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thedrifter
01-02-04, 08:47 AM
Korea—3 August 1950—The Corps
Goes to War

by LtGen Robert P. Keller, USMC(Ret)

Training for combat during peacetime is often neglected due to lack of resources.
When the Korean conflict erupted in August 1950, Marine aviation was ready.
Often I have reflected upon the extraordinary days that saw the sudden, unanticipated onset of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, and most particularly the course it took in its earliest times. Without any intent to be “dramatic,” I have long since been convinced that the experiences of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade constituted the defining matrix of the historic “bonding” of the modern Marine air-ground team.


The “roots” sprouted in much earlier times—Nicaragua, for example. And surely there was a worthy degree of “flowering” in varied locales of World War II (WWII). I suggest, however, that nothing heretofore quite matched those early, exceptionally challenging days of ground Marines’ involvement in the Pusan perimeter and the absolutely essential support initially given by two Marine fighter squadrons hanging offshore on a pair of small aircraft carriers. Very productive shorebased elements of other Marine aviation units weighed in quickly as well. All elements fulfilled their critical roles. In fact, to my mind, this was the Navy-Marine-sea-and-landbased air-ground team, operating with unmitigated effectiveness in an absolutely critical and gravely difficult circumstance. How did it all come to pass?


Marine Fighter Squadron 214 (VMF–214)—the “Black Sheep” squadron renowned for its WWII record in air-to-air conflict under Pappy Boyington’s leadership—had been training very actively in every tactical air regime for months on end preceding 25 June 1950. A considerable majority of the pilots were of WWII vintage, and a notably significant level of current combat readiness had been achieved. This readiness was reflected in our winning the highly coveted and respected Commander, Air Force, United States Pacific Fleet “Battle Efficiency Pennant” for fiscal year 1950—ending then on 30 June. The award was signified by the painting of a white, block letter “E” on each aircraft. How truly meaningful, considering what would come to pass that summer. LtCol Howard A. “Rudy” York, who was commanding officer until 15 May 1950, had done his job well.


Soon after the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) commenced their onslaught, ground Marine and aviation units hastily were melded into the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. Its 6,500-plus Marines and their equipment set sail from San Diego on 14 July to head for the conflict. On 1 August, 24 Black Sheep Chance-Vought Corsairs, as well as other brigade aviation formations, launched from the USS Badoeng Strait (CVE 116) and flew to Itami Air Base in Japan. The critically significant ground Marines—those wonderful “grunts”—continued at sea, in company with a few other aviation units, for offloading in the port of Pusan, Korea.


Black Sheep pilots at Itami flew a few short “refresher” sessions simulating carrier landings. This was a matter of practical prudence. Due to the Badoeng Strait’s loaded deck, we could not fly at all in transit, and the requisite technique was quite precise. We departed Itami the afternoon of 3 August in three sequential flights of eight. Two hours later I was the first to “trap” aboard the USS Sicily (CVE 118) in the Tsushima Straits. All squadron mates followed in order.


VMF–323, led by Maj Arnie Lund, still was “gearing up,” needing just a little more time to get comfortably into the “saddle” again. After all, that outfit actually had been disestablished not long before 25 June, then hurriedly reconstituted when the crisis arose. While pilots were briefed aboard the Sicily on what was known of the situation ashore, eight aircraft were refueled; loaded with bombs, rockets, and ammo for our 20mm wing guns; and spotted on deck for takeoff. The planes were manned and catapulted in sequence at 1630 to join together and go to war. I felt privileged to be the leader of that first Marine Corps offensive effort in this new conflict.


I checked in by radio with 5th Air Force “Mellow” Control Center at Taegu. The folks on duty there were very happy to hear from us. Indeed, the threat to their own locale was getting ever closer. We pointed our noses toward the NKPA and their resources at Chinju and Sinban-ni, just off the southwestern corner of the Pusan perimeter. We got there. Our attacks were not anticipated, and they very much focused the enemy’s attention. We struck troops, supplies, and impedimenta. Although our first “shots” may not have been “. . . heard ‘round the world,” a certain degree of notice was taken. Here, as I recall, is how one war correspondent on the Sicily reported it:


Today, August 3rd, barely an hour after landing aboard this small aircraft carrier, eight Corsair fighter aircraft were fueled, armed, and launched to attack the North Koreans. Each aircraft had ‘MARINES’ painted on the fuselage in large white block letters. The enemy was about to learn that the Marines had landed and the situation would soon be well in hand.

Unbeknownst to me until nearly a half-century later, Capt John Perrin had given a camera to his wingman, Capt John Skorich, to take photos. One of those photos snapped as we headed for the Korean Peninsula, is shown at right. Perrin is flying number 16, Capt Bob Tosdal is in 10, and Maj Keller is in 8. Maj Bill Lundin and his three wingmen were close behind us.


Operating for the next 3 days as a single-ship “task force” accompanied by a plane-guard destroyer, Sicily moved along the southern coast of Korea and up the west side of the perimeter. Her skipper was CAPT Jimmy Thach—a WWII ace and aggressive naval aviator. We flew 75 sorties against targets of opportunity—attacking bridges, railroads, troops, vehicles, tanks, Kimpo airfield at Seoul, and a camouflaged freighter in Inchon Harbor. This action was attention-getting—serving notice to the enemy of what was in store for them.


Sicily then sailed back around easterly to join with the Badoeng Strait. VMF–323 was aboard the Badoeng Strait and was ready for a fight. Our ground Marines were at the point of early contact with the enemy. Tough battle was joined. It got progressively tougher and more demanding as these early days passed. Both squadrons immediately and continually provided multiple sorties of very close air support. Other Marine air elements ashore did their jobs. We killed enemy. We saved Marines and allies. What could have been more meaningful? It has been noted that those initial Black Sheep sorties on 3 August were the first 8 of a total of 127,496 combat sorties eventually rung up by Marine Corps aviation during the Korean War.

Our squadron had its own casualties. Jim English’s newly born daughter would never know her father. Bob Floeck’s son contacted me in 1994, and Walt Lischeid’s in 1996. They were avid to learn about their respective fathers—whom neither had ever been able to “know.” What were they actually like as persons? I did my best to help them.


Other Black Sheep lives were lost. This was war. All one can say is that the enemy paid a very dear price in casualties. Our air support impacted to save substantial numbers in ground Marine formations. But, if you’re doing the flying and providing the cover and protection, you cannot ever be completely fulfilled when you lose even a single grunt. You know in your heart you’ve done everything you could. Yet, you ache for not having been able to do more.


The Korean conflict is distant history. Marines learned a very great deal from it. Those “lessons” were devoutly applied in subsequent combat and paid substantial dividends. Still, lives have been lost. The best one can say is that the casualties were many fewer than otherwise would have been so. And, in this seemingly ever more fractious world, that thought constitutes at least some degree of comfort.


Will there be future need for significant Marine Corps military undertakings? Prudent realism suggests yes, surely. When and where? That is not specifically known. Thus, the only recourse is to keep minds open, standards high, and powder dry.


continued........

thedrifter
01-02-04, 08:48 AM
I believe a very credible case can be made for the postulation that the crucible of the Korean War forever shaped the basic fighting ethos of the modern Marine Corps. The Vietnam and Gulf Wars annealed it further. The United States of America is fortunate to have its Marines, and the awesome competence of the Navy-Marine Corps team.


An unalterable truism is twofold: (1) Marines characteristically perform superbly and always shall, and (2) our unique air-ground team must be maintained and perpetuated for the good of this Nation and its posterity.


>LtGen Keller was the CG, Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico from 1972–74. He is retired and lives in Pensacola, FL.


Comments From Commanders on
Marine Air at Pusan:


BGen Edward Craig, CG, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade at Pusan: “Close air support furnished by the Marine airmen was a marvel to everybody concerned, including the Marines. We had never seen anything like it even in our practice. . . .”


COL Paul L. Freeman, USA: “The Marines on our left were a sight to behold. Not only was their equipment superior or equal to ours, but they had squadrons of air in direct support. They used it like artillery. It was, ‘Hey, Joe, this is Smitty. Knock off the left of that ridge in front of Item Company.’ They had it day and night. . . . We just have to have air support like that, or we might as well disband the Infantry and join the Marines.”


http://www.mca-marines.org/Gazette/0104keller.html


Sempers,

Roger
:marine:

quebono
12-18-06, 09:00 PM
I was part of the brigade (MAG 33). The General's comments are accurate.