thedrifter
11-09-03, 08:53 AM
The Boxer Rebellion: Coalition Expeditionary Operations in China
by Maj Glen G. Butler
‘Just as every Marine is a rifleman regardless of duties and military specialty, all Marines must also think of themselves as part of a fundamentally expeditionary organization designed and intended to project military force overseas. . . . The expeditionary mindset implies a Spartan attitude: an expectation and a willingness to endure—in fact, a certain pride in enduring—hardship and austere conditions. . . . [and the] versatility and adaptability to respond effectively without a great deal of preparation time to a broad variety of circumstances. Another part of this expeditionary mindset is a global perspective oriented to responding to a diverse range of threats around the globe rather than to a specific threat in a specific part of the world.’
—Marine Corps
Doctrinal Publication 3,
Expeditionary Operations
Introduction
Shortly after the turn of the century, an allied coalition of eight nations entered a foreign land to protect the interests and safety of their peoples living in the area. Anti-Western terrorists had killed hundreds of innocent civilians and threatened to kill all “foreign devils” unless they left the region. American determination and leadership convinced the other nations to strike into the capital of the beleaguered country. British forces formed the strongest part of the alliance with the United States. After initial successes against the terrorists, the burgeoning coalition found itself fighting the army of the host state (turned sympathetic to the terrorists) in what could undeniably be termed a world war.
Although this may sound like a description of contemporary military activities, the above paragraph actually describes the China Relief Expedition (CRE), a short but violent international conflict that occurred over 100 years ago.
The CRE took place in the Far East over a 55-day period in the sweltering summer of 1900. Popularly known as the “Boxer Rebellion,” the campaign is perhaps better labeled the “Boxer Uprising,” as rebellion implies a revolt against the government. In fact, the Boxers’ enmity was directed not against the Chinese leaders but against the unwelcome foreign influence in their land. Most U.S. Marines are at least vaguely aware of the campaign, thanks in part to the eventual “who’s who” list of American participants: two-time Medal of Honor winners Smedley D. Butler and Dan Daly; Commandants William P. Biddle (1910–14), Wendell C. Neville (1929–30), and Benjamin H. Fuller (1930–34); and even a young civilian engineer named Herbert Hoover, who would rise to become our Nation’s 31st President (1929–33). The rosters of other participating nations are similarly impressive.
Despite the event’s many famous veterans (and the 1963 Charlton Heston/Ava Gardner movie 55 Days in Peking), many Americans today might identify the Boxer Rebellion as a feud between Don King and Mike Tyson rather than recognize its long-term military and political significance. As the first participation of the United States in a multinational coalition against a common enemy abroad, the Boxer Rebellion provides many relevant lessons for modern military theorists and diplomats alike.
Background
The seeds for the uprising were sown gradually in the latter part of the 19th century as foreign powers expanded their presence and power in the Far East. The British wanted to continue to import their Indian opium into China. Other Western powers had similar financial interests in the area. By the late 1800s Europeans had seized Chinese ports, Christian missions were established and, in 1895, a war was lost to Japan. Not wanting to be left out, the United States sought to retain a foothold amidst the great powers’ “spheres of influence” in this region. This effort was manifest in Secretary of State John Hay’s “Open Door” policy proposal in September 1899. Hay, a former Ambassador to Great Britain, expressed America’s wish to prevent other powers from restricting trade by calling for open commercial access to all treaty ports and spheres of influence (and essentially endorsing the continued integrity of the Chinese state). Although the other Western powers did not officially accept the Open Door plan, unofficially they nodded in agreement—at least in Hay’s eyes. The nations recognized that sharing and dividing their conquests would bring multilateral competition and tension, but knew this cooperation would also prevent unilateral exclusion.
The average Chinese peasant was quite annoyed at the growing foreign presence in the late 1800s. Certain “secret societies” fomented popular discontent by attributing a rash of floods and droughts on Chinese gods who were said to be unhappy with the “evil” Christian missionaries and their fellow converts. One such group was I Ho Ch’uan (also Yihequon), translated variously, they were known as The Society of Harmonious Fists, The Society for Unity and Righteousness, Righteous Harmonious Fists, or The Fists of Patriotic Union. To westerners they became simply “the Boxers.” The faction had been around for many years—at least since the 1700s—but foreigners knew very little about them. The Boxers practiced martial arts and claimed that their magical, spiritual powers made them invulnerable to their enemies’ swords and bullets. Wearing uniforms with red scarves, sashes, and headdresses, they often carried banners into battle marked with vitriolic slogans and threats. Although they possessed some basic firearms, they were primarily armed with swords and spears—and a swelling hatred for the missionaries, their converts, and for the others “invading” their country.
Concern for the safety of Americans in China led to the stationing of U.S. Marines at the Peking (now Beijing) legation on 4 November 1898 (and soon thereafter in the northern Chinese trading center of Tientsin (now Tianjin));1 however, these guards were withdrawn in the spring of 1899 after tensions appeared to ease. The Boxers vigorously rejoined their uprising in late 1899, terrorizing rural Christian missions and their native Chinese converts in the northern provinces. The rioters burned churches and homes, raped women, and murdered families—usually by beheading and often by dismembering. Many of those who escaped fled to the foreign legations in the capital city of Peking. The Chinese Empress Dowager, Tzu Hsi (nicknamed “Old Buddha”), superficially supported the calls of concerns from foreign officials in Peking and Tientsin, taking little to no action against the Boxers. These frustrated officials wired their governments for help in May 1900 fearing the increasing popularity and aggressiveness of the brutal Boxers operating nearby. The Boxers continued to attract potential followers by promising that millions of “spirit soldiers” would soon descend from the heavens to help rid the homeland of all foreigners. A full-blown crisis appeared imminent.
A Call to Arms
After the Spanish-American War ended in December 1898, the Americans maintained a large military contingent in the Philippines—just 400 miles from China—and were thus prepared to answer the distress call from China within days. Putting President William McKinley’s “Manifest Destiny” platform into action, a small force of Marines and sailors landed in the port of Taku (now Dagu) on 29 May. At 10:30 that night the landing party ended their 40-mile journey at Tientsin, substantially augmenting 25 British Royal Marines who had been stationed there for several months.2 Grateful foreign residents offered the new arrivals a lively welcome, complete with brass band, free beer, and “lusty cheers for Uncle Sam.”3
The commanding officer of the USS Newark, CAPT Bowman H. McCalla, USN, led the U.S. naval force and accompanied a smaller detachment as it made its way northwest to Peking 2 days later. Thousands of silent Chinese lining the road as this detachment marched into the capital provided an awesome spectacle for the Marines (who reciprocated by offering a similarly impressive scene for the curious onlookers), but the natives’ subdued welcome betrayed the raucous terror that was to come. Under McCalla, Marine Capt John “Jack” Twiggs Myers commanded approximately 50 Marines and 2 sailors for the Peking guard, a unit that was followed into that city by similar contingents from Britain, Russia, Japan, France, and Italy (German and Austrian guards arrived 3 days later); altogether, an international group of 21 officers and 429 Marines, soldiers, and sailors stood poised to defend their frightened countrymen in the Chinese capital. Fortunately, this rescue party of reinforcements arrived before the Boxers surrounded the town.
The Crisis Escalates
Within days, the so-called Righteous Fists had dismantled railroad tracks and were severing telegraph lines—essentially cutting Peking off from the rest of the world. CAPT McCalla had returned to the larger force assembled at Tientsin and was growing frustrated at the apparent indecision and hesitancy of the assembled coalition as the situation to the north deteriorated. At an evening conference of allied commanders on 9 June, he allegedly exclaimed:
I don’t care what the rest of you do. I have one hundred and thirty men here from my ships and I’m going tomorrow morning to the rescue of my flesh and blood in Peking. I’ll be damned if I’ll sit down here, ninety miles away, and just wait.4
The British were eager to press forward as well, and the following morning a rescue party of about 2,000 men from the 8-nation coalition set off to free their comrades in besieged Peking, leaving a few hundred behind to defend Tientsin. ADM Sir Edward Seymour, commander in chief of the British China Station, led the force, seconded by CAPT McCalla.
continued....
by Maj Glen G. Butler
‘Just as every Marine is a rifleman regardless of duties and military specialty, all Marines must also think of themselves as part of a fundamentally expeditionary organization designed and intended to project military force overseas. . . . The expeditionary mindset implies a Spartan attitude: an expectation and a willingness to endure—in fact, a certain pride in enduring—hardship and austere conditions. . . . [and the] versatility and adaptability to respond effectively without a great deal of preparation time to a broad variety of circumstances. Another part of this expeditionary mindset is a global perspective oriented to responding to a diverse range of threats around the globe rather than to a specific threat in a specific part of the world.’
—Marine Corps
Doctrinal Publication 3,
Expeditionary Operations
Introduction
Shortly after the turn of the century, an allied coalition of eight nations entered a foreign land to protect the interests and safety of their peoples living in the area. Anti-Western terrorists had killed hundreds of innocent civilians and threatened to kill all “foreign devils” unless they left the region. American determination and leadership convinced the other nations to strike into the capital of the beleaguered country. British forces formed the strongest part of the alliance with the United States. After initial successes against the terrorists, the burgeoning coalition found itself fighting the army of the host state (turned sympathetic to the terrorists) in what could undeniably be termed a world war.
Although this may sound like a description of contemporary military activities, the above paragraph actually describes the China Relief Expedition (CRE), a short but violent international conflict that occurred over 100 years ago.
The CRE took place in the Far East over a 55-day period in the sweltering summer of 1900. Popularly known as the “Boxer Rebellion,” the campaign is perhaps better labeled the “Boxer Uprising,” as rebellion implies a revolt against the government. In fact, the Boxers’ enmity was directed not against the Chinese leaders but against the unwelcome foreign influence in their land. Most U.S. Marines are at least vaguely aware of the campaign, thanks in part to the eventual “who’s who” list of American participants: two-time Medal of Honor winners Smedley D. Butler and Dan Daly; Commandants William P. Biddle (1910–14), Wendell C. Neville (1929–30), and Benjamin H. Fuller (1930–34); and even a young civilian engineer named Herbert Hoover, who would rise to become our Nation’s 31st President (1929–33). The rosters of other participating nations are similarly impressive.
Despite the event’s many famous veterans (and the 1963 Charlton Heston/Ava Gardner movie 55 Days in Peking), many Americans today might identify the Boxer Rebellion as a feud between Don King and Mike Tyson rather than recognize its long-term military and political significance. As the first participation of the United States in a multinational coalition against a common enemy abroad, the Boxer Rebellion provides many relevant lessons for modern military theorists and diplomats alike.
Background
The seeds for the uprising were sown gradually in the latter part of the 19th century as foreign powers expanded their presence and power in the Far East. The British wanted to continue to import their Indian opium into China. Other Western powers had similar financial interests in the area. By the late 1800s Europeans had seized Chinese ports, Christian missions were established and, in 1895, a war was lost to Japan. Not wanting to be left out, the United States sought to retain a foothold amidst the great powers’ “spheres of influence” in this region. This effort was manifest in Secretary of State John Hay’s “Open Door” policy proposal in September 1899. Hay, a former Ambassador to Great Britain, expressed America’s wish to prevent other powers from restricting trade by calling for open commercial access to all treaty ports and spheres of influence (and essentially endorsing the continued integrity of the Chinese state). Although the other Western powers did not officially accept the Open Door plan, unofficially they nodded in agreement—at least in Hay’s eyes. The nations recognized that sharing and dividing their conquests would bring multilateral competition and tension, but knew this cooperation would also prevent unilateral exclusion.
The average Chinese peasant was quite annoyed at the growing foreign presence in the late 1800s. Certain “secret societies” fomented popular discontent by attributing a rash of floods and droughts on Chinese gods who were said to be unhappy with the “evil” Christian missionaries and their fellow converts. One such group was I Ho Ch’uan (also Yihequon), translated variously, they were known as The Society of Harmonious Fists, The Society for Unity and Righteousness, Righteous Harmonious Fists, or The Fists of Patriotic Union. To westerners they became simply “the Boxers.” The faction had been around for many years—at least since the 1700s—but foreigners knew very little about them. The Boxers practiced martial arts and claimed that their magical, spiritual powers made them invulnerable to their enemies’ swords and bullets. Wearing uniforms with red scarves, sashes, and headdresses, they often carried banners into battle marked with vitriolic slogans and threats. Although they possessed some basic firearms, they were primarily armed with swords and spears—and a swelling hatred for the missionaries, their converts, and for the others “invading” their country.
Concern for the safety of Americans in China led to the stationing of U.S. Marines at the Peking (now Beijing) legation on 4 November 1898 (and soon thereafter in the northern Chinese trading center of Tientsin (now Tianjin));1 however, these guards were withdrawn in the spring of 1899 after tensions appeared to ease. The Boxers vigorously rejoined their uprising in late 1899, terrorizing rural Christian missions and their native Chinese converts in the northern provinces. The rioters burned churches and homes, raped women, and murdered families—usually by beheading and often by dismembering. Many of those who escaped fled to the foreign legations in the capital city of Peking. The Chinese Empress Dowager, Tzu Hsi (nicknamed “Old Buddha”), superficially supported the calls of concerns from foreign officials in Peking and Tientsin, taking little to no action against the Boxers. These frustrated officials wired their governments for help in May 1900 fearing the increasing popularity and aggressiveness of the brutal Boxers operating nearby. The Boxers continued to attract potential followers by promising that millions of “spirit soldiers” would soon descend from the heavens to help rid the homeland of all foreigners. A full-blown crisis appeared imminent.
A Call to Arms
After the Spanish-American War ended in December 1898, the Americans maintained a large military contingent in the Philippines—just 400 miles from China—and were thus prepared to answer the distress call from China within days. Putting President William McKinley’s “Manifest Destiny” platform into action, a small force of Marines and sailors landed in the port of Taku (now Dagu) on 29 May. At 10:30 that night the landing party ended their 40-mile journey at Tientsin, substantially augmenting 25 British Royal Marines who had been stationed there for several months.2 Grateful foreign residents offered the new arrivals a lively welcome, complete with brass band, free beer, and “lusty cheers for Uncle Sam.”3
The commanding officer of the USS Newark, CAPT Bowman H. McCalla, USN, led the U.S. naval force and accompanied a smaller detachment as it made its way northwest to Peking 2 days later. Thousands of silent Chinese lining the road as this detachment marched into the capital provided an awesome spectacle for the Marines (who reciprocated by offering a similarly impressive scene for the curious onlookers), but the natives’ subdued welcome betrayed the raucous terror that was to come. Under McCalla, Marine Capt John “Jack” Twiggs Myers commanded approximately 50 Marines and 2 sailors for the Peking guard, a unit that was followed into that city by similar contingents from Britain, Russia, Japan, France, and Italy (German and Austrian guards arrived 3 days later); altogether, an international group of 21 officers and 429 Marines, soldiers, and sailors stood poised to defend their frightened countrymen in the Chinese capital. Fortunately, this rescue party of reinforcements arrived before the Boxers surrounded the town.
The Crisis Escalates
Within days, the so-called Righteous Fists had dismantled railroad tracks and were severing telegraph lines—essentially cutting Peking off from the rest of the world. CAPT McCalla had returned to the larger force assembled at Tientsin and was growing frustrated at the apparent indecision and hesitancy of the assembled coalition as the situation to the north deteriorated. At an evening conference of allied commanders on 9 June, he allegedly exclaimed:
I don’t care what the rest of you do. I have one hundred and thirty men here from my ships and I’m going tomorrow morning to the rescue of my flesh and blood in Peking. I’ll be damned if I’ll sit down here, ninety miles away, and just wait.4
The British were eager to press forward as well, and the following morning a rescue party of about 2,000 men from the 8-nation coalition set off to free their comrades in besieged Peking, leaving a few hundred behind to defend Tientsin. ADM Sir Edward Seymour, commander in chief of the British China Station, led the force, seconded by CAPT McCalla.
continued....