PDA

View Full Version : Caught Off Guard



thedrifter
12-17-03, 01:42 PM
Phase I: Caught Off Guard <br />
<br />
Pre-War: <br />
An obscure country in the far reaches of Asia, Korea was forgotten by the American public and policymakers at the end of World War II. Despite ongoing clashes...

thedrifter
12-17-03, 01:46 PM
Invasion:
In the early hours of June 25, 1950, a sleeping South Korea was invaded by 135,000 North Korean troops. With Soviet-designed invasion plans, the well-equipped and well-trained force shocked and overwhelmed the ill-equipped and scattered South Korean army.

Within three days, the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) captured Seoul and effectively destroyed South Korea's army. The American expatriate community -- which included a U.S. military advisory force of 500 -- was caught completely off guard, and forced to evacuate.



Urgent Press

United Press Correspondent Jack James
June 25, 1950
Seoul, Korea

URGENT PRESS UNIPRESS NEW YORK.

25095 JAMES FRAGMENTARY REPORTS EXTHIRTY EIGHT PARALLEL INDICATED NORTH KOREANS LAUNCHED SUNDAY MORNING ATTACKS GENERALLY ALONG ENTIRE BORDER. PARA REPORTS AT ZERO NINE THIRTY LOCAL TIME INDICATED KAESONG FORTY MILES NORTHWEST SEOUL AND HEADQUARTERS OF KOREAN ARMYS FIRST DIVISION FELL NINE AYEM STOP. ENEMY FORCES REPORTED THREE TO FOUR KILOMETERS SOUTH OF BORDER ON ONGJIN PENINSULA STOP. TANKS SUPPOSED BROUGHT INTO USE CHUNCHON FIFTY MILES NORTHEAST SEOUL STOP LANDING EXSEA ALSO REPORTED FROM TWENTY SMALL BOATS BELOW KANGNUNG ON EASTERN COAST WHERE REPORTEDLY OFFCUT HIGHWAY ENDITEM NOTE SHOULD STRESSED THIS STILL FRAGMENTARY AND PICTURE VAGUE.

SYET JAMES.



Disturbing Reports

Ambassador to Korea John Muccio
June 25, 1950
United States Embassy, Seoul, Korea

The morning of the 25th of June, I got a call from my deputy, [Everett Francis] Drumright, just about 8 o'clock, telling me that in the past hour KMAG [U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group] headquarters had been receiving reports from the several units along the front of an onslaught across the 38th parallel. He said he had held up calling me until he could get a better indication of what was really going on. (We had had so many reports of that kind in the two years prior, that it was hard to determine if these were just forays across the 38th parallel or whether it was something beyond that.) And I said, "Well, I'll meet you at the office right away."

I walked over, it was about a five minute walk from the residence to the chancery . . . . On the way over about 8:30, I ran into Bill James of the UP [United Press]. He apparently had had a restless night and was heading toward his office. And he said, "What are you doing stirring at this time of the morning?" It was Sunday morning.

And I said, "Oh, we've had some disturbing reports from activities on the 38th parallel, you might want to look into them."

And went up and Drum and I drafted a telegraphic report to Washington which was very carefully worded because we were not too -- it was not too clear yet just what was going on. But that was the first flash to Washington, which left the Embassy there just after 9:00 on the morning of the 25th (Korean time). Of course that whole day, Sunday, was filled with all kinds of rumors.

Source: Harry S. Truman Presidential Library




Follow-up Cable

United Press Correspondent Jack James
June 25, 1950
Seoul, Korea

PRESS UNIPRESS NEWYORK.

25103 JAMES ADD 25095 REPORTS SAID ATTACKS LAUNCHED IN HEAVY RAIN AFTER MORTAR ARTILLERY BARRAGES WHICH BEGAN FOUR AYEM SUNDAY MORNING STOP. KAESONG WHICH LIES PRACTICALLY ON PARALLEL ONLY MAJOR CITY REPORTEDLY TAKEN STOP. TANKS SUPPOSEDLY BROUGHT INTO PLAY THERE PARA KAESONG ABOUT FIFTY MILES ALONG ONE KOREAS BEST ROADS FROM SEOUL STOP.

MILITARYERS HERE HOWEVER SAID NORTHERN FORCES COULD PROBABLY STOPPED AT IMJIN RIVER WHICH CAN CROSSED BY VEHICLES EITHER ALONG SINGLE RAILWAY BRIDGE OR BY HANDPOWER FERRY PARA THERE APPARENTLY NONO ACTION DIRECTLY NORTH SEOUL AT CHOSONGNI WHICH PROVIDES SHORTEST ROUTE FOR INVASION SUDKOREAN CAPITAL AND IS ONE OF TRADITIONAL ROUTES THROUGHOUT KOREAN HISTORY STOP.

THERE SOME OPINION HERE THAT ATTACKS WHICH BEEN HEAVIEST IN EAST AND WESTERN PORTIONS OF PENINSULA MIGHT BE FEINTS DESIGNED DRAW SUDKOREAN STRENGTH AWAY FROM THIS ROUTE PARA NORTH KOREAS SUPERIOR AIRFORCE NOTNOT USED STOP. WEATHER TOO BAD IF USE INTENDED PARA OBSERVERS SEOUL SAY MAJOR ATTACK THIS TIME NOTNOT IN NORTHS FAVOR STOP. RAINY SEASONS JUST BEGINNING RICE PADDYS ARE FULL WATER ROADS CAN BECOME MORASS MAKING TRANSPORT SUPPLY AND OPERATIONS OF TANKS AND AIRFORCE DIFFICULT TO IMPOSSIBLE PARA STILL NOTNOT CERTAIN WHAT SCOPE OR STRENGTH OF ATTACKS ARE BUT ONE OFFICER SAID QUOTE THIS LOOKS LIKE THE REAL THING UNQUOTE. PARA THERE BEEN NONO UNUSUAL ACTIVITY REPORTED RECENTLY FROM NORTH OF PARALLEL REGARDING TROOP MOVEMENTS OR CONCENTRATIONS SUPPLYS WHICH WOULD INDICATE MAJOR ATTACK STARTING HOWEVER ENDS.

JAMES.



That's against the Charter of the United Nations!

Assistant Secretary of State for U.N. Affairs John Hickerson
June 25, 1950
State Department, Washington, DC

It was Saturday night, I guess about 10 o'clock. In those days night calls weren't unusual. . . . This call was from the watch officer of the Far Eastern Bureau, and said, "There's a development and I think that you would want to come in right away. I can't discuss it on the telephone."

... I thought it obviously was a Far Eastern development, because it was their watch officer who called. Interestingly enough, the thing I thought likeliest was that the Chinese Communists had attempted an invasion of Taiwan.

... Dean Rusk and one or two of his boys and I were the only ones at the time . . . Rusk and I talked it over and decided that obviously the first thing we'd do, while trying to find out what was possible, would be to raise the question in the UN. We put that up to Dean Acheson, and he said it sounded fine, but he wanted to check with the President, who was in Independence, and he did check. . . . And the President approved taking it up with the United Nations. . . .

Senator [Warren Robinson] Austin, was our permanent representative to the UN. I knew that the Senator was out of town, he had gone up to Vermont for the weekend. I knew there was no point in trying to get him and Ernest Gross was his deputy. I had a call put in for Gross' house. He was out for the evening. I left urgent word with one of his daughters to trace him if she knew where he was and have him call immediately. It took a little while. I don't know the age of this girl, and we just couldn't wait. Around midnight I decided that we just couldn't wait and I called Trygve Lie, Secretary General at his home, on the telephone, and told him what had happened. I told him that Gross would be in touch with him as soon as I could reach Gross, but I wanted to alert him, let him know what had happened.

He hadn't heard it, but by that time it was on the radio. He turned on his radio and yes, there it was. I never shall forget, Lie was quite the fellow. I liked him. He, of course, was Norwegian, spoke English very well, but with a pronounced accent. I told him what had happened and his first words were, "My God, Jack, that's against the Charter of the United Nations!" (in a strong Norwegian accent). I couldn't think of anything more original to say than, "You're telling me, Trygve, of course it is!"

Source: Harry S. Truman Presidential Library




Sunday was a very confused day

Ambassador to Korea John Muccio
June 25, 1950
United States Embassy, Seoul, Korea

Sunday was a very confused day and we were mainly spent in trying to find out what was really going on at the front. But by nightfall Sunday it had become evident that it was just a question of time [until Seoul fell]. . . . [W]e got word Sunday morning that they had not only attacked along the whole 38th parallel, but they made two landings on the east coast and that certainly couldn't be dismissed. But my first thought was the women and children. About midnight Sunday night we sent word for them to be ready to move. In the meantime we were checking on vessels that might be available in Pusan or Inchon.

Source: Harry S. Truman Presidential Library



Haven't been so badly upset since Greece and Turkey fell into our lap

President Harry Truman, to Bess Truman
June 26, 1950
Washington, DC

We had a grand trip back once we were in the air . . . . The crowd at the Washington Airport was made up of the Secretaries of State and Defense and Army, Navy, and Air. Had them all up to dinner [at Blair House] at eight . . . . My conference was a most successful one, and there is a chance that things may work out without the necessity of mobilization. Haven't been so badly upset since Greece and Turkey fell into our lap. Let's hope for the best. . . .

Lots and lots of love and many happy returns for the thirty-first year of your ordeal with me. It's been all pleasure for me.

Source: Harry S. Truman Presidential Library



continued.....

thedrifter
12-17-03, 01:48 PM
American Civilians Arrive in Japan

Clarence Mehlhaff, 24th Division, 63rd Field Artillery, Camp Okata, Japan
July 5, 1950
Fukuoka, Japan

At that time, when this broke, the KMAG people from Korea and their dependents, they were coming into Camp Okata. They coming in by plane and by boat out of Pusan ... They were landing at Itazuke Air Base, which was the other side of Fukuoka. They were coming up into our compound. We had to feed them, and we used all the men that we had on the post to ship them out, get them on the trains with their luggage. They took them up to Tokyo or Yokohama, one or the other, and they shipped them a lot of them back home. Because they were all civilians.

Then, we had to get out of our Quonset huts, because those people had to sleep in there, and it was right in the monsoon. Everything was wet and rainy, and we were out in the pasture in pup tents and squad tents, until it finally broke and lightened up and the sun came out, and then we got aboard two LSTs which they brought in from Fukuoka. Dropped the anchor out aways and then they rammed it up on the sand, and that's how we loaded up everything. There was two LSTs ... one was the 63rd and the other was ... the 52nd.




Task Force Smith:

General MacArthur intended Task Force Smith as "an arrogant display" of American military power. Numbering only 540 troops, most with little training and no combat experience, Task Force Smith was destroyed by NKPA troops who commanded a considerable advantage in numbers and armor.
For the next month, NKPA troops crushed small and inadequately prepared American troops and forced their retreat south. Despite the shocking losses of both men and morale, the U.S. contingent bought sufficient time for a troop buildup around the port of Pusan in the southeastern corner of the peninsula.



A funny noise coming down the road

Clarence Mehlhaff, 24th Division, 63rd Field Artillery
July 1950
South of Taejon

This buddy of mine and myself, we finally jumped out of the truck. I was so tired. It's hard to explain what you just went through -- of all the firing and that, and not getting hit. Everybody in the truck was shooting into the buildings and whoever was in the buildings was shooting at you. Once we got out of town, my buddy and I, we jumped off the truck because I couldn't go no more. I was so tired and I just wanted to go to sleep. I laid down behind a tree ... we laid down and fell asleep. It was around four o'clock when we heard a funny noise coming down the road, which woke us up. It was a 12 ton wrecker, an Army wrecker. They were coming out of Taejon also. It had big pipes on, and was making a lot of noise. The guy stopped, and he said, "Do you guys want a ride?" I said, "Yea, where are you going to?" He said, "Well, we're going to have to get out of here because the enemy is coming in the back here, they're probably 4 miles from here." So, we got on that wrecker and we took off . The next thing, we were back on the other side of the Naktong River...

The company I was in had lost everything, had lost probably -- I would estimate -- three quarters of their men. So we stayed on the riverbank until we got some more supplies. Then we were shipped down to Mayang.



Battle of Osan: They told us to get out of there

Clarence Mehlhaff, 24th Division, 63rd Field Artillery, Camp Okata, Japan
July 5, 1950
Osan

Took us 12 hours to get to Pusan. From Pusan, they put us on flat cars. From there, we left and we went to Taejon. When we got to Taejon, we had to get all of our equipment off the train, off the flat cars, and we had to move the vehicles up the road until we got up the next morning, which was on the 5th of July, to Osan.

That's where we put in two howitzers on the side of the roads, artillery howitzers. Some of us, I believe it was Wilson and myself, with two other guys -- the first sergeant gave us the bags of bazooka shells and the bazooka to go out a couple of hundred yards out in the front to see if and when the tanks were coming and if there was any infantry out there. We spent half a day out there until we got called back. The infantry was coming back at the same time. They told us to get out of there because they couldn't hold three division of North Koreans.

So we came back to a little village which had a school house. We spent the night at the school house. The next day, we moved on to P'yong Tek. That's where the real battle really started, Pyong Tek. We lost ten men the first night; they were FO [forward observer] parties. We moved back, we kept moving back because we couldn't hold them, until we got to the Kung river. We set up there. We were in that position three days, firing our howitzers. I'll tell you, they were hot. Not only the howitzers were hot -- the guys were all hot because the temperature was 120 degrees, and in fox holes and all that. We were there three days.

And then the enemy came across. The infantry could not hold because they had lost so many men already ... All the guys got slaughtered that way. This is why they started after us, being the artillery. We didn't know they were coming at us until it was too late. They hit us on two sides. Like I said, I was a machine gunner that day. I had two other guys with me. It was like an outpost. The guys across, over on the other hill -- it wasn't really a hill, it was just a bank, where the water flowed past the side of them there -- they had a hole dug there to set up their machine gun. That's where they hit those guys over there, when they swept around the whole company. When they hit, it wiped out quite a bit. They hit not only the howitzers; all the ammunition trucks were blowing up at the same time. It killed some of our men, and also it was killing the enemy. Because they really had come in too close. They threw mortars in and they blew up all the trucks. They went through A Battery and B Battery, and Headquarters; part of Headquarters and Service got out better than A and B Batteries. Because they had a better chance of getting out from where they were at.

... Col. Dawson was battalion commander at that time. The day before this happened, he got blood poisoning in his hand or something. They evacuated him, and Col. Dressler took over the battalion. When we got hit, he jumped into a foxhole and there was another corporal that jumped in from his CP right behind him. They both got killed in that battle.



So famous and distinguished a soldier

Syngman Rhee, President of South Korea
July 14, 1950
Pusan, Korea

Dear General MacArthur:

In view of the common military effort of the United Nations on behalf of the Republic of Korea, in which all military forces, land, sea and air, of all the United Nations fighting in or near Korea have been placed under your operational command, and in which you have been designated Supreme Commander United Nations Forces, I am happy to assign to you command authority over all land, sea, and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities. Such command to be exercised either by you personally or by such military commander or commanders to whom you may delegate the exercise of this authority within Korea or in adjacent seas.

The Korean Army will be proud to serve under your command, and the Korean people and Government will be equally proud and encouraged to have the overall direction of our combined combat effort in the hands of so famous and distinguished a soldier who also in his person possesses the delegated military authority of all the United Nations who have jointed together to resist this infamous communist assault on the independence and integrity of our beloved land.

With continued highest and warmest feelings of personal regard,


Sincerely yours,
Syngman Rhee

continued.......

thedrifter
12-17-03, 01:50 PM
Battle of Taejon: We had no leader <br />
<br />
Clarence Mehlhaff, 24th Division, 63rd Field Artillery <br />
July 19-20, 1950 <br />
Taejon <br />
<br />
After we left there we walked to Nan Sang that night. We got in about 1:30...

thedrifter
12-17-03, 01:51 PM
The high water mark of the North Korean invasion <br />
<br />
Logan &quot;Fightin' Preacher&quot; Weston (Colonel (ret.), at the time a Captain) <br />
August 3, 1950 <br />
Western flank of Pusan Perimeter <br />
<br />
3 August 1950 is a...