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thedrifter
10-15-03, 11:22 AM
SMALL UNIT ACTION
IN VIETNAM
SUMMER 1966


By

Captain Francis J. West, Jr., USMCR


<MARINE CORPS EMBLEM>


HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Printed 1967
Reprinted 1977



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Original On-Line
Page Page

Foreword.......................................... ........... 1 5

Mines and Men............................................... . 3 7
Units involved: 9th Marines; 3d Amphibian
Tractor Battalion; MAG-36.

Howard's Hill.............................................. .. 15 21
Units involved:1st Reconnaissance Battalion;
5th Marines; MAG-11; MAG-12; MAG-36

No Cigar............................................. ........ 31 38
Units involved:5th Marines.

Night Action............................................ ..... 46 54
Units involved:7th Marines.

The Indians........................................... ....... 59 69
Units involved:1st Force Reconnaissance Company;
12th Marines; MAG-11.

Talking Fish.............................................. ... 68 79
Units involved:12th Marines.

An Honest Effort............................................ . 77 88
Units involved:5th Marines.

A Hot Walk in the Sun........................................ 82 94
Units involved:5th Marines; 1st Engineer Battalion;
Provisional Scout Dog Platoon; MAG-36.

"General, We Killed Them".................................... 90 103
Units involved:5th Marines; 9th Engineer Battalion;
Provisional Scout Dog Platoon; MAG-12; MAG-36.

Glossary of Marine Small Arms................................ 122 140







FOREWORD

The origin of this pamphlet lies in the continuing program at all levels
of command to keep Marines informed of the ways of combat and civic action in
Vietnam. Not limited in any way to set methods and means, this informational
effort spreads across a wide variety of projects, all aimed at making the
lessons learned in Vietnam available to the Marine who is fighting there and
the Marine who is soon due to take his turn in combat.

Recognizing a need to inform the men who are the key to the success of
Marine Corps operations--the enlisted Marines and junior officers of combat
and combat support units--the former Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Major
General William R. Collins, originated a project to provide a timely series of
short, factual narratives of small unit action, stories which would have
lessons learned as an integral part. Essential to General Collins' concept
was the fact that the stories would have to be both highly readable and
historically accurate. The basic requirement called for an author trained in
the methodology of research, with recent active duty experience at the small
unit level in the FMF, and a proven ability to write in a style that would
ensure wide readership.

On the recommendation of retired Brigadier General Frederick P.
Henderson, Captain Francis J. West, Jr., a Marine reserve officer, was invited
to apply for assignment to active duty during the summer of 1966 to research
and write the small unit action stories. Captain West was well qualified to
undertake the project: he had recently been on active duty as a platoon leader
in the Special Landing Force in the Western Pacific; he had majored in history
as an undergraduate at Georgetown University and was a graduate student at the
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton
University; and he had written a number of articles, papers, and a book which
indicated that he had the capability of communicating with a wide and varied
audience.

Recalled to active duty at his own request late in May 1966, Captain West
was given a series of informal briefings at Headquarters Marine Corps on the
current situation in Vietnam and was soon on his way to that country. He
arrived at Da Nang on 5 June and went into the field immediately as an
observer/member of a wide variety of Marine small units and saw action in all
parts of the III Marine Amphibious Force area of responsibility. Developing
his own methods of operation, and carrying in addition to normal weapons and
equipment, a tape recorder, a camera, and a note pad, the captain took part in
most of the actions he describes and interviewed

1



participants in the others immediately after the events portrayed. During his
stay in Vietnam, Captain West was actively supported in his work by the
Marines with whom he served, and by none more helpfully than the III MAF
commander, Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt, and his G-3, Colonel John R.
Chaisson, who read and approved each of the rough draft narratives that
Captain West completed in Vietnam. Colonel Thomas M. Fields, of the Combat
Information Bureau at Da Nang, also provided much assistance and support.

This pamphlet, then, is based upon first-hand, eyewitness accounting of
the events described. It is documented by notes and taped interviews taken in
the field and includes lessons learned from the mouths of the Marines who are
currently fighting in Vietnam. It is published for the information of those
men who are serving and who will serve in Vietnam, as well as for the use of
other interested Americans, so that they may better understand the demands of
the Vietnam conflict on the individual Marine.

2





MINES AND MEN


Preface: The author spent two weeks with the 9th Marines,
most of the time with Delta Company. He participated in the
patrol described as an extra infantryman, swapping his tape
recorder for an automatic rifle when the platoon was hit.
Throughout most of the fight, he did not see the patrol leader,
but later was able to piece together the entire action by
interviews and by listening to his recorder, which was running
throughout the engagement.


In late spring and early summer of 1966, the most notorious area in I
Corps was the flat rice paddy-and-hedgerow complex around Hill 55, seven miles
southwest of Da Nang. In the Indochina War, two battalions of the French
forces were wiped out on Hill 55; in the Vietnam War, a Marine lieutenant
colonel was killed on the same hill. The 9th Marines had the responsibility
for clearing the area and no one envied the regimental commander, Colonel
Edwin Simmons, and his men their job. The enemy they hated, the enemy they
feared the most, the enemy they found hardest to combat, was not the VC; it
was mines.

One company of the regiment--Delta--lost 10 KIA and 58 WIA in five weeks.
Two men were hit by small arms fire, one by a grenade. Mines inflicted all
the other casualties. Only four of the wounded returned to duty. From a peak
strength of 175, Delta Company dropped to 120 effectives. Among those
evacuated or killed were a high percentage of the company's leaders: five
platoon commanders; three platoon sergeants; nine squad leaders; and six fire
team leaders.

On 8 May, the 1st Platoon of Delta Company was 52 men strong, commanded
by a first lieutenant and honchoed<*> by a staff sergeant. For a month they
patrolled. At division level, the operations section could see a pattern
which indicated the patrols were slowly and surely rooting the VC
infrastructure out of the area. But for the individual rifleman, it was ugly,
unrewarding work. The VC in previous encounters had learned the futility of
determined engagements against the Marines. So they sniped and ran and left
behind the mines.


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<*> honcho - Marine slang, derived from Japanese, for a boss.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmchist/vietnam.txt


Sempers,

Roger
:marine: