed ingredient of popular tolerance and support of the rebel resistance fading.
Obviously, the Iraqis want the basics of peace, security, jobs, water and electricity –the basic things that any people would desire. The theory is that such desires will operate as a lever to win over the hearts of the local population. Yet, there is precious little indication that any of the efforts to date have had such a broad effect. America rebuilding what America destroyed isn’t particularly witnessed as a gift.
Still, there is a military mission. The troops are still given the right to defend themselves, with continued promises of a fierce response against any attackers.
However unpopular it is to acknowledge, America is an occupying army in Iraq. There still is little in the way of a local government to support. The current challenge is to avoid civilian casualties, and to not feed the Sunnis’ belief that the occupation is intended to defeat, humiliate and marginalize them.
The key requirement is to be prudent in any air strikes, artillery bombardments, home demolitions and any roundups of insurgents’ family members. Yet, such tactics are paradoxical when troops still find it necessary to blockade neighborhoods, kick down doors and demolish the homes of those suspected of supporting the insurgency.
Local politics are deceiving. While it appears that some areas are being successfully won over, it quickly becomes apparent why. In the south, the Shi’ites see cooperation as an avenue to gain power and to seek revenge, having been long oppressed by Saddam Hussein’s regime. Thus, they have much to gain by their patience and compliance.
Conversely, in Saddam’s favored Sunni Triangle, the hate continues to run deep. Tolerance of the coalition forces can be the best expected response. There is little hope of winning those hearts. Worse, any hatred for the Shi’ites will only be multiplied by coalition actions.
While attacks on U.S. forces in certain regions have been cut, it is highly questionable as to whether or not such is to be perceived as a valid indication that the troops are truly winning over the local population.
While the proposed tactical and strategic changes are an intelligent next step, both Iraqi citizens and American troops share a common question. “Why are we still here?”
Ralph Omholt is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at skydrifter@comcast.net.
http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=321&rnd=751.0547157749827
Sempers,
Roger
:marine:
Tactical Evolution, or Tactical Desperation?
By Ralph Omholt
It’s time to be blatant: the U.S. military is getting desperate in Iraq.
On one hand, the military is obviously desperate to retain all soldiers, while suffering recruiting shortfalls. The military is desperate to get more, from less; that’s an issue, by itself.
On the other hand, the military is radically changing its tactics within Iraq, while changing the pre-deployment training standards for soldiers slated for future deployment there. Effectiveness is the obvious goal.
The Army’s proposed changes include enhancing survival skills, particularly those oriented around convoy movements and urban warfare. Army officials have announced that the new training and procedures will begin this month and plans are to integrate them at all basic training units by spring.
The described changes are radical. Many of the changes return to the strategies and tactics used in the Vietnam War. The new “skills” include the recognition and evasion of booby traps and how to search towns and urban environments for guerrillas.
The changes subtly betray the administration’s worst fears – that Iraq is becoming another Vietnam. While there are some elementary differences, the Vietnam veteran quickly says, “Same-same.”
The Iraq operation, however, continues to illustrate that the U.S. military is incredibly resistant to learning from history. In Iraq for instance, we again have seen the tactics which were used to defeat the Russians in Afghanistan, particularly the regular ambush of convoys on known or predictable routes. The lesson here is for the Army to resurrect one tactic from the Vietnam era for troop mobility: replacing truck convoys with UH-1 Huey and CH-47 Chinook helicopter air convoys. It’s academic that if the roads serve as ambush environments, one avoids road travel. That’s apparently still not the Army’s conclusion - yet.
While the helicopter is still vulnerable to attack, quantity can make up for much of the risk. Attackers would think twice, if they knew that response could be only seconds away, whether troops or gunships.
The Army is also intelligently adding an increase in weapons training, teaching recruits not only how to fire the M-16, but other weapons, including a variety of machine guns.
The new training includes the identification and counter-insurgency methods against remote-controlled bombs, known as IEDs - Improvised Explosive Devices. These improvised bombs have proven quite deadly and seem to be a primary weapon of choice for Iraqi guerrilla fighters. Unfortunately, the lesson not being learned here is, “Evade known and predictable routes.”
In the same training will be convoy tactics and teaching recruits how to respond to simulated ambushes. The new training is supposed to illustrate such tactics as placing sandbags inside the various vehicles, for protection against a variety of bombs, grenades and machine guns.
The training is also supposed to include a course in urban combat, with emphasis on tactics for fighting guerillas who blend in with the local civilians.
The new training is also a paradox, as it also emphasizes PR with the civilian population. Unfortunately, the new tactics paint the U.S. forces as a desperate and unpopular occupation force. Just in terms of the Islamic culture; the coalition forces cannot be accepted. Thus, the PR component is essentially “mission impossible.”
The inherent role of the soldier is to be aggressive. Being nice is difficult. The Vietnam veteran quickly gets nauseated at the restrictive rules of engagement (“Do not fire unless fired upon.”) We’ve heard this before – the return of a formula for defeat.
It has already been established that the psyops guys blew it in Iraq. The ethnic and cultural divisions are incredibly deep among the Iraqis. For anyone to anticipate Iraqi acceptance of Americans, in particular, is naïve nigh unto stupid. Yet our troops are now encouraged to be diplomats first. That’s just not the way it works – not in Iraq.
The classroom solution is logical enough. It assumes that local residents can be won over if American troops treat them with a high degree of dignity, patience and understanding. Theoretically, popular support for the United States is supposed to grow, with the needed ingredient of popular tolerance and support of the rebel resistance fading.
Obviously, the Iraqis want the basics of peace, security, jobs, water and electricity –the basic things that any people would desire. The theory is that such desires will operate as a lever to win over the hearts of the local population. Yet, there is precious little indication that any of the efforts to date have had such a broad effect. America rebuilding what America destroyed isn’t particularly witnessed as a gift.
Still, there is a military mission. The troops are still given the right to defend themselves, with continued promises of a fierce response against any attackers.
However unpopular it is to acknowledge, America is an occupying army in Iraq. There still is little in the way of a local government to support. The current challenge is to avoid civilian casualties, and to not feed the Sunnis’ belief that the occupation is intended to defeat, humiliate and marginalize them.
The key requirement is to be prudent in any air strikes, artillery bombardments, home demolitions and any roundups of insurgents’ family members. Yet, such tactics are paradoxical when troops still find it necessary to blockade neighborhoods, kick down doors and demolish the homes of those suspected of supporting the insurgency.
Local politics are deceiving. While it appears that some areas are being successfully won over, it quickly becomes apparent why. In the south, the Shi’ites see cooperation as an avenue to gain power and to seek revenge, having been long oppressed by Saddam Hussein’s regime. Thus, they have much to gain by their patience and compliance.
Conversely, in Saddam’s favored Sunni Triangle, the hate continues to run deep. Tolerance of the coalition forces can be the best expected response. There is little hope of winning those hearts. Worse, any hatred for the Shi’ites will only be multiplied by coalition actions.
While attacks on U.S. forces in certain regions have been cut, it is highly questionable as to whether or not such is to be perceived as a valid indication that the troops are truly winning over the local population.
While the proposed tactical and strategic changes are an intelligent next step, both Iraqi citizens and American troops share a common question. “Why are we still here?”
Ralph Omholt is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at skydrifter@comcast.net.
http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=DefenseWatch.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=321&rnd=751.0547157749827
Sempers,
Roger
:marine: