thedrifter
12-02-03, 07:56 AM
12-01-2003
Study Long-Term Impact of New USMC Policies
By Matthew Dodd
The U.S. Marine Corps, like every other military service, is facing a dynamic and uncertain future in today’s global environment. Depending on your personal outlook, you may see a future full of challenges, or you may see a future of opportunities. Regardless of your perspective, two critical factors to always keep in mind are the morale and the retention of the force.
Leaders at all levels usually recognize these two factors and most leaders include them in their decision-making process. Sometimes, leaders enact policies that cause many to wonder whether those policies’ effects on morale and retention were given as much attention as they deserved.
Recently, the Marine Corps announced two new policies that seem to have the potential to have a tremendous impact on the morale and retention of all Marines, especially our junior enlisted troops and junior officers. The senior leadership “party line” for both policies is that they are positive measures and justified by current situations.
I know Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) is trying to keep track of the feedback and reactions to these policies. Let me briefly present these two policies and then solicit your feedback and reactions to them. I will consolidate what I hear and learn from you and then present my findings in follow-on articles.
The first policy, announced on Oct. 28, 2003, is to extend the length of unaccompanied tours to Okinawa and the Japanese mainland from 12 months to 24 months, starting next spring.
According to an article in Marine Corps Times on Nov. 10, Marine Corps officials said:
“The intent is to increase unit effectiveness by keeping Marines there longer and reflects a steady improvement in the living conditions and entertainment options for leathernecks assigned to the Pacific outposts …. ”
The article later went on to quote a statement from Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Michael W. Hagee:
“The overall quality of life is now relatively comparable to stateside assignments. The reduced turnover will enhance our operational readiness and … war-fighting capability.”
Overall, the article tried real hard to present the new policy in as positive a way as possible. As a career Marine officer, I found myself thinking that the article was the opening salvo in a public relations war to try and convince as many Marines as possible that this policy was good and that it should just be accepted as is.
Here is a quoted sound-bite from a HQMC Public Affairs spokesman:
“We’re trying to change the mentality of a tour on Okinawa as a deployment, vice another duty station …. Okinawa is just another Marine base. It just happens to be over in Japan …. If [Marines are] there for two years they start to be good neighbors … and they’ll be able to understand the culture better and hopefully that will make us be better guests of the island.”
The article’s most objective and factual passages gave some official background to the Japanese overseas assignment policies for all the services:
“Because life on the island was so austere, in 1987 the Marine Corps was granted an exception from a new Pentagon policy setting overseas assignments at a minimum of two years …. Therefore, the Marine Corps assignment policy to Okinawa and Iwakuni, Japan, currently stands apart from the other military services .… The Air Force sends its troops to Okinawa on 24-month unaccompanied tours, as does the Navy. Unaccompanied tours to Iwakuni stand at 12 months for airmen, a service spokeswoman said, and the Navy sends sailors on 12-month unaccompanied tours to a limited number of smaller Japanese outposts …. Information on the Army’s Japan tour lengths was not available by press time.”
On the other side of this issue, the article devoted limited space to the negative aspects of this policy change:
“But others might greet the news with dismay. Marines with families may view the choice of uprooting their loved ones for three years or leaving them stateside for two years as too difficult to accept .… ‘It’s harder for single Marines and those whose families are stateside’ ” [according to a married lieutenant who just completed a 3-year tour with his family].
Judging from the informal reactions from enlisted Marines and officers I have spoken with about this policy, I sense a big disconnect between what the Marine Corps Times reported and emphasized, and what Marines are thinking about this policy. I could be wrong, so I would like to hear from others (Marines and people from other services) who have specific opinions, perspectives and experiences related to this policy.
Some specific areas I am curious about are the implications for troop morale and retention, the true readiness enhancement to our Japan-based forces, and the potential or probable impacts on Marine Corps families.
The second policy came into effect on Nov. 6, 2003: It is the new II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) crackdown on unsafe driving. This policy affects Marines, sailors, other service members, and family members at Camp LeJeune, N.C., Marine Corps Air Stations (MCAS) Cherry Point and New River, N.C., and MCAS Beaufort, S.C.
According to a Marine Corps Times article on Nov. 24, “It’s a radical policy, one that II MEF officials hope will pay off in the long run. If it works here, don’t be surprised to see it catch on like bulldog tattoos at Marine Corps bases worldwide.”
How radical is this new policy? Well, rather than give you my opinion on how radical it is, let me give you some highlights of the policy from the Times article and let you decide for yourself:
“If you are arrested off base driving while impaired or intoxicated, you will lose your base driving privileges for 30 days or the length of your civilian suspension, whichever is greater. Get convicted out in town or refuse to submit to a chemical-analysis test, and you will lose base driving privileges for at least a year.
“If you get convicted off base for reckless driving, aggressive driving, or driving in excess of 15 miles per hour over the speed limit, you will lose base driving privileges for at least 90 days.
“If you are a repeat offender, base traffic court officers have the authority to revoke driving privileges for a longer period for on- or off-base infractions, possibly indefinitely.
“Every officer and staff non-commissioned officer (SNCO) in II MEF is expected to report on- or off-base violations whenever possible (i.e. writing down license-plate info, vehicle descriptions, driver descriptions, alleged offenses, and time and location). That info is to be turned in to the base provost marshal’s office for further action.
“The base provost marshal’s office will forward civilian traffic infractions to commanding officers. Commanders are expected to take whatever action they feel is appropriate, from doing nothing, deciding to impose non-judicial punishment and stiff fines, or eventually leading the offenders to base traffic court.
“Local law enforcement officers have pledged to help support the new II MEF policy.”
This balanced Times article included some comments opposed to the policy:
“It’s bad enough we have other things to worry about without staff NCOs hounding us out in town. It’s just added pressure” … “Giving staff NCOs and officers the power to start the ball rolling on traffic violations opens the door for abuse and problems. I think that’s a little bit much. I think it’s just going to cause a lot of conflicts” .… Others agree, saying the new plan is founded in solid motives but amounts to intimidation and infringement on personal rights.”
And some comments in favor of or justifying the policy:
continued...
Study Long-Term Impact of New USMC Policies
By Matthew Dodd
The U.S. Marine Corps, like every other military service, is facing a dynamic and uncertain future in today’s global environment. Depending on your personal outlook, you may see a future full of challenges, or you may see a future of opportunities. Regardless of your perspective, two critical factors to always keep in mind are the morale and the retention of the force.
Leaders at all levels usually recognize these two factors and most leaders include them in their decision-making process. Sometimes, leaders enact policies that cause many to wonder whether those policies’ effects on morale and retention were given as much attention as they deserved.
Recently, the Marine Corps announced two new policies that seem to have the potential to have a tremendous impact on the morale and retention of all Marines, especially our junior enlisted troops and junior officers. The senior leadership “party line” for both policies is that they are positive measures and justified by current situations.
I know Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) is trying to keep track of the feedback and reactions to these policies. Let me briefly present these two policies and then solicit your feedback and reactions to them. I will consolidate what I hear and learn from you and then present my findings in follow-on articles.
The first policy, announced on Oct. 28, 2003, is to extend the length of unaccompanied tours to Okinawa and the Japanese mainland from 12 months to 24 months, starting next spring.
According to an article in Marine Corps Times on Nov. 10, Marine Corps officials said:
“The intent is to increase unit effectiveness by keeping Marines there longer and reflects a steady improvement in the living conditions and entertainment options for leathernecks assigned to the Pacific outposts …. ”
The article later went on to quote a statement from Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Michael W. Hagee:
“The overall quality of life is now relatively comparable to stateside assignments. The reduced turnover will enhance our operational readiness and … war-fighting capability.”
Overall, the article tried real hard to present the new policy in as positive a way as possible. As a career Marine officer, I found myself thinking that the article was the opening salvo in a public relations war to try and convince as many Marines as possible that this policy was good and that it should just be accepted as is.
Here is a quoted sound-bite from a HQMC Public Affairs spokesman:
“We’re trying to change the mentality of a tour on Okinawa as a deployment, vice another duty station …. Okinawa is just another Marine base. It just happens to be over in Japan …. If [Marines are] there for two years they start to be good neighbors … and they’ll be able to understand the culture better and hopefully that will make us be better guests of the island.”
The article’s most objective and factual passages gave some official background to the Japanese overseas assignment policies for all the services:
“Because life on the island was so austere, in 1987 the Marine Corps was granted an exception from a new Pentagon policy setting overseas assignments at a minimum of two years …. Therefore, the Marine Corps assignment policy to Okinawa and Iwakuni, Japan, currently stands apart from the other military services .… The Air Force sends its troops to Okinawa on 24-month unaccompanied tours, as does the Navy. Unaccompanied tours to Iwakuni stand at 12 months for airmen, a service spokeswoman said, and the Navy sends sailors on 12-month unaccompanied tours to a limited number of smaller Japanese outposts …. Information on the Army’s Japan tour lengths was not available by press time.”
On the other side of this issue, the article devoted limited space to the negative aspects of this policy change:
“But others might greet the news with dismay. Marines with families may view the choice of uprooting their loved ones for three years or leaving them stateside for two years as too difficult to accept .… ‘It’s harder for single Marines and those whose families are stateside’ ” [according to a married lieutenant who just completed a 3-year tour with his family].
Judging from the informal reactions from enlisted Marines and officers I have spoken with about this policy, I sense a big disconnect between what the Marine Corps Times reported and emphasized, and what Marines are thinking about this policy. I could be wrong, so I would like to hear from others (Marines and people from other services) who have specific opinions, perspectives and experiences related to this policy.
Some specific areas I am curious about are the implications for troop morale and retention, the true readiness enhancement to our Japan-based forces, and the potential or probable impacts on Marine Corps families.
The second policy came into effect on Nov. 6, 2003: It is the new II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) crackdown on unsafe driving. This policy affects Marines, sailors, other service members, and family members at Camp LeJeune, N.C., Marine Corps Air Stations (MCAS) Cherry Point and New River, N.C., and MCAS Beaufort, S.C.
According to a Marine Corps Times article on Nov. 24, “It’s a radical policy, one that II MEF officials hope will pay off in the long run. If it works here, don’t be surprised to see it catch on like bulldog tattoos at Marine Corps bases worldwide.”
How radical is this new policy? Well, rather than give you my opinion on how radical it is, let me give you some highlights of the policy from the Times article and let you decide for yourself:
“If you are arrested off base driving while impaired or intoxicated, you will lose your base driving privileges for 30 days or the length of your civilian suspension, whichever is greater. Get convicted out in town or refuse to submit to a chemical-analysis test, and you will lose base driving privileges for at least a year.
“If you get convicted off base for reckless driving, aggressive driving, or driving in excess of 15 miles per hour over the speed limit, you will lose base driving privileges for at least 90 days.
“If you are a repeat offender, base traffic court officers have the authority to revoke driving privileges for a longer period for on- or off-base infractions, possibly indefinitely.
“Every officer and staff non-commissioned officer (SNCO) in II MEF is expected to report on- or off-base violations whenever possible (i.e. writing down license-plate info, vehicle descriptions, driver descriptions, alleged offenses, and time and location). That info is to be turned in to the base provost marshal’s office for further action.
“The base provost marshal’s office will forward civilian traffic infractions to commanding officers. Commanders are expected to take whatever action they feel is appropriate, from doing nothing, deciding to impose non-judicial punishment and stiff fines, or eventually leading the offenders to base traffic court.
“Local law enforcement officers have pledged to help support the new II MEF policy.”
This balanced Times article included some comments opposed to the policy:
“It’s bad enough we have other things to worry about without staff NCOs hounding us out in town. It’s just added pressure” … “Giving staff NCOs and officers the power to start the ball rolling on traffic violations opens the door for abuse and problems. I think that’s a little bit much. I think it’s just going to cause a lot of conflicts” .… Others agree, saying the new plan is founded in solid motives but amounts to intimidation and infringement on personal rights.”
And some comments in favor of or justifying the policy:
continued...